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INTRODUCTION
GENETIC PRIVACY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the concept of 'genetic privacy'; that is, the privacy interests 
which surround genetic information. The work is set in the context of the wider 
debate about the function and value of privacy in se. The application of privacy to 
the field of genetics reveals a plethora of interests which are currently under­
protected by the law. An argument is made herein for the legal recognition and 
protection of such privacy interests. The thesis proceeds in the following manner.
# Chapter one establishes the parameters for the work and gives a brief account of 
the rise in concern about privacy protection in western states. It is argued that 
with the establishment of the so-called western liberal tradition one can see the 
beginnings of a role for privacy in society. As that tradition has grown and 
developed so too has the need and function of privacy. In this chapter a further 
parallel is drawn between the role of privacy generally and the role which it 
plays in the health care context. At this stage a tentative definition of privacy is 
offered which consists of two elements: (i) informational privacy, which 
concerns issues of access and control surrounding personal health information, 
and (ii) spatial privacy which concerns issues of access to the 'person' or 'self 
and control of one's own personal sphere of life. To illustrate these two senses 
of privacy examples are drawn from the discipline of medical law, and in 
particular from the problem of the patient in persistent vegetative state (PVS).
* Chapter two involves a discussion of the current knowledge concerning genetic 
information and the current uses to which genetic information can be put. An 
account is also given of the nature of genetic disease. The focus of this chapter is
the identification of the range of interests which individuals, families, 
employers, insurers and the state might have in genetic information. Also, as a 
means of providing a useful mechanism for discussing the problematic issues 
which surround this topic, this chapter outlines four case scenarios which will 
be used in subsequent chapters to examine the efficacy of various legal means 
which could be used to protect privacy interests in genetic information.
Chapter three concerns the principle of respect for autonomy and considers this 
principle from both the ethical and legal perspective. The current legal position 
on the protection of patient autonomy in the United Kingdom is examined and 
the principle as so understood is applied to the genetic information case 
scenarios to test the efficacy of this area of law in addressing the issues raised.
Chapter four adopts the same approach as chapter three, this time using the 
concept of confidentiality, as it is understood in professional, ethical and legal 
terms. Again, this chapter concludes with an application of the concept under 
scrutiny to the case scenarios.
Chapter five draws together the prior arguments and seeks to mount a defence 
of the view of privacy advanced in this work. The chapter begins with an 
account of the public/private distinction - which is crucial to an understanding 
of the privacy debate - and goes on to review the current literature on the 
nature, value and scope of privacy as a social construct in western culture. 
Examples are drawn from the United States where legal protection of privacy 
has been accorded both at the level of the common law and the Constitution. In 
keeping with the overall structure of the thesis, the chapter culminates in an
assessment of the success with which privacy as defined can address the 
problems raised by the case scenarios.
Finally, in chapter six the thesis is brought to a conclusion. It is argued that the 
law could be used to protect the range of interests which have been discussed by 
recognising and developing a right to (genetic) privacy. An account is given of 
the various means by which such a right could be introduced and comment is 
made on the possible efficacy of such an approach. The chapter also considers a 
less interventionist role for the law in establishing an appropriate 'care ethic' for 
professionals who deal in personal genetic information.
GTL 
June 1997
CHAPTER ONE
HEALTH CARE, PATIENT 
RIGHTS AND PRIVACY
1.1 - IN T R O D U C T IO N
Privacy is a problem. Or rather, privacy causes problems. It causes problems for 
sociologists^ psychologists^, anthropologists^, philosophers'^, politicians^, doctors'", 
lawyers^, governments^, states^, communities^®, g r o u p s a n d  i nd i v i du a l s Th e  problems
 ^ Benn, S.L and Gaus, G.F. (eds.); "Public and Private in Social Life" , London, C rook H elm  and St. Martin's 
Press, 1983.
 ^ See, Goffm an, E.; 'The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life’. London, Pelican Books, 1971, Ingham, R.; 
'Privacy and Psychology', in Y oung, J .D . (ed.); 'Privacy'. Chichester, W iley & Sons, 1979, chapter 2, Jouard, 
S.M.; 'Som e Psychological Aspects o f Privacy’. 31, Law and Contemporary Problems, 307, 1966, Kelvin, P.A.; 
'Social Psychological Exam ination o f Privacy'. 12, British Journal o f  Social and Clinical Psychology, 248, 1973, 
Margulis, S.T. (ed.); 'Privacy as a Behavioural Phenom enon', 'il), Journal o f  Social Issues, N o .3, 1977.
 ^ See, M oore, B. Jr.; 'Privacy', N e w  York, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1984, M urphy, R.F.; 'Social Distance and the 
V eil'. Am erican Anthropologist, 1257, 1964, and W estin, A.; 'The Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy', 
in Schoeman, F. D.; 'Philospohical D im ensions of Privacy'. Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1984, at 
pp. 56 - 74, Arendt, H.; 'T he Fluman C ondition’. Chicago, U niversity of Chicago Press, 1958.
Kupfer, J.; 'Privacy. A u tonom y and Self C oncept'. 24, Am erican Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 1987, N egley , 
G.; 'Philosophical V iew s on  the Value o f Privacy'. 31, 2, L aw  and Contemporary Problems, 319, 1966, Reiman, 
J.H.; 'Privacy. Intimacy and Personhood’, 6, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26, 1976, and generally, Schoeman, 
F. (ed.); 'Philosophical D im ensions o f Privacy : An A nthology', Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 
1984.
 ^ See, A m es, J.; 'Privacy Law Forced Back on the Agenda', 89(6), L aw  Society's Gazette, 8, 1992.
 ^Berg, K.; 'C onfidentiality Issues in Medical Genetics: The N eed  for Laws, Rules and G ood  Practices to  
Secure Optim al Disease C ontrol', Second Symposium  o f the C ouncil o f Europe on  Bioethics, Strasbourg, 30 
N ovem ber - 2 Decem ber 1993, CDBI-SY-SP (93) 3, Boyd, K.M.; 'H IV  Infection and AIDS: The Ethics o f  
Medical C onfidentiality'. 1%, Journal o f  Medical Ethics, 173, 1992, W ertz, D .C . and Fletcher, J.C.; 'Privacy and 
D isclosure in Medical Genetics Examined in an Ethics of Care', 5(3), Bioethics, 212, 1991, D w orkin, G.; 
'Access to  Medical Records: D iscovery. C onfidentiality and Privacy',42. M odem  Law  R eview , 88, 1979, and 
Cantrell, T.; 'Privacy: The Medical Problem s', in Young, op. cit., chapter 9.
 ^For example, D w orkin, G.; 'Privacy and the Law ', in Y oung, J.B. (ed.); 'Privacy'. Chichester, W iley &
Sons, 1979, chapter 5, Gavison, R.; 'Privacy and the Limits o f  the Law'. 89(3), Yale Law  Review, 421, 1980, 
Markesinis, B.S.; 'O ur Patchy Law of Privacy - Tim e to  do Som ething about it'. 5 i {6}, Modern Law R eview , 
802, 1990, Parent, W .A.; 'A  N e w  D efin ition  for Privacy for the Law '. 2, Law  and Philosophy, 305, 1983, 
Prosser, W.L.; 'Privacy : A  Legal A nalysis'. 48, California Law  Review , 338, 1960, Wacks, R.; 'Personal 
Inform ation. Privacy and the Law ', Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, Warren S.D, and Brandeis, L.D.; 'The 
Right to  Privacy'. 4, H arvard L aw  R eview , 193, 1890-91.
 ^ See, H ixson, R.F.; 'Privacy in a Public Society'. N e w  York, O xford U niversity Press, 1987, Gould, J.P.; 
'Privacy and the Econom ics o f Inform ation', Journal o f  Legal Studies, 827, 1980, M ellors, C.; 'G overnments 
and the Individual : Their Secrecy and his Privacy', in Young, J.B. (ed.); 'Privacy'. Chichester, W iley & Sons, 
1979, at p .87, Handler, J.F. and R osenheim , M.K.; 'Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile 
Justice'. 31(2), Law and Contemporary Problems, 377, 1966 and Creech, W .A.; 'The Privacy of Governm ent 
E m ployees'. 31(2), L aw  an d Contemporary Problems, 413, 1966.
 ^See, for example. Article 8 o f the European C onvention for the Protection of H um an Rights and Article 12 
o f  the Universal Declaration o f H um an Rights, both o f w hich provide for the protection of personal privacy. 
For com m ent on the former see, Loucaides, L.G.; 'Personality and Privacy U nder the European C onvention  
on H um an Rights', 61, British Yearbook o f International Law, 175, 1990.
A s W estin has com m ented, '[njeeds for individual and group privacy and resulting social norms are present 
in virtually every society. Encom passing a vast range o f activities, these needs affect basic ares of life for the  
individual, the intimate fam ily group, and the com m unity as a w hole.', see W estin, A.; 'Privacy and 
Freedom '. London, The Bodley Head, 1967, at 13.
which it causes relate to its definitions^, its functions^, its n a t u r e i t s  utilityS^, its value 
and its protections^.
In this work some of these problems will be addressed. The subject matter will be 
approached from the perspective of the law, and therefore the focus of the work will be on 
the protection of privacy by legal means. However, because the scope of privacy is so wide- 
ranging no attempt can be made to analyse the concept in all of its many facets and guises. 
Considerable narrowing of focus is required. The focus which has been chosen for this 
thesis is the role of privacy in a health care setting: it will examine patient privacy and the
Schoem an, F.D .; 'A dolescent C onfidentiality and Family Privacy', in Graham, G. and LaFollette, H .,
(eds.); 'Person to Person', Philadelphia, Tem ple U niversity Press, 1989, at 213 - 234, Walden, I.N . and Savage, 
R .N .; 'Data Protection and Privacy Laws: Should Organisations Be Protected?' , 37, International and  
Com parative L aw  Quarterly, 337, 1988, Creech, loc. cit.
Blom -C ooper, L.; 'The Right to be Let A lon e'. 10{2), Journal o f Media L aw  and Practice, 53, 1989, Kupfer,
J.; 'Privacy. A utonom y and Self C oncept', 24, Am erican Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 1987, Benn, S.L;
'Privacy. Freedom and Respect for Persons' in Schoeman, 'Philosophical D im ensions of Privacy', op. cit., 
Gavison, 'Privacy and the Limits o f Law ', loc. cit.. Gross, H .; 'Privacy and A u ton om y', in Feinberg, J. and 
Gross, FL; 'Philosophy o f  Law', Second Edition, U SA , W adsworth Inc., 1980, H enkin, L.; 'Privacy and 
A u ton om y', 74, Columbia L aw  R eview , 1410, 1974, Fried, 'Privacy'. 77, Yale L aw  Journal, 475, 1968.
Parent, W .A.; 'A  N ew  D efin ition  for Privacy for the Law'. 2, Law  and Philosophy, 305, 1983, Parent, W .A.; 
'Recent W ork on the Concept of Privacy*. 2Q{4), Am erican Philosophical Quarterly, 341, 1993, Gavison, 
Privacy and the Limits o f Law'. loc. cit., Posner, R.A.; 'The Right to Privacy'. 12, Georgia Law R eview , 393, 
1978, M cCorm ick, D .N .; 'Privacy: A  Problem  of D efin ition '. 1, British Journal o f  Law and Society, 75, 1974, 
Fried, 'Privacy', loc. cit.
Innes, J.C.; 'Privacy. Intim acy and Isolation'. N e w  York, O xford U niversity Press, 1992, Benn, S.L; 
'Privacy. Freedom  and Respect for Persons' in Schoeman, 'Philosophical D im ensions of Privacy', op. cit., 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits o f L aw ', loc. cit., Fried, 'Privacy', loc. cit., M urphy, 'Social Distance and the 
V eil', loc. cit.
M uch debate centres around the philosophical nature o f  privacy. Is it a right, a claim, an interest, and issue 
o f control or a state o f being? For a discussion o f the possibilities and a review of the literature, see 
Schoeman, 'Philosophical D im ensions o f Privacy; A n  A n th ology', op. cit., chapter one.
Reim an, J.H.; 'Privacy. Intimacy and P ersonhood', 6, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26, 1976, Rachels, J,; 
'W hy Privacy Is Im portant', 4, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 323, 1975, T hom son, J.J.; 'The Right to  
Privacy'. 4, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 295, 1975, Scanlon, T.; 'Thom son on Privacy'. 4, Philosophy and  
Public Affairs, 315, 1975.
W acks, 'Personal Information. Privacy and the Law', op. cit., H ixson, op. cit., Thom son, ibid, Scanlon, 
ibid, and N egley, 'Philosophical V iew s on  the Value of Privacy', loc. cit.
This issue has given rise to much concern recently in the U nited  Kingdom. O ver the past thirty years there 
have been six attempts to introduce som e form  of legislation to protect privacy. N o n e  has succeeded. 
Furtherm ore, several com m ittees have been established to examine the matter and report; in 1972 the 
Younger C om m ittee {Report o f  the C om m ittee on Privacy, C m nd 5012), in 1990 the Calcutt C om m ittee 
{Report o f  the Com m ittee on Privacy and Related Matters, C m  1102) and in 1993, Calcutt re-examined the 
question o f privacy legislation and recom m m ended Parliamentary inteiwention {Review o f  Press Regulation, 
Cm 2135). As a direct result o f the latter, the Lord Chancellor's Department, in association w ith  the Scottish  
Office, produced a consultation paper entitled Infringement o f  Privacy in July 1993 inviting com m ent on  the 
possible nature and content of a civil remedy for infringement of privacy in the UK. To date, no further 
action has been taken.
interface between medicine and law in the protection of individual rights in the provision 
of health care. More particularly, this work concentrates on the privacy issues raised by 
what has been termed the 'New Genetics’. The advent of genetics and genetic testing has 
given rise to unique problems in the health care setting. The discovery of a predisposition 
to a genetic condition in one individual also reveals information about the genetic make-up 
and potential risks to family members. There is, therefore, potential for conflict over 
access to and control of such information. Traditionally, the duty of confidentiality owed 
by a health care professional to a patient has provided an appropriate means by which 
personal health Information has been secured. It is not clear, however, that the problems 
which surround genetic information in the familial milieu can be adequately dealt with 
using confidentiality. Furthermore, the principle of respect for patient autonomy - which 
has been described as the guiding ethical principle in health care and which has more 
recently received legal sanction by the UK and US courts - is similarly ill-equipped to 
provided a satisfactory solution to the problems posed by family genetic information. This 
thesis examines these problems and argues for the value of an appeal to the concept of 
privacy in seeking to resolve some of the more intractable issues.
1.2 - Establishing Parameters
It is necessary in this first chapter to establish parameters within which this work will be 
set. In particular, it is necessary to establish a context for the discussion of privacy and a 
justification for its treatment from the legal perspective.
It is submitted that the search for the essential character of the concept of privacy centres 
around the search for a means to establish an identifiable and sustainable interface between 
the public and private spheres of human life^ .^ Furthermore, because human life does not 
exist in a vacuum but in a human society, it is submitted that privacy is also concerned with
See generally, Benn and Gaus, Public and Private in Social Life, op. cit.
regulation of the relationship between an individual and the society in which s/he lives^ ®. 
Indeed, the two concepts of 'individual' and 'society' are inextricably linked - the definition 
of one provides, almost by analogy, the definition of the other. For example, Giddens 
defines a society as,
'...a cluster, or system, of institutionalised modes of conduct.
To speak of 'institutionalised' forms of social conduct is to 
refer to modes of belief and behaviour that occur and recur - 
or, as the terminology of modern social theory would have Jt, 
are socially reproduced - across long spans of time and space. 21
Yet, he is of the opinion that,
'societies only exist in so far as they are created and re-created 
in our actions as human beings. In social theory we cannot 
treat human activities as though they were determined by 
causes in the same way as natural events are. We have to grasp 
what I would call the double involvement of individuals and 
institutions: we create society as we are created by it.
For the purposes of this thesis, the treatment of the concept of privacy will be conducted in 
the context of the individual/society relationship in a western liberal democracy. It is 
necessary to make a choice about a particular contextual setting because privacy per se is 
simply an abstract concept. It requires a context in order to give it meaning because its 
function changes according to how we define the notions of 'individual' and ' s o c i e t y A
2® See, W acks, R.; 'Personal Information. Privacy and the Law ', op. cit., at 7, and T om linson , P.J.; 'Privacy 
and Law Enforcem ent', in Y oung, 'Privacy', op. cit., chapter 6.
Giddens, A.; 'Sociology : A  Brief But Critical Introduction', Second Edition, London, MacMillan Press, 
1986, at 8. Social systems he defines as, '[involving] patterns o f relationships am ong individuals and groups.' 
at 12.
ibid, at 11.
2^  For a study of the role o f privacy in a range o f different societies such as Classical A thens, the times of the 
O ld Testam ent and A ncient China, see. M oore, B.; 'Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural H istory', op. cit. It 
has been claimed that today in China the concept o f privacy is an anathema to the populous: '[w]hen Victor 
Sidel, a physician well know n for his national and international work in public health, visited the People's 
Republic o f China som e years ago, he encountered com m on public-health practices that required people to  
reveal highly personal information, w hich was then posted in a public place. Sidel asked, "Don't people 
consider this an invasion o f their privacy?" and his C hinese interpreter could not translate the question. The 
Chinese language apparently lacked a concept o f  privacy in the sense that makes it an ethical value in W estern 
society.', see, Macklm, R.; 'Privacy and C ontrol o f G enetic Inform ation', in Annas, G.J. and Elias, S.; 'Gene 
Mapping: U sing Law and Ethics as G uides'. N e w  Y ork, O xford U niversity Press, 1992, chapter 9, at 157. 
Similarly, Ketcham notes that, '...w hile in the W est there is great value placed on [the] lonely sense o f
desire for privacy is a bi-product of our social organisation. It is necessary therefore to 
choose a particular conception of 'society' or the 'individual', each with its corresponding 
adjunct, in order to analyse privacy in a meaningful v/ay. The reasons why the model 
chosen is that of the western liberal democracy are outlined below^ .^
2.1 - PRIVACY A N D  THE WESTERN LIBERAL TRADITIO N
The western liberal tradition - with its central tenets of democracy and a commitment to 
individualism - is a phenomenon which is unprecedented in human history. Its origins can 
be traced to events which took place only a few centuries ago, yet the effects which its 
ethos has had on human beings and human societies is remarkable. This is especially true of 
the effect on the function and perceived value of privacy. The origins of modern claims to 
privacy are found in the same epoch as the origins of this liberal tradition^^ and with the 
rise of individualism can be witnessed a rise in concern for personal privacy^ .^ Thus, to a 
certain extent, the development of the western liberal democracy has been parallelled by 
the increase in importance of the role of privacy in the lives of those individuals who, 
together, constitute such a society. To set this thesis in such a context, therefore, provides 
valuable insight both into the concept of privacy as well as aspects of liberal societies^ .^
"private space," it is a concept uncherished and scarcely even recognised as existent by Japanese.', see 
Ketcham. R. 'Individualism and Public Life'. N e w  York, Basil Blackwell, 1987, at 113. M oore, ibid, posits 
that 'a desire for privacy [is] a panhuman trait', at 276. H e notes, however, that, '...privacy is minimal where 
technology and social organization are m inim al.', ibid.
2'^  Benn, 'A  Theory of Freedom '. N e w  York, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1988, notes, '[t]he judgements w e  
make about our privacy arrangements must take the rest o f our cultural ideals largely as w e find them. 
Individuals like ourselves in our kind o f culture [western liberal democracy], then, do have an interest in 
privacy in the management o f the internal econom y o f  their ow n personalities and of their personal relations 
w ith  others', at 287.
2^  See, for example, W estin, 'Privacy and Freedom ', op. cit., chapter one. This is reproduced in Schoeman, 
F.D . (ed.); 'Philosophical D im ensions o f Privacy: A n A n th o logy ', op. cit., at 56 - 74.
2® See Vincent, G.; 'A  H istory  of Secrets?', in Prost, A . and Vincent, G. (eds.); 'A  H istory of Private L ife'. 
V olum e 5, London, Belknap Press, 1991, at 147 - 149, wherein he discusses the totalitarian regime and its view  
of privacy. A s he states, 'In a totalitarian regime all barriers between private life and public life seem to be 
broken down.' H e rejects the view, however, that there is no room  for, or desire for, privacy in such a 
society.
22 For a discussion of privacy in prim itive societies, see W estin, A.F.; 'Privacy and Freedom ', op. cit., at 11 - 
22 .
2.2 ” The History of Privacy and the Western Liberal Tradition
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries represented a time of great turmoil and great 
change in human history. In particular, two events proved to be instrumental in the 
establishment of the liberal tradition which is now so prevalent in the modern world. 
These two events were two revolutions : the French Revolution which brought sweeping 
political change and the Industrial Revolution which acted as the catalyst for world-wide 
socio-economic change. Together they altered incontrovertibly the course of humankind.
2.2.1 - The Renaissance, The Reformation and the 'Age o f Reason ' - the Fomenters o f 1789
The French Revolution of 1789 resulted from the culmination of many factors borne out of 
an era of which the Revolution signals the end point^®. That period of history, which can 
loosely be referred to as the late Middle Ages, saw the advent of the Renaissance and the 
Reformation; in themselves periods of considerable turmoil and declension. The 
Renaissance was a time of challenge and change when originality of thought became 
prevalent and old traditions and institutions began to be questioned. In particular, religious 
dogma was openly disputed and intellectual freedom actively encouraged. This laid the way 
for the Europe-wide rejection of Catholic idolatry by the Protestant Reformation^^. At that 
time, the influence of the churches both in relation to matters of the state and the lives of
2^  See Kelly, J.M.; 'A  Short H istory o f  W estern Legal T heory'. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, w ho traces 
the developm ent o f western legal and political thought from the times of the Greeks and Romans, through  
the M iddle Ages (1100-1350), the Renaissance and Reform ation (1350 - 1600) and beyond to the later 
Tw entieth  century. See also, G oodm an, E.; 'The Origins o f the Western Legal Tradition: From  Thales to the 
T udors'. Sydney, The Federation Press, 1995.
2^  K elly, ibid., states, 'It is w orth...noting...that the general psychological and social connection between the 
ethos o f  Protestantism, w ith  its emphasis on  the individual's direct relationship and answerability to God, 
and the rise modern capitalist enterprise, is thought to be well established; the link, roughly speaking, is 
supposed to lie in the idea that God's favour, the outward mark of his "election" o f  an individual for 
salvation, w ill be visible in material prosperity here on earth; this transmutes subtly into the idea that God's 
favour attaches to whatever efforts the individual w ill make to bring prosperity about: G od helps those w ho  
help themselves.', at 167 - 168. H e cites, W eber, M.; 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism', 
translation Parsons, T. (London 1976), and Taw ney, R .H .; 'Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism'. (London, 
1926).
individuals were far greater than they are today^®. Transformation in the churches therefore 
meant direct transformation of many aspects of social life; religious and  secular. Stone, for 
example, argues that the collapse of Puritanism in England in the late seventeenth century 
left a number of essential - if unintended - legacies for the more secular society that 
succeeded it^h He contends that,
’respect for the individual conscience directed by God was one 
element of Puritanism...that survived to help create not only 
the desire to provide religious toleration for ’tender 
consciences', but also to induce a respect for personal autonomy in other aspects of life. '^2
O f the development of this 'toleration' he says,
'It was the reaction to the excesses of Puritanism, however, 
which provided other important contributions to the trend 
towards individual autonomy. One was the eighteenth 
century hostility to 'enthusiasm' of all kinds and the 
consequent growth of a willingness to tolerate most forms of 
Christian sectarianism provided they did not disturb the 
public peace. When toleration at last became a positive virtue, 
a great step had been taken in the direction of autonomy.
This is but one example of how, in conjunction, the Reformation and the Renaissance 
provided an 'openness of spirit', both in intellectual and ecclesiastical terms, which proved 
to be wholly conducive to the changes to come. As Barber has noted.
®® K elly com m ents, however, that about the year 1100, the concepts o f state and church began to emerge as 
separate entities, w ith separate, although connected, spheres of operation. N o  longer were they view ed as 
'sim ply tw o aspects' o f the same unity, ibid, at 123 - 128. The result o f this was that a need arose for 
philosophical and spiritual justification o f the state as a separate entity. The first 'decisive step' towards 
providing this came from St Thom as Aquinas w ho, arguably, came to be one o f the forefathers o f modern 
legal and political theory, at 124 - 126. St Thom as 'fused' Aristotle's doctrine about man's civic nature w ith  
Christian doctrine about God's role in the creation that nature and thereby 'legitimized' the state itself 'as a 
part of God's design', ibid. The hoo\a Defensor pa d s  (Defender o f the Peace), by Marsihus (Marsiglio) o f  
Padua w hich was published in 1324, w ent further than this because o f its claims that the entities of state and 
church were w h olly  separate and that the latter should be subordinated to the form er in matters temporal. 
K elly observes o f  the w ork that '[it laid] like an unexploded mine among Europe's intellectual furniture, to  
be detonated tw o  centuries later in the age o f the Reform ation', at 127. H e is o f the op inion  that the w ork of 
Marsilius 'is a m ilestone in the history o f  constitutional freedom', at 130.
Stone, L.; 'The Family. Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800'. London, Penguin Books, 1977, at 176-177. 
2^ ibid. 
ibid.
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'...the largely pejorative meaning that the classical and 
early Christian periods gave to such terms as individual 
and privacy was transformed during the Renaissance in a 
fashion that eventually produced the Protestant 
Reformation and the ethics of commençai society.
The Enlightenment period, or the 'Age of Reason', which followed from the Renaissance 
and the time of the Reformation, saw an even greater willingness among the intellectual 
elite to challenge and to question traditions and to seek personal and social betterment^^. 
This period saw a marked increase in popularity for 'individual' pursuits, and thinkers of 
the time turned their attentions towards notions of 'the self and the underlying value of 
such^ .^ In particular, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a view developed 
which today forms one of the cornerstones of western civilisation and epitomises the very 
essence of liberalism. This view is commonly known as individualism ^'^, It is an idea 
which embodies a moral notion about what it is to be a human being. It is the foundation 
for a belief system which holds that all human beings are unique, that they possess basic 
rights and that such rights should be respected^ .^
Barber, B.; 'Strong D em ocracy', Berkeley, U niversity  o f California Press, 1984, at 195.
Kelly, op. cit.f at 249 - 250, describes the Enlightenm ent thus, '...to call the Enlightenm ent a 'm ovem ent' 
may be misleading; it was more a shared m ood or tem per, or attitude to  the world, in w hich the dominant 
note was one o f  profound scepticism towards traditional system s of authority or orthodoxy (especially those 
of religion), and a strong faith in the pow er o f  the human reason and intelligence to make unlim ited advances 
in the sciences and techniques conducive to hum an welfare.'
Sennett, R.; 'The Fall o f Public M an'. London, Faber and Faber, 1989, chapter five.
See, generally, Lukes, S.; 'Individualism'. O xford, Blackwell, 1973. For an account of the rise of 
individualism in western culture see, Ketcham, op. cit., esp. chapter tw o. For com m ent on  and criticism of 
individualism, see Avineri, S. and de-Shalit, A ., (eds.); 'Communitarianism and Individualism ', Oxford, 
O xford U niversity  Press, 1992,
Benn, 'A  Theory of Freedom ', op. cit., at 215ff, discusses various 'individualistic m odels o f social 
collaboration'.
Kelly, op. cit., at 228, maintains that Grotius was the first proponent of this view . C iting Tuck, he notes 
that Grotius' w ork, Inleidinghe to t de Hollandsche Rechts-gheheerdtheydt -wzs, 'the first reconstruction of an 
actual legal system  in terms o f rights rather than laws', see Tuck, R.; 'Natural Rights Theories'. Cambridge, 
1979, at 66.
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Commenting on the phenomenon of individualism, Walton has noted,
'Fundamental to individualism is the claim in respect of the 
logical priority of the individual as opposed to society. A  
society is taken to be the aggregate of individuals contrasting 
with the organicist's claim that the whole is in some sense 
greater than the parts,
Shils has argued that a commitment to individualism is the sine qua non of a humane and 
liberal society. He says,
'A society that claims to be both humane and civil is 
committed to their [humanity and civility] respect. When its 
practice departs from that respect, it also departs to that 
degree from humanity and civility.
2.2.2. - The Emergence o f a ’Need'for Privacy
The changes brought about in the periods leading up to the French Revolution were 
common throughout Europe and paved the way for an increasingly important role for 
privacy in society. For example, the connection between the rise of individualism and 
privacy is made by Benn,
'...the importance attached to the privacy of the person is one 
aspect or the Western European, post-Renaissance liberal 
stress on individuality, on moral responsibility of the 
normally rational individual, and his responsibility for what 
he is and does.
See, W alton, A.S.; 'Public and Private Interests: H egel on  Civil Society and the State', in Benn and Gaus, 
'Public and Private In Social Life' , op. cit., chapter 10.
Compare the views o f  Michael Sandel as com m ented on  by Benn, 'A  Theory of Freedom ', op. cit., at 256 - 
258: 'a person is not prior to to  com m unity but constituted by it'. For a range o f views on  this, and related 
points, see A vineri and de-Shalit, 'Comm unitarianism  and Individualism', op. cit.
Shils, E.; 'Privacy: Its C onstitution and Vicissitudes'. 31(2), L aw  and Contemporary Problems, 281, 1966, at 
306.
Benn, S.L; 'The Protection and Lim itation o f  Privacy'. 52 (11,12), Australian Law Journal, 601, 686, (1978), 
at 604 - 605.
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This point has been noted by other commentators'^' .^ As an example, the work of Lawrence 
Stone provides valuable insight into the changing patterns of behaviour vis family life prior 
to and beyond this turbulent time. His approach is essentially three-fold in that he 
identifies stages of evolution of family life over the three centuries from 1500-1800'^ .^ He 
discusses the 'open linear family' which he asserts existed from 1450-1630, the 'restricted 
patriarchal nuclear family' from 1550-1700, and the 'closed domesticated nuclear family' 
from 1640-1800. Stone equates the development of the latter phase of family life - which is 
that which is most familiar to those living in family units in contemporary society - with 
the rise of individualism and the Renaissance Humanist stress on 'civility''* .^ He argues that 
the rise of individualism and liberalism, and their success, are due to a combination of the 
following factors: secularism, the pursuit of happiness, humanitarianism, physical and 
bodily privacy and the development of the market economy'^^. Of particular interest is the 
integral part which privacy has played. He notes that with increasing stress on 'civility' 
came increasing emphasis on the need and desire for privacy'^®. The sum and substance of 
this 'civility' involved the identification of behaviour considered to be worthy of 'civilised' 
persons and its cultivation. The corollary of this involved the labelling of certain other 
forms of behaviour as uncivilised. The result was not necessarily that uncivilised behaviour 
was discouraged (for this was not always possible), but that it was hidden from view : it 
became private. As he comments,
'One of the features of this new 'civility' was the physical 
withdrawal of the individual body and its waste products from 
contact with others.
See, for example, M oore, 'Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural H istory', op. cit. at 283, Lukes, op. cit., at 
59 - 66 argues that privacy is a central tenet o f individualism, also O 'D onovan, K.; 'Sexual D ivisions in Law '. 
London, W eidenfeld and N ico lson , 1985, chapter one.
Stone, L,; 'The Family. Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800'. op. cit.
ibid, at 171. Stone states that 'civility' is, 'defined as a set o f  external behaviour traits w hich distinguished  
the civilised from  the uncivilised.' ibid. 
ibid, at 179.
48 ibid, at 169 - 172.
49 ibid, at 171.
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The development of a 'need' for spatial privacy during this time also came about because of 
changes in the types of person who constituted society. It is thought that human beings 
have not always had a need, or an ability, to form close relationships with other human 
beings^4 This is particularly true of the middle ages when life was brutal and brief, and in 
the words of one commentator,
'The expectation of life was so low that it was imprudent to
become too emotionally dependent upon any other human
being.'^ 5
This was not, however, simply a question of prudent advice or misplaced self-preservation. 
There would seem to be two reasons why individuals in the past did not need to, or could 
not, form close personal relationships.
First, prior to the eighteenth century the standard view of individuals was very 
functionalist. Individuals were perceived to be merely a part of a greater whole, bound 
together in the 'Great Chain of Being' insignif icant as a separate entity, non-deserving of 
recognition as something unique. In those times people were valued because of their utility 
rather than their personal qualities or attributes. Thus, as Stone says, '
'One wife or child could substitute for another, like soldiers in 
an army.'^^
The implications of this were, it is thought, that no deep, emotional bonds developed
between individuals to any recognisable extent compared with contemporary human
relations. Since individuals were not seen to be of any particular worth in se there was
4^ For an interesting discussion o f h ow  relationships are formed in modern society, see D uck, S.; 'What Are 
W e Trying to D evelop  W hen We D evelop  A  Relationship?', in Giddens, A . (ed,); 'Fluman Societies: A  
Reader', Cambridge, P olity  Press, 1992, at 23 - 25.
See, Prost, op. cit., at 5.
Stone, op. cit., at 172. 
ibid.
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In his opinion the motive for this was as follows,
'It was a desire to separate one’s body and its juices and odours 
from contact with other people, to achieve privacy in many 
aspects of one's personal activités, and generally to avoid 
giving offence to the 'delicacy' of others. The essence of this 
movement was to create a culture in which the elite, the 
gentleman and the lady, were clearly distinguished by a whole 
set of immediately recognisable external behaviour traits.
This behaviour is immediately recognisable today but it is no longer indicative of one's 
membership of an elite. Current cultural mores surrounding such behaviour make it 
necessary to carry out the practices in a state of privacy in order to avoid the culturally- 
engendered response of embarrassment^h In this context, what can be called spatial privacy 
has gone from being a privilege of the ruling classes to an everyday necessity. The 
behaviour remains the same. The need for and function of privacy, however, have changed.
The development of a 'need' for spatial privacy among the upper classes can be observed in 
various other aspects of seventeenth and eighteenth century life. For example, unlike trends 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when upper-class houses were built with a series of 
interconnecting suites and no corridors, seventeenth and eighteenth century architects 
began to design grand houses which were made up of separate rooms connected by an 
independent corridor, arguably to allow privacy to be respected^ .^ This view is 
substantiated by Aries,
'...[not until the eighteenth century did the family begin] to 
hold society at a distance, to push it back beyond a steadily 
extending zone of private life.'^^
ibid.
Benn, 'A  Theory o f Freedom ', op. cit., at 281, is o f  the opinion that, '[ejmbarassment is the culturally 
appropriate response in a society w ith  the concept oîprudenda-, anyone not displaying it may be censured as 
brazen or insensitive.'
Stone, op. cit., at 169, com m ents that 'the m otive was partly to obtain privacy for individual members o f  
the family, but m ore especially to provide the fam ily itself w ith  som e escape from  the prying eyes and ears of 
the ubiquitous dom estic seiwants, w ho w ere a necessary evil in every m iddle and upper-class household.' See 
also pp.245 - 246.
Aries, P.; 'Centuries o f  C hildhood ', H arm ondsworth. Penguin, 1979, at 386.
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nothing to he gained by forging emotional ties. This attitude extended even to those who 
today are regarded unquestioningly as intimates; that is, spouses, life partners and 
children^8_ h  would seem that persons could function quite easily without the need to 
establish and maintain intimacies with others.
According to Stone, the second reason why close personal relationships were not formed to 
any great extent prior to the eighteenth century was because of the psychological make-up 
of people of that time. He says,
'In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there 
predominated a personality type with "low gradient" affect, 
whose capacity for warm relationships was generally limited, 
and who diffused what there was of it widely among family,kin, and neighbours.'^ 9
Thus it would seem that not only did individuals have no perception of any need to form 
intimate relationships, but also they were incapable of doing so.
Stone argues, however, that a change has taken place in the last few hundred years in 
relation to both of the above^ .^ Regarding the generally-held attitude towards individuals, 
he talks of the change which took place which he calls an 'abandonment of the principle of 
human interchangeability'That is, people began to value each individual as unique and of 
worth and not as a wholly replaceable entity^^. This was a direct result of the general 
change throughout society which took place at that time which gave increasing importance 
to an egocentric view of society and the individual at the expense of the prevailing
8^ See Aries, op. cit.
59 Stone, op. cit., at 180. 
ibid. 
ibid.
Furtherm ore, Stone also notes a change from  the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries in certain sections o f  
society in terms o f personality types: Tn the eighteenth century there predominated am ong the upper 
bourgeoisie and squirarchy a personality type w ith  "steep gradient" affect, w hose general capacity for 
intimate personal relationships was m uch greater, and w hose em otional ties were n ow  far m ore closely  
concentrated on  spouse and children.', ibid.
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functionalist view^5_ The conjunction of changes in personality types and changes in value 
systems was instrumental in the evolution of a view of the world which places the 
individual at its centre and which focuses considerable attention on individual acts and 
individual responsibility. In turn, the development of a 'need' to form intimate 
relationships gave rise to a corresponding 'need' for the appropriate circumstances in which 
such relationships can be formed: the desire to escape scrutiny and interference from others. 
Spatial privacy therefore became essential. As Benn has noted,
'Post-Renaissance individualism provided the ideological 
ground for the interest in privacy, and growing social 
complexity generated the need for it, but not until relative 
affluence enabled people to enjoy exclusive places ~ personal 
bedrooms, personal studies - were interests in privacy as such 
articulated. 4^
Seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was composed predominantly of oppressive 
oligarchies where the minority elite enjoyed tremendous wealth and privilege at the 
expense of the majority poor. Thus, as this quote indicates, the changes which occurred in 
the period leading up to the French Revolution, and in particular, the effect which these 
changes had on desires for privacy, were only felt by the upper classes of European society, 
for only they had the 'relative affluence' spoken of by Benn^ ^^ . Stone observes that,
'As for the poor, who constituted the majority of the 
population, they continued well into the nineteenth century 
to live in one- or two-roomed houses. Under these conditions, 
privacy was neither a practical possibility nor, one imagines, 
even a theoretical aspiration.
5^ A lthough Stone admits that the actual cause o f such a 'mass-personality change' is not precisely know n, he 
nevertheless cogently concludes that this was as a result o f the political and social changes occuring at the 
time: '...it seems plausible to suggest that [the change] m ay have been associated not on ly  w ith  the broad 
social and intellectual changes of the period, but also w ith  a series o f changes in child rearing, w hich  created 
am ong adults a sense o f trust instead o f mistrust.' This latter elem ent is discussed by him  in m uch m ore depth  
in chapter 9.
4^ Benn, 'A  T heory o f Freedom ', op. cit., at 295.
5^ ibid. A t p .285 Benn remarks, '...writers have criticised preoccupations w ith  privacy, particularly the 
privacy o f  fam ily relations, as part o f the pathology of post-Renaissance bourgeois society.' See, Leach, E.; 'A  
Runaway W orld?', London, O xford U niveristy Press,1968, (1967 R eith Lectures), and H alm os, P.; 'Solitude 
and Privacy: A  Study of Social Isolation, its Causes and Therapy’, London, Routledge and Regan Paul, 1952. 
*5^ Stone, op. c it., at 170.
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Certainly, from the historical perspective.
'the possibility of having a private life was a class privilege 
limited to those who lived, often on private incomes, in 
relatively sumptuous splendor.
Yet, the movements of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment set in 
motion events which were to change incontrovertibly European society and, ultimately, 
western civilization. As we know, the culmination of the changes which had swept Europe 
was the French Revolution.
2.2.3. - The French Revolution
The French Revolution was one like no other because i t  embodied a desire for political and 
social change on a much grander scale than had ever before been contemplated. Previously, 
revolutions had been aimed at a particular group in control, a superior or a monarch. N o  
institutional reform was intended or envisaged. The unique character of the French 
Revolution is found in the fact that it was instigated and carried out because of a desire to 
bring about such institutional reform. The embodiment of the chànge that was brought 
about, and which remains today at the heart of the French C o n s t i t u t io n ^ ® ^  is contained in 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens adopted by the French National 
Assembly in 1789. This document represented the culmination of changes and the shift in 
fundamental values which had occurred in the recent past and provided a physical 
embodiment of the ideas and ideals which sprang from that time and which continue to 
epitomise the (modern) liberal democracy: freely-elected representative government, the
Prost, op. cit., at 7. It is ironic that today the 'upper classes/social elite’ have less means o f protecting 
privacy because there are m ore threats to it from  tabloid journalism. Celebrities and royalty (and to a lesser 
extent public officials) experience threats to  their privacy w hich m ost 'average' individuals do not.
8^ T he French C onstitution was adopted in 1791 by the N ational Assem bly formed after the Revolution. 
Even today, this C onstitution represents an exemplary charter for liberal democracies.
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, the notion of inalienable human 
rights, and the ideal of human e q u a l i t y 9^
Although the French Revolution did not in itself do anything for privacy or its protection, 
it concretised the values and the changes which had given rise to increased interest in, and 
concern for, privacy. Further, it secured the way forward for 'democratized' societies and, 
thereby, paved the way for an increasingly important role for privacy in such societies '^ .^
2.2.4. “ The Industrial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution, which took place throughout Western Europe and the United 
States in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century, proved to be the link between 
notions of democracy and individual freedoms which had developed from the French 
Revolution and the notion of market economy and capitalism which evolved as a result of 
industrial innovations^b This brought about great social changes on a variety of different 
levels.
The advent of industrialisation allowed geographical mobility on a scale never before 
possible or imaginable. With this came, inevitably, mass migration of people to those places
9^ The idea that all human beings are equal is not one w hich  was novel at that time. It was a theory w hich  has 
existed from  the times of the Greeks and Rom ans and w hich  had been sustained am ong theological, political 
and legal writers throughout the ages. H ow ever as K elly, op. cit., notes, 'The general notion  o f human 
equality, the presum ption against privilege, o f course had very ancient roots, but...[was]...stated m ost 
stridently at, and since, the French R evolution.' Kelly traces western legal th eo iy  through human history and 
com m ents on  the attitude o f the writers towards the n otion  of equality and notes than, in alm ost every  
period, the m ajority favoured som e view  that 'all are w orthy  o f  equal treatment'. The justifications for this 
vaiy . For example, the Greeks considered alien the notion  that 'one man is as good as another' but considered  
that, in the eyes o f the law, equality existed betw een men (at 29 - 30). In the Middle Ages, it was creation o f  
all hum anity by G od w hich bestowed the quality o f  equality (at 104 - 107 and 146 - 148). That is not to say, 
however, that in practice the theory was applied. Slavery was still com m on in Europe in the late Middle 
Ages, and political subordination was also com m onplace (at 146). It was not until the French R evolution  that 
th e o iy  and practice began to coincide.
W estin discusses the 'origins of m odern claims to  privacy' in his acclaimed w ork Privacy and Freedom, op. 
cit. H e makes particular note o f  the role o f privacy in the modern democratic state, ibid., chapters one and 
tw o.
Capitalism has existed since the sixteenth century, industrial capitalism since the late eighteenth century, ie- 
w ith  the Industrial R evolution.
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where there was work, namely; towns and cities^ .^ Industrialised countries therefore 
experienced a period of rapid urbanisation. The growth of towns and cities meant that 
there was an urgent demand for the provision of basic services such as adequate housing, 
water and health care. The latter became a particularly pressing need^  ^ because, with the 
rise in concentrated populations, came a rise in the incidence of infectious disease and a 
substantial increase in the mortality rate^  ^ However, in the early part of the industrial 
revolution such basic services were not always available and life for the working classes in 
towns and cities was, 'toil and wretchedness, rich in suffering and poor in e n j o y m e n t . ' 9^5
N ot surprisingly, these conditions put increased strain on the personal lives of individuals^^. 
The relocation of the population from the country into towns led to a substantial 
impingement on living space^ .^ Where industrialists built dwellings for their workers in 
close proximity to their place of work there was no sharp division between the working 
and the non-working lives of individuals. Very often individuals found themselves living
It should also be noted that additional factors contributed to  the m ovem ent of people from  the country to  
the tow ns and cities. As the eighteenth century progressed land became a valuable com m odity and 'private’ 
ownership as a concept took  hold. The result was that custom s of access and use were denied to those w ho  
had previously w orked the land: depriving them  o f their main means o f subsistence. G iven this, little choice 
remained: becom e destitute or find em ploym ent in the new  industries.
5^ For an excellent critique o f the w hole social order of that tim e, see Engels, F.; 'The C ondition of the 
W orking Class in England*, edited by Kiernan, V ., London, Penguin Books, 1987. This b ook  was initially  
published in 1844 and includes som e interesting statistics. For example, Engels notes that scarlet fever, rickets 
and scrofula were largely confined to the w orking class, in w hose streets the m ortality was tw ice as high 
compared to  the middle class streets. Lie also obseiwes that the death rate in the cities was higher that in the 
countryside: 1 in 30 compared to 1 in 40.
4^ N o te , however, that after the middle o f the nineteenth century m ortality rates began to  drop dramatically 
and the major causes o f death were no longer infectious disease but rather other conditions such as heart 
disease and cancer. See M cK eown, T.; 'The M odern Rise o f  P opulation', London, Edward A rnold, 1976, esp. 
at 80 - 82. There is m uch controversy about the causes o f this change. The main factors w ould  seem to be 
im provem ents in nutrition and standards of livings, environm ental improvem ents through public health  
legislation and administration and the effects o f medical interventions for certain conditions. The im portance 
o f the role o f  the latter has, however, been disputed, see M cK eow n, ibid, at 150, '..on balance the effects of 
hospital w ork in this period w ere probably harm ful...any patient faced the risk o f contracting a lethal 
infection up to the second half o f the nineteenth century...and it was not until much later that hospital 
patients could be reasonably certain o f dying from  the diseases w ith  w hich they were admitted.' C f  - W inter, 
J.M.; 'The D ecline o f M ortality in Britain. 1870 - 1950'. in Barker, T. and Drake, M ., (eds.); 'Population and 
Society in Britain, 1850 - 1950', Batsford Academ ic and Educational, 1982.
Engels, op. cit. at 69.
See Prost and V incent, (eds.), op. cit., w hich outlines social changes which had influences on  the lives o f the 
poorer classes w hich  eventually led them  to demand m ore private space, especially Prost, 'The Transition  
from  N eighbourhood  to M etropolis', at 103ff.
See Giddens, 'Sociology : A  Brief But Critical Introduction', op. cit., at 6.
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next to, or in very close proximity to, co-workers in cramped and less than ideal 
conditions. Such conditions heightened individuals' awareness of personal space - or rather 
the lack thereof - and contributed directly to the development of a desire for spatial privacy 
among the poor. Thus, although for different reasons, the desires of the poor began to 
mirror those of the elite concerning a 'need' for spatial privacy.
2.2.5. - Informational Privacy
The living conditions created by industrialised society had another profound effect on the 
lives of individuals. People saw a marked increase in the speed with which information 
about themselves was disseminated. By this period of history human psychology had 
changed and individuals now had a sense of the intimate: personal relationships were 
formed as a matter of emotional need. Yet, one's range of 'intimates' in industrial society 
was greatly extended. N ot only did one share one's life with family and friends but also 
with many hundreds or thousands of other persons who lived or worked in the same place 
or who frequented the same establishments. Strangers therefore became pseudo-intimates : 
vast tracts of one's life could be shared with persons for whom one could feel very little, yet 
about whom one could know a great deal. However, because individuals did not choose 
these 'intimates' and because they could not control the flow of information about 
themselves between such 'intimates' (and others), people began to experience an increasing 
sense of loss in relation to a side of their lives which had also come to be associated with the 
private sphere: personal information^®. Just as the 'need' for privacy had manifested itself in 
a desire for spaces where individuals could ensure limited access to their person, so too then 
developed a 'need' for feelings of control over personal i n f o r m a t io n ^ 9 _
9*8 C f  Shils, 'Privacy: Its C onstitution  and Vicissitudes', loc. cit., at 288 - 292.
9^ See, for example, Jouard, loc, cit. O ne might make the point that the likelihood of neighbours know ing  
one's 'personal' details is higher in a village than in a tow n, and this is certainly true. H ow ever, the likelihood  
is also higher that a eighteenth/nineteenth century village the populus constituted a com m unity - akin to an 
extended family - where the lives o f  all were so intim ately connected than intimacies were w illingly and 
necessarily shared. The same is not true o f a city where personal inform ation can be disseminated to com plete 
strangers and no control can be exercised over its use thereafter. Reporting in 1972 the Younger C om m ittee  
com m ented, '...the apparent loss o f  privacy through physical proxim ity may be m ore than offset by
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2.3, - Privacy : A Definition
It is submitted that the notions of privacy considered above continue to reflect the privacy 
needs of persons today. These 'needs' embodies two conceptions of privacy. First, privacy 
as a state of non-access to the individual's physical body or 'person' - what has been called 
here spatial privacy. Second, privacy as a state in which the individual has control over 
personal information - what has been termed informational privacy^^. From these two 
conceptions of privacy one can deduce one unifying definition: privacy as a state of 
separateness from others. This includes physical (body) separateness from others [spatial 
privacy) as well as separateness of parts of our lives which are so intimately connected to 
our idea of 'self that they equate with physical separateness. Included in this is personal 
information [informational privacy). This is the definition of privacy which is adopted in 
this work. In chapter five the reasons for this choice of definition will be more fully 
considered and properly justified. For the moment, privacy should be taken to refer to a 
state in which an individual is separate from others, either in a bodily sense or by reference 
to the inaccessibility of certain intimate adjuncts to their individuality, such as personal 
information.
2.3.1. - Why Protect Privacy f
It has been argued that with the rise of the western liberal democracy there arose a need for 
individual privacy. It has also been shown that the privacy interests which individuals have
anonym ity  in modern crowded com m unities...[t]he significant change affecting privacy is the growth in 
numbers and sizes o f com m unities and the creation o f conurbations w hich contain an increasingly high 
proportion  o f  the w hole population.', at 23 - 24.
8° This view  of privacy corresponds largely w ith  a lay view  o f the concept. The Y ounger C om m ittee on  
privacy found that the responses o f  individuals to  questions in a com m issioned survey about what constituted  
invasions o f privacy tended to  place the n otion  o f privacy into one or both o f  tw o groups: freedom from  
intrusion or privacy o f inform ation, see Y ounger C om m ittee, 1972, op. cit., at 32.
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are of two distinct kinds. What has not been explained is why individuals need privacy. 
Several arguments can be made.
First, as has been shown, a state of physical separateness from others is necessary in order to 
allow personal relationships to begin and to grow. The levels of intimacy which typify the 
modern personal relationship can only be achieved by ensuring and securing separateness 
from others. Trust, which is essential to the establishment and maintainance of all 
relationships, requires not only a degree of intimacy to develop but also a currency in 
which to deal. An important part of that currency is personal information. Individuals 
trade private information both as a sign of trust and on the basis of trust. The security of 
the information is guaranteed by the tacit undertaking that it will not be noised abroad. In 
this way personal and professional relationships flourish and an important part of the fabric 
of society is woven more tightly®b As Fried has said,
Love and Friendship...involve the initial respect for the rights 
of others which morality requires of everyone. They further 
involve the voluntary and spontaneous relinquishment of 
something between friend and friend, lover and lover. The 
title to information about oneself conferred by privacy 
provides the necessary something. To be friends or lovers 
persons must be intimate to some degree with each other.
Intimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, 
beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and 
which one has the right not to share with anyone.
Second, a degree of separateness - that is, being alone with no company or selected company 
- allows the individual personality to reflect on experiences and learn from them. Constant 
company, and so constant interaction, deprives the individual of time to assimilate life 
experiences and to get in touch with one's own individuality®^.
®* See Fried, 'Privacy', loc. cit.
®^  Fried, C.; 'A n  A natom y of Values : Problem s o f Personal and Social C hoice', Cambridge 
(Massachussettes), Hai-vard U niversity Press, 1970, at 142.
®5 Jouard, loc. cit.
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Third, it has been argued that the modern psychological make-up of individuals is such that 
a degree of separateness is required to ensure that individuals retain a degree of mental 
stability. Jouard has put a forceful argument that (western) public life puts considerable 
strain on individuals who must assume certain personae to integrate with o t h e r s ® ^ .  These 
personae, not being full and true reflections of the personality of the individual, cannot be 
maintained indefintely without serious psychological consequences. A state of privacy 
allows the 'masks' to be dropped and a degree of release to be obtained.
Fourth, tangible harm can come to an individual who is not granted a degree of privacy. As 
regards spatial privacy, invasion on the body which is unauthorised is disrespectful of the 
individual and may cause physical harm. The criminal and civil laws of assault recognise 
and protect to a degree the inviolability of the human body. Perhaps less obvious, but no 
less valid however, is the mental harm which can arise if one's spatial privacy is not 
respected. For example, clandestine observation can produce profound feelings of violation 
in individuals even although no actual physical contact occurs and/or no personal 
information is gathered® .^ Similarly, unauthorised use or disclosure of personal information 
can lead to harm to individuals. Information about one's personal condition, behaviour or 
habits which others find distateful can lead to individuals being ostracised from 
communities or becoming the object of violence and discrimination. As Greenawalt puts it,
'One reason why information control seems so Important is 
precisely because society is as intolerant as it is, precisely 
because there are so many kinds of activity that are subject to 
overt government regulation or to the informal sanctions of 
loss of job or reputation.'®^
®4 ibid, and see generally, note 2 above.
®5 See Benn, S .L /Privacy. Freedom  and Respect for Persons', in Schoeman, F .D .; 'Philosophical D im ensions 
of Privacy', op. cit., chapter 8, at 230 - 231.
®^  Greenawalt, K,, 'Privacy and its Legal Protections'. 2(3), Hastings Center Studies, 45, 1974.
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The hysterical reaction to AIDS which lasted for most of the 1980s, and the intolerance and 
discrimination which continue to flow from that time - and which have in part been 
institutionalised®^ - are recent reminders of how 'intolerant' society can be®®.
There is one final argument in support of the protection of privacy. The above arguments 
concentrate on individual interests. Arguably, however, there are also public interests in 
privacy protection. For example, it can be argued that it is in the public (society) interest to 
have a community inhabited by 'complete' individuals as opposed to two-dimensional 
characters® .^ Similarly, for a society which holds the individual in esteem and seeks to 
accord him or her respect, it is surely in the public interest to reduce to a minimum all 
potential harm to individuals. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that harm can come 
to society itself if privacy is not respected. If the element of trust which is so crucial to the 
development of relationships is lost because individuals cannot seek and receive guarantees 
about the security of information, important and valuable information will not be 
communicated. This can render important social organs powerless to deal with a variety of 
social conditions. A powerful example of this can be seen in the medical confidentiality case 
o î X  V y90. In this case a newspaper gained access to the medical files of two doctors who 
had AIDS and who were continuing to work in general practice. The newspaper sought to 
disclose this information and argued that it was justified in doing so because the public had 
a right to know that doctors were continuing to treat patients when they were afflicted by 
such a condition. The court, however, rejected this argument and in issuing an injunction
For examples o f the ways in w hich  discrim ination and bias have been included in certain U K  laws applying 
to those afflicted by AID S see generally, Flaigh, R. and Flarrls, D ., (eds.); 'AIDS: A  Guide to the Law '.
Second Edition, London, R outledge, 1995. Examples include the continuing practice o f insurance com panies 
o f requiring supplem entaty inform ation from  those in so-called 'high-risk groups' as opposed to those w ho  
engage in 'high-risk practices', and the governm ental policy  w hich prevents same sex partners from  
'inheriting' a tenancy from a deceased partner, as is possible w ith  spouses.
®® This is also discussed by Benn, 'A  T heory o f Freedom ', op. cit., chapter 10 and p .282.
®9 Benn notes that, '...the children of the k ibbutz have been found by som e observers defective as persons, 
precisely because their em otional stability has been purchased at the cost o f an incapacity to establish deep 
personal relations. Perhaps w e have to choose between the sensitive, human understanding that w e achieve 
on ly  by the cultivation o f  our relations w ith in  a confined circle and the extrovert assurance and adjustment 
that a Geineinschaft can offer. H ow ever this m ay be, to the extent that w e value the former, w e shall be 
com m itted  to valuing the right o f privacy.', in 'Privacy. Freedom and Respect for Persons', op.cit., at 237. 
90% 'L ,y[1988]2  A ll ER 648.
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held that there was a public interest in maintaining the confidence of people such as the two 
doctors. Rose J. summed up his reasoning as follows,
...[i]n the long run, preservation of confidentiality is the only 
way of securing public health; otherwise doctors will be 
discredited as a source of information, for future patients "will 
not come forward if doctors are going to squeal on them".9i
All of these reasons will be considered in more depth in future chapters. For the present, it 
is sufficient to note that the definition of privacy advanced in this thesis is two-pronged : it 
relates both to spatial and informational privacy. And, there are strong reasons for 
recognising and protecting both kinds of individual privacy - reasons which are grounded 
in both private and public interests.
2.3.2. - Privacy : A  Role fo r  the Law?
The public/private distinction is central to the western liberal tradition and arises from the 
commitment of the latter to individualism. A sphere of the 'private' embodies areas of life 
in which individuals are not subject to scrutiny, restraint or interference by society. The 
boundary between the two areas of public and private requires careful policing for the 
division is in a constant state of flux. Crucial to this role of 'policing' and, arguably, the 
existence of the division between public and private itself, is the law^ .^ The question of the 
existence of the public/private distinction in western life and the problem of the 
sustainability of a division between the two spheres is, in essence, a debate about the limits 
of law. If the private sphere represents non-intereference, non-intrusion and non-action by 
others, there is little role for the law to play in that sphere. However, in maintaining a 
delimitation around that sphere of life, arguably, the law has a significant role as the prime 
motivator and regulator of human action in society. Morever, to examine the tension
9^  ibid, at 653.
92 See, O 'D on ovan , 'Sexual D ivisions in Law ’. London, op. cit., at 2 - 3.
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between public and private life from the legal perspective provides insight into the concept 
of law, its function and its limitations.
In addition, it is submitted that the role of the law in protecting interests and finding 
acceptable solutions is crucial. The history of privacy has been beleaguered by obscurantism 
and im p r ec is io n ^ ^ . Clarity of function and scope is essential to the development of a 
workable concept and, in the opinion of the present writer, this is attainable only by legal 
means. It will be contended that, in light of the submissions about privacy and related 
matters with which this thesis will detail, there should be a role for the law to play in 
seeking protection of the concept as it has been defined. This is because of the value it has 
and because of the primacy of the role of the law as a means to balance interests which 
conflict and to resolve disputes as they arise in relation to matters of value to our society 
and the individuals in it. Given the fact that privacy is currently accorded no direct legal 
protection in the UK, the ultimate aim will be to evaluate proposals for introducing 
patient privacy protection in this country .
3.1. ■ TH E INTERVENTIONIST STATE AS TENET OF THE WESTERN LIBERAL 
T R A D ITIO N
A further justification for the choice of the western liberal democracy as a context for this 
discussion of privacy is the phenomenon of the expanding role of the state in western 
communities. In the course of the twentieth century western society has witnessed 
increasing interest of states in a whole range of matters concerning the lives of citizens^L As 
Stromholm has indicated.
95 Infra, chapter five.
94 For example, in the last century western society has w itnessed the state taking responsibility for the 
provision o f m any basic seiwices such as housing and utilities, subsistence benefits, education and child  
welfare. O f primary importance am ong these is the provision o f health care, discussed infra. O n another 
level, w estern societies are epitom ised by an excess o f legislation stem m ing from paternalistic attitudes o f the 
state towards its citizens. Thus, w e find legislation prohibiting or severely restricting sales of alcohol and 
other drugs, prom oting health and safety at w ork, requiring the wearing o f seat belts or safety helm ets, etc.
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...prevailing democratic ideologies stress the need for 
continuous debate on matters of public interest...the 
complexity of modern society and the subtle interwovenness 
of facts and interests within its framework have led to the 
feeling that almost everything concerns everyone in one sense 
or another. Thus, any unimportant event may touch upon 
matters in which the public may claim a legitimate interest.95
Hence, what the ideology giveth with one hand it taketh away with the other. Individual 
interests are given more importance in democratic communities but at the same time public 
interests are also afforded greater weight. This increases tension at the interface between the 
public and private areas of life and requires that we define, with as much clarity as possible, 
where the boundaries between the two areas lie. Arguably, it is the function of privacy to 
provide a mechanism to ensure that such boundaries are well constituted. A legally 
protected right to privacy ensures that such boundaries are ultimately respected. It also 
provides recognition of the fact that at times certain areas of life can, and should, be kept 
separate. As Schoeman states,
...respect for privacy signifies our recognition that not all 
dimensions or persons or relationships need to serve some 
independently valid social purpose.9^
4.1. - CURRENT THREATS TO PRIVACY
The justification for examining privacy at the present time can be linked with the above. 
Western democracies have evolved and progressed over the last two hundred years but 
never before has there been the potential for as many different forms of invasion of privacy 
as exist today. Various explanations have been put forward as to why there seems to have 
been a rise in concern, especially in the twentieth century92.
Such legislation com es in a variety o f forms ranging from  prohibition w ith the threat o f  criminal sanction, 
through civil liability to  the use of fiscal means to  control behaviour.
95 Strom holm , S.; 'Rights o f Privacy and Rights o f the Personality : A  Comparative Study'. Stockholm , P.A . 
N orstedt and Sdners Forlag, 1967, at 17.
9*^ See, Schoeman, F .D .; 'Privacy and Intimate Inform ation’, in Schoeman, 'Philosophical D im ensions o f  
Privacy: A n  A nthology', op. cit., chapter 17, at 413.
92 For a som ewhat dated but neverthless interesting survey o f U K  attitudes see. Y ounger C om m ittee, Cmnd  
5012, 1972. The C om m ittee at that tim e found that privacy rated highly in the concerns o f the U K  public.
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4.2. - The Twentieth Century and the C ontinuing Process of Démocratisation
Antoine Prost has posited that one significant change which has occurred in the twentieth 
century has been a greater division between home and work life. This has resulted because 
more people have begun to work in someone else's space rather than their own. He argues 
that this physical division between the workplace and the home has led to a greater 
separation in the minds of people between the two spheres of life^ ®. This in turn has led to 
an increased reluctance to allow one to encroach on the other^ .^ One might view this as 
part of a continuing process. In the 19th century living conditions required individuals to 
live and work closely with one another and this resulted in increased desire for both spatial 
and informational privacy. Today, the de facto division which exists for most people 
between their work and home life provides them with a clearer division between the two 
spheres of life and therefore provides them with more privacy. However, this has in turn 
led to a greater division between the two spheres in the individuals' minds which has led to 
a greater desire to maintain such a division, that is, a greater desire for privacy. This
ranking in im portance on ly  after concerns about crime prevention, unem ploym ent and educational 
standards. O n  a wider level, Benn, 'A  T heory o f Freedom ', op. cit., at 294ff, considers that the rise in interest 
concerning privacy rights in western states can be attributed to social changes o f  tw o kinds: cultural and 
technological. Posner, w ho has offered an econom ic analysis o f privacy, argues that the increase in personal 
incom e over tim e has led to greater likelihood  o f invasions of privacy and correspondingly more desire for 
privacy. A s he notes, '[t]here is apparently very little privacy in poor societies, where, consequently, people 
can readily observe at first hand the intimate lives o f others. Personal surveillance is costlier in wealthier 
societies, both  because people live in conditions that give them  greater privacy and because the value (and 
hence the opportunity cost) of tim e is greater - too  great, in fact, to  make the expenditure o f a lot o f it in 
w atching the neighbours a w orthw hile pursuit. A n  alternative m ethod o f inform ing oneself about how  others 
live was sought by the people and provided by the press. A  legitimate and im portant function of the press is 
to  provide specialization in prying in societies w here the cost o f obtaining inform ation have becom e too  great 
for the N o z y  Parker.', see Posner, R .A .; 'A n  E conom ic T heory o f Privacy', in Schoeman, 'Philosophical 
D im ensions o f Privacy: A n  A nthology', op. cit., chapter 15, at 335.
9® See, Prost, A.; 'Public and Private Spheres in France', in Prost, A . and Vincent, G. (eds); 'A H istory of 
Private Life', op. cit., at 9 - 49. A t 27 he com m ents, 'The contrast between private life and w ork life is 
nowadays embedded in the very structure o f m odern cities and scedules. People no longer w ork where they  
live or live w here they w ork. This principle applies not just to apartments and w orkshops but the w hole  
neighbourhoods. Every day huge populations migrate between hom e and workplace by autom obile and mass 
transportation.'
99 ibid.
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phenomenon demonstrates the voracious appetite of privacy - the more it is fed the more it 
requires feeding
Prost has noted the spread of privacy concerns through all strata of society in the twentieth 
century. As he says,
...the twentieth century may be seen as a period during which 
the differentiation of public and private, at first limited to the 
bourgeoisie, slowly spread throughout the population. Thus, 
in one sense the history of private life is a history ofdemocratization.
If one accepts that with the progress of 'democratization' has come a rise in the 'need' for 
privacy and, therefore, a growth in the importance of privacy, the continued progress of 
'democratization' around the world provides a further justification for examining privacy 
and the nature of its role in such a process. Certainly, the western liberal tradition would 
seem to have been vindicated by its apparent 'success' as a blueprint for a 'good society'. 
The recent demise of the USSR and the soviet-block communist countries and their 
replacement by 'democratic' systems says more about the world-wide perception of the 
values and accomplishments of liberalist capitalism than it does about the effectiveness of 
communism. As one commentator has said.
"^50 There is som e empirical evidence to support this. In 1972 the Y ounger C om m ittee on Privacy 
com m issioned a survey w hich aimed to established public attitudes towards privacy. A m on g it conclusions it 
stated the fo llow in g : '[e]ven if there is today m ore real privacy for som e than hitherto, our survey o f public 
attitudes to privacy shows that people w h o  have becom e accustomed to privacy prize it the m ore highly.', see 
Y ounger C om m ittee, 1972, at 24. A  sum m ary o f the survey is found at A ppendix E  in the report.
Prost, A .; 'Introduction', in Prost and V incent, op. cit., at 7.
^^ 2 O ther 'tw entieth century developm ents' o f pertinence to privacy, are also observed b y Prost. For  
exam ple, he notes, '[a] half-centuiy ago the family took  precedence over the individual; n ow  the individual 
takes precedence over the family. The individual was once an intrinsic part of his or her family. Private life 
was secondary, subordinate and in m any cases secret or marginal. N o w  the relation o f individual to family  
has been reversed. Today, exept for m aternity, the fam ily is nothing m ore than a tem porary meeting place 
for its individual members. Each Individual lives his or her ow n life and in doing so expects support from  a 
n o w  informal family. A  person w h o  considers his or her family suffocating is free to seek rewarding contacts 
elsewhere. Private life used to  coincide w ith  fam ily life; n ow  the family is judged by the contribution it 
makes to  the individual private lives o f its members.', see Prost, Public and Private Spheres in France loc. 
cit., pp. 67 - 102, at 84.
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There are few states in the world today that are not 
proclaimed by their rulers to be 'democracies', whatever their actual political complexion may bed°5
Moreover, the heightened role of privacy within such a 'democratic' state or system has not 
gone unnoticed^°4_ As Barth has put it,
It is [a respect for privacy] as much as in any other single 
characteristic that the free society differs from the totalitarianstated°5
A similar view is expressed by Bryant,
Totalitarians are, in principle, unwilling to tolerate reserves 
of privacy. Lenin told the young communists in 1920, "We 
recognise nothing private. Our morality is entirely 
subordinate to the interests of the class struggle of the 
proletariat".^^^
The apparent connectedness between democracy (or démocratisation) and privacy indicates 
clearly the appropriateness of the choice of the western liberal democracy as a context 
within which to study privacy.
4.3, - The Technology Society: N ew  Threats to Spatial and Informational Privacy
In all spheres of life sophistication in computers, photographic equipment, bugging and 
recording devices has increased dramatically the likelihood of a breakdown in the
See Fukuyam a, F.; 'The End o f F listory?', 16, The N ational Interest, 3, 1989, and Fukuyam a, F.; 'R eply to  
M y C ritics', 18, The N ational Interest, 21, 1989. See also, Kryl, M.; 'Are W e Facing the Trium ph o f Liberalism  
and the End o f H istory?', in Brecher, B. and Fleischm ann, O ., (eds.); 'Liberalism and the N e w  Europe', 
Aldershot, A vebury, 1993, at 49 - 58.
^^ 4 See, for example, W estin, 'Privacy and Freedom ', op. cit., especially chapter tw o, Benn, 'A  T heory o f  
Freedom ', op. cit., at 289 - 297, Kupfer, J.; 'Privacy. A u ton om y and Self-Concept', loc. cit., Hallborg, R.G.; 
'Principles o f Liberty and the Right to Privacy'. 5, L aw  an d  Philosophy, 175, 1986, and Hirschleifer, J.; 
'Privacy: Its O rigin. Function and Future'. 9. Journal o f  Legal Studies, 649, 1980,
Barth, A.; 'The Price o f L iberty*. N e w  Y ork, The V iking Press, 1961, at 12.
106 Bryant, C .G .A .; 'Privacy. Privatisation and Self-D eterm ination', in Y oung, J.B. (ed.); 'Privacy', op. cit., at 
7 0 - 7 1 .
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distinction between public and private life in the twentieth century^°2 This has, 
understandably, been accompanied by a corresponding rise in the degree of concern which 
individuals feel about their personal privacy. For example, in 1972 the Younger Committee 
on Privacy published the results of a survey which it had conducted to determine the 
attitudes of members of the public towards various forms of 'invasion of privacy’ 
Individuals were asked, inter alia, to consider whether, in general, people had less privacy 
than before. It was found that 58% of those interviewed thought that this was so. Only 19% 
thought that people had more privacy. The remaining 23% did not think the situation had 
changed. As the Report states,
This view of the general decline of privacy was held by every 
sub-group formed by analysis on several dimensions such as age, 
and socio-economic grouping, except the small group (3%) who 
rated "protecting people's privacy as not at all i m p o r t a n t " .
The main reason given by respondents for their feelings that privacy had declined was the 
increase in the number of forms one must fill in which led to a feeling that too much was 
known about individuals by a wide variety of organisations The second most common 
reason advanced was that privacy decline was due to housing being more crowded together 
with neighbours overlooking one's house and g a r de n ^I t  is submitted that although this 
survey was commissioned and carried out over two decades ago there is nothing which has 
changed so radically in contemporary society which might lead us to expect that the results
^^ 2 For an interesting exam ination o f the US state cases on  privacy concerns surrounding com piuters, see 
Karasik, E.FL; 'A  N orm ative Analysis o f D isclosure. Privacy, and Computers : The State Cases', 10, 
C om puter/Law  Journal, 603, 1990.
108 Younger, The Report o f  the C om m ittee on Privacy, C m nd. 5012, July 1972. A  shortened version of the 
survey report is contained in A ppendix E o f the C om m ittee's report. The C om m ittee discusses its 
conclusions about the survey in chapter six, paiticulary paragraphs 98 - 102. 236, Table F; 239, Table J.
^^ 9 A ppendix E, at 232.
110 id.
111 These responses were to a question w hich asked about feelings o f the decline o f privacy in gerenal. This 
should be compared w ith  the resposne obtained w hen people were asked if they felt their their personal 
privacy had been eroded in the last five years o f their life. H ere the opinion was almost equally balanced. A  
paradox? Perhaps, but the Report explains this apparent disparity thus, '[t]he explanation lies partly in the 
connection between privacy and age, since younger people were more likely to have increased their privacy  
by gaining independence from  their family, and partly in a general feeling of anxiety about the extent to  
w hich the general deterioration in privacy might m ight affect the individual in the future.', ibid  at 242.
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would be very different if the same survey were conducted today112, That said, and the age 
of the Younger survey aside, a problem exists concerning the value of this survey and the 
kinds of conclusions which one can draw from its findings. This has been articulated by 
Wacks,
...an attitudinal survey, of the kind conducted by the Younger 
Committee,...can, at best, illustrate only that a certain 
proportion of those questioned regard their 'privacy' invaded by 
certain forms of conduct or that they have experienced particular 
forms of such invasions to a greater or, lesser extent. And, 
though such research may reveal interesting attitudes, they do 
not directly address the question of whether there is a social 
'problem' of sufficient gravity to warrant legal control or
regulation. 115
Writing in 1989, Wack's solution was another surveyH4. His, however, targeted solicitors 
in metropolitan England, Wales and Northern Irelandu^ rather than members of the 
general public. His aim was to establish the degree to which individuals are subjected to 
assaults on their privacy of a sufficiently serious nature for them to take action, legal or 
otherwise, to prevent their recurrence or to seek to remedy their loss of "pr i vacy . "Hi s  
findings are revealing. First, 43.4% of the total number of actual complaints received 
concerned the alleged misuse of confidential information (computerised or otherwise). This 
represented the largest group of reported claims and mirrors the finding of the Younger 
Committee. Second, Wacks discovered what he calls 'an unexpectedly high number' of 
complaints in respect of 'intrusion'. By this he means telephone-tapping, bugging, spying, 
photographing or electronic surveillance of private activities. 30.9% of the total number of
5^ 2 jt should also be noted that of a category o f seven civil and social rights (which included im proving race 
relations, protecting the freedom o f the press and giving equal rights for w om en) protecting people's privacy  
was ranked the m ost im portant. In this context it is subm itted that a different outcom e might w ell result 
today. This does not mean how ever that privacy concerns in se have diminished any, but sim ply that other 
concerns, such as accepting racial and sexual equality, have taken on increased im portance compared to  1972. 
^^ 5 Wacks, R.; 'Personal Inform ation. Privacy and the Law', op. cit., at 135 - 136.
^^ 4 See generally, Wacks, 'Private Inform ation. Privacy and the Law ', op. cit., chapter four.
^^ 5 This included law centres and the N ational C ouncil for Civil Liberties. 
ibid, at 138.
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actual complaints received concerned intrusion. Once again, this reflects the results of the 
Younger Committee which found that intrusion was of particular concern to individuals.
What can we conclude from these surveys? It can be seen that both show a high degree of 
concern for informational privacy, as demonstrated both by a section of the general public 
chosen at random (Younger) and from a sample of those who have sought professional 
advice on their legal position (Wacks). By contrast, Wacks' survey does not seem to ask 
about invasions of spatial p r i v a c y ^ This is not surprising since his thesis argues that 
privacy should be seen solely in terms of protection and control of personal information^i®. 
Nevertheless, both surveys show a heightened awareness of the special nature of a private 
sphere and record considerable abhorrence among individuals when this sphere is felt to be 
invaded. Both Younger and Wacks reflect a view of the world which divides our existence 
into separate spheres. In one sphere - the public she re - we can be observed, listened to and 
interacted with by others and no feelings of invasion or intrusion arise. By contrast, in the 
private sphere - often represented by the home and the family unit - similar acts by others 
meet with considerable hostility and induce strong feelings of violation and intrusion. We 
have seen that the Younger survey recorded the second highest response for feelings of 
intrusion through close-proximity living. It should also be noted that Wacks observed a 
very high number of persons experiencing feelings of intrusion because of alleged 
surveillance of private activities. N ow , it might be argued that such concerns as noted by 
Wacks relate solely to informational privacy rather than spatial privacy - the concern of the 
individuals in question being the obtaining of information by surreptitious means. Whereas 
this is no doubt part of the concern, it is submitted that it does not accurately reflect the 
reality of the situation. It is unfortunate that Wack’s survey does not provide us with more
^^ 2 T he questionnaire was presented as follow s. "In the last five years, approxim ately h ow  m any persons have 
sought advice in respect o f possible legal action they m ight pursue from : a) the alleged 'tapping' o f  their 
phone?, b) the alleged 'bugging' o f their hom e or office?, c) the alleged spying upon, photographing or 
electronic suiweillance o f their private activities?, d) the publication w ithout their consent o f private facts by  
the new s media?, e) the use w ithout their consent o f their name or picture for advertising or other 
com m ercial purposes?, f) the alleged misuse o f confidential inform ation (computerised or otherwise) e.g. by  
credit rating agencies or the N ational H ealth  Service?". See Wacks, op. cit., at 142.
See further infra, chapter five.
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detail on the precise nature of the concerns of individuals who sought legal advice. In 
particular, we do not know whether their complaints arose because certain information had 
been obtained by clandestine surveillance. The relevant questions asked simply, Tn the last 
five years, approximately how many persons have sought advice in respect of possible legal 
action they might pursue arising from : a) the alleged 'tapping' of their phone?, b) the 
alleged 'bugging' of their home or office?, c) the alleged spying upon, photographing or 
electronic surveillance of their private a c t i v i t i e s ? ' ^^9 These questions tend to suggest that i t  
is the act of surveillance, rather than the obtaining of any personal information therefrom, 
which has been the concern of individuals. Furthermore, given that Wacks later asks 
specifically about complaints concerning, 'the alleged misuse of confidential information 
(computerized or o t h e r w i s e )  ' ^ 20  ^ it is suggested here that his survey shows indirectly that 
feelings of invasion are experienced even i f  no information is gathered. One could be 
engaged in perfectly innocuous activities such as reading or watching television, yet many 
of us will maintain that an invasion of privacy has occurred if we are subjected to 
clandestine observation. I t  is suggested that these feelings correspond to the construct of 
spatial privacy: a sphere which can be invaded by mere observation and need not be 
connected to informational privacy. In this respect, it can be concluded that the surveys of 
both Younger and Wacks reveal a high degree of concern for the protection of such a 
conception of privacy. Thus, both surveys reveal not only that individuals perceive privacy 
as a construct which embodies two concepts (spatial and informational separateness), but 
also that there is serious concern about the protection of such spheres of life.
4.4. - Privacy and the Press
Personal privacy has been put under increased threat in recent years by the vagaries of the 
media, and in particular the press. Sir David Calcutt has been the central figure in a long
^^ 9 Wacks, op. cit., at 142.
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drawn out saga in the United Kingdom concerning the need for tighter controls on the 
press and the protection of individual privacy.
In the UK there is no direct legal protection of personal privacy (informational, spatial or 
otherwise), although certain privacy interests are protected in an ancillary manner through 
other legal rights and rights of action. For example, the law of breach of confidence 
protects confidential information - an important subset of personal information. Similarly, 
the law of trespass protects property interests which can in turn protect personal spatial 
interests by ensuring limited access to property and therefore limited access to persons on 
the property. However, towards the end of the 1980s there was a growing concern about 
the activities of the press in intruding on the lives of individuals coupled with a growing 
realisation that existing laws could not protect adequately all of the privacy interests which 
individuals would like to enjoy. In April 1989 it was announced that a Committee would 
be set up under the Chairmanship of David Calcutt QC with the following terms of 
reference:
In the light of the recent public concern about intrusions into the 
private lives of individuals by certain sections of the press, to 
consider what measures (whether legislative or otherwise) are 
needed to give further protection to individual privacy from the 
activities of the press and improve recourse against the press for 
the individual citizen, taking account of existing remedies, 
including the law of defamation and breach of confidence; and to
make recommendations
Like the Younger Committee before it, however, the Calcutt Committee declined to
recommend the introduction of a statutory right of privacy in the UK^ ^ .^ Instead, the focus
of the Committee fell on the establishment of the Press Complaints Commission (PCC)
which was designed to replace the Press Council as the self-regulatory body of the press.
The PCC was given 18 months to prove that it could adequately police the press and
H om e Office, Report o f  the C om m ittee on Privacy and Related Matters (The Calcutt Report), Cm  1102, 
H M SG , June 1990, at 1. 
ibid, paragraph 12.5.
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provide effective means of redress for complaints by individuals concerning intrusive 
journalistic practices. Recommendations regarding legal measures to tighten individual 
privacy protection were confined to the establishment of certain criminal offences in 
England and Wales and the right to complain to the PCC and seek redress for any privacy 
invasions. During its investigations the Committee found that although a wide range of 
complaints had been received about press activity, the nature of the complaints could be 
arranged into two distinct categories of intrusion into privacy:
• physical intrusion by reporters and/or photographers; and
• publication of intrusive material.
The Committee made reference to a recent survey which had been conducted by MORI for 
the News of the World on 28 - 30 November 1989^ 3^ This showed that 73% of those 
sampled considered that the press intruded too much into the lives of public figures. That 
said, only 29% of the sample thought that tighter laws for privacy protection were 
required. The Committee commented that,
We have found no reliable evidence to show whether 
unwarranted intrusion into individual privacy has or has not 
risen over the last twenty years^ 24_
This of course is restricted to invasion by the press. Yet, despite the above comment, the 
Committee felt that there existed a need for legislation to address the problem of intrusion 
into the lives of individuals by the use of surveillance technologies. It proposed criminal 
offences along the following lines^ ^^ :
ibid, paragraph 4.6. 
ibid, paragrpah 4.8.
ibid, paragraph 6.33. D efences were outlines as follow s : 'It should be a defence to any o f these proposed  
offences that the act was done - a. for the purposes o f  preventing, detecting or exposing the com m ission o f  
any crime, or other seriously anti-social conduct; or b. for the protection o f public health or safety; or c. 
under any lawful authority.', see paragraph 6.35.
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The following acts should he criminal offences in England and Wales:
a. entering private property, without the consent o f the lawful occupant, with the intent to 
obtain personal information with a view to its publication;
b. placing a surveillance device on private property, without the consent o f the lawful 
occupant, with the intent to obtain perso?ial information with a view to its publication;
c. taking a photograph, or recording the voice, o f  an individual who is on private property, 
without his consent, with a view to its publication and with the intent that the individual 
shall be identified.
It is submitted that these criminal offences are premised on a view of spatial privacy which 
bears out that argued for above. It can be seen that although entry onto private property is 
necessary in the case of (a) and (b), the same is not true of offence (c). Thus, actual physical 
intrusion is not always necessary for an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, in the case of (a) 
and (b) no actual personal information need be obtained to constitute an invasion of 
privacy. It is sufficient that the private sphere has been penetrated and there is an intention 
to seek out such information for publication. That is, it is the invasion of the private space 
rather than the taking of private information which is thought to constitute the offensive 
behaviour. Similarly, as regards offence (c) it is not the obtaining of information in the 
guise of a photograph or a voice sample which is necessarily the invasion of privacy - for 
this could occur when the person was in public - but rather it is the obtaining of this 
information when the person is in the private sphere. It is important to note that there is 
no qualification that the information be 'personal' or 'private'. This suggests that the focus 
of the offence, as with (a) and (b), is the invasion of the private sphere rather than the 
obtaining of personal information. Together these suggested offences suggest not only a 
loophole in the existing law, but also a perceived need for greater protection in the field of 
spatial privacy.
In July 1992 David Calcutt was again asked to report on the issue of privacy and press 
regulation. This came about because of a failure on the part of the press to implement 
successfully the recommendations of Calcutt I and because no action had been taken
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regarding the introduction of the criminal offences outlined above. In an amazing turn­
around, the Report of Calcutt II recommended that further consideration should be given 
by the Government to the introduction of a statutory right of privacy in the It was
also recommended that the criminal offences be enacted (with minor c h a n g e s )  *^7 Jjq 
response a Consultation Paper was produced by the Lord Chancellor's Department in 
association with the Scottish O f f i c e I n  the end, however, Calcutt's recommendations 
concerning a statutory right to privacy were rejected^^ .^ Moreover, no steps have, to date, 
been taken to implement the criminal provisions protecting spatial privacy. It is 
undeniable, however, that there remain considerable concerns about this form of personal 
privacy. The inaction of the UK Government will serve only to exacerbate such concerns.
4.5. -The European and International D im ension
The rise in concern for personal privacy can also be witnessed on the International and 
European leveP^°. In particular, the need to protect informational privacy has been 
advocated by a number of bodies over the last few decades. As long ago as 1980 the Council 
of the OECD issued guidelines on the protection of privacy and cross-border flows of 
personal data^^h In 1981, the Council of Europe issued a Convention for the Protection of
Departm ent o f N ational Heritage, R eview  of Press Self-Regulation, Cm 2135, H M SO , January 1993, 
paragraphs 7.33 - 7.42.
ibid, paragraphs 7.1 - 7.31. The changes proposed do not affect the essential nature o f the offences, as 
discussed above. It should be noted that because the Report recom m ended the introduction of a statutory  
com plaints tribunal, an alternative approach that was offered was to incorporate the substance of the criminal 
offences into a statutory code w hich  the tribunal w ou ld  admisiter. This proposal was endorsed by the 
N ational Pleritage Select C om m ittee, see - H C  294-1, 1993.
Lord Chancellor's D epartm ent/Scottish  Office, Infringem ent o f Privacy, July 1993.
This occurred in  the summ er o f 1995, see debate at 263 H .C .D eb . c.1323, follow ing the announcem ent o f  
the response o f the G overnm ent to the recom m endations for a privacy law - Cm.2918, 1995.
130 P q j -  com m ent see, Brennan, T.J. and M acA uley, M.K.; 'R em ote Sensing Satellites and Privacy: A  
Fram ework for P olicy Assessm ent', 4(3), Law^Computers an d A rtificial Intelligence, 233, (1995); Tupm an, 
W .A.; 'Cross-national Criminal Databases: The O ngoing Search for Safeguards', 4(3), Law, Com puter and  
A rtificia l Intelligence, 261, (1995); Slee, D .; 'Privacy and the European U nion  : A n Exam ination o f the 
Provenance and C ontent o f the Forthcom ing Data Protection Directive and its Likely Impact on U K  Data 
Protection L aw ', 4(3), Law, Computers an d A rtificia l Intelligence, 277, (1995), and Reidenberg, J.R.; 'Privacy in 
the Inform ation Econom y: A  Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?', 44, Federal Com m unications L aw  
Journal, 195, 1992.
23 September 1980.
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Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. To date this is the only 
international legal instrument in this field^ ^^ .
The European Community has long been aware of the problems and concerns relating to 
cross-border personal data exchanges and in a number of resolutions dating back as far as 
1976 the European Parliament has expressed considerable disquiet about the lack of 
harmonisation in this area within the Community. Several calls have been made to the 
Commission to prepare draft legislation aimed at remedying the situation^^ .^ In 1981 the 
Commission issued a recommendation which made it clear that it considered protection in 
this area to be of fundamental importance, and recommended that member states ratify the 
Council of Europe Convention before the end of 1982. The failure of many member states 
to do so and the diversity of national approaches to the protection of personal data 
eventually led the Commission to produce, not one, but two draft directives aimed at 
harmonisation of Community laws. COM (90) 314 final - SYN 287 was issued on 13 
September 1990 and contained a proposal for a Council Directive concerning the 
Protection of Individuals in relation to the Processing of Personal Data^ '^^ . On the same day 
and in the same document^^^, the Commission also proposed a Council Directive on the 
Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in the context of Public Digital 
Telecommunications Networks, in particular the Integrated Services Digital Network  
(ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks. It was felt that this second directive was 
necessary to supplement the general directive by applying the general principles of data 
protection to the specific requirements of the new telecommunications networks. The 
Council and the European Parliament had stressed on many occasions the need to protect
N o te , however, the C onvention  leaves open a large num ber o f  options for the im plem entation o f  basic 
principles w hich it upholds.
133 OJ N o  ClOO, 3 /5 /1 9 7 6 , p.27; OJ N o  C140, 5 /6 /1 9 7 9 , p.34; OJ N o  C87, 5 /4 /1 9 8 2 , p.39.
134 A  lacuna in U K  Data Protection law  is thought to  have been exposed by the H ouse o f I.ords decision in R  
V Brown  [1996] 1 ALL ER 545. For com m ent see, M orton, J.; ‘Data Protection and Privacy', 10, European 
Intellectual Property R eview  y 558, 1996.
135 C O M  (90) 314 final - SY N  288.
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personal privacy in light of developing t e c h n o l o g i e s i 3 6 .  The general directive was eventually 
adopted in its final form on 24 October 1995137. In response the UK Government produced 
a consultation paper inviting views on how it might best implement the provisions of the 
directivei38. This must be done before 24 October 1998139. The telecommunications 
network directive remains in a draft form. For the purposes of this chapter the production 
of these directives reinforces the argument already advanced that to an unprecendented 
degree the potential threat to informational privacy is greater now than it has ever been. 
The arguments concerning spatial privacy have already been made. Thus we see that for 
both conceptions of privacy advanced in this work - spatial privacy and informational 
privacy - there are very good reasons for seeking at the present time to study the 
desirability and efficacy of legal protection of personal privacy. Historical and sociological 
events have conspired to produce a society which values individuals yet which threatens 
their privacy interests almost as a matter of course. It is therefore submitted that it is a 
valuable and worthwhile exercise to examine the concept of privacy along the lines outlined 
herein. I t  has already been stated that the focus of this work is privacy in the health care 
setting. The next section explains why this context was chosen.
136 OJ N o  C257, 4 /1 9 /1 9 8 8 , p .l;  OJ N o  C 196, 1 /8 /1 9 8 9 , p.4; OJ N o  C7, 12 /1 /1 9 8 7 , p.334; OJ N o  C12, 
1 6 /1 /1 9 8 9 , p .66; OJ N o  C12, 1 6 /1 /1 9 8 9 , p.69.
137 D ir 95 /4 6 , OJ L 281/31 , 23 N ovem b er 1995.
138 H o m e O ffice, C onsultation Paper on  the EC  D ata Protection D irective (9 5 /4 6 /E C ), H M SO , March 1996.
139 F or com m ent on  h ow  the D irective w ill affect rights in the U K  see, H ogg, M.; 'P ih  
D ata Protection R ights', 1996 Scots L aw  Times 127.
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5.1. - PRIVACY IN  CONTEXT: TH E HEALTH CARE SETTING
As has already been stated, privacy has found a role to play in very many areas of life. And, 
for the large number of areas where privacy has found a role, there is a corresponding large 
number of different roles which privacy plays. To attempt a discussion of privacy in all such 
areas would be foolhardy. It is submitted that it is necessary to focus on one area of life - 
one aspect of the interface between the individual and society - in order to carry out a 
worthwhile and sufficiently in-depth study of privacy. This means, therefore, that what is 
said in this work must be seen as context specific. The definition of privacy which is 
offered, the function it is perceived as having, and the role which it is argued it should play, 
are limited by the setting in which the discussion is carried out. This is not to say that what 
is argued in this work will not be of some relevance to privacy in other contexts, it is 
simply to state that no warranty is given as the applicability of what is said outside the 
chosen context for this discussion. The chosen context is that of health care. The focus of 
this work is, therefore, patient privacy.
5.2. - Privacy : A  Concept in Search of a Context
To a great extent, the reasons for choosing the health care setting as a context for this 
discussion of privacy mirror the reasons for setting the entire work within the broad 
context of the western liberal tradition. The need to choose a context is dictated by the 
nature of the concept of privacy. Privacy is exceptionally difficult to define. One can offer a 
variety of different definitions of privacy, some of which can conflict, and some of which 
are antithetical to each other, yet almost all of which can be justified and are p la u s ib le ^ ^ o .  
This thesis is not intended to involve a philosophical discussion of the range of possible 
meanings of privacy. Nor, is it intended to provide a definitive account of privacy. Rather, 
it is intended to argue for a particular conception of privacy which will be of practical use
140 w ill be discussed further in chapter five, infra.
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in helping us to understand the kinds of individual interests which are at stake in the health 
care context and in appreciating the role which the law might have in recognising and 
protecting such interests. For such a particular conception is required a particular setting, 
the limits of which are relatively certain and the function of privacy therein relatively clear. 
The reasons for choosing as that context the health care setting are outlined below.
5.3. - H ealth Prom otion S>c the 'Cult of the Body'
Axiomatically, the rise of western liberal democracy has spawned a very egocentric society. 
For the majority, one's private life takes considerable precedence over social or community 
matters. Moreover, Prost has argued that,
[t]here is no more telling sign of the primacy of individual life than the modern cult of the body.^^i
This is a reference to the near-obsessional interest displayed by many in the western world 
concerning personal appearance and body management. Prost cites increases in concern 
with personal hygiene, physical fitness and healthy eating as evidence of the development of 
such a c u l t  4^2 The consequence of all of this, he notes, is that the body has become the focal 
point of personal identity,
[t]o be ashamed of one's body is to be ashamed of o n e s e l f .  4^3
With the increased interest in the body has come an increased concern with threats to the 
body. Arguably, the most consistent and persistent threat to the body is illness. N ot 
surprisingly, therefore, concerns about ill health have taken a sharp rise in recent t i m e s 4^4 
Indeed, the promotion of health and well-being has become of paramount importance to
4^1 Prost, A .; 'T he Fam ily and the Individuar. in Prost and V incent, 'The H istory o f Private Life', op. cit., at 
93.
142 ihid., at 87 - 101.
143 ihid., at 93.
144 Prost discusses this at 95 - 98.
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western society. O f course, the health of individuals is of importance to all societies, but it 
is with unwaiverable conviction that western states place the pursuit of health as primary 
among the prerequisites of a 'good life'. Further, in such states health has come to mean, 
not just the absence of illness, but the attainment of a state of well-being which includes an 
entire range of desirable features and characteristics, including physical fitness, 
attractiveness to others, correctness of proportions and psychological s t a b i l i t y  145. Often the 
attainment of this state is achieved with the help of modern medicine. Technological 
advances have allowed the boundaries of medicine to be pushed ever further forward, 
making the treatment of actual ill health but one option in a range of possible options 
offered to patients. As more can be done for the 'health' of the populus, so more interest is 
taken by the populus in its ' h e a l t h ' 4^6  ^ This helps to explain the importance of health 
promotion - and therefore health care - in western societies. It is submitted that it is valid to 
choose the health care setting as a context for a discussion of privacy because of the 
important place which health care has in our society and because of the strong connection 
which exists between concerns about health promotion and concerns about privacy 
protection.
5.4. - Body, Self and Privacy
The link between the self and the body is an obvious one for various reasons, not least of 
which is the fact that the body is seen to 'house' the self and be governed by it. 
Furthermore, the body is a tangible and real manifestation of the abstract we call 'the self 
which makes the latter easier to conceptualize. Body and self are inextricably linked, and 
often - and quite naturally - the two are perceived as being one and the same. Protection of 
the body therefore becomes synonymous with protection of the self. So, in circumstances
4^5 T he W orld H ealth  O rganisation defined 'health' in its C onstitution  o f 1946 as '...state of com plete 
physical, mental and social w ell-being, and not m erely the absence o f disease or infirm ity.', W H O ; 
'C on stitu tion '. N e w  Y ork, W H O , 1946.
4^6 The habit o f turning to m edicine for the p rom otion  o f health has been called the ' m edicalization o f  
health' and it is not always perceived as appropriate or desireable, see, for exam ple, D ow n ie , R .S., Fyfe, C. 
and Tannahill, A.; 'H ealth  P rom otion: M odels and Values', O xford, O xford U niversity Press, 1990, at 1.
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where the body is under threat, for example by disease or illness, individuals can experience 
feelings of deep violation of their inner self and invasion of a sphere of their life over which 
they thought they had exclusive control. As the Danish Council of Ethics has put it,
Disease - especially severe disease - is a personal matter In the 
sense that it concerns fundamental aspects of a human being's 
person: the potentiality for physical development, pain, 
suffering and, ultimately, death. A person's outlook on his 
own disease is therefore a decisive part of his relationship 
with himself. To a verjr great degree, this relationship is 
instrumental in determining an individual's personal sphere, 
that part of life which a person is entitled to keep tohimself. 147
Moreover, if individuals subject themselves to health care in an attempt to remove the 
immediate threat to their body, in the process this might exacerbate the feelings of 
violation and invasion which have been experienced. For example, in order to assist in the 
betterment of health, very often aspects of the self have to be revealed to health care 
providers. Thus, the body must be exposed to detailed examination, intimate and personal 
details have to be disclosed, family histories must be recounted, and humiliating procedures 
must be braved. The end result of all of this may, or may not, be an improvement in 
health. The ultimate goal of health care, therefore, may, or may not, have been achieved. 
But in the process, the Individual has revealed his or her inner self to others, has given away 
personal information and knowledge and has been exposed to invasive incursions on the 
body. O f course, this is not to say that health care is necessarily a threat to that private 
sphere of an individual’s life, but it does highlight how the provision of health care is 
intimately connected with the private life of individuals and also how health care provides 
the means for potentially serious invasions of privacy.
4^7 See, D anish C ouncil o f  Ethics, 'Ethics and M apping the ITuman G enom e*. 1993, at 52.
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5.5. “ Threats to Patient Privacy in the Health Care Setting
There are many ways in which the provision of modern health care and the machine of 
modern medicine pose potential threats to patient privacy. An example is found in the use 
of wards to care for patients. Some of the most personal moments of one's life are lived out 
in hospitals, yet easy access to persons is afforded by a system which places groups of 
patients together in the same room with no separation between them save a flimsy curtain. 
Conversations about diagnosis, prognosis and treatment can be overheard, notes are left at 
the end of patients' beds which can easily be read, and generally, the practice of everyday 
medicine is conducted before an audience consisting not only of other patients, but also 
families and friends of such patients and other visitors to the institution. Even when 
patients have private rooms the position is not much improved. Access to their person and 
information about their condition is freely available to a range of hospital staff: both 
clinical and ancillary. Doctors, nurses, auxilliaries, support staff, cleaners, and 
administrators can all gain such access. Even unauthorised visitors can easily breach the 
security of hospitals to invade the privacy of p a t i e n t s 4^8 Indeed, one of the most celebrated 
privacy cases to be heard in the UK courts in recent times involved just such a scenario.
5.5.1. - The case o f  Kaye v  Robertson
In Kaye v  Robertson^^'^ a British television actor, Gorden Kaye, had been seriously injured 
during the winter storms of 1990 and underwent brain surgery at Charing Cross Hospital 
in London. While he was in a private room recovering, two reporters from the Sunday 
Sport newspaper gained access to his room, carried out an interview and took some 
photographs. Their intention was to publish these in a subsequent issue of the newspaper.
4^8 This m ay sound like a plea for greater security in hospitals, but it is not. It is an exam ple of h ow  patients 
are placed in  an extrem ely vulnerable setting w hen  in the hands o f health care providers. T he nature o f the 
institutions o f  medical care is such that tight security is a scarce and ill-affordable luxury. This is a fact o f  life. 
But, it should  nevertheless be recognised that this feature o f  m odern health care serves to  heighten the privacy 
concerns o f  the incum bents o f such institutions.
149 [199X] FSR 62. This case is discussed in m ore detail, infra.
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Mr Kaye, however, had no recollection of the interview minutes after it had taken place 
and, in any event, was in no state to give valid consent to its publication. Yet, on seeking a 
remedy to prevent publication, he was, in effect, u n s u c c e s s f u F ^ o  The extent of his remedy 
was to have a statement published along with the story and photographs which made it 
clear that they had been obtained without the plaintiff's consent. In his judgment Leggatt 
L.J. made the following comments,
[the] right [of privacy] has so long been disregarded here that 
it can be recognised now only by the legislature....it is to be 
hoped that the making good of this signal shortcoming in out­law will not be long d e l a y e d ,
This case, perhaps more than any other, has highlighted the woeful inadequacy of English 
law in relation to the legal protection of personal privacy. N o  better protection has been 
recognised or accorded by the Scottish c o u r t s ^^2 That the circumstances which gave rise to 
this case took place in a health care setting is significant. As Bingham L.J. said,
If ever a person has a right to be let alone by strangers with no 
public interest to pursue it must surely be when he lies in 
hospital recovering from brain surgery and in no more than partial command of his f a c u l t i e s . ^^3
The vulnerable position in which persons find themselves in the health care setting makes 
all the more pressing the need for adequate and effective protection of their interests, 
including those of privacy. Moreover, this case provides a good example of how the privacy 
interests which patients have in the health care setting are of two distinct, yet related,
3^0 In the absence o f specific legal protection o f  privacy in the U K , Mr. Kaye had to try four different existing  
forms o f action in an attem pt to secure a satisfactory rem edy. These were: Libel, M alicious Falsehood, 
Trespass to  the person, and Passing O ff. O n ly  m alicious falsehood was considered to be o f  any relevance, but 
no damages w ere awarded and the induction granted was lim ited to  publishing anything w ith  the interview  
and photographs w hich , 'could be reasonably understood or convey to any person reading or look in g  at the 
D efendant's Sunday Sport newspaper that Plaintiff had voluntarily permitted any photographs to be taken for 
publication in that newspaper or had voluntarily perm itted representatives o f the D efendants to  interview  
him  w hile a patient in the Charing Cross hospital undergoing treatment.', ihid  at 66. In other w ords, Kaye 
could not prevent publication o f the story or photograph, m erely publication o f his consent.
3^1 ihidy at 71.
3^2 These matters w ill be discussed further in chapter six, infra.
133 ihid, at 70.
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kinds; informational privacy and spatial privacy. The invasion of Gorden Kaye's privacy 
occurred at two levels: the invasion of personal space by uninvited third parties and the 
invasion of his privacy interests in personal information by the publication of photographs 
of him and details about his condition in a public newspaper. The plaintiff's failure to 
secure adequate legal protection of either of these interests is lamentable and requires that 
the situation be redressed.
5.6. - PRIVACY, STATE INTEREST A N D  HEALTH CARE PRO VISIO N
A further justification for this choice of context is the role of state interest in health care 
provision. Just as it has already been observed that one sign of a democratic system is the 
extent to which the state takes an interest in the lives of individuals, it is clear that one of 
the primary ways in which this occurs is in relation to health care. As Prost comments,
...sickness, a central concern of private life, has become the 
focus of much public policy. Nothing is as private as health, 
yet nothing is so readily made the responsibility of the public authorities. Health is now a public as well as private a f f a i r . ^ 3 4
The interest of the state in health matters has consequences for patient privacy in at least 
two ways. First, in those countries which provide state-run health care, the public nature of 
the enterprise takes away from the individual patient control of their environment. 
Whereas such a public system might facilitate the chances of every individual of gaining 
access to medical care, it does little to address concerns with individual privacy which flow  
from this. For example, scarcity of resources means that ward systems have to be used with 
the resultant threat to privacy outlined above.
Second, under the mantle of public health, states take it upon themselves to intervene in the 
lives of individuals in circumstances where interference is thought to be justified on health 
134 ihid^ at 98.
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grounds (usually invoking a 'best interests' argument) or when the individual is perceived 
to be a threat to the health of the community at large (usually invoking a 'public health'
argument) 135.
5.6.1. - Notifiable Diseases
As an example of state intervention consider the concept of notifiable disease. A ll  states pass 
legislation requiring the notification to public authorities of cases of specified contagious 
d i s e a s e s i 3 6 .  The most common 'notifiable' diseases include typhoid, smallpox, cholera, 
plague and relapsing feveri37. In such circumstances, it is argued that the threat to privacy 
which such notification poses is justifiable because of the threat of disease in the wider 
community. In many cases this is undoubtedly true. However, the choice of which diseases 
are notifiable is sometimes open to question. For example, in some states AIDS has been 
made a notifiable d i s e a s e  138. Yet AIDS139 - or rather its antecedent FIIVi^o - cannot be 
transmitted by casual contact. Individuals must engage in 'high risk behaviour' before
135 See, for exam ple, the U S  Supreme C ourt decision in Jacobson v  Massachusetts 197 US 11, 24 - 30, 49 L Ed 
643, 25 S Ct 358 (1905), in w hich  it was held that the court could balance the interests o f  the individual in 
refusing sm allpox vaccine (protected under the C onstitution) against the state's interest in preventing disease. 
T he conclusion  of the court was that the state interest was sufficiently com pelling not to  render 
unconstitutional a law requiring com pulsory vaccination against sm allpox save in circumstances where the 
individual could  show  significant disadvantage or threat to life.
156 P q j .  ^ critical account o f infectious disease control legislation in Germ any, Switzerland, England, Sweden  
and the N etherlands, see D ute, J.; 'A ffected By The T ooth  o f  T im e : Legislation on  Infectious Diseases 
C ontrol in Five European C ountries', \2 , Medicine and Law, 101, 1993.
3^7 In England and Wales the law  governing this matter is found in Public Flealth (Control o f Disease) A ct 
1984. O ther relevant legislation includes the Public Flealth (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1968 and 1985. 
In Scotland the law is to  be found in a num ber o f statutes dating back to the Infectious Disease 
(notification)act 1889 and the Public H eath  (Scotland) A ct 1897.
138 Por com m ent on  this issue and various other legislative responses to H IV /A ID S , see K eow n, J.; 'AIDS: 
Should It Be Made a N otifiab le Disease?', Ju ly /A ugu st, Professional Negligence, 121, 1989, Fluss, S.; 'W hat 
C an Legislators D o  to Com bat A ID S?', January, Com m onwealth L aw  Bulletin, 283, 1988, and Kirby, M .D .; 
'A ID S Legislation - Turning U p  the Fleat?', \1 , Journal o f  Medical Ethics, 187, 1986. States in w hich A ID S is 
notifiable include, Denm ark, N orw ay , Sweden, and m ost U .S . states. N eith er H IV  nor A ID S is notifiable in 
the U .K .
3^9 A ID S is a nem onic for A cquired Im m une D eficiency Syndrom e. The condition  was first discovered in 
1981.
160 p iiY  refers to Fluman Im m unodeficency Virus. The virus was first discovered in 1983. A  test became 
available in 1985. It is thought that H IV  leads to  A ID S. A ID S, as a syndrom e, cannot be transmitted from  
one individual to another.
49
transmission is p o s s ib l e ^ ^ i  fact, this disease has been labelled by American clinicians as 
'the least infectious disease we have every come a c r o s s ' ^62 To some this suggests that the 
'balance' between public interests in public health and private interests in personal privacy 
is not being struck in an acceptable m a n n e r ^ 63_
Moreover, if notifiable diseases legislation is not supported by additional provisions 
designed to ensure that individual rights are protected, the continued existence of such 
legislation becomes questionable. A recent survey of the legislative provisions of five 
European countries concluded.
In many respects current legislation on infectious diseases 
control appears to be outdated. For at least two reasons legal 
provisions need modernization: First, there has been a 
considerable increase in medical knowledge of disease 
transmission and as a consequence the methods of 
interrupting the spread of disease are today much more 
refined than they were in the past; second, in current legal 
analysis greater emphasis is placed on the protection of 
individual rights, especially the right to privacy and the rightto physical i n t e g r i t y .  6^4
Other examples of state interest in health matters include: the regulation of abortion^65  ^
compulsory vaccination p r o g r a m m e s 6^6^  the requirement of blood tests before m a r r i a g e 6^7^
6^1 There are o n ly  three m ethods o f transm ission o f  EIIV. These were identified in 1982, T hey are: 
unprotected anal or vaginal sex, the sharing of needles.in intravenous drug abuse and the infection by a 
m other o f her unborn child. N o  other verified m ethod o f transmission has been identified.
6^2 Jeffries, D .; 'AID S - The N e w  Black D eath?'. Medico-Legal Journal, 158, 1986, at 158.
6^3 This is especially true given the consequences o f  m aking a disease notifiable. N o t  on ly  does this mean that 
all clinicians are legally obliged to  pass patient inform ation on to  authorities, but also it means that the same 
authorities have considerable powers to  collect further inform ation through com pulsory exam ination and 
contact tracing. Furtherm ore, in the nam e of disease control, such authorities can exercise strong control 
pow ers over individuals including quarantine and isolation. See, D ute, loc. cit., at 101. See also, Guttm acher, 
S.; 'H IV  Infection: Individual Rights v. D isease C on tro l', 17 {\), Journal o f  L aw  an d Society, 66, 1990.
164 D ute, loc. cit., at 107 - 108.
165 In the U S  these are considered to m atter o f  the constitutionally protected right o f privacy, see chapter 
three, infra.
166 M ost western states require, or strongly encourage, parents to  have children inoculated against a range of 
diseases including tuberculosis, p o lio , rubella and measles.
167 In m any U .S . states prospective spouses are required to subm it to  a b lood test before the marriage 
cerem ony. Tests can be done for a range o f  matters including H IV , STD 's (sexually transmitted diseases) and 
som e genetic disorders.
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the denial of property rights in one's own bodyi^s and the prohibition of assisted 
suicide/euthanasiai69.
It is not argued here that all of these examples necessarily relate exclusively to an invasion 
of personal privacy, but they do all concern a blurring of the division between public and 
private spheres of life. In this thesis an attempt will be made to provide greater clarity for 
this division in the health care setting using the concept of privacy.
5.7. - C U R R EN T THREATS TO PATIENT PRIVACY
Finally, the justification for studying privacy in the health care setting at the present time is 
found in the increased threat which technological medical advances pose to patient privacy. 
Just as it has been argued above that technological advances have given rise to more 
concerns about privacy generally, so too it can be seen that medical advances are likely to 
heighten patient concern for privacy in a clinical setting. There are two ways in which this 
is likely to happen.
5.7.1. " Advances in Medical Technology and the Threat to Patient Informational Privacy
A s  medical science pushes ever onwards it reveals new and seemingly never-ending 
knowledge about our species, homo sapiens. Better than ever before we understand how as 
an organism we reproduce, grow, develop and die. In particular, scientific advances now
6^8 See, Moore v  The Regents o f  the U niversity o f  California  793 P 2d 479, 271 Cal Rptr. 146 (1990). For 
com m ent, see N uffield  C ouncil on  Bioethics, 'H um an Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues', A pril 1995, at pp.2, 5, 
10 - 12, 55, 67, 72 - 73, 123, 139 - 140, Annas, G.J., 'O utrageous Fortune: Selling O ther Peoples C ells', 
Hastings Center Report, N ovem b er/D ecem b er, 36, 1990.
6^9 M ost w estern states expressly forbid assistance In the taking o f one's ow n life. G enerally the criminal law  
acts as the sanction, see, in the U K , R v  Cox (1992) 12 B .M .L.R  38, but cf- R v  A rth u r  (1981) 12 BM LR 1. 
A ttem pts to alter this in O regon and the N orthern  T erritory in  Australia have not been successful. In the 
N etherlands no legislation exists to legalise euthanasia. Assistance in taking one's life is accepted but on ly  
w ith in  narrow ly defined guidelines. For com m ent on  this latter, see K eow n, I.J.; 'The Law and Practice o f  
Euthanasia in the N etherlands', 108, L aw  Q uarterly R eview , 51, 1992. In January 1994 the R eport o f  the 
H ou se o f Lords' Select C om m ittee on  M edical Ethics (H .L. Paper 21, 3 volum es, 1993/1994) expressly  
rejected reform  in the U K  along the lines o f introducing legislation allow ing voluntary euthanasia. O n  the 
subject o f  reform in this area see, O tlow sk i, M.; 'A ctive V oluntary Euthanasia: O ptions for R eform ', 2, 
Medical L aw  R eview , 161, 1994.
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allow us to examine ourselves at the microscopic level. It is now possible to examine the 
human genome and to understand the workings of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) : the so- 
called blueprint of life. For the community such advances are clearly in the interests of the 
collective good. For the individual, however, the ability to gain knowledge about one's own 
genome could be a frightening prospect. Such information could reveal an underlying 
disease or dysfunction, or could indicate a predisposition to such disease. Moreover, it 
could have implications for one's relatives given the common genetic heritage which family 
members share. Also, once such information is discovered a question mark arises over its 
use and possible misuse. Family members, the state, insurers and employers could all claim 
an interest in 'knowing' the genetic information of individuals. The basis and legitimacy of 
such interests will be discussed in chapter two. That such information exists, however, 
means that potential invasions of privacy can occur. Before scientific advances provided us 
with the means to gather such information there was no such concept as 'genetic privacy'. 
N ow , arguably, such possibilities require that we address questions of privacy which arise 
from the discovery of genetic information.
A related point concerns the use of electronic medical records which facilitates considerably 
the use of personal health data. Such systems open up many potential uses of health data 
beyond the immediate care and treatment of the patient from whom the data were 
collected. In ways which are unprecedented, personal information about individual patients 
can be disseminated and used on a much wider scale than ever before. For example, Dierks 
has argued that compiled medical data can be assigned to four main uses: therapy, 
administration, financing and r e s e a r c h Databanks of health information have been 
proposed in various j u r i s d ic t io n s ^ ^ i^  not least the United Kingdom where a National Health 
Service super database has been established providing multiple access points throughout the
7^9 Dierks, C.; 'Medical C onfidentiality and Data Protection as Influenced by M odern T ech nology'. 12, 
Medicine and Law, 547, 1993.
7^1 See G ostin, L.; 'G enetic Privacy'. T i, Journal o f  Law, Medicine an d Ethics, 320, 1995 in w hich he discusses 
the U S  position.
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countryi^2_ Genetic registers and D N A  fingerprint banks have also been proposed for a 
variety of reasons including medical research and crime detection and prevention. In the US 
the exceptionally ambitious National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
(NHANES) is underway to collect both genetic and non-genetic information. Already the 
project has collected non-anonymous health data from over 40,000 Americans in 26 states. 
The data collected range over 500 separate issues concerning, inter alia^ the individual's diet, 
bone density, blood pressure, risk status, drug use and history of sexually transmitted 
disease. NH ANES also tests and stores biological samples for long-term follow-up and 
statistical research^^ .^ Yet, although such moves might make the administration of hospitals 
easier, or the balancing of national health care budgets more accurate, or the catching of 
criminals less time consuming, or even the search for further medical advances a little less 
difficult, without adequate legal safeguards for the rights of individual patients, 
unauthorised uses of personal medical data could be construed as harmful and offensive 
invasions of privacy. Dierks argues that medical confidentiality, as the traditional means 
used to ensure that patient privacy is protected, can no longer adequately protect patient 
rights. From the perspective of German laws, he argues for a greater role for data 
protection provisions both to protect patient rights and,
...to let the enormous chances presented by new methods of
data processing be fully exploited in research.
Writing from within a system which has made the right to 'informational self- 
determination' a constitutional r i g h t h e  argues for an acceptable balance to be struck 
between 'optimized data exploitation and maximum protection of the individual's 
r i g h t s ' H o w e v e r ,  in systems with a less developed sense of individual patient rights such 
as the UK, to talk of balance is meaningless. A balance cannot be struck if patients are
See, Tonks, A.; ‘Information Management and Patient Privacy in the N H S *. 307, British Medical Journal, 
1227,1993.
G ostin, loc, cit., at 322,
ibid, at 550. 
ibid, at 548. 
ibid, at 549.
denied recognition of the fundamental rights related to being a patient. It is far from clear 
that such rights are adequately defined and/or recognised in this country^^ .^ As paramount 
among them, the right of privacy requires clear definition and recognition. As will be 
shown in chapter four, the law of confidentiality is in an unsophisticated and confused state 
in the United Kingdom. Whereas it is not denied that it helps to protect some privacy 
interests of medical patients, it will be argued that it cannot adequately do so when faced 
with new problems posed by medical advance. As an alternative, a particular view of the 
concept of privacy will be outlined which will form the basis of a legally protected right 
which can protect the interests of patients.
5.7.2. - Advances in Medical Technology and the Threat to Patient Spatial Privacy
Another problem has arisen in recent years because of developments in life-prolonging 
techniques. Inter alia, privacy arguments have been advanced to challenge the application of 
such techniques to patients. This can be seen most readily in the cases of patients in 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) which have come before the courts of the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (Eire).
5.7.2.I. - W hatisP V Sf
It is notoriously difficult to articulate a satisfactory definition of Persistent Vegetative 
State^ ®^. Common features include an irregular but cyclical state of circadian sleep and 
wakefulness, yet which is not accompanied by any evidence of self-consciousness or 
awareness, specific recognition of external stimuli, or consistent evidence of attention or
The Data Protection Registrar has, for example, urged the British medical profession to adopt a 'culture of 
data privacy'. Speaking at a conference on healthcare com puting in April 1997, Ms Elizabeth France argued 
that the use o f 'pseudonym ised data' could go a long way to addressing the problems of privacy and 
confidentiality which surround the N H S's medical data networks, see Carnell, D .; 'Data Protection Registrar 
Calls for Culture o f Privacy'. 314, British Medical Journal, 922, 1997.
For com m ent on the legal positions in the British isles, see, Mason, J.K. and Laurie, G.T.; 'The 
Management o f the Persistent Vegetative State in the British \s\es\  Juridical Review, 263, 1996.
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inattention or learned responses. Patients generally retain cranial-nerve and spinal reflexes, 
including those related to visual and auditory stimuli. Such patients are, however, wholly 
insensate. The condition of PVS is furthermore degenerative: the grey matter of the brain 
dissolves and in correctly diagnosed patients there is no hope of recovery of consciousness. 
In contrast, the brain stem remains intact and there is therefore no need for artificial 
ventilation. The same is not true of feeding and hydration. The feeding and hydration of 
patients in PVS is done either by naso-gastric intubation or gastrostomy tube.
5.7.2.2. - PVS: The Legal Issues
In each PVS case to be heard by a court of law the question for the court has been the 
legitimacy of removal of invasive artificial feeding techniques done with a view to allowing 
the patient to die^ ^^ . The legal issues which arise from such a proposed course of action are, 
in the main, two-fold : first, on what civil law authority might such a decision be taken 
(and by whom)? and second, what is the position of the criminal law, given that the patient 
will die as a direct result of the removal of feeding? For the purposes of this thesis it is 
interesting to note that privacy arguments have been advanced in many of these cases 
justifying the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Basically, the argument which 
has been put is as follows : to continue to 'feed' an individual when there is no evidence 
that the individual consents to the procedure and there is no 'benefit' to be gained from the 
procedure (medical or otherwise) is an invasion of the patient's fundamental rights. Most 
particularly, it is argued that it is an invasion of the patient's privacy. This argument is seen 
most clearly in the cases which have come before courts in jurisdictions which have a 
written consitution, in particular, the United States and the Republic of Ireland (Eire).
N orm ally, this w ould  happen w ithin tw o to three weeks from dehydration.
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5.7.2.3. - PVS in the United States
The nature of the United States Constitutional Right to Privacy will be discussed in detail 
in chapter five. This is a very wide-ranging right of US citizens which protects many areas 
of personal life such as the abortion decision, access to contraception and to reproductive 
services, and home and family life. This now also includes cases involving PVS patients. In 
Re Daniel Joseph Fiori - a recent decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concerning 
PVS - the judge helpfully carried out a very comprehensive survey of all of the US cases to 
address the problem^^°. They number over f i f t y I n  his judgment he considers all of the 
methods used by the US courts in dealing with PVS cases,
Absent the existence of a statute on the subject, the various legal 
precepts relied upon to authorise the withdrawal of sustenance 
from a person in persistent vegetative state have been reduced to 
a "best interests" analysis, "substituted judgment" criterion or a 
"clear and convincing" evidence standard of proof which draw 
their strengths from the federal or state constitutional r i^ ts  o f 
privacy. Equally applicable to the right of an individual to forego 
life-sustaining treatment is the common law right to freedom 
from unwanted interference with bodily integrity ("self- 
determination") .
[emphasis added, citations omitted]^^^
One of the most celebrated examples of this is the case of In re Quinlan^^'^. Karen Ann 
Quinlan was admitted to hospital on the evening of April 15 1975 after experiencing two 15 
minute periods of respiratory failure for reasons which have never been made clear. Three 
days after her admission the attending physician found evidence of decortication and partial 
brain stem death requiring that Karen be placed on a respirator to assist her breathing.
Superior C ouit o f Pennsylvania. O pinions filed January 17th, 1995; 438 Pa. Super. 610; 652 A . 2d 1350 
(1995).
This case is discussed by O'Flaherty J. in the Irish case In the M atter o f  a Ward, to be discussed infra.
182 piori, at 650. The Superior Court decision was later upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: In re 
Fiori 543 Pa. 592; 673 A . 2d. 905 (1996).
183 re Quinlan  70 NJ 10 (1976), 355 A  2d 647.
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Although initially in a coma^ '^^ , Karen soon developed 'sleep-wake' cycles. This led the 
expert physicians attending her to conclude unanimously that she was in a "chronic 
persistent vegetative state". An application was lodged by her father who sought judicial 
authority to withdraw the life-sustaining measures temporarily preserving his daughter's 
life, and his appointment as guardian of her person to that end. His request was opposed by 
Karen's doctors, the hospital, the County Prosecutor, the State of N ew  Jersey and Karen's 
guardian ad litem.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Karen Quinlan's father's wish and appointed 
him guardian. It held that Karen had a fundamental right of privacy under the US 
Constitution which did not disappear simply because Karen could not exercise it 
personally. Moreover, the court held that the right of privacy enjoyed by Karen (and all 
other US citizens) is broad enough to encompass the decision to refuse life-sustaining 
m e a s u r e s I t  was recognised that the State has a constitutional interest in the preservation 
and sanctity of human life, but in dealing with this challenge to the plaintiff's arguments 
the court made the following statement:
We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the 
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily 
invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes 
a point at which the individual's right overcomes the State 
interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen's choice, if she 
were competent to make it, would be vindicated by the law. Her 
prognosis is extremely poor...she will never resume cognitive life.
And the bodily invasion is very great...she requires 24 hour 
intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a 
catheter and a feeding tube^ s^
It is important to distinguish between com a and PVS, Coma is typified by a state in w hich patients can 
make no verbal response, cannot obey comm ands and do not open their eyes either spontaneously or to any 
stim ulus. In such a state the patient's respiratory function can be depressed or varied, unlike the PVS patient 
w hose respiratory function is normal. A lso , unlike PVS, coma carries w ith it a chance of recovery depending 
on the severity o f the condition, its cause and treatment, see, 'The Permanent Vegetative State : A  Review by  
the W orking Group Convened by the R oyal College o f Physicians and Endorsed by the Conference o f  
Medical R oyal Colleges and their Faculties o f  the U nited  K ingdom ', 30, Journal o f  the Royal College o f  
Physicians o f  London, M arch/April 1996, 119, at 121.
Q uinlan, at 39. 
ibid, at 40.
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o f  course, Karen could not exercise the right for herself but the court held that her father 
as guardian could do so. In this way the civil law authority for the decision to terminate can 
be seen to be grounded in the patient's right to privacy - a right which protects, inter alia, 
bodily integrity. This, it is submitted, is akin to the notion of spatial privacy argued for 
above.
It should be noted that the US courts' protection of 'spatial privacy' in the case of PVS 
patients has not always been articulated in privacy terms. In cases decided subsequent to 
Quinlan some courts have preferred to rely on the common law rather than the 
Constitution. For example, in In re EichneA^^ an 83 year-old man in PVS was held to have 
expressed sufficiently clearly prior views about not wishing to be maintained in such a state 
to allow the court to authorise removal of his artificial sustenance. This was done by 
reference to his common law right to informed consent, the corollary of which is the right 
to r e f u s e  Similarly, in In re Conroy - a case dealing with refusal of treatment albeit not by 
a PVS patient - it was held that whereas constitutional privacy might be relevant, it was not 
necessary because the common law was adequate^® .^
In the three companion cases of In re PeteA' '^ ,^ In re FarrelP^^ and In re Johes^^^ the New  
Jersey Supreme Court formulated guidelines and procedures under which life-sustaining 
medical treatment (including artiflcal feeding) may be wlthdrawn*^^. In justifying the right 
of patients to seek withdrawal of treatment the court "reaffirmed the principles established 
in Quinlan and Conroy"; namely, the consitutional privacy protection accorded to
187 In re Eichner 52 N Y 2d  380, 420 N E 2d 72.
188 See also the com panion case decided at the same tim e which applies the same reasoning, In re Storar 52 
N Y 2 d 3 6 3 , 420 N E 2d 64.
18^  In the M atter o f  Claire Conroy 486 A  2d 1209 (NJ SC) (1987).
190 108 N J 365, 529 A . 2d 419 (1987).
191 108 N J 335, 529 A . 2d 404 (1987).
192 1 08 N J 394, 529 A . 2d 434 (1987).
192 T w o o f  these cases concerned paitents in PVS (Peters and Jobes).
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individuals' decisions to refuse treatment and the common law right of self-determination. 
This latter right encompasses,
[T]he right of a person to control his own body. [It] is a basic 
societal concept, long recognised in common law^ i^.
A fair conclusion to draw from the above would be that the concept of spatial privacy - a 
physical sphere in which the individual's interests and person are considered to be inviolate 
except with due cause^ s^ _ is an important and recognised interest in the US. Indeed, it 
receives protection at two levels. Of course, the common law right of self-determination 
and the constitutional right of privacy are not applicable solely to patients in PVSi^ .^ But as 
has been explained, the unrelenting progress of medicine produces new problems for the 
law with unnerving regularity and the case of PVS illustrates how, in the US at least, the 
law has adapted to ensure adequate protection for individual interests, particularly those 
concerning spatial privacy. Indeed, the problem of PVS has even received Supreme Court 
attention. However, the terms which the court has used in protecting the PVS patients 
rights add some confusion to the question of the nature of the protection afforded.
5.7.2.4. - Cruzan v  Director, Missouri Department o f Health et al.
The US Supreme Court dealt with the question of PVS, and more generally the issue of 
refusal of medical treatment, in 1990 in the case of Cruzan v  Director, Missouri Department 
o f Health et ah^^. Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident in January 1983 which left 
her hospitalised and in persistent vegetative state. After it became apparent that nothing
194 YFis was stated in Farrell, ib id  at 347, quoting In re Conroy 98 NJ at 346.
9^2 In the case o f In re Peters, supra,the N ew  Jersey Supreme Court said the follow ing : 'We find it difficult to 
conceive o f a case in w hich the State could have an interest strong enough to subordinate a patient's right to  
choose not to be sustained in PV S.’, 108 NJ at 380.
9^6 For an example o f h ow  the case o f Conroy has, in fact, substantially expanded the com m on law  right to 
self-determination in the context o f consent to medical treatment see, Schultz; M. M.; 'From Informed 
Consent to Patient C hoice : A  N ew  Protected Interest'. 95, Yale Law Journal, 219, 1985.
197 497 U S 261, 111 L Ed 2d 224, 110 S Ct 2841, decided June 25 1990.
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more could be done for their daughter, Nancy's parents, as co-guardians, asked the 
employees of the hospital to terminate artificial feeding and hydration. The employees 
refused to do so without court approval. The trial judge ordered that the parents request 
should be carried out, but this was overturned on appeal in the Missouri Supreme Court. 
The parents in turn sought leave to appeal to the US Supreme Court which was granted. 
The appeal was, however, unsuccessful.
The objection voiced by the parents of Nancy Cruzan against the decision of the Missouri 
Supreme Court concerned only one aspect of the ruling. The court had held that a patient 
has a right to refuse treatment, including artificial sustenance and that this was based either 
on the constitutional right of privacy or the common law right to self-determination. 
Furthermore, the court had held that the decision to refuse treatment could be taken on 
behalf of a patient if the patient v/as unable to do so him or herself. However, in so 
holding, the court added that no person could assume the choice of terminating medical 
treatment for an incompetent person in the absence of "clear and convincing, inherently 
reliable evidence" that the patient would have so wished. It was held that such was absent in 
the case at hand^ s^.
In essence the Supreme Court upheld this view relying on the state interest in the 
preservation of human life. This interest entitled the state to impose a heightened 
evidentiary burden on those seeking to terminate life and further entitled the state to take 
measures to guard against potential abuses of the law to the detriment (death) of incapax
198 "pEe testim ony adduced at trial consisted primarily o f N ancy Cruzan's statements made to a housemate 
about a year before her accident that she w ould  not want to live should she face life as a "vegetable", and 
other observations to the same effect. The observations did not deal in terms o f withdrawal of medical 
treatment or o f hydration and nutrition.' ibid, at 246. It should not be thought, however, that the result of 
the case was that N ancy  Cruzan was maintained indefinitely. Several m onths after the Supreme Court 
decision another hearing was held before the original trial judge w ho again ordered that the feeding be 
removed. This tim e the state did not object. N e w  evidence had been brought to the trial about N ancy's 
wishes. Despite the attempts o f  various groups to  prevent the removal o f feeding, and after thwarting a group 
of protesters w ho tried to enter the patient's room  to reconnect her feeding tube, the tube was eventually  
rem oved on Decem ber 26 1990 and N an cy  died 11 days later.
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patients. Of interest to this thesis however is the nature of the classification of the right 
protected.
Having noted the position of state courts regarding PVS cases and the role given to both the 
right of privacy and the right to self-determination, the Supreme Court took a different 
approach in grounding the right of the individual to refuse treatment,
Although many state courts have held a right to refuse 
treatment is encompassed by a generalised constitutional right 
of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is 
more properly analysed in terms of the Fourtennth 
Amendment liberty interest
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of, life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Citing its own prior decisions, the 
Supreme Court argued that the basis for the right of individuals to refuse medical treatment 
lies in the constitutionally protected liberty interest^°°. The outcome of this decision was 
the same as that of the Missouri Supreme Court : individuals have the right to refuse 
invasive treatments which interfere with the personal physical sphere of their being^°h The 
terminology used is, however, different. This terminological disparity - which some would 
call a conceptual confusion^o^ _ is an on-going problem for the those seeking to interpret the 
American Constitution. It has wide-ranging implications for the constitutionally protected 
privacy right and we shall return to this issue in later chapters. It is sufficient to note at this
ibidy at 242, note 7.
See, Jacobson v  Massachussetts, 197 U S  11, 24 -30 , 49 L Ed 643, 25 S Ct 358 (1905), [in this case the Court 
balanced the recognised liberty interest o f  the individual in refusing invasive vaccination w ith the state 
interest in protecting public health]; Washington v  Harper, 494 US 210, 108 L Ed 2d 178, 110 S Ct 1028 
(1990), [in this case the C ou it held that the forcible injection of medication into a non-consenting person's 
body represents a substanital interference w ith  the person's liberty]; Vitek v  Jones 445 US 480, 63 L Ed 2d 
552, 100 S Ct 1254 (1980), [in w hich the Court held that the transfer of a patient to a mental hospital coupled  
w ith  mandatory behaviour m odification treatment implicated liberty interests]; and Parham v J.R., 442 U S  
584, 61 L Ed 2d 101, 99 S Ct 2493 (1979), [here the Court held that a child, in com m on w ith  adults, has a 
substantial liberty interest In not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment].
201 Pqj. analysis o f the Cruzan decision and its im plications for US citizens and states see, Capron, A .M . (ed.); 
'Medical Decision-M aking and the "Right to Die" after Cruzan', 19(1-2), Law, Medicine and Health Care, 1991.
See, for example,Wagner D eC ew , J.; 'The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics', 5, Law  and Philosophy, 
145, 1986.
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time that the interest which the courts seek to protect - be it labelled a privacy interest or 
otherwise^^  ^- corresponds to the interest which has been identified as spatial privacy in this 
thesis^°‘^ .
5.7.2,5. - The Republic o f Ireland : In the Matter o f a Ward
In July 1995 the Irish Supreme Court heard its first PVS case^ °^ . The subject of the case, W, 
was born in 1950 and suffered irreversible brain damage after experiencing three cardiac 
arrests during a minor gynaecological operation on 26 April 1972. On 14 October 1974 the 
President of the Irish High Court declared W to be of unsound mind and incapable of 
managing her own affairs. Initially the father of the ward, then her sister, and then her 
mother, was appointed committee of her person. In 1992 W was fitted with a gastrostomy 
tube under general anaesthetic^^ .^ Finally, in March 1995, an application was made by the 
committee and the family of the Ward to the High Court in the following terms : (a) that 
all artificial nutrition and hydration cease; (b) that the Court should give such directions to 
care having regard to the order of the Court as are appropriate. The High Court assumed 
jurisdiction in the case under its parens patriae jurisidiction derived successively from the 
prerogative of the British Crown to the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland^°  ^ and finally to the 
President of the High Court or his assignee^o .^ This allows the court to take decisions on 
behalf of all incapable persons - adult or minor - in respect of both personal and financial
As Annas has pointed out, '...it should be noted...that both rights [privacy and liberty] derive from the 
same source, and their content in this context is unlikely to be different.’, see, Annas, G. J.; 'The Long D ying  
of N ancy  Cruzan', 19(1-2), Law, Medicine arid Health Care, 52, 1991.
204 W riting tw o years after the Cruzan  decision, Meisel notes that, 'The C ourt’s shift from  a privacy analysis 
to a Fourteenth Am endm ent analysis is unlikely to have any impact in state courts on com m on-law  or state 
constitutional grounds, as w ell as federal constitutional right o f privacy. This has been brone out in 
subsequent state court decisions, in w hich they have continued to rely on state constitutions, state statutes, 
and the com m on-law  right to be free from  unwanted intereference w ith bodily integrity to provide the basis 
for the right to refuse medical treatment, the refusal of w hich w ill reuslt in death.' see Meisel, A.; 'A 
Retrospective on Cruzan \ 20(4), Law, Medicine an d  Health Care, 340, 1992.
In the M atter o f a W ard (1995) 2 I.L.R.M. 401
It should be noted that the Ward was not a case of 'full PVS', but as the trial judge said, 'although the 
Ward is not fully PVS, she is nearly so and such cognitive capacity as she possesses is extremely minimal.' For 
com m ent on  this see. Mason and Laurie, /oc. cit.
207 J3y G overnm ent o f Ireland A ct 1920.
208 g y  Courts o f Justice A ct 1936.
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aspects of their lives. In all cases the paramount interest must be the best interests of the 
ward. On 10 May 1995 the High Court issued an Order stating that it consented on behalf 
of the Ward to the withdrawal and termination of abnormal and artificial means of 
nourishment and declared such withdrawal lawful. Furthermore, the court consented on 
W's behalf to the non-treatment of infections or other pathological conditions save in a 
palliative way and declared such non-treatment legal. The Attorney General, the Institution 
in which the Ward was cared for and the Solicitor General as Guardian ad litem  appealed to 
the Supreme Court against the decision. The family also sought to vary the order °^ .^
The decision of the Supreme Court was delivered on 27 July 1995. In delivering their 
judgments the majority of justices relied on the privacy rights of the Ward as justification 
for granting authority to allow her to die.
Chief Justice Hamilton focused on the primacy of the right to life protected under the Irish 
Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40.3.2.). He noted that the right necessarily 
implies various other ancillary rights not individually or specifically set forth in he 
Constitution: the right to live life in the fullest content, to enjoy the support and comfort 
of one's family, to social contact with one's peers, to education, to the practice of religion, 
to work, to marry and have children, to bodily integrity, to self-determination and to 
privacy^ More specifically, he argued that the right includes the right to die a natural 
death and not to have life artificially maintained merely to prolong life. Of the treatment of 
the Ward he said, '[it] Is intrusive, constitutes an interference with the integrity of the body 
and cannot be regarded as normal means of nour i shment .Acknowledg ing  that the right 
to individual privacy and bodily integrity are examples of those unenurnerated right
In essence this concerned a very similar issue to that central to Cruzan. The H igh Court stated that the 
standard o f proof required clear and convincing evidence before medical treatment w ould  be discontinued. 
The fam ily subm itted that the correct standard is balance o f probabilities. Second, the family has the right (as 
opposed to  the court) under the Irish C onstitution A rticle 41.1. to require that medical treatment (feeding) be 
discontinued.
Transcript of H am ilton C.J.'s decision, at 49. 
ibid, at 51.
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recognised by Article 40.3 of the Constitution, he quoted with approval the following 
passage of his own judgment in Kennedy v  Ireland,
...though not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the 
right to privacy is one of the fundamental personal rights of 
the citizen which flow from the Christian and democratic 
nature of the State. It is not an unqualified right. Its exercise 
may be restricted by the constitutional rights of others or by 
the requirements of the common good and is subject to the 
requirements of public order and m o r a l i t y . 2 ^ 2
Similarly, he referred with approval to an article written by the President of the High 
Court in which it was stated.
...there are very powerful arguments to suggest that the 
dignity and autonomy of the human person (as 
constitutionally predicated) require the State to recognise that 
decisions relating to life and death are, generally speaking, 
ones which a competent adult should be free to make without 
outside restraint, and that this freedom should be regarded as 
an aspect of the right to privacy which should be protected as 
a "personal" right by Article 40.3.1.^^^
From this he concluded that, if mentally competent, W would have the right to forego the 
feeding and medical treatment. He went on to argue, moreover, that W's incapacity did not 
deprive her of her right under Article 40.1 of the Constitution to be treated equally before 
the law^ '^^ . He concluded that the responsibility for the exercise of any of the rights of the 
Ward rested with the President of the High Court, Lynch, J. by virtue of his parens patriae 
j u r i s d i c t io n a l^ .  In the exercise of this jurisdiction the first and paramount consideration 
must be the well-being, welfare or interests of the Ward. Applying this, Hamilton held that 
the best interests of the Ward lay in removal of the feeding from her and denial of all
^12 ibid, at 52. Kennedy v  Ireland  1987 I.R. 587. 213 id.
21'! ibid, at 55 - 56.
213 ibid, at 56 - 57.
64
further medical treatment, save palliative care. This required clear and convincing proof of 
all relevant matters, which he was satisfied Lynch J. had adduced at trial.
In like manner. O'Flaherty, Denham, and Blayney J.218 used privacy as the basis
of their respective decisions in this case. The only dissent in the case, that of Egan J., was 
based on the fact that W was not fully in PVS and therefore the judge in question did not 
feel that he could make the orders requested. The majority did, however, dismiss the 
appeals and ordered that artificial feeding and hydration be removed from the Ward. The 
common basis for the right which justified such a decision was the patient's right to 
privacy: a right to die with dignity and not be subjected to invasive and unnatural medical 
procedures. Once again, it is submitted that the recognition and protection of such a right
is akin to protecting the spatial privacy interests identified in this work.
5.7.2.6. - Guillain-Barre Syndrome: the Canadian and New Zealand Experience
Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) is a disease which affects the nervous system. It destroys 
the connections between brain and body leaving the afflicted person with a useless body, 
unable to breathe, eat, move or communicate. The brain, however, is not dead in the 
conventional medical sense i^ .^ In many ways the victims of this condition resemble 
patients in PVS. First, the condition is hopeless and irreversible. Second, conscious 
functional brain control over the body is absent requiring medical intervention to feed, and 
in the case of GBS, to breathe. Third, the 'problem' of patients suffering from such 
conditions is new and arises as a direct result of medical advances. A few years ago such 
patients would have died soon after developing their respective conditions. Fourth, given
21  ^Transcript, at 5ff.
2^2 Transcript, at 34ff. D enham  gives a good acount o f the content o f the Irish privacy right at 34 - 36.
21^  Blaney J. did not make specific reference to  the right of privacy, but he did not make specific reference to  
any other right either. The essence of his judgment was to endorse fully the decision of the President of the 
H igh Court. This means clearly that he accepted the privacy argument which formed the basis o f the latter 
judgment. See the com m ents o f H am ilton, C.J., supra.
21  ^That is, the patient is not brain-stem dead. In fact, in m any cases patients retain intellectual capacity and 
mental competence, yet have no control over their body whatsoever.
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that medical assistance is provided, sooner or later the question of withdrawal of invasive 
support procedures will raise its head. For these reasons it is valuable to consider judicial 
pronouncements of the question of withdrawal of support from GBS patients. Of particular 
note are decisions of the New Zealand and Québécois courts.
5.7.2.7. - Nancy B v  HotebDieu de Quebec
The decision in the case of Nancy B v  Hotel-Dieu de Quebec^^^ was handed down in 1992. It 
concerned a patient suffering from GBS who, although completely unable to move, had 
retained her mental capacity and intellectual competency. An action was brought 
requesting that her artificial support be discontinued and an injunction was granted 
forbidding any further medical intervention and permitting the medical person in charge of 
Nancy's case to stop respiratory support^^b The Superior Court of the Province of Quebec 
held that to keep a patient on a respirator without her consent constituted an intrusion and 
intereference which violated her person^^z. The language used was that of autonomy and 
the right to self-determination, but the interest which the court sought to respect was the 
inviolability of person by unwarranted and unwanted medical treatment.
5.7.2.8. - Auckland Area Health Board v  Attorney-General
The leading case to deal with withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in N ew  Zealand is 
Auckland Area Health Board v  Attorney-GeneraR^^. This case concerned an application made 
by doctors for a declaration clarifying the criminal law position if life-sustaining measures 
were removed from a GBS patient. In authorising withdrawal of support the High Court 
referred with approval to Nancy B. It was stated,
220 Haney B v  Hotel-Dieu de Quebec eta l. (1992) 86 D LR  (4th) 385.
221 ibid, at 395.
222 ibid, at 391.
223 A uckland Area Health Board v  Attorney-G eneral [1993] 1 N ew  Zealand Law Reports 235.
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The Nancy B case...serves to highlight...a set of values which 
are central to our concept of life; values of human dignity and 
personal privacy...Human dignity and personal privacy belong 
to every person, whether living or dying. Yet, the sheer 
invasive ness of the treatment and the manipulation of the 
human body which it entails, the pitiful and humiliating 
helplessness of the patient's state, and the degradation and 
dissolution of all bodily functions invoke these values.224
Clearly, the spatial privacy interests of the patient suffering from Guillain-Barre Syndrome 
are the same as those of the patient in PVS in this regard. These decisions show how the 
Québécois and New Zeland courts have recognised the importance of these interests and 
have sought to protect them by authorising the removal of unjustified life support systems.
5.7.2.9. “ PVS Cases in the United Kingdom
There have been numerous decisions in England and Wales concerning the withdrawal of 
feeding and hydration from patients in PVS225. All have applied the reasoning in the 
seminal case of Airedale NHS Trust v  Bland^^^. Anthony Bland was crushed in the 
Hillsborough stadium tragedy in April 1989 and suffered serious brain anoxia. He was 
subsequently diagnosed as being in PVS. Three and a half years later his medical carers, 
with the full support of his family, sought to discontinue artificial feeding and allow him to 
die. Yet, because no parens patriae jurisdiction remains in England227  ^ the English courts 
faced a dilemma. N o one, not even the court, could consent on behalf of the incapacitated 
patient to withdrawal of the invasive feeding. The course left to the courts was to make an 
anticipatory declaration about the lawfulness of any proposed course of action. The
224 ibid at 245.
223 For com m ent see M ason and Laurie, toe, cit.
226 Airedale N HS Trust v  Bland  [1993] A C  789.
222 It having been removed, (perhaps accidentally), by the Mental Flealth Act 1959 and the revocation of the 
Warrant under the Sign Manual under w hich the jurisdiction of the Crown was conferred. See R e F (mental 
patient : sterilisation) [1990] 2 A C  1 per Lord Brandon at 57. See also Lord Browne-W ilkinson in Bland  at 
[1993] A C  789, at 883.
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uniqueness of this case and its inherent controversial nature ensured that it received a 
hearing by the highest court in the land: the House of Lords.
Their Lordships approached this case in a manner very different to the other jurisdictions 
which have been examined. Rather than taking the opportunity to vindicate patient rights 
(of privacy or otherwise), the court placed exclusive emphasis on the futility of the 
treatment and the test of patient best interests. Lord Mustill's argument, which was typical 
of the arguments advanced, can be explained as follows,
• treatment of the incompetent is governed by necessity and necessity is, in turn, defined 
in terms of the patient's best interests;
• once it is determined that there is no hope of recovery, any interest in being kept alive 
disappears and, with it also disappears the justification for invasive therapy;
• in the absence of necessity, there can be no duty to act, and in the absence of a duty to 
act, there can be no criminality in an omission.
This line of reasoning takes a very physician-oriented approach. This is compounded by the 
fact that the determination of the patient's best interests is, In the final analysis, to be 
carried out by the clinicians responsible for the management of the patient^^ .^ Thus it is for 
the doctors to decide whether further treatment is futile, it is then for them to decide 
whether removal of feeding is in the patient's best Interests (as established by reference to 
medical opinion), and if they so decide then they are absolved of any possible future 
criminal liability because they no longer have a duty to treat the patient^^ .^
22S ibid, at 870, per Lord G off. In determining 'best interests' the Lionse referred to the Boiam principle 
(normally used in negligence actions): w ould  a responsible body of medical opinion do as the practioner 
intends to do?, see Bolam v  Friern Hospital Management Com m ittee  [1957] 1 W LR 582; (1957) 1 BMLR 1.
229 This reasoning has been follow ed in other cases, including, Frenchay Healthcare NFIS Trust v  S [1994] 2 A ll 
ER 403, Re C, reported as a news item  on ly  (Ford, R.; 'Patient in Coma May D ie w ith D ign ity '. (1995), The 
Times, 18 N ovem ber, p .l) , Re G  [1995] 3 Med.L.R. 80, and Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust v  S [1995] 3 
Med.L.R.84.
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The requirement to seek court approval for withdrawal of feeding was maintained by the 
House of Lords230 but in subsequent cases the main function of the court has been reduced 
to declaring that the diagnosis of PVS is correct. Once that is done it automatically follows 
that it is in the patient's best interests not to receive feeding and hydration. In addition, the 
Official Solicitor has declare that no case will be opposed once the diagnosis is confirmed. 
This means that cases are decided routinely at first instance with appeals increasingly 
unlikely. As Mason and Laurie have commented,
[cjomplete médicalisation of non-treatment decisions in the 
condition is only a short step away; further involvement of 
the English courts is likely to be confined to those cases in 
which there is serious dispute between or within the health 
caring and family groups.231
There is no mention of the patient's right to privacy in the judgments of their Lordships in 
Bland. This is interesting because privacy arguments were advanced^^ .^ Anthony Lester QC  
and Pushpinder Saini as am id  curiae put forceful privacy arguments advancing Anthony 
Bland's right to have artifical feeding withdrawn. As they put it,
Although there is no enforceable general right to personal 
privacy in English law...the common law ensures respect for 
personal privacy by means, inter alia, of the principle of self- 
determination according to which a doctor must not invade 
the bodily integrity of his patient so as to treat him against his 
wishes...Human dignity in the context of the present case is 
not an abstract metaphysical notion; it is an established and 
orthodox legal concept which can be judged objectively by a 
court or tribunal, whether by our courts or by the European 
Court of Human Rights. There is a social duty to respect the 
patient's right to, and interest in, personal privacy and human 
dignity during what remains of his life. 233
230 Practice N o te  [1994] 2 A ll ER 413; (1994) 18 BMLR 159., and recently. Practice N o te  [1996] 2 FLR 375.
231 M ason and Laurie, loc, cit., at 269.
232 See, for example, the arguments b y  the a m id  curiae at [1993] A C  at 848.
233 ihid.
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They continue:
It would be a fallacy to suppose that if the appeal were allowed 
this would mean that the courts would be respecting the 
patient's privacy, bodily integrity and human dignity. The 
current invasive measures artificially maintaining his life 
would then continue without his consent...it cannot have been 
intended, when the parens patriae jurisdiction over 
incompetent adult patients was removed, to authorise such a 
gross form of discriminatory treatment against such 
individuals on the grounds of their mental disability...The 
House must decide whether patients in the present patient's 
condition are to be allowed to die with dignity, or whether 
they should continue involuntarily to be what was described 
as "passive prisoners of medical technology" because they are 
"symbols of life" whose "bodily integrity" must be 
maintained...In some cases the artificial prolongation of 
corporeal existence must degrade and demean the very 
humanity which it is meant to serve. Highly invasive medical 
treatment may perpetuate human existence without hope of 
consciousness, through a combination of body and feeding 
tubes that many of whatever religious belief or philosophical 
conviction might reasonably regard as an insult to life rather 
than as a proper respect for its sanctity.234
All of these sentiments are ones with which the present writer agrees, and we have seen 
them articulated by others in other jurisdictions in cases very similar to this, but virtually 
none of them received support or saw repetition in the judgements of their Lordships. 
Passing reference is made to the 'interest' of the patient in personal autonomy233^ but each 
time the relevance of this is dismissed because the patient is not capable of exercising his 
autonomy to make a choice about treatment. All agree that any such choice should be 
respected if it could be made, but faced with the impossibility of this each judge falls back 
on the best interests test. This, as has been shown, is then defined by reference to clinical 
judgment and medical criteria.
234 ihid, at 849, 850.
233 See, for example, LordM ustill, 891, 892 and 893
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One might ask, what difference does this make? The outcome appears to be the same as all 
other cases in all other jurisdictions examined, so why focus on the different nature of the 
tests applied? The answer is that the outcome is not the same. The case of Bland 
demonstrates that the rights of the individual are very dependent on medical judgments and 
objectively determined tests of best interests which refer almost exclusively to medical 
opinion. There is no recognition as such of personal rights, least of all the right of privacy. 
This is a cause for concern. The nature and scope of patient rights are very vaguely defined 
in the United Kingdom. Moreover, in a country where there is no constitutional protection 
of rights, and arguably a tendency to defer to the medical profession on matters of patient 
care, there is a very genuine fear that the rights which do exist might be compromised or 
eroded over time. It is reasonable to argue that the Bland decision does much more to 
strenthen the position of medical staff and to add to their degree of power over patients 
than it does to clarify or fortify the rights of patients themselves. In such a climate a clearer 
statement of the rights of patients is needed and primary among such rights should be the 
right of patients to privacy.
5.7.2.10, - Scotland's Contribution: Law Hospital NHS Trust v  Lord Advocate artd Others
Finally, brief mention should be made of the legal standing of PVS patients in Scotland. 
After much debate the position was eventually settled by a bench of five Court of Session 
judges in Law Hospital N H S Trust v  Lord Advocate^^^. Janet Johnstone was a middle-aged 
woman who fell into PVS as a result of a failed suicide attempt. The case for withdrawal of 
feeding and hydration was made by the hospital treating her and a guardian ad litem  was 
appointed to argue on her behalf. Because of the complexity of the issues involved and the 
unprecedented nature of the case, the Lord Advocate also appeared. The solution of the 
Inner House of the Court of Session to Mrs Johnstone's condition can be seen as something 
of a half-way house between the English position and that of other jurisdictions. Unlike
236 Law Hospital NHS Trust v  Lord A dvocate and Others 1996 SLT 848; 1996 SLT 869.
71
England, the Court of Session was able to claim a continuing parens patriae jurisdiction and 
therefore sought to deal with the case as one of consent. This has been the approach of the 
American, Canadian and Irish courts. Unlike these courts, however, the Court of Session 
did not apply a rights-based analysis, but preferred to follow the English lead and apply a 
best interests test dominated by reference to medical opinion^^ .^ Furthermore, the court 
held that there was no obligation to apply to the court in every future case : a decision as to 
whether or not to do so would rest on those responsible for the care of the patient. For 
future cases, it remains to be seen how the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court of 
Session will be administered. In Law Hospital NHS Trust v  Lord Advocate and Others, where 
the only decision to be taken was whether or not it was in the patient's best interests not to 
receive further feeding, the Inner House of the Court of Session felt that it alone had 
authority to 'consent' to the withdrawal. That is, there was no need to appoint a tutor 
dative; the traditional appointee of the Scottish courts for welfare matters of incompetents. 
This departs from the position in the US where a guardian can seek authority to consent on 
behalf of the incompetent. It is not clear whether the Inner Flouse envisages that future 
tutors dative - appointed before the 'withdrawal' decision has to be taken - will have the 
authority to do so, or whether the court, or the medical carers, must have the last word.
5.7.3. - Spatial Privacy: A  Conclusion
The above cases demonstrate the privacy interests which PVS patients have^ s^. It has 
already been argued that these interests are not confined solely to such patients but extend 
to all patients in the health care setting. Yet, the decisions to date in PVS cases demonstrate 
several things about legal protection of spatial privacy, first, although the interest which 
patients have is common to all cases, the language and means used to protect this interest 
vary between jurisdictions. Although the interest has most commonly been referred to as a
237 ibid, at 859 per  Lord President H ope.
238 Pqj. speculation on  the position in Australia (where the courts are yet to hear such a case) see, M endelson, 
D .; 'Jurisprudential Aspects o f W ithdrawal of Life Support Systems from Incom petent Patients in Australia', 
69, The Australian L aw  Journal, 259.
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privacy interest, this is not always the case, and this begs questions of accuracy of 
terminology. This will be dealt with in chapter five. Second, from the UK perspective it is 
not clear that the interest which an individual patient has in spatial privacy is adequately 
protected. The UK courts have approached the problem in PVS cases from a medical 
perspective and have faded to frame their decisions in terms of individual rights, preferring 
instead to hand responsibility and power to the medical profession. This, it is submitted, 
will only lead to further erosion of patient rights and possibly a failure to protect 
adequately their interests. Third, these cases are a striking example of how medical advances 
pose increasingly complex problems for patients and practitioners and give rise to difficult 
questions and issues about the sanctity of human life and the protection of the bodies and 
personalities of patients. It is submitted that the progress of medical science indicates that 
such invasions are likely to continue rather than abate in the future. The fact that privacy 
arguments have been advanced in such cases demonstrates the importance of a particular 
conception of privacy as applied to patients; namely, spatial privacy. In addition, it 
supports the amenability of privacy arguments to protect patient interests in their person.
6.1. - SPATIAL & INFO RM ATIO NAL PRIVACY: NEW  GENETICS & NEW  
PROBLEMS
So far, two separate conceptions of privacy have been advanced in this thesis: informational 
privacy and spatial privacy. It has been argued that the privacy of patients in the health care 
setting is composed of both of these forms of privacy. It has also been argued that medical 
advances increase concerns about possible privacy invasions and reveal a need to ensure 
proper protection of the rights and interests of patients. The concern of this thesis is, as has 
been stated, the legal protection of patient rights and interests in the United Kingdom. To 
date, what legal protection has been accorded to the spatial and informational interests in 
the UK has been of two distinct forms.
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First, concerns about security of information have been considered as part of the domain of 
the law of confidentiality. Confidential information is imparted from patient to doctor and 
the doctor is under an ethical and legal duty to refrain from disclosing such information to 
others without due cause. The appropriate legal remedy is an action for breach of 
confidence. In the medical sphere, however, it is arguably the relationship which is the 
focus of the protection rather than the information itself. Moreover, it is difficult to 
determine when and to what extent the rights and interests of third parties external to the 
confidential relationship, are protected. These factors, in combination with others, have 
caused problems in the past and have led some to argue that this action of breach of 
confidence is ill-equipped to deal with the kinds of problems which arise for patient privacy 
from the so-called 'doctor/patient r e l a t i o n s h i p '239.
Second, the ethical principle of respect for patient autonomy has recently received legal 
recognition in the U K .  A  series of cases has protected the interest of patients in exercising 
their autonomy to prevent unwarranted interference with their bodily integrity24o. Such an 
interest corresponds in large part to the concept of spatial privacy. The notion of patient 
autonomy which emerges from these cases in one of patient choice : the patient has the 
right to choose whether or not to receive treatment and can refuse treatment even if this 
has serious and/or fatal consequences. This, however. Is dependent on the patient being 
able to exercise choice, which in turn is dependent on numerous conditions which are 
designed to ensure that the patient can understand options, comprehend consequences and 
evaluate risks and benefits. I f  this cannot happen, as, for example, In the case of patients in 
PVS, then a best interest approach is adopted which, as has been shown, places heavy 
reliance on medical opinions and evaluations.
239 See, for example, Wacks, R.; 'Privacy and Press Freedom '. London, Blackstone Press Ltd., 1995, at 56.
240 See, Re T  (adult : refusal o f  medical treatment) [1992] 4 A ll ER 649; [1992] 3 WLR 782, Re C  (refusal o f  
medical treatment) {1994} 1 A ll ER 819; [1994] 1 FLR 31 and m ost recently Ae 445, Court of Appeal, 26 March 
1997, unreported. C f- Re S (adult : refusal o f medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671. For a discussion o f these 
cases see chapter three, infra.
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O f course, this brief account of confidentiality and autonomy cannot lead to any concrete 
conclusions. It is designed to show simply two things: first, that forms of legal protection 
already exist in the UK for the interests identified in this thesis as informational and spatial 
privacy interests. Second, these means of protection have proved to be flawed in protecting 
patient interests. Arguably, this alone should be the cause of some concern. However, the 
focus of this thesis will show how these concepts are wholly inadequate to deal with 
privacy problems in one specific area; namely, human genetics. This area of scientific 
development has given rise to unique problems for both individuals and families and is the 
paradigm example of how technical advances can pose a threat to personal privacy. It will 
be shown that the nature of the interests which individuals have in their genetic 
constitution relate both to informational and  spatial privacy and it will be argued that what 
is required is recognition of a patient privacy right per se. Only in this way can we provide 
a proper basis for adequate legal protection of such interests.
Thus the remainder of this work will proceed as follows. Chapter two will consider the 
nature of human genetics and the kinds of problems which have arisen for both 
informational and spatial privacy. Chapter three will examine the role of patient 
autonomy in protecting patient rights and interests in the UK. Chapter four will consider 
the same role of the law of confidence. Chapter five will involve an analysis of the concept 
of privacy as seen by other commentators and will include a defence of the definition of 
privacy advocated in this work. It will also demonstrate how the view of privacy adopted 
here can help to address the privacy issues surrounding familial genetic information and can 
help to formulate a legally recognised privacy right. Finally, chapter six will consider 
proposals for reform and possible legal remedies.
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CHAPTER TWO
HUMAN GENETICS AND 
GENETIC PRIVACY
1.1. - IN T R O D U C T IO N
This chapter will consider the current state of knowledge about human genetics and 
will outline the available options regarding possible uses of such knowledge. The 
claims of persons and institutions with an interest in genetic information will also 
be examined and the potential conflicts explained. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of various scenarios which highlight the unique problems posed by 
genetics for society and the law. These will be used in chapters three and four when 
considering the utility of appeals to autonomy and confidentiality as a means of 
addressing such problems. We shall return to these scenarios again in chapter five 
where it will be argued that the concept of privacy, as defined in this work, is the 
proper means for resolving these problems.
2.1. - THE H U M A N  GENOME PROJECT
The Human Genome Project was established in 1988 with the ambitious aim of 
mapping and sequencing the entire chain of human DNAb the human genome^. A  
double helical string of D N A  is contained in the nucleus of every cell in every 
human being. D N A  dictates the nature and function of all such cells^. For this 
reason the human genome is often referred to as 'the master blueprint of us all'4. It 
is estimated that the work of the Human Genome Project will be completed by the
 ^ D eoxyribonucleic acid.
2 For general com m ent on  the project and its aims see, W atson, J.D.; 'The Hum an Genom e Project 
: Fast. Present and Future*. 248, Science, 44, 1990.
3 It is estimated that a human being is com posed o f ten m illion m illion cells.
4 See, U S Departm ent o f Energy and N ational Institues o f Health, 'The H um an Genom e 1991-92 
Program R eport', 1992, at iii.
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turn of the century^. International coordination of the project is undertaken by the 
Human Genome Organisation (HUGO)^,
Already, the project has proved to be a source of invaluable knowledge regarding 
the make-up, nature and function of the so-called double helix of life .^ The benefits 
which will accrue from this work are extensive. In July 1995 the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee produced a report on Human 
Genetics^ within which the Committee outlined the potential benefits of human 
genomic research^. These include:
• Better understanding of human illness and the role of the 'genetic component' 
in a great many conditions including psychiatric, mental and neurological 
disorders;
• Quicker and cheaper diagnoses of common diseases;
• Better understanding of the "biochemical or physiological mechanisms" 
involved in genetic disease: 'focusing on the mechanism involved may bring
a b o u t  c u r e s . ' *^3.
3 See, for example, W ilkie, T. 'Perilous Knowledge : The Human G enom e Project and its 
Im plications', London, Faber and Faber, 1993.
6 For an accessible and com prehensive account of the w ork  o f the H um an G enom e Project and its 
consequences see, Bodmer, W. and McKie, R.; 'The Book of Man : The Q uest to D iscover Our 
Genetic Heritage'. Little, Brown & Com pany, 1994.
2 The expressed aim o f the Project is to acquire, '...com plete knowledge of the organization, 
structure and function o f the human genom e...', see, 'Flumaii G enom e 1991-92 Program Report', 
U nited States Departm ent o f Energy, Office o f Energy Research Office of Environmental research, 
W ashington D C , 1992, at iii.
 ^ H ouse of C om m on Science and Technology C om m ittee, 'Fluman Genetics: The Science and its 
Consequences', Third Report, FIMSO, 6 July 1995.
9 ibid, at 33 - 51, paragraphs 65 - 124.
4^  ibid, at 36, paragraph 69.
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» Improved techniques in the design of drugs to produce chemicals which can fit 
precisely with molecules implicated in disease;
• Gene Therapy;
• Germ-line Therapy.
However, as the Committee pointed out.
While genetics is likely eventually to transform 
medicine, it may take some while before treatments 
based on genetic knowledge become available...[i]n the 
short term, the most widespread use of medical 
genetics will be, as now, in diagnosis and screening.
Thus the first real and tangible benefits to emerge from this work have been tests 
kits for genetic diseases and c o n d i t i o n s  ^ 2 These make the identification and analysis 
of defective genes relatively inexpensive and, increasingly, a coinmon-place 
o c c u r r e n c e 3^ Tests can be used to detect an individual's genetic predisposition to a 
particular genetic disorder or his or her status as a carrier of a genetic condition
ibid, at 36 - 37, paragraphs 71, 72. As the Report makes clear, 'Diagnosis is aimed at individuals; 
genetic screening is routine screening o f populations, or identifiable subsets of populations (for 
example, m en or w om en only, or ethnic groups at increased risk for particular diseases).', id.
42 As the Gene Therapy A dviso iy  C om m ittee noted in its First Annual Report (N ovem ber 1993 - 
D ecem ber 1994), 'The application of gene therapy in any routine sense for health care is a long way 
off. A  prolonged period o f research lies ahead and it w ould be w rong to expect immediate returns 
or instant cures in view  o f the tim e and effort that must be expended.', see H ouse o f Com m ons 
Science and Technology C om m ittee Report, ibid., at 47, para. 111. The N H S  Central Research and 
D evelopm ent C om m ittee on  the N e w  Genetics produced its first report in M ay 1995 (Department 
o f H ealth, Report o f the Genetics Research A dvisory Group, May 1995) in w hich it opined that 
'[cjorrective gene therapy...is still a long w ay off.', ibid  at 17. It also laid dow n the follow ing  
requirements before it w ould consider acceptable the widespread im plem entation of gene therapy : 
(a) has safety been established?, (b) is treatment possible?, (c) is effectiveness proven?, id.
43 It has been estimated that there are over 3,500 'established' and 2,500 'suspected' genetic 
disorders. Disorders are 'suspected' to  exist principally because o f a lack o f familial data to 
substantiate the existence o f more rare conditions, see McKusick, V.A.; Mendelian Inheritance in 
Man: Catalogs o f Autosom al D om inant. A utosom al Recessive and X-linked Disorders. Eleventh 
Edition, (John H opkins U niversity Press 1993). 95% of the most com m on diseases can be tested for 
as w ell as about one hundred o f  the rarer diseases.
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which might afflict progeny. Already 95% of the most common genetic diseases can 
be tested for as well as about one hundred of the rarer diseases. And, as one 
commentator has noted,
This is likely to rise to a thousand or more over the 
next decade as the human genome project bears fruit.44
Yet, as the Science and Technology Committee has indicated, the development of 
therapies from the work of the Project is not commonplace. Some successes have, 
however, already occurred. For example, in 1990 the first attempt was made to 
treat a human being with an inherited genetic disorder through the use of genetic 
engineering techniques45. The success of this procedure led to other attempts using 
similar techniques46 and in 1994 specialists at the Jones Institute for Reproductive 
Medicine at the Eastern Virginia Medical School, USA successfully completed the 
first genetic testing for Tay-Sachs disease42 to be carried out on an embryo prior to 
its implantation in the womb of its mother48.
44 See Vines, G.; 'Gene Tests: The Parent's D ilem m a'. N ovem ber, N ew Scientist, 40, 1994, at 42.
43 The technique was carried out by a team from the N ational Institutes o f H ealth in Bethesda, 
Maryland U SA , on a young girl suffering from SCID (Sever Com bined Immune D eficiency). In this 
case, the condition was caused by an inherited inability to produce an enzym e (adenosine 
deaminase) essential to the proper functioning of the im m une system. Most persons afflicted w ith  
the condition die in early childhood; norm ally by succumbing to a m inor Infection. The technique 
em ployed by the Bethesda team was as follow s. A  sample of the most affected cells (white blood  
cells or 'T' cells) was extracted from  the patient's body and subjected to genetic m odification  
techniques w hich allowed the missing enzym e to be 'inserted' into the genetic make-up o f each of 
the cells in the sample. Thereafter, the cells were allowed to divide and m ultiply until a sufficient 
quantity of the 'treated' sample was produced. This was then transfused back into the girl in the 
same w ay as an ordinaiy b lood transfusion. A lthough apparently simple, this was the first tim e such 
genetically-modified material had been used in the treatment of a human being w ith  a genetic 
disorder. For a fuller account o f events see, W ilkie, 'Perilous Knowledge : The Fluman Genom e 
Projects and its Im plications', op. cit., at 16 - 23.
46 ibid.
42 Tay-Sachs disease is caused by the absence o f an enzym e which breaks down fatty substances in 
neurons. It is a fatal disorder of the neivous system  which invariably results in a slow , painful death 
w ithin  the first five years o f life.
4^  This resulted in the birth of a healthy baby girl in January 1994. See, Rennie, J.; 'Grading the 
Gene Tests'. Scientific Am erican, 270(6), 66, 1994.
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clearly, these advances have far-reaching implications for the future of medicine 
and the provision of health care. It is undeniable that they bring considerable 
benefits to humanity. However, it is also undeniable that they will change 
incontrovertibly the way we consider the human species and the way in which we 
consider ourselves. In the preamble to the World Medical Association Declaration 
on the Human Genome Project, it was stated that,
[t]his area of scientific progress will profoundly affect 
the lives of present and future members of society, 
bringing into question the very identity of the human 
individual and intruding upon the snail's pace of 
evolution in a decisive and probably irreversible
manner. 19
Moreover, the implications which these advances have for personal privacy are 
profound. Whereas few would deny that the availability of genetic knowledge can 
be beneficial, it must also be recognised that such tests can be the source of 
problems. Information concerning one's genetic make-up is of a highly personal 
and sensitive nature. To discover that one is likely to develop a debilitating 
condition in later life or that one will pass on such a condition to one's children can 
be a devastating and profound experience. Exposure to such knowledge can alter 
considerably one's self-perception and can challenge notions of self-identity^o. 
Furthermore, such knowledge can affect an individual in his or her social, 
professional and familial milieux with adverse results. The mere availability of 
genetic information serves to heighten concerns about the uses to which such 
information might be put; uses which might compromise the interests of the 
person who has been tested (the pro band). For example, by revealing the 
information to employers or insurers or other interested third parties, the
49 This declaration was adopted at the W orld Medical Association's 44th assembly in 1992.
29 This point is made by the Danish Council o f Ethics, Ethics and Mapping the Fluman G enom e. 
1993, at 52.
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information might lead to judgements being made which adversely affect or even 
discriminate against the individual. More uniquely, genetic tests also reveal 
information about relatives of the proband, with, arguably, a corresponding threat 
to their interests and their privacy. Family members might be loath to learn of a 
relative's predisposition to a particular genetic condition given the likelihood that 
they carry a similar risk. Finally, the state itself could put genetic information to 
many uses given the ability of such information to identify with high degrees of 
accuracy individuals and their current or future traits.
For all of these reasons, the existence and availability of genetic information gives 
rise to legitimate concerns on the part of the individuals to whom it relates 
regarding its use or possible misuse. The next section outlines the current state of 
knowledge about human genetics and the current possibilities regarding testing and 
screening. Given the existence of such knowledge and its potential uses, the parties 
who might have an interest in such knowledge will then be discussed. Finally, the 
problems of reconciling the various interests will be highlighted in a series of case 
studies.
3.1. - H U M A N  GENETICS A N D  GENETIC DISEASES
It is the function of this section to explain terminology, to outline the facts 
concerning genetic information and to examine the nature and efficacy of genetic 
testing.
Genetic disorders are caused by mutations in genes. Genes are responsible for the 
functioning and operation of every cell in the human body^i. It is thought that
24 It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 human genes exist each of a length o f a few  
thousand base pairs.
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every individual carries several ’defective’ genes within their genome^^. However, 
not every individual suffers from, or will suffer from, a genetic disorder. This is so 
because of two important influences which dictate the pathology of genetic 
'diseases': inheritance and the operation of external factors.
The genetic constitution of all human beings is contained in their chromosomes. 
Every individual has twenty three pairs of chromosomes: half inherited from their 
mother and half from their father^ .^ Some genetic diseases - recessive disorders - only 
manifest themselves in individuals whose parents both pass on the same gene defect. 
The parents themselves are asymptomatic and only carry the recessive gene : hence 
the term 'carrier'. Any individual who inherits only one copy of such a recessive 
gene will also be asymptomatic but may be a carrier. The presence of one copy of 
the healthy gene is sufficient to override the deleterious effects of the unhealthy 
gene. The conjunction of two defective genes, however, results in disease. Examples 
of such disorders include cystic fibrosis, thalassaemia and sickle cell anaemia. On 
average, the chances of being affected by such a recessive disorder when both 
parents are carriers is 25%24.
In contrast, dominant disorders require both copies of a gene inherited from parents 
to be healthy in order to avoid disease. Examples of such conditions include 
Huntington's Disease and certain forms of Alzheimer's disease. The chances of
22 See Suter, S.M.; 'W hose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic 
Inform ation'. 91, Michigan Law Review , 1854, 1993, at 1858: '[ejveryone probably carries between  
three and nine deleterious or disease genes, m ost o f which are recessive.'
23 Genetic diseases are generally of one o f three kinds: (1) Chromosomal disorders, which involve 
the 'lack, excess or abnormal arrangement o f one or more chrom osom es, producing excessive or 
deficient genetic material', (2) Mendelian or sim ply inherited disorders w hich are determined by a 
single gene mutant, and (3) M ultifactorial disorders w hich are 'caused by an interaction o f m utliple 
genes and m ultiple exogenous or environmental factors', see, W ilson, J .D ., Braunwald, E., 
Isselbacher, K.J., Petersdorf, R .G ., Martin, J.B., Fauci, A .S., and R oot, R.K.; Principles o f Internal 
M edicine. Tw elfth Edition, (M cGraw-Hill Inc. 1991) at 24.
24 O n a purely statistical analysis, another 25% w ill not can y the gene defect at all. 50% o f the 
offspring w ill, however, be carriers. Furthermore, it should be noted that if an affected person 
marries a carrier of the condition 50% of their progeny w ill be affected, ibid.
82
being affected by such a condition are 50% in each case. Such dominant disorders 
differ from recessive disorders in two important respects. First, many dominant 
disorders do not usually manifest themselves until later in life^ .^ This means that a 
family can be complete before there is any sign that a genetic trait has been 
inherited. Second, when manifestation does occur it is characterised by extreme 
variation in the symptoms experienced by family m e m b e r s ^ ^ .  This can further delay 
the recognition of a pattern of inheritance in a particular family^ .^
Both of the above kinds of disorders are called monogenic disorders^ .^ They carry a 
relatively high risk of transmission to first degree relatives of an affected person. 
Polygenic disorders relate to conditions which result from the interaction of two or 
more defective genes. Examples include ischaemic heart disease, congenital cancer 
and diabetes29. Only 5% to 10% of first degree relatives are affected by such 
conditions because of the need for many genes to interact to cause disease^o. Such
23 Around 50% of dominant disorders are 'late-onset' disorders.
26 A n additional com plicating factor is that o f non-penetrance: that is, although defective genes have 
been passed onto progeny the progeny remain unaffected by the condition.
22 Additional differences between recessive and dom inant disorders include the fact that parents o f a 
sufferer from  a recessive condition w ill in general be entirely free of the disease. A t least one parent 
o f a person afflicted w ith  a dominant condition w ill also be affected (although it is possible in a 
small number of cases for an individual to suffer from the condition because of a m utation which  
has occurred). Further, recessive conditions do not in general pass through generations vertically. 
O n ly  siblings are affected. W ith few  exceptions, the incidences o f such disorders are rare because o f  
the need for the conjunction of tw o individuals both of w hom  carry the defective gene and transmit 
it to their children. D om inant disorders transmit vertically through generations and are more likely  
to result in disease.
2® The other form of single inherited disorders w hich is com m on involves the so-called 'X-linked' 
disorders. These affect the sex chrom osom e. The sex of any individual is determined by the 
arrangement o f the X  and Y  chrom osom es. W om an have tw o X  chrom osom es (XX). Men have one 
X  chrom osom e and one Y  chrom osom e (XY). X-linked genetic disorder therefore afflict men (in 
the vast majority o f cases) because, if their X  chrom osom e is damaged or defective, they do not have 
another healthy copy of the chrom osom e w hich  w ill override the deleterious effects o f the 
unhealthy X  chrom osom e. Clearly, this is not the case for wom en. C om m on X-linked disorders 
include colour-blindness, haemophilia, ocular albinism and Duchenne Muscular D ystrophy. 
W om en act as carriers o f the gene defect and it is they w ho pass it onto their sons. Men cannot pass 
the defective X  chrom osom e onto their sons because the male always contributes his Y  
chrom osom e to  his sons; the X  chrom osom e is transmitted to  his daughters. All female offspring of 
an affected male are carriers. W ilson eta l, op. cit. at 28.
29 O ther com m on conditions include asthma, epilepsy, hypertension, multiple sclerosis and 
schizophrenia.
39 W ilson et al, op. cit. at 30. The precise number o f genes responsible for polygenic traits is 
unknow n, ibid.
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polygenic disorders are an example of the general class of multifactorial conditions 
which forms the other common classification of genetic dysfunction^^. Polygenic 
disorders can work alone or in tandem with environmental conditions to result in 
human disease. Common external environmental factors which influence the 
manifestation and/or progression of genetic disease include; diet, exercise, stress, 
alcohol and drugs, and exposure to toxic chemicals or radlation^ .^ As with purely 
polygenic conditions, however, the predictability of the occurrence of 
multifactorial genetic conditions is very low compared to monogenic disorders^ .^ 
For this reason the majority of research which has been carried out to date on 
genetic conditions and diseases relates to the latter rather than the former. That 
said, by far the most common disorders experienced by individuals are due to 
multifactorial, as opposed to a monogenic, dysfunction^^. Indeed, it is thought that 
in the future it will be possible to detect a genetic component in a great many 
disorders and conditions which today are seen as purely organic or as resulting 
from social and not physiological dysfunction; for example, schizophrenia, manic 
depression, and drug or alcohol abuse.
These facts allow us to draw certain conclusions about the nature of genetics and 
genetic information. Any information which becomes known about a particular 
individual's genetic constitution also reveals, with varying degrees of certainty, 
information about the genetic constitution of members of both their immediate 
and extended family. For relatives, this can reveal the possibility that one already 
has a particular condition or that one is at increased risk from developing such a 
condition or that one is a carrier. However, the chances of this being the case can
34 For a general discussion o f such conditions see, W illiam son, R. and Kessling, A.M.; 'The 
Problem  of Polygenic Disease' in Ciba Foundation Sym posium  149, 'Human Genetic Information : 
Science, Law and Ethics', Chichester, John W iley & Sons, 1990, at 63 - 80.
32 The study o f such conditions has been coined Ecogenetics, see Pence, G.E.; 'Classic Cases in 
Medical Ethics', Second Edition, N ew  York, M cGraw-Hill, Inc. 1995 at 407 - 408.
33 ibid.
34 Indeed, it is thought that, '...only three percent o f all human diseases are caused by defects in a 
single gene.,.', see Rennie, 'Grading the Gene Tests' , loc. cit., at 96.
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rarely be accurately predicted simply on the basis of test results of a relative^ .^ 
Although some conditions carry a straightforward statistical probability of 
affliction, increasingly it is becoming clear that many variable factors influence 
one's genetic constitution. This precludes the drawing of any concrete conclusions 
based simply on information from others^ *". As the Danish Council of Ethics has 
noted,
[i]n many - possibly even most - cases, great 
uncertainty still attaches to ascertaining whether or 
not a disease is hereditarily conditioned. A long string 
of illnesses such as cancer and cardiovascular disease 
cannot be categorically classified as being hereditarily 
or environmentally conditioned, but must be assumed 
to be due to the - as yet only partly clarified - 
interaction of hereditary and environmental factors.^^
The degree of uncertainty which accompanies such information might lead to 
considerable unease and concern among relatives about their own genetic status. 
For those who choose not to be tested themselves the prospect of living with such 
uncertainty is a daunting one. Yet, even for those who choose to be tested, the 
benefits are neither immediate nor guaranteed.
T he technical term for a person w ho has been tested is the proband  or the index case^  see W ilson et 
al, op. cit., at 24.
G ostin points out that the sensitivity of testing is limited by the know n m utations in a target 
population. As he states, '[S]creening can detect only 75 percent o f CF chrom osom es in the U .S. 
population. Approxim ately one in every tw o couples from the general population identified by CF 
screening as "at-risk" w ill be falsely labeled. Predicting the nature, severity, and course of disease 
based on  a genetic marker is an additional difficulty. For m ost genetic diseases, the onset date, 
severity of symptoms and efficacy o f treatment and management vary greatly.’, see Gostin, L.O.; 
'G enetic Privacy', l i ,  Journal o f  Law, Medicine and Ethics, 320, 1995 at 323 quoting Fost, N .; 'The 
Cystic Fibrosis Gene : Medical and Social Im plication for Fleteroy.ygote D etection ’. 2 6 i, Journal o f  
the Am erican Medical Association, 2777, 1990.
Op. cit., at 10. See also, Cavoukian, A.; 'Confidentiality Issues in Genetics : The N eed  for 
Privacy' in Second Sym posium  of the C ouncil o f Europe on Bioethics, Strasbourg, 30 N ovem ber - 2 
D ecem ber 1993, CDBI-SY-SP (93) 5 at 4.
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3.2. - Genetic Information and Testing
A wide range of genetic tests are now available^ .^ In contrast, few cures for genetic 
disorders currently exist^ .^ In this respect the usefulness of testing is limited. Since 
the knowledge to which tests give rise can only be used to avoid the onset of disease 
in a very small number of cases, the value of such tests must be sought elsewhere. 
Indeed, several arguments have been advanced about the value of testing in the 
absence of cure. For instance, concerning multifactorial conditions which are 
heavily influenced by an environmental component, it has been argued that such 
knowledge can be used to inform individuals fully of possible risks to health which 
can possibly be minimised by a change in lifestyle'^ .^ Similarly, the discovery of 
one’s status as a carrier for a particular condition means that any decision which 
will be taken thereafter regarding reproduction will be an informed decision. Also, 
it has been argued that one can better prepare for hardship to come, both mentally 
and in other ways, if one is aware of the risk of developing a disease at a later stage 
in life'^ h Such early prediction allows appropriate support mechanisms - such as 
counselling - to be set in place in advance of the onset of any d isease '* ^ .
Vines notes, '[a]ll Britain's health regions have genetic testing and counselling centres, which can 
test for about 20 of the com m onest inherited disease, w hich together account for 95 per cent of all 
cases', loc. cit., at 42.
As one com m entator has said, '[fjorced analysis o f the human genome w ill cause the gap between  
diagnostic ability and therapeutic failure to widen more than ever. W e shall detect diseases w ith  
greater and greater precision, we shall learn to predict at the preclinical or prenatal stage w ithout 
being able to do anything about the cause.', see Schmidtke, J.; 'W ho O w ns the H um an Genome? 
Ethical and Legal A spects'.44(1),/. Pharrn. Pharm acol, 205, 1992, at 209.
See, for example, Ryan, M .P., et a l\  'A n Ethical Debate : Genetic Testing for Familial 
H ypertrophic Cardiom yopathy in N ew born  Infants'. 310, British Medical Journal, 856, 1995, in 
w hich a view  is put that early detection of this inherited weakness of the heart can mean that, '[t]he 
child can be raised w ith  an emphasis on avoidance o f energetic activities rather than be suddenly 
banned from  an established sporting pursuit during adolescence, when the disease is diagnosed 
clinically', at 857. See also, R eilly, P.; 'Rights. Privacy, and Genetic Screening'. 64, Yale Journal o f  
Biology and Medicine, 43, 1991. H ow ever, w ith  the w hole range of multifactorial conditions the 
problem  comes in know ing which aspects o f one's lifestyle are causal in the onset o f disease.
See Ball, D ., Tyler, A. and Plarper, P.; 'Predictive Testing of Adults and Children' in Clarke, A. 
(ed.), 'Genetic Counselling : Practice and Principles', London, Routledge, 1994, at 63 - 94, especially 
71. A lso see, Pelias, M .2.; 'D u ty  to D isclose in Medical Genetics : A  Legal Perspective', 39, 
Am erican Journal o f Medical Genetics, 347, 1991.
This of course presupposes that such support mechanisms exist.
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It must be borne in mind, however, that even in this context the efficacy of genetic 
tests is limited. Tests can neither predict the particular likelihood of the onset of a 
condition, nor the date when disease will develop nor the severity of the condition 
which any one individual is likely to experience'^ .^ Further, mutations in disease- 
causing genes can themselves be responsible for disease. To be truly effective a test 
must be capable of detecting all such mutations'*' .^ Yet, because longer genes are 
more likely to carry mutations, the difficulty of this task increases with the 
genetically more complex conditions. The recently discovered BRCAl gene'*^  - 
thought to be responsible for five percent of all breast cancers'**^  - is unusually 
long'*^ . It has been estimated that even once a test is developed its efficacy will be 
limited: '...a negative result would be indeterminate and could be expressed only as 
a probability''*®.
In certain circumstances the cooperation of family members is required to provide 
an accurate test result for the existence of a genetic condition. Tests fall into one of 
two categories: linkage tests and genetic tests. The latter detect the 'defective' gene 
itself and can be carried out without familial cooperation. Linkage tests, however, 
merely detect 'markers' which accompany genes and for accurate results blood 
samples are required both from affected and unaffected members of one's family.
**^ See, Berg, K.; 'C onfidentiality Issues in Medical Genetics: The N eed for Laws. Rules and G ood  
Practices to  Secure Optim al Disease C ontrol'. Second Symposium  of the Council o f Europe on  
Bioethics, Strasbourg, 30 N ovem ber - 2 Decem ber 1993, CDBI-SY-SP (93) 3 at 4 - 5. A lso , G ostin, 
'Genetic Privacy', loc. cit., at 323.
'*'* A  recent example o f this has been the test for hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. Initial screening 
proved to be inaccurate until the d iscoveiy of a m utation o f the cardial beta-myosin heavy chain 
gene M Y H 7, see, Ryan et al, loc. cit., at 856.
'*^  The discovery o f the gene was announced on 15 September 1994 by a team at the U niversity of 
Utah.
For a statistical breakdown and comment see, Eeles, R.; ‘Testing For the Breast Cancer 
Predisposition B R C A L . 313, British M edical Journal, 572, 1996.
'*^  The gene consists o f  100,000 base pairs o f nucleotides, which is ten times longer than the average 
gene.
'*® See, Pence, op. cit., at 411 - 412. The same problem  occurs w ith  all 'long' genes, for example, the 
gene for cystic fibrosis.
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Without these, test results are inconclusive'*^. The full informed consent of all 
relatives might, however, be difficult to obtain^ **. Clearly, the efficacy of test results 
will be affected If only a number of relatives agree to cooperate^*.
All of these factors make recourse to genetic testing a hazardous b u s in e s s ^ ^  
Moreover, the multiplicity of interests at stake makes the potential for conflict over 
the use of genetic information reaP .^
4.1. - THE INTERESTED PARTIES
This section will consider four parties who might have an interest in the genetic 
information of an individual : 1) the individual him or herself (the prohand)', 2) 
relatives of the individual in question; 3) those employing or insuring the individual 
or seeking to do so; 4) the State. The nature of such interests will also be
'**^ ibid, at 396.
It is the view  of the Danish C ouncil o f Ethics that, '...no unsolicited approach may be made 
by...health authorities in the case o f examinations w hich may evince an hereditary disease in the 
family. This can create undue anxiety on the part o f the relatives concerned and, at worst, encroach 
radically on their lives, through no wish of their ow n...the regard for family member's integrity 
weighs heavier than the understandable need o f the counsellee to be diagnosed and to have future 
options for action set out.', op. cit., at 23.
See Ball, D ., Tyler, A. and Harper, P., op. cit., at 66 - 69. As the authors state, '[Ijlnked marker 
studies are norm ally the on ly  means o f genetic prediction for a disorder until the causative gene is 
identified and specific mutations(s) isolated, w hereupon direct mutational analysis becomes possible, 
allowing prediction to  be made using a single sample from an applicant.', at 68. The genetic marker 
for H untington's disease was discovered in 1983. It is located on the short arm of chrom osom e 4. 
The gene for H untington's Disease was eventually located in March 1993. A  genetic test became 
available in 1994. For com m ent see Miller, S.K.; 'To Catch a Killer G ene' N ew ScietttisC, April 3, 7, 
1993, and Harding, A.E.; 'The Gene for H untington's Disease', 307, British Medical Jouryial, 396,
1993.
See, for example, Hayes, C.; 'Genetic Testing for H untington's Disease - A  Family Issue', 
327(20), N ew  England Journal o f  Medicifte, 1449, 1992. Some researchers have even recorded an 
adverse effect in persons w ho are told that they are not at risk, see Hoffm an, D .E . and Wulfsberg, 
E-A.j 'Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions ; Is it in Their Best Interest?'. 23, Journal o f  
Law, Medicine and Ethics, 331, 1995, and Huggins et al; 'Predictive Testing for Fluntington Disease 
in Canada: Adverse Effects and Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased Risk'. 42, 
Am erican Journal o f  Medical Genetics, 508, 1992.
A s an example, and for an account o f the problems of prenatal testing from a French perspective 
see Lenoir, N .; 'Aspects Juridiques et Ethiques du D iagnostic Prenatal : Le D roit et Les Pratiques en 
Vigeur en France et dans Divers Autres Pays', in 'ITuman Genetic Analysis and the Protection of 
Personality and Privacy', International C olloquium , Zurich, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag,
1994.
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considered. It is submitted that it is by an examination of the respective interests 
which parties have in genetic information that one can understand the nature of the 
problems which can arise. This also serves to bring the issues within the rubric of a 
common language, which in turn allows one to compare and contrast various, and 
at times competing, interests.
In this context of genetic information, an interest is defined as a claim that a benefit 
can come to the party in question by recognising that the party has a relationship 
with the genetic information. The basis of that relationship might be -
• personal', that is, the information is about the person;
• economic, that is, the information can affect one's employment or insurance 
business; or
• paternalistic, that is, the party is in a position to use the information to protect 
the individual or others from harm.
O f course, the question of whether or not a party has an interest in genetic 
information is an evaluative matter. Inherent in the notion of interest is the idea 
that it is in the party's interest to recognise the relationship with the genetic 
information. And, to do so will normally lead one to conclude that it is therefore 
in  the party's interest to know, and to have access to the information in question. 
However, depending on the perspective one adopts, this might not always be the 
case. This is explained further below.
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4.2. - An Individual's Interest in his/her Genomic Information
It is axiomatic that a person who has been tested for one or more genetic conditions 
has a significant interest in knowing and determining what happens to the resulting 
information. Arguably, genetic information is 'the most personal information of 
air^ '*. As we have seen, such information can help an individual to make informed 
decisions about his or her health and lifestyle and furthermore this can lead to the 
prevention of future disease. In addition, knowledge of one's genetic status permits 
informed decisions about future reproductive choices to be made. Whereas it has 
already been established that personal health information is inherently connected to 
and part of the private sphere of an individual's life, genetic information has a 
unique relationship with the Individual in many other ways. For example, as Suter 
has noted,
[wjhile contracting chicken pox has virtually no 
effect on identity, the knowledge that one carries a 
disease gene may influence one's self-perception and 
definition of "one's own concept of existence" in a 
way most infectious diseases do not.^^
Furthermore, and again unlike 'conventional' health information, genetic 
information cannot be completely anonymised. It is a unique marker pointing the 
way to a single individual. As Gostin puts it,
See, Laurie, G.T.; 'The M ost Personal Inform ation o f A ll : A n Appraisal of Genetic Privacy in 
the Shadow of the Hum an G enom e Project'. 10, International Journal o f Law, Policy and the Family, 
74, 1996.
See Suter, S.M., 'W hose Genes Are These Anyway? : Familial Conflicts over Access to G enetic 
Inform ation', loc. cit., at 1893.
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Genomic data are qualitatively different from other 
health data because they are inherently linked to one 
person. While non-genetic descriptions of any given 
patient’s disease and treatment could apply to many 
other individuals, genomic data are unique. But, 
although the ability to identify a named individual in 
a large population simply from genetic material is 
unlikely, the capacity of computers to search multiple 
data bases provides a potential for linking genomic 
information to that person. It follows that nonlinked 
genomic data do not assure anonymity and that 
privacy and security safeguards must attach to any 
form of genetic material.
Finally, genetic information does not simply provide us with information about an 
individual's medical past, which is the case with most medical records. In addition, 
genetic information furnishes us with knowledge about the individual's medical 
future. This knowledge can be vague, in that we know only that the person has a 
certain percentage risk of developing disease, or it can be certain; we know that 
given time, disease w ill develop. Either way, such knowledge permits those who 
hold it to make judgements about the future life of the individual. Thus the 
proband him or herself can make future life decisions based on this information. By 
the same token, insurers or employers might change their attitude towards the 
individual based on the predictive data. Such attitudinal shifts might not always be 
to the individual's advantage^ .^
For these reasons and those which have already been advanced in chapter one, an 
individual has a very strong claim to a right to control what happens to such 
information. In essence, such persons have an interest in this information because it 
relates to them and can affect their lives. Furthermore, because of their status as 
moral agents and because of the close relationship which they have with such
G ostin, 'Genetic Privacy', loc. cit., at 322. 
See infra.
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information, respect is due not simply to them as individuals but also to their 
interests in such inherently personal material.
4.3. “ The Interest of Relatives in a Proband's Genetic Information
In an entirely unique way, exactly the same reasons as above can be advanced by 
the blood relatives of a proband to claim an interest in genetic test results since a 
test result will also reveal information about them^®. One significant difference 
between a proband and a blood relative, however, is that the proband has made a 
conscious decision to acquire the information. The same might not be true of blood 
relatives. Yet, once such information exists questions of security, access and control 
arise. Further, if the individuals to whom the information relates do not agree on 
such issues, problems of balancing the competing interests must be a d d r e s s e d ^ ^ .  A 
further complicating factor is the potential claims of non-blood related relatives 
such as spouses. An example of how conflict can arise can be seen from a recent 
French example.
4.3.1. - The French Glaucoma Studies
In the late eighties and early nineties the French Institut National D'Etudes 
Démographiques (National Institute for Population Studies) carried out studies in
The existence o f this interest has been recognised by a variety o f bodies, including N uffield  
C ouncil on  Bioethics, Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues, Decem ber 1993, chapter five; The Royal 
C ollege o f Physicians o f London, Ethical Issues in Clinical Genetics: A  Report of the W orking 
Group of the Royal College o f Physicians' Comm ittees on Ethical Issues in Medicine and Clinical 
G enetics. 1991, para, 4.19, and the Danish Council o f Ethics, op. cit., at 62.
Because of technological advances in the last fifty years in the field of computers the means now  
exist to  store and access all forms o f inform ation for indefinite periods of time. In this way, genetic 
inform ation could also prove relevant for future generations o f the same genetic line. See Barber, B.; 
'Securing Privacy in Medical G enetics', Second Symposium  o f the Council o f Europe on Bioethics, 
Strasbourg, 30 N ovem ber - 2 Decem ber 1993, CDBI-SY-SP (93) 2 at 6, and Berg, K.; 
'Confidentiality Issues in Medical Genetics : The N eed  for Laws. Rules and G ood Practices to 
Secure Optim al Disease C ontrol', Second Symposium  o f the Council of Europe on Bioethics, op. 
cit., at 3.
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the region of Nord Pas De Calais (near Boulogne-sur-Mer) into instances of 
hereditary glaucoma. Reported cases of this condition were unusually high 
compared to the rest of the country. The Institute was able to trace the ancestors of 
three families known to be sufferers from glaucoma back fifteen generations to a 
blind couple who lived in a small village in the region in the 16th century. Having 
done so, it was then relatively easy to retrace the descendants of the couple back to 
the present day in order to identify those individuals who were at increased risk of 
developing glaucoma. The nature of the condition is such that, if caught in its early 
stages, even before the individual patient has perceived that there is anything 
wrong, its advancement can be halted simply with a prescription of eye-drops. 
However, if glaucoma is not diagnosed at this early stage it can eventually lead to 
blindness, and the only treatment available at later stages is surgery. The French 
INED decided to consult the National Data Protection Agency to determine the 
correct procedure to be followed in order to inform the individuals at high risk. 
The Agency responded that the Institute should not, under any circumstances, take 
steps to inform these people of the information they had discovered. To do so, it 
was said, would be a breach of their privacy. This caused an outcry in France^®. Of 
particular interest to this work is the nature of the questions which this sort of 
scenario raises.
4.3.2. - Familial Issues and Interests in Genetic Information
Many issues arise from the above scenario. It provokes us to ask appropriate 
questions which help us to understand the nature of the interests which individuals 
and relatives have in genetic information.
See, ’L ’Express', N .2123, 20 March 1992.
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For example, should relatives be informed of test results, especially if the results 
reveal a predisposition to a serious condition? Should the wishes of the tested 
person be taken into account? Should the wishes of relatives be taken into account? 
Could a relative demand disclosure of such information? Does the absence or 
presence of a cure make a difference? Could a relative refuse to receive such 
information? That is, could such a person have a claim not to know of a genetic 
predisposition? Might an interested third party such as the state have a claim in 
requiring that they know such information? Does the health care professional who 
has performed the test owe a duty to disclose to relatives of a tested person, even if 
they are not patients of the professional? If so, what is a professional to do if those 
to whom the duty is owed disagree about how the information should be treated? 
All of these questions have implications for the privacy of the persons concerned.
The need to address privacy issues in this context has already been appreciated by a 
number of international bodies. For example, the Bilbao Declaration, which was 
drafted at the International Workshop on Legal Aspects of the Human Genome 
Project which took place in Bilbao, Spain in May 1993, highlights the main 
problematic areas likely to arise from the work of the Human Genome Project and 
the areas considered to be worthy of immediate attention by the legal systems of 
the world. Included in this is,
[pjrotection of the personal privacy or confidentiality 
of genetic information, and determination of cases in 
which it could feasibly be altered or overstepped.^*
Moreover, in March 1995 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) issued a revised outline of a Declaration on the 
Protection of the Human Genome. In paragraph B.9 it is stated.
The Bilbao Declaration on the H uman Genome, M ay 1993.
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The confidentiality of genetic data associated with a 
named person and stored or processed for the 
purposes of research or any other purpose, must be 
protected from third parties except where the law 
provides otherwise and where justified by the generalinterest. 2^
The interests which surround personal and familial genetic information can be 
distilled to the following:
• The Individual - an interest in the genetic information resulting from  a test
For the reasons already outlined above, the individual who has consented to a 
genetic test has an interest in the results of the test. This is so even if the test reveals 
information which was not expected, for example - a test for an inherited disease A  
also reveals a predisposition to disease B. The basis for this latter assertion is the 
individual's right to be respected as a moral agent. However, it is entirely 
contingent on the individual agreeing to receive the information^^.
• The Individual - an interest in keeping the information in a state o f non-access
Because of potentially harmful outcomes which can befall an individual if personal 
information is not kept secure, the individual has an interest in keeping the 
information secret or private; that is, limiting access to those whom s/he 
authorises.
See, the revised outline o f the Declaration on the Protection of the I-Iuman G enom e by the 
U nited  N ations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 7 March 1995, BIO /C IB- 
C O M JU R /95.
See below.
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Wolf has warned that our society runs a serious risk of applying a reductionist 
approach to genetic information^'*. This, she posits, will adversely affect individuals 
and will lead to what she terms 'geneticism'. Using the context of health insurance, 
she points out that too often individuals are seen 'as their genes''' .^ This, in turn,
...subdividfes] communities by their genetic 
characterisitics, and promot[es] the idea that genetic 
differences are real, biological, and neutral grounds for 
different treatment.
Wolf's point is a valid one in that it highlights one serious danger inherent in the 
availability of genetic information. Genetic knowledge, in se, may be neutral, but it 
cannot be asserted that the uses to which it can be put are necessarily also so. Our 
recent past teaches us that genetic information can be seen as bringing 'scientific', 
and therefore 'credible', foundations to long-held prejudices and deep-ingrained 
bigotry. As more becomes known about the human genome it cannot be stated 
with certainty that such information will always be used for entirely 'neutral' ends. 
Consider, for example, recent discussion about the desirability and utility of a 
search for a 'gay' gene^ .^ On the one hand, scientific proof that homosexuality has a 
genetic basis brings credence to the argument that homosexuals are 'made that way' 
and that homosexuality is not simply a life choice. By the same token, scientific 
proof of the 'gay' gene proves that all along homosexuals were correctly treated as 
'deviants', for such a gene could easily be seen as a "mutation" from the "normal". 
Such divergent viewpoints not only call into question the appropriateness of 'gay' 
gene research but also indicate that individuals have a strong interest in maintaining
W olf, S.M.; 'Beyond "Genetic D iscrim ination’’ : Towards the Broader Harm o f Geneticism '. 23, 
Journal o f  Law, Medicine and Ethics, 345, 1995. 
ibid, at 346. 
id.
As an example o f the discussion w hich surrounds this subject see, Vines, G.; 'Gene Tests: The 
Parents' D ilem m a'. N ovem ber, N ew  Scientist, 40, 1994, LeVay, S. and Ham er, D .H .; 'Evidence for a 
Biological Influence in Male H om osexuality', May, Scientific Am erican, 20, 1994, and Byne, W.; 
'The Biological Evidence Challenged'. May, Scientific Am erican, 26, 1994.
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control and. security over their own genetic information should it ever be 
discovered that they possess such a gene.
The above is an argument that individuals have an interest in the security of genetic 
information because harm can come to them if security is not maintained. 
However, this is not the only reason for claiming an interest in security of such 
information. In chapter one it was contended that as moral agents in a western 
liberal democracy individuals deserve respect and that this extends both to their 
person and their personal information. Deferrence to the wishes of individuals is 
one of the utmost forms of respect. Thus it should be enough that the individual 
express a wish or desire that information be kept secure to invoke the respectful 
response of maintaining non-access. N o further justification should be required'"®. 
The interest which the individual has is the interest in having his or her wishes 
respected, and it is therefore related only tangentially to the information itself. 
Nonetheless, this is an important interest which affects the sum and nature of the 
overall claims to the genetic information.
• Family Members - knowledge and security o f genetic information
For the same reasons argued above, blood-related family members have an interest 
both in knowing the test results from a proband and in ensuring that the 
information is not noised abroad without authority. The question of whether or 
not their interest is as strong as that of the proband is more difficult to answer. 
Certainly, the risk of more distant relatives being affected by a particular condition 
is reduced because of the different genetic influences which they have been 
subjected to compared with the proband^^. Similarly, a spouse or partner can gain
O f course, this is not to  say that respect should always be forthcoming, but it does im ply that 
good reasons should exist before wishes or desires are not respected.
See, W ilson, et. a l ,  op. cit., at 30 : '...as the degree o f relation becomes more distant, the likelihood  
o f a relative inheriting the same com bination o f  genes becomes less. M oreover, the chances o f any
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no knowledge at all about his or her own genetic constitution by knowing their 
partner's test result, but such a person could nevertheless claim several interests in 
knowing the information. For example, such knowledge gives an indication about 
possible future risks for any future progeny. Also, such information could weigh 
heavily in any decision of the partner to remain with the proband.
Those relatives with the strongest interest of all are the first degree relatives of the 
person who has been tested. This is so because they have the highest likelihood of 
genetic similarity with the proband. The interests of such relatives include those of 
the children of a proband who might want to know whether they have any risk of 
disease which might affect themselves or their progeny. Siblings, too, have a strong 
interest in a brother or sister's test results given their common parentage '^*.
That said, it is important to stress once again that one's concern with genetic 
information should not be viewed simply as a desire to avoid harm in the guise of 
genetic disease. Even if test results show no risk of disease, it should not be 
presumed that individuals will automatically be happy to surrender control of such 
information. Relatives will still have an interest in each other's genetic information 
even if it reveals nothing sinister. Such information is nevertheless intimately 
connected with their private sphere and possibly their sense of self and therefore to 
disrespect the information is to disrespect the people involved. This point has been 
made above concerning the individual proband.
From the above it is clear that conflict will arise when the proband wishes to keep 
test results secure and family members wish to know them. That is, when the
relative inheriting the right com bination of genes decrease as the number of genes required for the 
expression of a given trait increases.'
This is particularly true for (identical) twins. It should be noted, however, that the knowledge of 
a sibling's test result w ill not change one's own  risk of ill health. The chances of being affected are 
the same for each sibling, eg- 50% chance of being affected by a dominant disorder or 25% chance of 
being affected by a recessive disorder (50% chance of being a carrier).
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individual wishes to keep the data private and the family wish to invade that private 
sphere, or perhaps, become part o/that private sphere.
• The Individual and the Family - an interest in not knowing?
Until now the discussion has proceeded on the basis that both the individual tested 
and the family members desire to know the information available. However, the 
question arises of whether individuals - either the proband or relatives - have an 
interest in not knowing test results. For example, the proband might agree to be 
tested but then change his or her mind. Equally, relatives might be approached by a 
proband willing to reveal test results but might refuse to accept the information. 
Let us consider the possible interests which individuals could have in not knowing 
such information.
It has been argued that knowledge of genetic information can bring many benefits 
to individuals. If a cure is available it can be sought and possible ill health may be 
averted. Even if a cure is not available, knowledge can nevertheless serve several 
ends. For example, because multifactorial conditions are by definition affected by 
many influences including the non-genetic, knowledge of a predisposition to such a 
condition can provide individuals with the opportunity to change aspects of their 
lifestyle. This can in turn influence the onset of disease^*. Similarly, the discovery 
of disease or predisposition to disease means that any decision which will be taken 
thereafter regarding reproduction will be an informed one. Moreover, it has been 
argued that with knowledge comes preparedness for the risk of developing a disease 
at a later stage in life^ .^ Unfortunately, such arguments all suffer from one
See, Ryan, M.P. et al, 'A n  Ethical Debate : Genetic Testing for Familial H ypertrophic 
Cardiom yopathy in N ew born  Infants', loc. cit. and Reilly, P.; 'Rights. Privacy, and Genetic 
Screening', loc. cit.
See Ball, D ., Tyler, A . and Harper, P.; 'Predictive Testing o f Adults and Children' in Clarke, A . 
(ed.). Genetic Counselling : Practice and Principles, op. cit. and, Pelias, M.Z.; 'D u ty  to D isclose in 
Medical Genetics : A  Legal Perspective'. loc. cit.
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fundamental weakness: they presume that only benefit can result from knowledge. 
This is not necessarily so.
The availability of a cure carries with it the certainty that disclosure can avert harm 
uncontrovertibly^^. For a third party to whom disclosure is made this can only be 
seen as a 'good th in g 'U n fo rtu n a te ly  few cures are currently available for genetic 
conditions. And, if disclosure is made to avoid an ancillary harm such as 
psychological upset there is less of a guarantee that the harm in question will, de 
facto, be avoided. Evidence exists from empirical studies which both supports^^ and 
refutes^ *" the benefits of disclosure to facilitate preparedness. Thus, it is entirely 
possible that individuals might be loath to learn of a relative's genetic status because 
of the implications which this knowledge can have for their own well-being. 
Indeed, the Danish Council of Ethics has warned of the risk of morhidificatiom  the 
notion of 'falling victim' to some inescapable 'fate' through knowledge about risk 
of disease^ .^
That said, in circumstances where a cure is available but an individual w ould  not choose to take it 
- perhaps for religious reasons - it is hard to see h ow  disclosure could ever be justified because the 
perceived harm could not be avoided. O f course, one could argue that faced w ith the reality o f the 
situation the individual might nevertheless accept treatment, but this is to adopt a strong 
paternalistic perspective, the ethical propriety of w hich is doubtful.
It is recognised that this might be a different matter for the individual w ho has had their genetic 
inform ation revealed to others. Yet, both legally and ethically disclosure is justified because it can, 
in absolute terms, further the public interest in avoiding harm. W e w ill return to this later.
See Ball, D ., et al.; 'Predictive testing of Adults and Children’, op. cit., quoting several others 
including, H ayden, M.R.; 'Predictive Testing for H untington's Disease : Are W e Ready for 
W idespead C om m unity Implementation?', 40, Am erican Journal o f  Medical Genetics, 515, and 
Brandt, J., et al.; 'Presym ptomatic D iagnosis o f Delayed-Onset with Linked D N A  Markers : the 
Experience o f H untington's Disease'. 2(y\, Journal o f the Am erican Medical Association, 3108, 1989.
See, Kevles, D .; 'In the N am e of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human H eredity'. London, 
Penguin Books, 1985 at 298,Andrews, L.; 'Legal Aspects o f Genetic Inform ation', 64, The Yale 
Journal o f  Biology and Medicine, 29, 1990, at 38, and also, Craufurd, D ., D odge, A ., Kerzln-Storrar, 
L. et al; 'Uptake o f Presym ptomatic Predictive Testing for H untington's D isease', 2, The Lancet, 
603, 1989.
op. cit., at 60. Whereas this is arguably true o f all disease, the problem can be particularly acute 
w ith  genetic disease because individuals can have future  ill health predicted. Thus a person can be 
affected even w hen they are perfectly healthy. W ith non-genetic disease usually one is actually 
affected by the disease before suffering psychological sequelae. A n  obvious example where this is 
not true is in the case of H IV  and AIDS.
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The possible adverse effects of knowledge of genetic predisposition have been well 
documented by Hoffman and Wulfsberg^®. They cite three examples of child 
screening programmes in Sweden, the United States and Wales involving 
respectively, Alpha^ -antitrypsin deficiency^^. Cystic Fibrosis®  ^ and Duchenne's 
muscular dystrophy®*.
In Sweden in 1972 the government initiated a nationwide screening programme of 
newborns. As part of the program parents were, a) told whether or not the child 
had alpha  ^ -antitrypsin deficiency, b) counselled to protect the child from 
environmental factors such as smoking or high dense-particle atmospheres which 
could exacerbate the child's problems, c) followed to determine the psychological 
impact of the information. Follow-up studies showed that more than half of the 
families with affected children suffered adverse psychological consequences, some of 
which continued for five to seven years. This led directly to the abandonment of 
the programme by the Swedish government in 1974®^ .
In like manner, Hoffman and Wulfsberg note that in the US Cystic Fibrosis 
screening programmes, which commenced as early as 1968, have been abandoned 
because 'many people think (even in cases where there is a familial risk for the 
disease) that early detection has no value and may, in fact, cause the family 
significant psychological distress prior to the time when the individual might
®^ H offm an, D .E . and Wulfsberg, E.A.; 'Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions : Is it in Their 
Best Interest?', loc. cit.
This is a genetic enzym e deficiency w hich is com m on in persons of Scandanavian descent. Those 
w ith the gene have a high risk of developing adult-onset emphysema.
®° C ystic Fibrosis is the m ost com m on recessively inherited disorder in the UK. It results in thick  
secretions in the lungs and pancreas w hich lead to chronic pulm onary and digestive disease.
®* This condition is typfied by chronic muscle wasting. The disease usually manifests itself in  
children of between tw o  and four years old. Death norm ally results by the nmiddle teenage years.
®2 H offm an and W ulfsberg cite the follow ing articles as authority, Thelin, T., et a l;  'Psychological 
Consequences o f Neo-natal Screening for A lpha  ^ -Antitrypsin D eficiency (A T D )', 74, Acta  
Paediatrica Scandinavica, 787, 1985, and M cN eil, T .F., et al.; 'Psychological Effects o f Screening for 
Somatic Risk : The Swedish A lpha  ^ -Antitrypsin Experience', 43, Thorax, 505, 1988.
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become symptomatic.'®^ For these reasons the authors assert that the United States 
has not instituted a programme of screening newborns for Duchenne's muscular 
dystrophy, unlike Wales where such a programme has run since 1990®'*.
Similar evidence is available for adults. Citing several studies Kevles has noted that, 
'[t]he revelation of genetic hazard has been observed to result not only in repression 
but in anxiety, depression, and a sense of stigmatization'®^. Also, Andrews has 
written that, '...deaths due to suicide are four times as prevalent among 
Huntington's disease patients than among the corresponding U.S. Caucasian 
population'®*".
Finally, it has even been observed that confirmation of one's status as an non­
affected person can have adverse psychological effects. Fluggins et aP^ and Wexler®® 
have carried out studies in families affected by genetic disease. The results show 
that:
[m]any may suffer "survivor guilt", particularly 
characteristic of wartime soldiers who live while their 
buddies are killed.®^
The possibility that any or all of these forms of harm can result means that 
individuals can cite a strong interest in not knowing genetic information about 
themselves.
®^ H offm an and Wulfsberg, loc. cit., at 333.
®'* id.
®^  Kevles, D.; ’In the N am e of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses o f Human H eredity', op. cit.,at 298. 
®^  See Andrews, L.; 'Legal Aspects o f  Genetic Inform ation', loc. cit., at 38.
®^Huggins, M. et al; 'Predictive Testing for LIuntington Disease in Canada : Adverse Effects and 
Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased R isk', loc. cit.
®® W exler, N .; 'Genetic Jeopardy and the N e w  Clairvoyance', 6, Progress in Medical Genetics, 277,
1985.
®^  ibid.
102
However, and as with the arguments put above regarding an interest in knowing 
information, one should not imagine that potential harm is the only reason for 
claiming an interest in not knowing genetic information. The question of respect 
also arises. It is submitted that to disclose genetic information to someone who has 
not expressed a desire to know it is disrespectful in two ways.
First, if the individual has actually stated that they do not wish to know the 
information, to furnish the information nevertheless disrespects their wishes and is 
an affront to them as moral 'chooser'. This is the same argument made above about 
respecting an individual's desire for security of information.
Second, even if the individual has not expressed a wish not to know the 
information it is contended that it can be offensive to provide the information to 
them. That an individual might not express views about their desire to know 
genetic information is likely given that so many different conditions can manifest 
themselves with such irregular patterns through families^ .^ That no wish has been 
expressed should not, however, lead one to believe that the individual has no 
interest in not knowing the information. Even if no tangible harm results from the 
disclosure, the fact that the individual's private sphere is invaded with such 
information - information which can alter considerably their peception of their self, 
their children and their role in society - is per se offensive. It requires them to take 
on board information which then cannot be unknown. The knowledge becomes a 
factor which will necessarily become part of many future life decisions of the 
individual. The individual is coerced into self-reflection and forced to evaluate and 
re-evaluate her/his self. Moreover, the information is given for reasons which are 
not those of the individual. It might be argued that it is in the individual's best
supra.
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interests to know the information, but this is to make a evaluative judgement which 
does not consider the actual wishes of the individual*.
For these reasons it is submitted that both the proband and the relatives of that 
person could have an interest in not knowing genetic information. This is not a 
fanciful argument. The interest has recently been recognised by the Council of 
Europe in its Convention fo r  the Protection o f Human Rights and Dignity o f the 
H uman Being with Regard to the Application o f Biology and Medicine, chapter III of 
which states (Article 10):
1. Everyone has the right to respect for private life in 
relation to information about his or her health.
2. Everyone is entitled to know any information 
collected about his or her health. However, the wishes 
o f individuals not to be so informed shall be observed.
3. In exceptional cases, restrictions may be placed by 
law on the exercise of the rights contained in 
paragraph 2 in the interests of the patient.
[emphasis added]^^
The recognition of this interest obviously complicates matters considerably. The 
most obvious conflict arises when one party wants to impart genetic information 
and another does not wish to receive it. Given that this can have implications for 
family members further down the genetic line, the respective claims require very 
close scrutiny.
*^ O f course, one w ould  take into account what one w ould believe the wishes o f the indiviudal to 
be, but this is not the same thing as taking into account the individual's actual wishes.
C ouncil o f Europe, Convention fo r  the Protection o f  H um an Rights and D ignity o f the Human  
Being w ith  Regard to the Application o f  Biology and Medicine: Conveiition on H uman Rights aitd  
Biomedicine, Strasbourg, N ovem ber 1996. The C onvention was adopted by the Com m ittee of 
Ministers on 19 N ovem ber 1996. Reference D IR /JU R  (96) 14.
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4.3.3. - Familial Issues and Interests in Genetic Information : A  Conclusion
The previous section outlines the various kinds of interests which a proband and 
his or her family members could have in their own genetic information. N o  
attempt has been made to evaluate the respective merits of the interests, nor to 
determine the weight which they should receive relative to each other in conflict 
situations. Before this can be done it is necessary to consider the full range of 
interests which can exist in the information including the interests of employers, 
insurers and the State. Moreover, it is only after considering all such interests that it 
will be possible to identify principles, values and factors which are of relevance in 
resolving conflict scenarios. However, it should be noted that the interests which 
have been identified in this section include privacy interests of the nature defined in 
chapter one. First, it is submitted that an interest in keeping information secure and 
in a state of non-access is an example of an interest in informational privacy. Second, 
an interest in not knowing genetic information is an example of an interest in 
spatial privacy. This second example cannot also be an example of informational 
privacy because the interest in informational privacy is an interest premised on 
knowledge of the existence of the information. As we have seen, an interest in not 
knowing does not require such knowledge. Rather, the interest in question is 
protection of the private sphere around one's self^. As the eminent philosopher and 
jurist James Fitzjames Stephen wrote in 1873,
[pjrivacy may be violated not only by the intrusion of 
a stranger, but by compelling or persuading a person 
to direct too much attention to his own feelings and 
to attach too much importance to their analysis. '^*
Invasions of privacy occur, in the case of informational privacy, when disclosures 
of the information take place to unauthorised parties. In the case of spatial privacy
That is, one's selfm  the sense o f one's personality, body, mind etc., rather than oneself. 
Stephen, J.F.; Liberty. Equality and Fraternity (Henry H old  & Co 1873) at 160.
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interests, these are invaded by unsolicited disclosure of genetic information to the 
prohand or relative.
Finally, as an indication of a possible solution to the conflict, consider the US 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research which recommended that disclosure to 
relatives should be made only if^  :
(a) reasonable attempts to persuade the proband to disclose have proved to be 
unsuccessful;
(b) there is a high probability of serious (that is, irreversible or fatal) harm to an 
identified third party;
(c) there is reason to believe that disclosure will prevent harm;
(d) the disclosure is limited to the information necessary for diagnosis and 
treatment.
This tries as far as possible to cater for the interests of the proband but fails to 
consider the possible spatial privacy interests of relatives which exist, even i f  a cure 
is available.
95 President's Commission fo r  the Study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedicine and  
Behavioural Research: Screening an d Counselling fo r  Genetic Conditions, W ashington D C , U nited  
States Government Printing Office, 1983.
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4.4. - EMPLOYERS AND INSURERS
The range of parties with an interest in genetic information is not restricted to 
those directly affected. Genetic information has been perceived (rightly or wrongly) 
as a useful predictive tool and much interest in the results of genetic tests has been 
expressed by bodies such as employers and insurers^ *". That such bodies could have 
an interest in gaining access to genetic information is not surprising : the possible 
risk of future ill health is not to their financial advantage. This section will examine 
the nature of this financial interest together with other possible interests which 
employers and insurers can claim in personal genetic information.
4.5. - Insurance
Genetic testing and insurance have one important feature in common: both are 
concerned with the evaluation of risk. We have already considered the nature of 
genetic testing. The nature of the insurance industry has been concisely summed up 
by Roscam-Abbing,
See, Andrews, L. and Jaeger, A.S.; 'Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the W orkplace', 17, 
Am erican Journal o f  Law  and Medicine, 75, 1991, Gostin, L.O.; 'Genetic Discrimination: The U se of 
Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers', 17, American  
Journal o f  L aw  and Medicine, 109, 1991, Greely, H .T.; 'Health Insurance. Em ploym ent 
Discrim ination and the Genetic R evolution ', in Kevles, D.J. and ITood, L., (eds.); 'The Code of 
Codes', Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1992, chapter 12, Harper, P.S.; 'Insurance and 
G enetic Testing’. 23 January 1993, 341, The Lancet, 224, Rothstein, M.A.; 'Genetic Discrim ination  
in Em ploym ent : Ethics. Policy and Comparative Law', and Roscam Abbing, H .D .C .; 'Predictive 
G enetic Knowledge. Insurances and the Legal Position o f the Individual’, in 'Human Genetic 
Analysis and the Protection of Personality and Privacy', op. cit. A lso, N ys, IT., N ederveen - van de 
Kragt, C.J.M., Roscam Abbing, H .D .C ., and Gevers, J.K.M.; Predictive Genetic Information and 
Life Insurance : Legal Aspects - Towards European C om m unity Policy?'. Maastricht, 
Rijkuniversiteit Limburg, 1993. For com m ent on the latter, see, Gannon P. and Laurie, G.T.; 
'R eview  - Predictive Genetic Information and Life Insurance: Legal Aspects - Towards European 
C om m unity Policy?', 2, European Journal o f  Health Law, 282, 1995.
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Insurance firms work with homogeneous risk groups. 
These are groups whose members have risks that are 
approximately similar (risk-classification). Private 
insurers generally base their decisions on actuarial 
calculations of the likelihood of loss or damage. 
Premiums ought to be consistent with the risk being 
insured. Underwriting is fundamental to insurance. It 
involves the careful assessment of the risk so that the 
rate of premium commensurate with that risk can be 
charged. Therefore, insurance companies need 
information of proposals, including medical 
information, in order to assess the risk and to take 
decisions on the issuing of policies, the charges and the 
conditions accordingly. In case a person represents a 
high risk, the insurance company will either demand a 
higher premium, or lay down special conditions 
(exclusions) or even will turn down the application.^^
There are many different kinds of insurance, but those of most relevance to genetic 
testing are life insurance (assurance) and health insurance. In the US where there is 
a very limited scheme of public health provision, private health insurance is 
essential. In the UK, private health insurance is currently less important because of 
the existence of the National Health System^®, but life insurance is required for 
certain types of loans, including mortgages for the purchase of property. Moreover, 
life insurance provides individuals with the best means to protect their loved ones 
in the event of their own death and so fulfil their responsibilities. In this way, 
insurance touches the lives of most of us. Denial of insurance can, therefore, have 
far-reaching consequences for both individuals and families.
Genetic information is clearly important to insurers in the assessment of risk and 
the establishment of premiums. It is entirely fair to say and to recognise that they 
have an economic or financial interest in the information. In particular, there are
Roscam Abbing; 'Predictive Genetic Knowledge. Insurances and the Legal Position of the 
Individual’, ibid, at 146.
®^ A lthough the incidence o f  private health insurance is said to be steadily increasing.
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two ways in which genetic information becomes of relevance. First, when the 
prospective insured already has knowledge about his or her own genetic make-up. 
This might be because of a family history of genetic disease or because of a genetic 
test taken by the individual him or herself. Because the nature of the insurance 
contract requires uberrima fides (utmost good faith), the prospective insured must 
disclose such knowledge as relevant and material information^^. If she or he fails to 
do so the insurer can at any time render the contract void*°°. Second, if no such 
information is available the insurer might nevertheless require the insurance 
candidate to undergo genetic testing. Although at the present time insurance 
companies do not as a matter of course require prospective insured to undergo such 
testing****, there is a fear that the increased availability of tests for a whole range of 
genetic conditions will lead to the 'development and proliferation of predictive
For a concise account o f insurance law in Scotland see, Gloag and Flenderson, T h e  Law of 
Scotland', Tenth Edition, Edinburgh, W  G R E E N / Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, 24. For England and 
Wales, see Birds, J.; ‘Modern Insurance Law’, Third Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993.
100 standard for materiality is discussed in Gloag and Henderson, ibid, at 24.6 : 'At present, 
under English law, the materiality o f an undisclosed fact in both life and indem nity insurance is 
defined by reference to the reaction of a reasonable insurer to the non-disclosure {Lambert v  
Cooperative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 485; Mutual Life Insurance Co. o f  N ew York v  
O ntario Metal Products Co. Ltd, [1925] A .C . 344; Highlands Insurance Co. v Continental Insurance Co. 
[1990] 2 A ll E.R. 947 (H.L.)) In Scotland it has been held that in life insurance, the test is that of the 
reasonable insured (Life Association o f  Scotland v  Foster (1873) 11 M. 351: referred to w ith  approval
by the Second D ivision  in Samuel Hooper v  Royal London General Insurance Co. L td .\993  SLT 679). 
In indem nity contracts, it has recently been decided by a court of authority that the appropriate test 
is that o f the reasonable insurer (Samuel Hooper v  Royal London General Insurance Co. Ltd., supra).
**** The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has in the past repeatedly stated that it does not intend  
in the foreseeable future to require that insurance candidates undergo genetic testing, see Harper, 
'Insurance and Genetic Testing', loc. cit., at 225, the N uffield Council on  Biotecthics, op. cit., 
paragraph 7.24, and the H ouse o f C om m on Science and Technology C om m ittee Report on Fluman 
Genetics, op. cit., paragraph 238. That said, the ABI announced in February 1997 that they do 
intend in the future to use genetic test results and genetic testing to determine insurance risk. The 
Association has issued a ruling in w hich it states that there w ill be a two-year moratorium during 
w hich test results w ill not be used against applicants for life policies linked to mortgages up to 
£100,000, and that testing w ill not be introduced before 1999., see Curphey, M. and Laurance, J.; 
'Life Insurers Dem and Gene Test Results’. The Times, 19 Februaiy 1997, p .l ,  and K m ietowicz, Z.; 
'H ealth Put at Risk by Insurers’ Demands for Gene Test Results'. 314, British Medical Journal, 625, 
1997. The ABI has recently established a Genetics Advisory C om m ittee to consider issues of 
genetics in the context o f insurance. In the U SA  a study carried out by the O ffice o f Technology  
Assessment has suggested that m ost insurers w ould not force individuals to undergo testing: Office 
o f T echnology Assessment o f the U S Congress, 'Genetic Tests and ITealth Insurance: the Results of 
a Survey’, W ashington D C , U S G overnm ent Printing Office, 1992.
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genetic t e s t i n g ' T h i s  will, allegedly, 'be employed as a loss avoiding device by 
i n s u r e r s ' T h u s ,  we have a paradigm example of a potential 'conflict of interests'. 
But what is the exact nature of the interests in conflict?
4.5.1. - The Interests o f the Insurance Industry
The concept of insurance is based on two principles: equity and solidarity. The 
principle of equity provides that the contribution of individuals should 
approximately reflect their level of risk. The more I am likely to claim insurance 
the higher my premium should be. The principle of solidarity, however, requires 
that the burden of bearing risks is spread throughout the general body of the 
insured.
From this we can identify two general interests of insurance companies in genetic 
information: the interest in making money and the interest in spreading the cost of 
insurance as widely as possible. That is, genetic information can assist the industry 
in calculating individual premiums but at the same time should not, where possible, 
discourage individuals from being tested. To do so would not be in the long-term 
interest of the Industry. That said, an interesting paradox faces the insurance 
industry with genetic information. For just as the increased certainty which genetic 
information can bring permits the industry to identify high risk individuals, too 
much certainty could signal the downfall of the industry itself. As one expert on 
the economics of insurance has said, '[t]he insurance industry cannot cope with 
c e r t a i n t y . T h i s  is explained by Alper and Natowicz,
Chadwick, R. and N gw ena, C.; 'The H um an Genom e Project. Predictive Testing and Insurance 
Contracts : Ethical and Legal Responses', 1, Res Publica, 115, 1995, at 115. 
ibid, at 116.
See the evidence o f D r N icholas Barr o f the London School o f Econom ics to the H ouse of 
C om m ons Science and Technology C om m ittee, op. cit., at paragraph 237.
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Traditionally, an insurance policy affords protection 
against very large costs resulting from the occurrence 
of an undesirable event whose probability is small. If 
the probability of loss is the same for each person then 
each will pay the same premium. But if the insurance 
company has information about the relative risk to 
each person it might charge premiums proportionate 
to the risk. In the extreme case there is sufficient 
knowledge to predict definitively to whom events will 
occur, the traditional concept of insurance breaks 
down...^^^
Thus genetic information is, for the industry, a double-edged sword.
A related interest of insurance companies concerns their public image. In particular, 
two perceptions among the public could have adverse consequences for the 
industry. First, if individuals feel that they will not receive fair treatment from 
insurance companies this might act as a disincentive to being tested. And, if 
individuals do not choose to be tested then no information will be available on 
which to calculate better the risk against which the individual seeks to insure. It 
might be argued that family history, which after all has always been part of the 
material information to be disclosed, will still be a guide. Perhaps so, but the 
unpredictability of many genetic conditions means that family history can often 
give no indication of an individual's particular risk. For example, in one study 
concerning Tay Sachs disease '82% of the incidents of the disease were initial 
occurrences within the kindred'
Alper, J.S. and N atow icz, M.R.; 'Genetic Testing and Insurance', 307, British Medical Journal, 
1506, 1993.
Andrews, 'Legal Aspects o f Genetic Inform ation', loc. cit., at 35 quoting Kaback, M.M . and 
Zeigler, J.L.; 'The John F. Kennedy. Institute Tay-Sachs Program: Practical and Ethical Issues in an 
Adult Genetic Screening Program' in H ilton , B., Callahan, D ., Harvis, M., Condliffe, P., and 
Berkley, B.; 'Ethical Issues in Hum an Genetics : Genetic Counseling and the U se of Genetic 
Knowledge', N ew  York, Plenum Press, 1973.
I l l
The risk of individuals being deterred from seeking testing has been considered to 
be significant. The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
commented that,
We accept that the insurance industry has collectively 
tried to deal with genetics in a responsible way; 
nonetheless we are concerned there is a real danger 
that people could decide to decline testing, even when 
such testing would be advantageous to them, because 
of the possible insurance implications.
Second, if individuals are apprehensive about the security of the information given 
to insurance companies, - for example, if it will be passed on to employers or other 
third parties without authority - this once again might deter them from being tested 
for genetic conditions. Clearly, this has implication not just for the insurance 
industry but also for the individuals and the families of individuals involved.
One proposed solution is a moratorium on the use of genetic information. For 
example, Robert Cook-Degan has stated that insurance companies, 'may choose not 
to use such underwriting information because using it would cause too much of a 
public outcry, or would call the entire industry into ques t ion .Certa in ly ,  many 
countries have seen insurance companies self-impose a moratorium on requesting 
genetic testing^ ®^ . Nys et al report that of all the countries which have legislated on
op. cit., paragraph 242. The C om m ittee continued, 'N ot on ly  w ill this act to the detriment of 
those directly concerned, but such reluctance could also hinder research w hich w ill be needed if 
genetic knowledge is fully to benefit society.', this w ill be discussed infra.
Cook-Degan, R.M.; 'Public Policy Implications o f the H um an G enom e Project’ in Bankowski, 
Z. and Capron, A ., (eds.); 'Genetics. Ethics and Hum an Values : H um an G enom e Mapping. Genetic 
Screening and Therapy', Geneva, Proceedings o f the 24th CIOM S Conference, T okyo, 22-7 July  
1990, at 64.
N ys, H . et aL, Predictive G enetic Information and T.ife Insurance: Legal Aspects ■ Towards 
European C om m unity Policy?, op, cit. It should be noted that D utch insureres imposed a 
moratorium on not requesting the results o f genetic tests for a period o f five years in 1990. This 
applied to  life and private disability insruance cover up to D .FL. 200,000 (£81,300). The 
moratorium was recently renewed for a further five years period. Moreover, the D utch  
Governem ent has asked insurers to revise their policy of not covering those w ith  Huntington's 
disease or muscular dystrophy: see. Science and technology C om m ittee Report, op. cit., at 236.
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the matter none considers that genetic testing solely for the purposes of insurance is 
acceptable Furthermore both the European Parliamentm and the Council of 
Europeii2 have taken a firm stand in decreeing as unacceptable either the use of 
genetic information or genetic testing. However, 'the insurance industry's 
objections to a moratorium on the use of genetic information are based on the fear 
of adverse selection.'
Adverse selection refers to the phenomenon of Individuals taking out insurance for 
excessively high sums on learning of a genetic disorder or a predisposition to such. 
Of course, at the present time and given the strict 'full disclosure' nature of 
insurance contracts, adverse selection is unproblematic : a failure on the part of the 
individual to reveal his or her knowledge of increased risk automatically entitles the 
insurance company to avoid the contract. If, however, a full moratorium were 
imposed on both requests for genetic tests and access to medical history, the 
insurance industry has a genuine fear that adverse selection will result. 
Unfortunately, no clear evidence exists that self-selection of this kind is likely to 
occur. As Harper has pointed out, the concerns of the insurance industry do not 
mirror the concerns of individuals and families. For the former, the fear is of high 
sum claims being made by high risk individuals. For the latter, the concern is with 
obtaining insurance at ordinary levels for basic life and health cover^ "^^ . This would 
tend to suggest that the fears of the industry are overstated.
ib id , at 6 - 15. N o te , however, in 1992 California introduced a Bill w hich w oidd allow insurers 
to  test persons seeking an individual life insurance policy. A lso, Canada w ould  consider genetic 
testing in relation to excessively high policies.
European Parliament, Resolution on the Ethical and Legal Problems Concerning Genetic 
Engineering, 16 March 1989, Official Journal o f the European Com m unities, 17.4.1989, N r  C 96,
p .168.
C ouncil o f Europe, Recom??tendation o?i Genetic Testing and Screening fo r  Health Care Purposes, 
no.R  (92)3, 1992.
Plouse of C om m ons Science and T echnology Com m ittee Report, op. cit., at 244.
Harper, ’Insurance and Genetic Testing', loc. cit., at 226. See also, Chadwick and N gw ena.'The 
Pluman Genom e Project. Predictive Testing and Insurance Contracts : Ethical and Legal Responses', 
loc. cit., at 119 - 121.
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4.5.2. - Individual and Family Interests
There are considerable individual and family interests in genetic information 
required for insurance purposes.
• Coercion
The nature of western social structure dictates that individuals must rely heavily 
on insurance in order to receive many basic services. As a result, the prospective 
insured find themselves in a considerably weaker bargaining position compared 
with the prospective insurer. Standard term contracts are the norm in the 
insurance industry and there is precious little scope for negotiation. This has 
several implications for the personal interests of individuals seeking insurance 
and the relatives of such.
First, the principle of uberrima fides requires full disclosure of all material facts 
known to the prospective insured and likely to influence the grant of insurance. 
This obviously includes medical history and therefore requires that highly 
personal and private details be disclosed. To assert that this occurs 'voluntarily' 
is to stretch considerably the meaning of the word. That said, this is not to say 
that such information should not necessarily be disclosed (for one might prefer 
the freedom of contract of the insurer to the curtailment of the freedom of the 
individual), rather it is simply to state that the interests of the individual in the 
information are strong. They extend to seeking and receiving guarantees about 
the security of such information from those who now hold it. When this 
information includes genetic information the interests of relatives of the 
prospective insured are similarly involved. Thus, the interests of both 
individual and relatives in informational privacy are relevant here.
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Second, for insurance companies to require individuals to undergo genetic 
testing places the individuals in a position of receiving information which they 
might not otherwise wish to know. This potentially offends against the interest 
which such individual have in not knowing information about their own 
genetic constitution. That is, the interest in spatial privacy. Moreover, because 
this information also reveals genetic data about relatives of the proband, the 
spatial privacy interest of such relatives in not knowing is also invoked.
• Discrimination
Discrimination is defined here as treating different groups of people differently 
for irrelevant reasons. An American study which addressed the issues 
surrounding genetic discrimination concluded that genetic conditions are,
...regarded by many social institutions as extremely 
serious, disabling or even lethal conditions without 
regard to the fact that many individuals with 
"abnormal" genotypes will either be perfectly healthy, 
have medical conditions which can be controlled by 
treatment, or experience mild forms of the disease. As 
a result of this misconception, decisions by such 
institutions as insurance companies and employers are 
made solely on the basis of an associated diagnostic 
label rather than on the actual health status of the 
individual or family.
This would suggest that the fear of discrimination by insurers in possession of 
genetic information has some grounding. Individuals therefore have an interest in 
seeking to minimise instances of discrimination wherever possible, principally by 
retaining control of their own genetic information.
Billings, P.R. e ta l.\  'D iscrim ination as a Consequence o f Genetic Testing'. 50, American Journal 
o f  H um an Genetics, 476, 1992, at 481.
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• Deterrence
Relatedly, individuals and their relatives have an interest in not being deterred 
from seeking genetic information should they wish to do so. The issue of 
deterrence does not directly involve privacy concerns, but it is important 
nonetheless that k be highlighted. As has been shown, deterrence can 
unfortunately be an unlooked-for consequence of certain insurance practices. If 
individuals are deterred from seeking genetic information this can affect them in 
many ways : if a cure or treatment is available, non-diagnosis deprives the 
individual (and his/her family) of the benefit which these can bring. Also, the 
absence of knowledge can adversely affect future progeny if uninformed 
decisions to reproduce are taken. Finally, deterrence deprives the individual of 
the chance of discovering a low risk, or non-risk of genetic disease. This could 
not only substantially affect his or her insurance premium but could also offer 
certainty about his or her future and a degree of psychological stability^
4.5.3, - Interests o f Health Care Professionals
This context of insurance takes the debate about genetic information outside the 
health care setting. This has implications not only for individuals and insurance 
companies, but also for health care professionals from whom information about 
patient genetic health will be requested and for whom the information can also 
represent a certain value. Two particular interests in the genetic information are 
discussed here.
This is premised on the fact that the individual wants to be tested but is deterred by fear of 
insurance consequences. The same arguments w ould not necessarily apply if the individual had no 
desire to know  his or her ow n genetic constitution.
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Research
If insurance practices deter individuals from seeking genetic testing this can have 
considerable adverse consequences for genetic research. Statistical data are of 
fundamental importance in the fight against any disease and this is equally true 
of genetic d i s o r d e r s I t  is therefore imperative that clinicians continue to 
receive source data from individuals and families affected by genetic disease. If 
individuals do not seek to be tested for fear of possible discrimination or a lack 
of security of the information revealed, then the sources of clinical data will be 
diminished with a consequent effect on research and by extension society as a 
whole.
Professional Obligations
Health care professionals have certain obligations to their patients which can be 
compromised by insurance practices. For example, requests for medical history 
might be viewed by clinicians as requests to breach patient confidentiality^
See N anula w ho makes such an argument in the context o f H IV /A ID S  : Nanula, P.J.; 
'Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to C ontrol A ID S'. 24, H arvard Journal on Legislation, 315,
1986.
There is som e empirical evidence to substantiate this. In the 1980s W ertz and Fletcher carried 
out a survey of 295 geneticists in the U nited  States. They found that the vast majority (88%) w ould  
not disclose genetic information to insurers w ithout patient permission, see Wertz, D .C . and 
Fletcher, J.C., (eds.); 'Ethics and Hum an G enetics', N ew  York, Springer Verlag, 1989. More 
recently, Geller et al. have carried out a comprehensive survey to determine the frequency with  
w hich various groups o f health care professionals (HCPs) would disclose confidential genetic 
inform ation to family members and unrelated third parties. 65% of a random sample of 1759 
obstetricians, pediatricians, internists, family practitioners and psychaitrists, and 79% of medical 
geneticists and genetic counsellors in ten geopgraphically representative US states responded to the 
suiwey. The results make interesting reading. Inter alia, the HCPs were asked if they w ould disclose 
a patient's know n risk o f H untington's disease to a health insurance com pany w ithout the patient's 
permission. 0% of the genetic counsellors and the medical geneticists w ould  disclose the 
inform ation. O n ly  2.9% of the physician group w ould do so. M ore interstingly, w hen asked if they  
w ould  disclose the fact that both members o f a couple had tested positive for C ystic Fibrosis when 
they had the couple's permission to disclose, on ly  32.8% of physicians said that they w ould  
automatically disclose the couple's carrier status. The remaining 67.2% responded that they w ould  
discuss com pletion o f the insurance form w ith  the couple first. It is important to note that no legal 
obligation is imposed on professionals to do anything other than disclose Information if patient 
consent has been given. The response to the su ivey w ould tend to suggest that the majority o f
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Similarly, if patients do not seek genetic tests for fear of insurance 
consequences, doctors might feel that they are denied the opportunity to care 
for their patients as best they can. Also, if individuals are required to undergo 
testing in locales chosen by insurance companies, doctors might feel concern 
about the adequacy of counselling which their patients will receive. Genetic 
counselling is an extremely important part of the testing procedure. Failure to 
offer it or carry it our properly can have severe ramifications for tested 
individuals on receipt of test results. All of these concerns relate to a health care 
professional's interest in the sanctity of the so-called 'doctor/patient 
relationship'. Requests by insurance companies for individual genetic 
information can place the parties against one another (breach of confidence) or 
can disempower the professional and thereby weaken the relationship s/he has 
with her/his patient. Given the benefits which can flow from a strong 
doctor/patient relationship, it is submitted that for both parties to such a 
relationship, there is arguably a strong interest in avoiding any unwarranted 
intrusions into the relationship or any externally imposed restraints.
4.5.4. - Insurance Interests in Genetic Information: A  Conclusio7i
Insurance companies have a financial interest in genetic information because this 
can minimise the damage of a bad risk. Too much accurate information, however, 
is not in the industry's interests because this removes all element of risk from the 
enterprise. Fortunately for the industry, genetic testing cannot furnish such 
accurate information. As has been shown, the nature of genetic disease is such that 
only a few disorders are caused solely by a single gene dysfunction. The majority of
physicians felt a moral or professional obligation not to disclose the information w ithout first 
ensuring that all care had been taken to m inimise any possible harm which could arise from  
disclosure: see, Geller, G., Tambor, E.S., Bernhardt, B .A ., Chase, G .A., Elofman, K.J., Faden, R.R., 
and H oltzm an, N .A .; 'Physicians' Attitudes Toward Disclosure o f Genetic Information to Third 
Parties', Zl, Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics, 238, 1993.
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disorders are polygenic and multifactorial. This means that alone, test results for 
most genetic disorders reveal little about future risk. In particular, they reveal 
nothing about the likelihood of onset, or the date of onset, or the severity of 
affliction. Even for disorders such as Huntington's disease or Duchenne's muscular 
dystrophy which are single gene dominant disorders and therefore carry a 50% risk 
of affliction for first degree relatives in each case, a positive test result cannot give 
any indiciation about onset or degree of affliction. Thus genetic tests do not and 
cannot provide a means of infallible predictability for the insurance industry. And, 
given that most conditions are multifactorial, the fact that several of one's relatives 
have died of heart disease, is likely to say more about the lifestyle of those 
individuals, than it does about a pattern of genetic disease. This limited value of 
testing and analysis of family history must be set against the privacy interests of 
individuals in keeping secure and/or not knowing their genetic constitution^*^.
The two forms of privacy interest in genetic information - informational privacy 
and spatial privacy - correspond to the two ways in which genetic information is of 
relevance to the insurance industry; namely, through family history and through 
genetic testing. To ask about one's family history or to ask for the results of prior 
genetic tests is to ask about personal information known to the individual. 
Questions arise about the desire of the individual to surrender such information 
and the subsequent security which it will enjoy. These are clearly issues of 
informational privacy. To ask an individual to undergo genetic testing to determine 
genetic risk raises questions of spatial privacy : the individual is placed in a situation 
where s/he will receive information which s/he might not wish to know. In both
O ne thing should be made clear. The better understanding which genetic testing can give us of 
individual genetic risk does yiothing to affect the incidence of genetic disease in the com m unity as a 
w hole. Genetic testing can sim ply give a more accurate indication o f risk, and even that is restricted. 
As Roseam Abbing has argued : 'N ot using genetic information in principle (except In case of 
adverse selection) is not a threat to the solvency of the insurance company: genetic risks have thus 
far (implicitly) been included in the coverage', in 'Predictive Genetic Knowledge. Insurances and the 
Legal Position of the Individual', loc. cit., at 153.
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of these circumstances an element of coercion is present in that information is 
revealed or discovered solely for the purposes of obtaining insurance. The powerful 
position of the insurer means that often individuals have no choice about 
complying with the insurer's requests. This makes for a potential conflict of 
interests and a need to determine which interests should prevail.
In contrast and in one respect, the interests of all parties concerned come together; 
no one wishes individuals to be deterred from seeking genetic testing. This has 
individual, familial and social consequences and deprives the industry of its 
perceived benefit of additional information. In order to avoid this the risk of 
discrimination and the concern about security of information must be addressed. A 
propos social discrimination and access to information this can be achieved by 
ensuring that Individual and family informational privacy is adequately 
protected*^®. More problematic, however, is the industry itself*^*. As the Nuffield 
Council has commented.
The Association of British Insurers emphasises that 
over 95% of life insurance policies are obtained at 
standard premium rate, while less than 1% of 
proposals are declined due to the mortality risk being 
too high. [However] the concern is that widespread 
use of genetic testing might sharply alter this
balance*22.
The proposal of Nuffield is that those individuals with a known family history 
who decide to take a test and test positive should not be treated any differently by 
the insurance company compared to other family members. That is, they will still
120 Pqj. an account o f the U S position see, Rothenberg, K.H.; 'Genetic Information and Health 
Insurance: State Legislative Approaches', 23, Journal o f  Law, Medicine and Ethics, 312, 1995.
See Billings, op. cit.
122 N uffield  Council on Bioethics, 'G enetic Screening: Ethical Issues', op. cit., paragraph 7.18.
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be assessed at the same risk as those family members who have not been tested*^ .^ 
The rationale behind this is that since testing is most likely to occur in families 
with a known risk, and because the industry tends to interpret family history 
cautiously* '^*, 'there is unlikely to be a major difference in insurability between an 
individual with a family history of a genetic disorder and an individual who has had 
a positive genetic test result.'*^  ^ By corollary, for those individuals who test 
negative the Council envisages that such persons should benefit from this result and 
be treated as someone with no family history*^ .^ In this way the Council hopes that 
individuals will not be deterred from having genetic tests and also that insurers will 
not be adversely affected since they can continue their present practice based on 
family history*^ .^ On one view this solution serves many interests; not only those 
of individuals who seek testing and the insurance industry, but also those of health 
care professionals and researchers who can gain access to test results if correct 
procedures are followed. However, it is interesting to note that the 
recommendations of the Council are somewhat different concerning population 
screening programmes. In such cases the majority of those taking part would not be 
aware of any family history of disease. The Council considers that,
If insurers were to demand access to the results of 
population screening for polygenic or multifactorial 
disease (for example, for genetic predisposition to 
breast cancer), and premiums were increased for those 
who tested positive, many people would clearly be 
discouraged from participating in such programmes.
This could have adverse consequences both for the 
health of individuals and for the public health*^®.
*23 ihid, at 7.28.
*24 For example, the Council notes that, 'Tables used by the insurance industry show  that insurers 
treat 5% risk o f developing H untington's disease in the same w ay as a 50% risk; such indiviudals 
may be declined insurance or offered insurance at an increased premium, depending on  their age at 
the tim e o f application. Insurance prospects for individuals w ith a family history of Huntington's 
disease on ly  improve w hen the risk is below  5%.', ibid, at 7.23.
*23 ibid, at 7.27,
*2^  ibid, at 7.29,
*27
*2S at 7.31.
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The conclusion of the Council is that it is not acceptable for insurers to have access 
to genetic test results which arise from a population screening programme*29, 
Furthermore, because of the principle of free and informed consent*^ ,^ genetic 
testing should not be made a prerequisite for obtaining insurance*3*.
Thus, it can be seen that on one point the Council is emphatic. Genetic testing 
solely for the purposes of assessing insurance risk is not acceptable. This is true 
both for those who have a family history and for those who have no knowledge of 
their genetic constitution. Indirectly, this shows due deference to the interest which 
individuals have in not knowing information. The language used by the Council is 
that of free and informed consent which relates to the principle of autonomy 
(discussed in chapter three), but the interest in not knowing, and thereby the 
interest in spatial privacy, is protected nevertheless.
In contrast, the Council's recommendations about revealing existing knowledge 
diverge depending on how one comes into the knowledge : (a) knowledge of a so- 
called family history, or (b) knowledge through population screening. If there is no 
family knowledge but screening reveals a genetic condition or predisposition there 
is no need to disclose this information. If, however, a family history is known but 
no effort has been made to confirm one's genetic status, the Council considers that 
nevertheless the history should be revealed. Thus in one case genetic information 
about a specific individual can be withheld from the insurer, in another non-specific 
information must be disclosed. The justification for this disparity seems to be the 
fear of dissuading individuals from seeking testing. For those with a family history
*29 ibid, at 7.32. That said, it was recomm ended that an upper limit be put on the moratorium. N o  
sum  was offered but approval was expressed of the D utch system which imposes a ceiling o f 200,000 
guilders, at 7.33.
*3® Discussed infra, chapter 3.
*3* ibid, at 7.35.
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of disease this is thought to be avoided by the scheme outlined above : those who 
are not tested are judged on the basis of the family history, those who are tested and 
test positive are also judged on the basis of family history but those who test 
negative should be treated as though there is no family history. For those with no 
family history, the solution to avoid deterrence from testing is to allow the 
individual to retain control of genetic information, even i f  this reveals disease or 
predisposition to disease. It is submitted that this is to place too much emphasis on 
family history. Furthermore, it does so at the expense of the privacy interests of the 
individuals within such a family. What this solution does not do is give due weight 
to an individual's interest not to know their own genetic constitution. By offering 
the incentive of possible lower premiums for those who seek testing and test 
negative, the Council makes a clear division between those who do and those who 
do not want to know. Those who do not want to know are judged on the basis of 
family history which is done in the favour of the industry. They cannot do 
anything to improve their chances of receiving insurance or lower premiums. Of 
course, one might argue that such a balance is fair since the insurance industry does 
not have any more accurate information on which to proceed and therefore it is 
entitled to judge based on the existing knowledge of family history. However, 
given the risk of overreaction to genetic information and the possibility of 
individuals receiving an unfair deal at the hands of insurance companies which fail 
to interpret properly family history*32^  it might be argued that it is not acceptable 
to leave individuals to the whim of the industry. If one accepts that individuals 
have a strong interest in not knowing their own genetic constitution, we should 
surely not consider as acceptable a system which prejudices them as a result. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that a family history belongs to a collective of
*32 This has been discussed above. N o te , in addition, that evidence to the H ouse of C om m on  
Science and Technology C om m ittee suggests that: 'witnesses were concerned that...insurers were 
not able to interpret the relatively simple genetic inform ation available to them. W hile there were 
no comprehensive studies o f the extent to w hich genetic information was misinterpreted to  a 
person's disadvantage, several cases in w hich this clearly had occurred were drawn to our 
attention.', op. cit., at 239, referring to M emorandum (Volum e III) at 1, 5, and 6 - 7.
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individuals, each one of which has an informational privacy interest in the security 
of the information and a spatial privacy interest in not knowing information. It 
should not be thought however that a common history means that knowledge of 
that history is necessarily held in common. Many members of a family might not 
know of the existence of a pattern of disease. For such knowledge to be placed in 
the hands of insurers means, however, that they might be faced with the knowledge 
at some future date. Databases allow insurance firms to link up individuals with 
common histories and this might interfere in the future with family members' 
interest in not knowing genetic information. Given this, perhaps a solution 
different to that proposed by the Nuffield Council is called for.
One suggestion which was put to the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee was that:
(1) Insurance companies should not ask for any information on genetic tests at 
the time the contract was made\
(2) I f  the insured dies o f a genetic disease on a list maintained by an appropriate 
authority as predictable by a genetic test, then the sum paid by the insurance 
company need not exceed a ceiling specified at the time o f the contract;
(3) Insurance companies would re-insure in an industry pool against the risks 
o f deaths from  genetically identifiable causes on the listH'^
As was stated, 'the effect of this would be to spread the cost of payments from the 
genetically determined diseases on the list over the whole population of the
insured'*34.
*33 Science and T echnology C om m ittee, op. cit., at 246.
*34 id.
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The advantages of such a scheme are that individuals can maintain informational 
privacy of genetic test results however obtained, and individuals would not be 
dissuaded from taking otherwise desirable tests for fear of the cost of later 
insurance. What is not clear is whether this would extend to individuals who have a 
family history of disease but who have not taken a test. If it did not, then the same 
objections raised above would apply. Given that the scheme specifically mentions 
information on genetic tests it is unlikely that it would extend to such persons,
A final possible approach is to ban altogether the use of genetic information, 
whether it be specifically related to an individual (that is, a genetic test result), or 
whether it be of a more vague familial nature (family history). Support for such an 
approach has been advocated by various commentators*^^. For example, Roscam 
Abbing has argued that restrictive measures on insurance companies should include,
- a ban on genetic predictive testing for serious diseases 
without the prospects of treatment;
- a restriction on the possibility of obtaining existing 
genetic predictive information on serious diseases 
without prospect of treatment, provided the insurance 
will not exceed an equitable ceiling (in order to 
prevent adverse selection);
- a restriction on asking for family history in the 
framework of medical underwriting if the insurance 
would not exceed a certain ceiling,*3^
*33 See Roscam Abbing, sub., and Churchill, L.R.; 'Self-Interest and Universal Health Care : W hy  
Well-Insured Americans Should Support Coverage for E veiyone'. Cambridge, Harvard U niversity  
Press, 1994 w ho argues that a system  of universal coverage is a viable w ay forward to address the 
problem s of US health insurance cover.
*3^  Roscam Abbing, 'Predictive Genetic Knowledge. Insurances and the Legal Position o f the 
Individual', loc. cit., at 164.
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These recommendations are linked to two relevant factors: the availability of a cure 
and the setting of a ceiling limit. The latter ensures that insurance companies do not 
suffer excessively should adverse selection prove to be a problem. The former 
recognises that the interests of individuals in knowing information change 
depending on whether anything can be done for their condition. The view taken is 
that to test people when there is no prospect of a cure for the condition solely to 
assess insurance risk is too great a burden for the individual to bear. However, if a 
cure is available testing can not only assist with insurance assessment but can also 
alert the individual to the possibility of disease. This approach is appealing because 
it considers the privacy interests of individuals in both specific genetic information 
and  family history. Such information need only be revealed in rare circumstances 
which reflect the concerns of the insurance industry. The relevance of a cure or 
treatment to the recommendations is interesting and the sense of the arguments is 
self-evident. This writer would add, however, that one should not overlook the 
possibility that individuals might not wish to know information about their genetic 
make-up even i f  a cure or treatment were available. The basis of an objection to 
receiving genetic information in such circumstances would be that it offends against 
one's spatial privacy interests. Thus, it might not be enough simply to require that 
a cure be available or that a ceiling limit be set because such restrictions on the use 
of genetic information do not protect against invasions of spatial privacy.
Closing Comments
This conclusion highlights the relative interests of prospective insured, the insurer 
and health care professionals in the context of insurance. It also outlines several 
proposals for reform. The relative merits and demerits of the arguments will be 
discussed in full, infra.
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4.6 - EM PLO YM EN T
In ways similar to those concerning the insurance industry, current and future 
employers can have a use for genetic information that has either been derived from 
a person's family history or obtained directly by subjecting the person to testing. 
The interests of individuals in their own genetic information have already been 
outlined in detail above. In the employment context these interests must be 
balanced against the following interests of employers.
4.6.1. - Financial Interest
The ill health or potential ill health of employees can have numerous adverse 
financial consequences for employers. For example, ill health can lead to early
retirement or redundancy requiring large payments to employees. This in turn
means frequent turn over of personnel which affects efficiency. During 
employment, ill health means many days lost through sickness with consequent 
disruption to the work environment. Furthermore, in the United States much 
health insurance cover is provided by employers which means that ill employees 
can represent a considerable financial burden. Given that employers clearly have an 
interest in reducing as far as is practicable undue personnel costs, the supposedly 
predictive nature of genetic information is a very attractive tool in workforce 
management. As one body has put it,
Healthy workers cost less: they are less often absent 
through illness, there are lower costs for hiring 
temporary replacements, and there are fewer
precautions which would need to be taken to deal
with health and safety risks*37.
*37 The N uffield  C ouncil on Bioethics, op. cit., at 6.4.
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In order to advance such a financial interest employers can seek and use genetic 
information at one or both of two different times: either when they are taking the 
decision whether or not to employ an individual, or at some later point once the 
individual is in employment. And, as we saw in the section on insurance, the source 
of such information can either be existing knowledge possessed by the individual 
(employee/future employee) or testing/screening to reveal previously unknown 
genetic conditions.
Let us first consider pre-employment requests for information. That is, genetic 
information is sought even before the employer/employee relationship has begun. 
In purely economic terms, this is the most effective means of reducing costs for the 
employer for several reasons. First, there is little expenditure incurred in obtaining 
the information - either the prospective employee is asked simply to reveal existing 
knowledge or s/he is asked to take a relatively inexpensive test. Second, there has 
been no previously incurred expenditure such as training or fringe benefits given to 
the individual, expenditure which would be lost if the genetic information which 
was discovered proved to be 'bad news'. Third, no future expenditure need be 
incurred in the guise of providing for the job applicant because there is no 
obligation which requires the employer to do so absent an actual employment 
contract.
With the exception of the first of these factors, an employer who seeks genetic 
information from a current employee is In a very different position. This is because 
s/he may well have spent time and money training someone who now cannot do 
the job, and also because an employment contract cannot simply be terminated 
without good reason; either the individual must be found another position or 
financial provision must be provided, for example, by early retirement.
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All of this means that if an employer intends to use genetic information as a basis 
for managing his/her workforce, it is very much in the employer's financial 
interests to seek genetic information from potential future employees, rather than 
from actual employees. Of course, whether or not it is legitimate for employers to 
seek genetic information either before or during employment is another matter. 
This will be discussed presently.
4.6.2. - Protecting Third Party Interests
Certain onerous burdens are placed on the shoulders of employers in western 
society. They must provide acceptable standards of care and conditions for their 
workers, they must ensure health and safety at work, they must bear the cost of 
work-related accidents and they must take responsibility for the careless conduct of 
employees who cause harm or injury in the course of their employment. Moreover, 
it is frequently the case that employers are liable to third parties for any harm or 
damage occurring on the former's premises or as a result of their operations. 
Principally, these are obligations to avoid or minimise harm. And, because so much 
of this harm can occur at the hands of employees, once again genetic information is 
perceived as a useful tool in determining any potential future mishap or liability*38. 
For example, if a worker who operates heavy machinery is found to be suffering 
from a genetic condition which makes him/her prone to a sudden heart attack 
beyond the age of forty five, then employers can take steps to ensure that the 
worker is given another less dangerous task to perform. Similarly, if an employee is 
found to have a predisposition to a particular condition which is exacerbated by 
environmental factors, the employee can be placed in working conditions which 
are absent such factors. For example, an environment which is dense with heavy
*3^  This interest is acknowledged both by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit., at 6.8 - 6.10, 
and the H ouse of Commons Science and Technology Committee in its third report, op. cit., at para. 
232.
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particles is very bad for individuals suffering from or prone to alpha^-antitrypsin. 
In this way employers can act more responsibly and minimise risk both to 
individuals who are likely to have their own health affected by working conditions 
and to third parties such as co-workers who might be harmed if ill health strikes an 
individual at an inopportune time. And, perhaps better still from the perspective of 
the employer, one might argue that future employees can (and should) be excluded 
from employment if information about their genetic constitution becomes available 
and this reveals either the presence of a genetic disease or a predisposition to 
developing such a condition which means that they are likely to pose a risk to 
others if employed.
4.6.3. - Protecting the Employee and the Prospective Employee
Finally, it can be argued that employer access to genetic information will further 
not only the interests of employers themselves but also the interests of individuals, 
either qua employee or qua job applicant. As an example consider screening 
programmes for employees and potential employees. Not only would test results 
give the employer a better idea of who might be a suitable worker in a particular 
environment, but also such knowledge would allow the individual him or herself to 
make informed decisions about the desirability of such employment. As the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics has stated.
Employees would, in principle, be empowered to 
avoid occupations which would increase the risk of ill 
health and which in the long run might be life 
threatening. In this way they could protect the 
economic security of themselves and their f a m i l i e s . * 39
*39 op. cit., at 6.6.
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o f  course, one would like to think that genetic information which could predict ill 
health could do so accurately enough to ensure the best interests of all concerned. 
However, as we know, the accuracy of genetic predictive information is far from 
assured, and the very factors which concern employers such as date of onset and 
degree of affliction are not currently known to us. Also, the sensitivity of such 
information and the apparent public misunderstanding which surrounds genetic 
information mean that there is a very legitimate fear that the information could be 
used to exclude individuals from employment or to terminate employment even 
when the employees in question are not affected by disease and are unlikely to be 
so for some time. The question therefore arises as to whether access to genetic 
information is art acceptable way to ensure the interests of employers and those of 
employees or job applicants.
4.6.4. - Balancing Interests and Pondering on Privacy
It should be evident from what has been said previously that each of the three 
interests postulated above raises serious problems of privacy for employees or 
prospective employees. Both the informational and spatial privacy interests of 
individuals are affected. Informational privacy interests are affected because 
personal information may be requested, disclosed and utilised in circumstances 
where the individual in question is not in a position to object by virtue of his/her 
weaker bargaining position, nor is s/he is a position to control the uses to which 
the information might be put at some future date. Spatial privacy interests are 
interfered with because individuals might be given previously unknown 
information, again in circumstances where they might otherwise not have chosen 
to know, but their freedom of choice is compromised by their desire to begin or 
remain in employment.
131
The privacy implications of employer requests for genetic information have been 
recognised both by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics*4o and the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee*4i. Relying heavily on the 
recommendations of the Nuffield Council, the Science and Technology Committee 
has recommended that legislation be introduced to protect the privacy of genetic 
information. It is suggested that the legislation be drafted so as to forbid employers 
from testing for genetic conditions other than those which might put the public at 
direct and substantial risk. Furthermore, any genetic testing for employment 
purposes should be strictly limited to specific conditions relevant to the particular 
employment and samples provided for testing should not be examined for evidence
of other conditions*42.
In coming to such recommendations, the Committee agreed with the Clinical 
Molecular Genetics Society that "decisions on employment should be based on 
current ability to do the job"*43. The clear message here is that access to genetic 
information must be justified on the grounds that the knowledge can have a direct 
bearing on the job of work to be done. If not, there can be no claim to have access 
to an individual's genetic information. In other words, for an employer to seek 
access to information, either pre-existing or previously unknown information, 
simply to further financial interests is not acceptable. This is all the more true when 
that access is sought to identify some future risk because such a future possibility 
does not affect the individual's current ability to perform his or her job of work.
It is also interesting to note that there is evidence that employment-based screening 
can actually be counter-productive, in that it can increase rather than reduce 
financial costs. For example, studies have shown that screening for hypertension
*40 op. cit., at paragraphs 6.20 - 6.23.
*4* op. cit., at paragraphs 231 - 233.
*42 ihid., at 232.
*43 idem., quoting Memorandum (volume II) p .52.
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has led to an increased sickness absence, increased anxiety and reduced self­
perceived health status among persons found to be hypertensive. This is so even 
when their condition proved to be so slight as not to warrant t r e a t m e n t * 4 4 .  This 
further weakens any economic arguments that employers could put in support of 
claims for access to genetic information.
What, however, of the argument that genetic information should be revealed to 
protect the interests of employees and job applicants themselves? Once again, the 
Committee in this regard agreed broadly with the recommendations of the 
Nuffield C o u n c i l *4 5 and concluded that.
Genetic Screening for employment purposes should he 
contemplated only where:
(i) there is strong evidence o f a clear connection between 
the working environment and the development o f the 
condition for which the screening is conducted;
(a) the condition in question is one which seriously 
endangers the health o f the employee;
(in) the condition is one for which the dangers cannot be 
eliminated or significantly reduced by reasonable 
measures taken by the employer to modify or respond to 
the environmental risks^^ .^
*44 See Stewart-Brown, S. and Farmer, A.; 'Screening Could Seriously Damage Your Health'. 314, 
British Medical Journal, 533, 1997, quoting Johnstone, M.F., Gibson, S., Wayne, T.C ., Haynes, R.B., 
Taylor, G .A., Sicurella, J. et ai-, 'Effects of Labelling on Income Work and Social Function Among  
Hypertensive Employees'. 37, J  Chron Dis, 417, 1984, and Haynes, R.B., Sackett, D.L., Taylor, 
D .W ., Gibson, E.S., Johnson, A.L.; 'Increased Absenteeism from W ork After Detection and 
Labelling of Hypertensive Patients',299, New England Journal o f Medicine, 741, 1978.
*45 N uffield Council recommendations, op. cit., at para.10.13.
*46 ibid., at 233. The Committee added, however, that there should be defences for employers 
against action taken by employees w ho had excercised their right to refuse genetic screening and 
developed a work related illness to which they were particularly susceptible. It should also be noted 
that the Council's recommendation is premised on the requirement that employers consult with  
em ployee representatives and possibly also seek the approval of the Health and Safety Commission.
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Importantly, the Committee stresses that 'employees should have the right to 
decide whether or not to participate in such s c r e e n i n g ' * 4 7 .  What neither the 
Committee nor the Council recommend, however, is that anti-discrimination 
provisions be introduced to protect those persons who choose not to know. We 
shall return to this below. It is also unclear whether the recommendations are 
intended to extend both to current employees and job applicants. N o convincing 
argument could be put that this should not be the case, but it is significant that the 
Committee only mentions 'employees'. Yet, the interest of employees and job 
applicants in not knowing has been articulated by the Nuffield Council,
[Genetic screening]...could operate to restrict job 
opportunities to those who, with few employment 
prospects, or for personal reasons, were prepared to 
assume the risk of ill health. It could provide a 
convenient excuse for employers to refuse either to 
take the reasonable steps necessary to accommodate 
those at higher risk or to employ certain categories of 
people able to work normally for an indefinite 
period*4s.
What the recommendations do not do is to distinguish between testing for 
conditions in individuals who are likely to be affected when there is clear evidence 
to this effect (for example, family history), and the comprehensive screening of 
groups such as current employees or job applicants. This is a very important 
distinction for several reasons. To screen widely and randomly is tantamount to a 
fishing expedition. In such circumstances it is hard not to accept the fact that 
screening is done primarily out of financial motive. For, given the interest in not 
knowing, it is harder in such cases to argue that screening is done in the individual's 
'best interests'. Whether or not such screening is done in the interests of third 
parties is a question of fact, but as Rothstein has correctly pointed out.
*47 idem. The Nuffield Council is less clear about this matter. It simply states that any programme 
should be 'accompanied by safeguards for the employee', op. cit., at 10.13.
*43 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit., at 6.7.
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'[t]o justify genetic testing or subsequent exclusion, 
the danger should pose a direct and immediate threat of 
harm to the individual or third parties. Otherwise, 
genetic testing and exclusions will be justified by 
future risks - possible years away^ 9^
Rothstein criticises the recommendations of the Nuffield Council (which were 
adopted by the Science and Technology Committee and are outlined above) for 
being 'not nearly strong e n o u g h ' T h e s e  recommendations require simply that 
the genetic condition 'seriously endangers' the health of the worker or third 
parties. This is clearly not the same as a 'direct and immediate threat of harm'. The 
number of conditions likely to pose such a ^direct and immediate threat' are few. If 
one accepts Rothstein's stricter language, the circumstances in which testing in 
employment is likely to be acceptable are severely limited^^k The present writer 
prefers the latter approach primarily because of the privacy implications which 
surround employer requests for genetic information^^ .^ The precise nature of these 
implications is discussed in the following chapters.
Finally, Rothstein argues that there are in essence only two main issues which 
surround genetic testing and employment: the first is discrimination, the second, 
issues of privacy and confidentiality^^^. The latter of these has been dealt with 
cursorily for now, and will be considered more fully as this work progresses. The 
former merits some consideration from the United Kingdom perspective.
Rothstein, 'Genetic Discrimination in Employment: Ethics. Policy and Comparative Law', ioc. 
cit., at 138 - 139. 
ibid., at 138.
For a similar argument, see Andrews, L. and Jaeger, A.S.; 'The Human Genom e Initiative and 
the Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies : Confidentiality of Genetic Information 
in the Workplace', 17. American Journal o f Law and Medicine, 75, 1991.
Geller et a i, toc. cit., note that w hen health care professionals were asked if they w ould disclose 
genetic information about patients to employers without permission 0.5% of physicians, 0.7% of 
medical geneticists and 0% of genetic counsellors said that they would do so. 
loc. cit., at 129.
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4,6.5. - Discrimination
There is no specific legal regulation currently in existence in the United Kingdom 
which concerns genetic testing or screening. Matters of discrmination must, 
therefore, be dealt with under the current employment laws. In contrast, in the 
United States some states have introduced anti-discrimination legislation directly 
tailored to the problems arising from genetic information. This is the preferred 
approach to deal with the issues^ ^^ . In the UK anti-discrimination law is governed 
by three pieces of legislation: the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations 
Act 1976, and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Under the 1975 and 1976 
Acts, the protection afforded against discrimination is restricted to the precise 
remits of the Acts; that is, sexual or racial discrimination^^ .^ In light of the fact that 
many genetic conditions are sex-linked or affect particular ethnic and racial groups 
instances of different treatment of afflicted individuals could amount to 
discrimination within the terms of these Acts, probably as examples of indirect 
discrimination. It is not clear, however, how successful such arguments would be, 
there being no cases on point. More chances lie with the most recent legislation to 
be passed in this country which deals with discrimination.
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is the first piece of U.K. legislation to deal 
directly with discrimination against disabled people. The Act outlaws 
discrimination in a wide range of fields such as employment, the provision of 
goods, facilities and services, the sale and let of property, education, and public 
transport.
For comment see Rothstein, loc. cit., at 139 - 140.
Other recourse might, o f ccourse, be available to the individual, for example, unfair or 
constructive dismissal procedures.
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The Act. defines "disability" and "disabled persons" in Part as follows,
1(1) Subject to the provisions of Schedule 1, a person 
has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a 
physical or mental impairment which has a substantial 
and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities.
1(2) In this Act "disabled person" means a person who 
has a disability.
In the context of employment, the provisions of the Act ensure that it is unlawful 
for an employer to treat an individual less favourably than he would treat others 
for a reason which relates to the individual's disability and when he cannot show 
that the treatment in question is justified^^ .^ Discrimination can occur, inter aliUy in 
respect of;
• the arrangements which an employer makes for the purpose of determining to 
whom he should offer employments^®;
• in the terms in which he offers employments^^;
• by refusing to offer, or deliberately not offering, employments^^;
• by refusing to afford an employee opportunities for promotion, a transfer, 
training or receiving any other benefit, or by treating the employee differently
i n  s u c h  o p p o r t u n i t i e s S ^ s .
• by dismissing an employee, or subjecting him to any other detrimentS^^
S56 ss. 1 - 3 .
S^  ^ s.5(1)(a) and (b). 
S^ ® s.4(l)(a).
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From what has been said above, these provisions could clearly go a long way to 
preventing discrimination against individuals based on information about their 
genetic constitutions^^. Note particularly, how pre-employment discrimination is 
also outlaweds^s Flowever, the question arises of whether the provisions of the Act 
actually extend to persons whose genome contains defective genes which do, or can 
have, a bearing on their ability to do their job. The crucial term here is ^can have'. 
Clearly, persons who are already affected by a genetic condition come within the 
definition of "disabled person". But what of a person who merely has a 
predisposition to ill health? A literal interpretation of s. 1(1) clearly excludes such a 
person for it speaks of one who 'has a physical or mental impairment which has a 
substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to- 
day act i v i t i es ' Thi s  section must however be read in conjunction with schedules 
one and two which allow for regulations to be made which will clarify the 
definitions in section 1. In particular, paragraph 8 of schedule one concerns 
'progressive conditions'. The examples given of such conditions are cancer, 
multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy or infection with the human 
immunodeficiency virus. The paragraph provides, that (a) the Secretary of State can 
issue further regulations which cdn include or exclude other conditions as 
'progressive', and that (b) someone who suffers from such a progressive condition 
will be treated as "disabled" provided that their condition results in an impairment 
which at least has (or had) an effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day 
activities, even if that effect is not a substantial adverse e f f e c t N o t e ,  however, 
that the individual must still in some way be symptomatic, thus still excluding 
those who will always be asymptomatic or who have at the relevant time 'merely' a
One limiting factor is the exemption for small business under s.7. The provisions of the Act do 
not apply to an employer w ho has fewer than 20 employees.
The remedies provided by the Act in the context o f employment are contained in s.8. The Act 
provides that cases can be heard before an industrial tribunal which has the power to order 
compensation to be paid, and/or to order the respondent to take action to obviate or reduce the 
adverse effect on the complainer, 
supra.
Schedule 1, paragraph 8(1) (a) (b) and (c).
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predisposition to disease. This means that discrimination against persons in the 
latter two categories is permitted by inference under the Act. In the Parliamentary 
debates this disparity and the question of genetic testing were raised, but the 
Minster in charge stated,
...except in a few well-publicised cases, genetic tests are 
not as yet a useful indicator of future actual disability.
Their inclusion would open up the [Act] to large 
numbers of people who are clearly not, and may never 
become disabled...we cannot wander into a situation 
whereby, for some reason or another, potentially the 
entire population could claim protection under the 
[Act]^ ^^ .
This is clearly a nonsense. It is certainly true that genetic tests are by no means 
accurate at the present time, but that does not mean that such tests cannot be 
misused by employers and others nor that they will not be used to exclude people 
from jobs and other services for irrelevant and irrational reasons. Surely, a 
'disability discrimination' Act should be used to outlaw all forms of discrimination 
which are based on grounds of 'disability', whether or not that disability is actual 
or perceived, current or future. The provisions of this Act as they currently stand 
are inadequate and clearly prejudicial to persons likely to develop genetic 
conditions later in life. It is to be hoped that the Secretary of State will use the 
powers given under the Act to expand the definition of disability to include such 
persons as soon as possible. The ludicrousness and dangerousness of the current 
provisions was accurately summed up by Baroness Jay in the House of Lords,
The paradox which is possible in the present situation 
is that where genetic counselling, genetic testing and 
identifying genetic markers is potentially one of the 
most exciting and liberating developments in medical 
science at the end of the 20th century, if it becomes 
the case that people feel that identifying those markers
Hansard, H .C ., Volume 257, col. 887.
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in their own personal situation will lead to 
discrimination, they will be less likely to take 
advantage of those extraordinary scientific advances 
which may help their own condition and in which 
medical science may be able to help future generations 
of children
4.6.6. - Employment Interests in Geneticlnformation: A Conclusion
The general consensus of commentators and official bodies is that access to genetic 
information by employers is acceptable only in very rare circumstances : 'decisions 
on employment should be based on current ability to do the job.'^ ^^  Where the 
ability of individuals becomes affected by genetic or genetic-related disease it is very 
likely that they will have knowledge of the fact. This militates against arguments 
supporting employer-based genetic testing. Arguments about the predictive value of 
such testing and its possible benefits for both employers, employees and job 
applicants must be seen in the context of potential conflict with individual privacy 
interests. Testing puts at stake the spatial privacy interests of employees and 
potential employees. Access to existing genetic information by employers puts at 
stake the informational privacy interests of such persons.
Access to genetic information should only be permissible when no other means of 
assessing risk are available. Yet, even if access is granted the privacy interests of 
employees or potential employees should continue to be respected by the 
employers now in possession of the information. The question of discrimination 
requires to be addressed more forcefully than it is at present in the United 
Kingdom in the context of genetic information.
168 J-Jansard, H .L., Volume 564, co l.1713.
H ouse o f Comm ons Science and Technology Committee, op. cit., at 232 quoting favourably the 
evidence of the Clinical Molecular Genetics Society.
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5.1. - THE STATE
The above sections have identified many varied interests which both individuals 
and institutions have in genetic information. Two particular concerns arise from 
these interests : an inclination to reduce costs wherever possible and a desire to 
minimise or eliminate harm. These concerns are also central to the potential 
interests which governments might claim in the genetic information of their 
citizens. In addition and relatedly, the state has a role in protecting and advancing 
what is referred to as 'the public good'; that is the collective interests of society as a 
whole. This section outlines the nature of all of these interests which the State 
might have in genetic information.
5.2. - SOCIAL INTERESTS
5.2.1. - Research and Anonymity
It has already been argued that research into genetic disease can only progress 
efficiently by allowing clinicians access to personal genetic information from 
individuals and families. For the state as protector of the public good, there is a 
very strong interest in encouraging and facilitating such research. This can lead not 
only to therapies and cures for genetic conditions, but also to a better 
understanding of how genetic disease spreads through the population and how it 
affects particular familial and/or ethnic groups. This can in turn lead to better 
counselling services and more informed targeting of at-risk populations who can be 
offered screening and treatments where these are available. However, as has also 
been pointed out, one unique aspect of genetic information is that it is a genetic 
marker unique to each and every individual. This makes considerably more 
difficult the complete anonymisation of genetic data. Anonymisation has to date 
been the ethically acceptable means of securing the public interest in research while
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at the same time avoiding problems of conflict with individual interests in medical 
data. For example, in ante-natal clinics in the UK anonymous testing of pregnant 
women for is carried out routinely to determine vital statistics about the
nature and rate of spread in the community. Figures released one year after the 
anonymous testing began showed some surprising results including an infection 
rate of 1 in 200 pregnant women in some areas of London^^b The system assures 
anonymity to those women who agree to take part and it is thought that in this 
way various desirable ends are reached with minimal problems. Essential statistics 
about the virus are obtained while women (infected or otherwise) who have chosen 
not to know the results, are not forced to know the results^ ^^ . This respects the 
spatial privacy interests of the women.
Genetic information by definition cannot be completely anonymised. That is not 
to say, however, that the information cannot be used in anonymised programmes 
of research. It is simply to state that the potential risk of the non-person specific 
information becoming person-specific is increased. The problem then becomes, 
initially at least, one of ensuring adequate protection of the informational privacy 
interests of those who provide sensitive genetic information. This is true of all 
anonymised information, but as Gostin has said,
170 HIV refers to the Human Immunodeficiency Viurs which is thought to be the progenitor of 
AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome).
Unlinked A nonym ous H IV  Surveys Steering Group; Unlinked Anonymous H IV  Seroprevalence 
Monitoring Programme in England and Wales - Data to the End o f 1994, London, Department o f  
Health, 1995.
There are, nevertheless, objections to the scheme which have been voiced. In particular, it is 
argued that a health professional fails in her/his duty to their patient if they are in possession of 
information about their health which is life-threatening yet they do not act thereupon.
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...although the ability to identify a named individual 
in a large population simply from genetic material is 
unlikely, the capacity of computers to search multiple 
data bases provides a potential for linking genomic 
information to that person. It follows that non linked 
genomic data do not assure anonymity and that 
privacy and security safeguards must attach to any 
form of genetic materiaF^b
5.2.2. - Clinical Benefits
If genetic research is allowed to continue and to flourish it will lead (hopefully) to 
clinical benefit in the way of cures and therapies for genetic conditions and diseases. 
Gene therapy is still in its infancy but considerable benefits are promised by those 
working in this field^ '^^ . Even if complete cures remain elusive - which is likely with 
many multifactorial diseases - increased understanding of the role of the genetic 
component in disease and its interaction with other factors can allow individuals to 
maximise their opportunity for a healthy future. Again, it is axiomatic that the 
state has a considerable interest in seeking to further this end.
Gostin, ’Genetic Privacy*, loc. cit., at 322. For comment on US legal attempts and proposals to 
protect patient interest while allowing access to genetic information see, Clayton, E.W.; 'Panel 
Comment : W hy the use of A nonym ous Samples for Research Matters', I"}), Journal o f  Law, Medicine 
and Ethics, 375, 1995.
Gene therapy consists of tw o separate techniques : somatic cell therapy and germ-line therapy. 
The former concerns manipulation o f the cells in the body of a particular individual. The latter 
concerns manipulation of the germ cells and therefore has implications both for the individual 
concerned and the progeny of that individual and all future generations thereafter. In the UK the 
Clothier Committee considered the ethics o f gene therpay in 1991: Report o f  the Committee on the 
Ethics o f  Gene Therapy, Cm 1788, 1991. It concliuded that somatic cell therapy 'does not represent a 
major departure from established medical practice; nor does it...pose new  ethical challenges', ibid, at 
21. The Committee did however recommend that a supervisely body be establish to authorise all 
instances of gene therapy in the UK. The Gene Therapy A dvisoiy Com m ittee was duly established 
in N ovem ber 1993. In contrast, the Com m ittee recommended that 'gene modification of the germ- 
line should not yet be attempted', ibid, at 18. This view has been supported by the House of 
Comm ons Science and Technology Committee, op. cit., at 124 which is of the opinion that '[t]he 
current prohibition on manipulating the genetic structure of a human embryo should remain 
[under the Human Fertilisation and Em bryology Act 1990, section 3(3)(d)] and there should be no 
manipulation of a human germ-line at any stage (including manipulation of gametes) without the 
approval o f the GTAC.'
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5.2.3. - Protection o f Public Health
One of the most obvious state interests in the health care setting is the interest in 
securing public health. In chapter one it was shown how forceful arguments 
legitimise legislation designed to contain contagious disease; legislation which 
curtails to a degree the rights and interests of infected individuals. In like manner, it 
has been argued that free(er) access to genetic information irrespective of a 
proband's wishes could be justified on the grounds of halting the spread of genetic 
disease. Additionally, it has been argued that where such information is not readily 
available mandatory testing might achieve the same end^ ^^ . Even if little or nothing 
can be done fot those already afflicted by genetic disorders, disclosure might 
prevent the transmission of defective genes to future persons. Against this, 
however, is the potential infringement on privacy interests which such practices 
can represent. See infra.
5.2.4. - Enhanced patient choice
Related to the above, it can be argued that the state has an interest in facilitating 
individual choice. The state can adopt a more pastoral role towards individuals by 
providing them with information which can assist in the making of important life 
decisions such as the question of whether or not to have a child if both partners are 
cystic fibrosis carriers. Not only does this make individuals arguably more 
independent as moral choosers but also it might have the desired social end of 
preventing further spread of genetic disease. For example, Ball et al. have noted that 
this view is held by the Royal College of Physicians,
See Suter, loc. cit., at 1897 citing Green, H .P. and Capron, A.M.; 'Issues o f  Law and Public 
Policy in Genetic Screening', in Bergsma, D ., (ed.); 'Ethical, Social and legal Dim ensions of 
Screening for Human Genetic Disease, 1974. See also Shaw , M.; 'Conditional Prosepective Rights 
of the Fetus'. 5, Journal o f  Legal Medicine, 63, 1984 in which it is argued that prospective parents 
should faced mandatory screening for certain conditions.
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[the] Royal College of Physicians report suggests that 
as long as individuals have the right to decide for 
themselves whether to bear children it could be argued 
that such individuals should have access to the fullest 
possible information, including genetic, pertinent to 
that decision and therefore this should not be 
withheldd^^
This would imply that the state should seek to further its interest in facilitating 
choice by providing comprehensive screening programmes, and a plethora of 
available genetic tests accompanied by suitable counselling services and other 
support mechanisms such as easy access to abortion. Cost implications aside, this 
would certainly further both individual and state interests by making free choice a 
market commodity. If such programmes were free of coercive measures the risk of 
conflict of interests is almost entirely eliminated^^ .^
The situation is more complicated, however, if the state seeks to further interests 
with existing information. In circumstances where prospective parents wish to 
know of a relative's genetic constitution in order to make a fully informed 
reproductive choice, there is real potential for conflict. If the parents' wish can only 
be granted by breaching the relative's informational privacy interests this poses the 
question of whether the interest in the information for reproductive purposes is 
enough to merit an invasion of the relative's privacy. Again, this will be analysed 
infra.
See Ball eta l, op. ch., at 77 referring to the Royal College of Physcians of London, Ethical Issues 
in Clinical Genetics : A Report o f  the Working Group o f  the Royal College o f  Physicians' Committees on 
Ethical Issues in Medicine and Clinical Genetics, 1991.
But not quite. As the Nuffield Council has pointed out : '[i]t has been argued that the 
availability of prenatal screening and diagnosis, together with the termination o f seriously affected 
pregnancies, both reflect and reinforce the negative attitudes of our society towards those w ith  
disabilities. Indeed medical genetics may add a new dimension if genetic disorder came to be seen as 
a matter o f choice rather than fate.', op. cit., at 8.11.
145
5.2.5. - Uses o f Genetic Information in the Criminal Justice System 
DNA Fingerprinting
D N A  Fingerprinting has revolutionised the process of crime detection. The 
technique was invented and developed by Professor Alec Jeffreys, a biologist at the 
University of Leicester in 1984. D N A  fingerprinting allows the identification of 
one individual among millions by simple analysis of a spot of blood, a few strands 
of hair, a sample of sperm or a drop of saliva. The method used relates to an 
analysis, in the chromosomes, of fragments of DNA which repeat certain sequences 
in abstract and complex patterns and which serve as a unique 'marker' for the 
individual in question!^®. In decrypting the order of these sequences biologists can 
thus produce what looks like bar codes on radiographic film. Each individual will 
produce a separate and unique pattern of lines; a genetic identity card of the 
individuaP^ .^ This information clearly has implications for crime detection. Minute 
samples of evidence from the human body left at the scene of a crime can help to 
identify a particular individual within very small margins of error. Scientific 
establishments which carry out such tests normally work also with and for the 
police and justice departments. In order to be accepted in court genetic evidence 
must be accompanied by statistical data relating to the probability of another 
individual having the same genetic fingerprint as the accused. In order for the 
establishments in question to calculate such probability they must have at their 
disposal considerable amounts of genetic data on computer. Hence the reason that
^^ ® Save identical twins.
Professor Jeffreys, the founder of the technique, has recently made even more refinements to 
the test. N ot only can the D N A  now  be analysed in a fraction of the original tim e (three days as 
opposed to three weeks), but also the presentation of the information has undergone something o f a 
change. Instead of presenting the data in the form of "bar codes" on film, an individual's genetic 
profile can now  be presented in the form of digital read out, capable o f direct transfer onto  
computer. Thus it is now  possible to have data banks of the genetic profiles of an entire country. 
For an up-to-date account of D N A  Fingerprinting see, Robertson, B. and Vignaux, G.A.; 
'Interpreting Evidence : Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom ', Chichester, John W iley &L 
Sons, 1995, chapter 9.
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most laboratories keep detailed data banks of genetic information which they 
update regularly with new genetic profiles. These are used for comparison with 
criminal profiles, yet all profiles are kept together often without distinction 
between the private clients and those obliged by law to take the test^ ®°. Concerns 
have therefore arisen about the security of genetic information kept in such files 
together with the possible uses to which it is put.
One such data base is that of the London Metropolitan Police^®/ It is estimated that 
the Metropolitan computers contain biological profiles on several thousand 
criminals, covering incidents ranging from minor offences to unsolved crimes. In 
principle the genetic data of anyone excluded from enquiries is erased from the 
police files. However this has not prevented the Metropolitan Police being taken to 
the European Court of Human Rights by one such individual for failure to do so in 
direct breach of Article 8 of the European Convention guaranteeing the right to 
privacy^® .^ The Court is unlikely to deliver its judgment for a few years but civil 
liberties groups supporting this action hope to convince the U.K. government 
before then to introduce some kind of legislation covering protection of genetic 
data. For the moment however this seems unlikely : the Home Office has expressed 
interest in establishing a national data bank of genetic fingerprinting^® .^
The 1990 Schengen Convention proposed the abolition of border controls and the 
development of closer relations between European Community police forces with a
®^® See, Note; 'The Advent of D N A  Databanks : Implications for Information Privacy', 16, 
American Journal o f Law and Medicine, 381, 1990.
®^^ The German police however have recently recruited more than one hundred geneticists for a 
"confidential project", see; 'L'Express', loc, cit., at 50.
®^~ ibid, at 51.
®^^ The genetic documentation of the prison population is equally gathering pace across the Atlantic 
w ith 13 states having already passed laws authorising the genetic fingerprinting of every criminal 
involved in a criminal incident. In the case of the state of Iowa this even extends to minor 
infractions of the law.
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correlative sharing of criminal information^® .^ The Schengen Information System 
which was born out of the Convention has been described as 'the most spectacular 
novelty' of the Conventions®^. This is a new computerised system which links 
national authorities and allows access to information and reports for the purposes 
of border checks and police enquiries. Based in Strasbourg, police forces and 
Immigration services Europe-wide ultimately will have access to information on 
the 320 million individuals who live within the Community borders^ ®^ . Baldwin- 
Edwards and Hebenton have noted that this has clear implications for personal 
privacy.
®^'^  N am ed after the agreement signed at Schengen, Luxembourg in 1985 relating to the free 
movement of persons within the European Com m unity.
®^^ See Schutte, J.E.; 'Schengen : Its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe'. 28, 
Common Market Law Review, 549, 1991, at 559.
1®^  The system w ill contain, inter alia, data about persons wanted for arrest for extradition 
purposes, data relating to aliens, data relating to persons whose whereabouts are to be reported (eg- 
missing persons), data concerning witnesses or suspects summoned to appear before a criminal 
court, personal information in police reports including name, sex, date and place of birth, 
nationality, identifying physical features, and propensity for violence.
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The real danger lies not so much In the arcane details 
of data protection provisions but in what Schengen 
presents as the key practice of policing in the future: 
essentially this focuses on 'unwanted and undesirable' 
individuals and groups as the end-point in European 
police-work. In our view, effective policing requires 
public confidence; this can only be achieved with 
appropriate standards of transparency, accountability 
and judicial review. The standards of Schengen will 
amount in practice to little more than a complex, 
almost impenetrable, legitimation of state and inter­
state invasion of personal privacy. The underlying 
trend is without doubt towards 'Big Brother'
Legal Obligations of Disclosure to Prevent or Detect Crime
The public interest in crime detection and prevention is obviously considerable and 
disclosure of private information is usually required and justified by law in certain 
circumstances. For example, in the United Kingdom personal information must be 
disclosed, inter alia, in the following circumstances:
- The Road Traffic Act 1991, section 21 requires that 'any person’ in possession of 
information which might lead to the identification of a driver thought to be 
involved in an offence under the Act must disclose this to the relevant 
authorities^ ®®;
- The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, section 18 
requires the disclosure of information which relates to acts, or potential acts, of 
terrorism;
1®^  See Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Hebenton, B.; 'Will SIS Be Europe's Big Brother?', in Anderson, 
M., and Den Boer, M., (eds.); 'Policing Across National Boundaries', London, Pinter Publishers, 
1994, chapter 8. See also in the same volume, Raab, C.D.; 'Police Cooperation : The Prospects for 
Privacy', chapter 7.
®^® This extends to health care professionals, see Hunter v  Mann [1974] QB 767; [1974] 2 All ER 414 
(which concerned a similar provision under the Road Traffic Act 1972).
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“ The Data Protection Act 1984 permits disclosures of information held on 
computer for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime or the 
apprehension or prosecution of offenders. This applies, however, only if the person 
making the disclosure has reasonable grounds for believing that a failure to disclose 
would be likely to prejudice one of these purposes.
- The lawful order of a competent court can compel disclosure of personal 
information.
Whereas none of these examples is specific to genetic information, all extend to 
cover such information if its disclosure could further the ends of the particular legal 
provision or order.
Genetic Determinism and Crime
The question of genetic components playing a part in disease has already been 
discussed above. A related question, however, concerns the extent to which any one 
individual's propensity towards criminality is genetically determined. In a recent 
Ciba Foundation Symposium this question was examined^® .^ One major conclusion 
of the symposium was that far more work must be done to establish the role of 
genetics in crime and criminal behaviour but nonetheless a nexus could not be ruled 
out. Such evidence of a genetic element m criminal behaviour presents the western 
state with a series of interesting dilemmas. For example, if an individual commits 
crime because s/he has a predisposition to doing so - in much the same way as one 
might have a predisposition to developing ischaemic heart disease given the right 
(or wrong) conditions - then to what extent can one and should one hold that
®^^  Ciba Foundation Symposium 194; 'Genetics o f Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour'. Chicester, 
John W iley & Sons, 1996.
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individual to blame for his or her c r i m e s ? I f  a system of criminal justice professes 
to be just because it only punishes those who intentionally commit crimes and 
excuses those whose freewill is somehow overcome or affected by uncontrollable 
factors, can it ever be argued that those who are 'genetically driven' to commit 
crime should be punished nevertheless? If not, how can the state ensure that those 
who are more likely to lose control because of their genetic constitution will not 
simply be those most likely to be absolved of crime and therefore those most likely 
to be released back into the community potentially to do more harm? There are no 
easy answers to these questions, but it is certainly arguable that i f  a genetic 
component proves to play a significant role in criminal behaviour then the state has 
a strong claim to an interest in knowing which individuals are likely to be affected.
5.3. - FINANCIAL INTERESTS
Any state or government has an interest in keeping costs to a minimum. In several 
ways genetic information can assist in this goal.
5.3.1. - Testing to establish paternity
D N A  fingerprinting is not reserved for use only by the police or for medical 
statistics. One obvious advantage that genetic fingerprinting has over old methods 
of blood testing is that one can identify a precise individual, whereas with
Consider the case of Stephen M obley discussed by D enno in the Ciba Foundation Symposium  
194. This man shot and killed a pizza store manager after robbing the till in February 1991. H e 
confessed to the crime one m onth later. A t his trial, Mobley's lawyers sought to lead evidence that 
his behaviour was heavily influenced by his genetic make-up. This, they argued, did not affect his 
guilt but should be taken into account to mitigate his possible sentence from the death penalty to 
life imprisonment. Evidence was led that M obley's family h istoiy displayed four generations of 
pattern violence. M obley was characterised as a man w ho 'had an inability to control his impulses 
or to internalize any kind of value system'. H ow ever, the Court's view  o f such evidence was that 
'[t]he theory of genetic connection...is not at a level of scientific acceptance that would justify its 
admission,' O n Febmary 20 1994 the jury found M obley guilty and he was sentenced to death. An  
appeal was, however, immediately lodged, see Denno, D.W.; 'Legal Implications of Genetics and 
Crime Research' in Ciba Foundation Symposium  194, op. cit., at 248ff.
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traditional tests one could only establish who was not present or who was not 
involved. This has obvious implications for paternity suits because it is now 
possible to determine precisely who is the father of a child rather than determining 
simply who is not. In this country immigration officers have been using the 
technique since 1985 to reunite families, establishing with certainty the genetic link 
between immigration candidates and their supposed relative already resident in the 
U.K. The test is even carried out in the country of origin: the British Embassies in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have recently been furnished with the necessary tools to 
carry out the test on suspect visa applicants even before they leave their respective 
countries. This relieves the U.K. of the problem of detaining and processing and 
possibly sending back such individuals^^b
In 1991 the Swedish social services department set up a programme to combat one 
of the biggest drains on its resources in recent years: the holiday romance 
syndrome. In the last decade statistics show that some 14,000 Swedish women have 
returned pregnant from holiday, principally from Mediterranean countries such as 
Spain, Italy and southern France. The Swedish government thus decided to initiate 
a programme to identify these "Latin lovers" in an attempt to recover some of the 
monies it had paid out in child maintenance and support. The unmarried mothers 
were asked to denounce the fathers of their children. 942 Spaniards, 550 Italians and 
some 60 Frenchmen were identified in this way. They were then offered the choice 
of either signing a document acknowledging paternity (and thereby accepting to 
pay maintenance) or of giving a sample of blood for genetic analysis. Almost two 
thirds of the Spanish accepted to pay, with the remaining 383 being summoned to 
the Swedish Embassy in Madrid to undergo the test, where they were joined by 172 
of the Italians. The French, it would seem, accepted their fate without question^^ .^ 
This is indicative of an ever increasing demand to use such fingerprinting
191 "L’pxpress", loc. cit., at 48. 
ibid, at 49,
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techniques in paternity cases outside the judicial system. Such technology gives 
unprecedented scope to impinge on the lives of others in this respect. In Germany, 
in cases of uncertain paternity heavy reliance is placed on evidence to determine the 
identity of the biological father. Around 22,000 cases arise each year requiring 
either traditional blood tests or genetic fingerprinting^^ .^ This however is relatively 
minor compared to the situation in the United States where 160,000 tests are 
carried out annually. In England the Child Support Act provides for the possibility 
of legally obliging a single mother to reveal the identity of the father of her child; 
failure to do so may mean her sacrificing certain social security allowances and 
benefits. Clearly, these states have a significant financial interest in requiring 
individuals to take responsibility for their acts^ '^*.
5.3.2. - Health Care Resources
Genetic information clearly has Implications for questions of resource allocation 
within any system of health provision^^ .^ For countries such as the United 
Kingdom and France which operate national health systems, considerable public 
expenditure is lost on genetic diseases and genetic-related conditions. All moves to 
eradicate or eliminate such diseases and conditions are therefore, in addition to 
being of social interest, of financial interest to the state.
193 por an account o f the German position and that in many other countries see, European 
Commission; ‘Studies on the Socio-Economic Impact of Biotechnology - Genetic Fingerprints: 
Scientific Truth and Filiation Law’. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1996. For the Scottish position on the use of genetic fingerprinting to establish 
paternity in Scotland, see Thom son, J.M.; 'Family Law in Scotland', Third Edition, Edinburgh, 
Butterworths, 1996, at 152 - 159,
194 See Knoppers, B.M., Grimaud, M .A., Choquette, C. and Le Bris, S.; 'Les Tests Genetiques a des 
Fins D'Identification', in 'Human Genetic Analysis and the Protection of Personality and Privacy', 
International Colloquium, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag Zurich 1994, for a discussion of the 
validity of genetic test results in the context of both penal policy and paternity suits.
195 Por recent comment on resource allocation from an ethical perspective see, Maxwell, R.J.; 
'Health Care Management: Are Ethics Relevant?' in Gillon, R. and Lloyd, A. (eds.), 'Principles of 
Health Care Ethics', Chichester, John W iley and Son, 1994, at 819 - 828. A lso, Williams, A.; 
'Economics. Society and Llealth Care Ethics', ibid, at 829 - 842. For a comprehensive account of 
resource allocation problems facing the N H S, see Newdick, C.; 'W ho Should W e Treat? : Law, 
Patients and Resources in the N .H .S .'. Oxford, Oxford Univesity Press, 1995.
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5.3.3. - Testing to prevent fraud in social benefits
Another financial interest lies in the reduction of fraud at the hands of 
unscrupulous citizens. Genetic testing or access to genetic information could verify 
the existence of actual or potential disease and thereby legitimise individual claims 
for state assistance. By corollary, such testing and access could defeat fraudulent 
claims and thereby save the state considerable sums of money.
5.3.4. - The State as Employer
It has already been shov/n that in the United Kingdom the only employer currently 
making regular use of genetic testing is HM Forces. This ensures that at risk 
individuals are not placed in dangerous situations and saves the government money 
in not training those who are unlikely to perform their duties with the requisite 
degree of efficiency. In the United States, the Administration has instituted a 
programme of compulsory genetic testing of military personnel, which information 
is held on data bases. Never again will there be an 'unknown s o l d i e r ' 9^6 Such a 
database facilitates quick, efficient and low-cost access to personnel materials with 
potential multifactorial uses.
5.4. - State Interests: A Conclusion
One can see from the above account of potential interests held by the state in the 
genetic information of its citizens that a broad range of roles is adopted by the state 
in its relationship with its citizens. We see the state as protector from harm,
9^6 The database was established by the Pentagon and it contains the profiles of the tw o m illion  
military personnel in current seiwice: D eputy Secretaiy of Defence Memorandum, N o . 47803, 16 
December 1991.
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facilitator of choice, social regulator and employer. To many, these roles will seem 
entirely beneficent, but as was pointed out in chapter one, such roles also typify the 
western state as the interventionist state. This has clear implications for the division 
in our society between public and private life, and by corollary has implications for 
the privacy of individuals. The legitimacy of these 'beneficent' roles of the state 
must, it is submitted, be subject to close scrutiny to determine not only whether or 
not they do in fact impinge on individual interests, but also to establish where the 
boundary can and should be drawn between public and private, and therefore 
between legitimate and illegitimate involvement of the state in the lives of 
individuals.
6.1. - FUTURE PERSONS
Lastly, one further interest might deserve recognition. Given the obvious 
implications for reproductive choices linked to genetic information, and given the 
possible consequences of a decision to reproduce even when tests results reveal 'bad 
news' (namely, the birth of a child with genetic defects), is it possible to argue that 
an interest might exist viz. the progeny of affected individuals? Such an interest 
might arise in one of two ways. First, an argument might be made that the interests 
of future progeny should be considered, even if we do not consider that such 
interests can, or should, trump those of existing p e r s o n s ^ ^ z  Second, the state might 
claim a valid interest in the outcome of individual's reproductive choices if this will 
result, with a relatively high degree of certainty, in the birth of a child which will 
be a drain on valuable resources. Once again, these issues will be examined 
presently.
197 JXgwena and Chadwick, have argued that it might be possible to take account of the interests of
the unborn in such circumstances, see 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D uty of
Confidentiality: Ethics and Law', loc. cit., at 85.
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7.1. ■ INTERESTS IN GENETIC INFORMATION: A CONCLUSION
Clearly there are a considerable number of potential interests which exist in 
relation to genetic information. The interested parties include:
• the proband
• the relatives of such a person (and their relatives)
• the insurance industry
• employers and potential employers
• the state
• those representing 'future persons'
As we have seen there is much potential for conflict, but also much scope for 
compromise. The next step is to consider how best to weight these respective 
interests, reach acceptable compromises where possible and to choose between 
interests where this is not possible.
It is submitted that in order to do this it is necessary to consider the relevant 
principles and values which bind together much of our social fabric in western 
society. These must be examined together with relevant factors about genetic 
information and disease which can sometimes tip the balance a particular way. In 
order to do this it is proposed that certain scenarios be considered which allow us 
to scrutinise examples of the interplay of interests and the potential nature of 
conflict. This also allows us to determine how the principles and values identified 
lead us towards possible solutions. Most importantly, because this thesis seeks to 
resolve problems and reconcile issues using legal means, the principles and values 
referred to will be examined from their legal perspective. Thus, this chapter will 
conclude by identifying the relevant principles, values and factors mentioned above 
and by outlining case scenarios which will be used to address the complex problems
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surrounding genetic information. These will be explored more fully from the 
perspective of the existing law in chapters three and four. In chapter five an 
argument will be made that a legal construct of privacy assists greatly in addressing 
the problems under scrutiny.
8.1. - WESTERN PRINCIPLES AND VALUES: A BRIEF ANTHOLOGY
8.1.2. Principles of Ethics
Much of western thinking and action, particularly in the medical and medical law 
spheres, is guided by the four 'principles of ethics' of moral philosophy. These four 
principles are;
• Autonomy;
• Beneficence;
• Non-maleficence;
•  J u s t i c e ^ 9 8
Autonomy refers to a state of moral independence and an autonomous individual is 
one who is a 'moral c h o o s e r ' ^ 9 9 ,  The principle of respect for patient autonomy is 
fundamental to good medical practice and is the cornerstone of many ethical and
9^8 These four principles are derived from the model o f bioethics developed by Beauchamp and 
Childress, op. cit. This is not the only model o f medical ethics in existence, but is the one preferred 
by the present writer. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that 'ethics' as a concept is not 
homogenous across different professions and different fields. Medical ethics is not the same as 
business ethics which in turn differs from professional ethics : see, D ow nie, R.S.; 'Professional 
Ethics and Business Ethics', in McLean, S.A.M ., (ed.); 'Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and 
Ethics', Aldershot, Gower, 1996, chapter 1. The model used in this w ork is clearly that of medical 
ethics as articulated by Beauchamp and Childress. In circumstances where the discussion moves 
outside the purely medical sphere - for example, into insurance and em ploym ent - the medical 
model is still used because the focus of this work is patient privacy. This is not too problematic 
because even although notions of ethics change across fields, comm on themes are nevertheless to be 
found - for example, although one might not use the terminology of 'autonom y' or 'non­
maleficence', 'respect' and 'public interest' convey in essence the same meaning and prescribe very 
similar conduct.
9^9 This term is borrowed from Stanley Benn, inter alia, from his work, 'A Theory of Freedom', op. 
cit.
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legal requirements concerning the way in which health care professionals treat their 
patients. Inter alia^ the principle requires that patients be consulted about health 
care provision, that their wishes be sought to proceed with treatment and that their 
wishes concerning treatment be respected, even if such wishes run counter to the 
advice or wishes of the health care professional. This extends to respect for the 
patients' wishes about their personal health information.
Beneficence and non-maleficence prescribe, respectively, that one should strive where 
possible to bring benefit to individuals and that one should endeavour at all times 
to minimise harm to them and others.
Justice requires that individual cases be treat like with like and that no unjustifiable 
decisions are made which prejudice one individual or group over another.
8.1.3. - Confidentiality
It has been said of confidentiality that it 'has been elevated to the status of a 
principle of Medical Ethics'^°°. Confidentiality is characterised by a relationship 
involving two or more individuals one or more of whom has/have undertaken, 
explicitly or implicitly, not to reveal information concerning the other individual 
in the relationship. It is accepted universally that health care professionals owe a 
duty of confidence to their patients and that only exceptionally should disclosure 
without consent be made. Although exceptions to the duty exist, in practice no 
breach is made lightly or without good cause. Confidentiality is the duty of the 
health care professional and the right of the patient.
8.1.4. - Privacy
200 Ng-vv-ena and Chadwick, 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D uty of Confidentiality: 
Ethics and Law', loc. cit., at 74.
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The definition of privacy offered in this work and the justification for its value 
have already been argued. A defence of the concept will be mounted in chapter five, 
but it is here submitted that the notion of privacy is generally accepted as a value in 
western culture.
8.1.5. - Public Interest
The concept of public interest has already been mentioned on frequent occasions. It 
is an amorphous term which has a role to play both in ethics and law. It acts as a 
safeguard for both individual and collective interests but suffers from a lack of 
precise definition and has therefore a tendency to be open to abuse. Nevertheless, 
the concept reflects many important values and must be considered in this debate.
8.1.6. - Additional Factors
In addition to the above, there are several factors which must be considered when 
trying to resolve complex issues surrounding genetic information. These are not 
only highly relevant but context specific and can be invoked - alone or in 
combination - in particular situations to assist in making the strongest argument for 
the most appropriate outcome. These factors are:
• The availability o f a cure. If death or disease can be avoided incontrovertibly it is 
trite that very strong arguments must be advanced to prevent disclosure of 
genetic information to those likely to be affected, especially in the absence of 
some other means of preventing harm. Gontrarily, if nothing can be done to 
prevent the onset of genetic disease or alleviate suffering the argument for 
disclosure is weakened.
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The severity o f the condition and likelihood o f onset, A fatal condition intuitively 
calls for action if death can be prevented. In contrast, a mild condition for 
which nothing can be done makes arguing for disclosure more difficult. In like 
manner, a 50% risk of developing a genetic condition which lies with a first 
degree relative is more compelling than a 1% or 2% risk to non-specific third 
cousins.
The nature o f genetic disease. The affliction of one individual with genetic disease 
does not pose any direct threat to any other living human being. In this respect 
genetic disease is very different from many conventional diseases. Also, with 
recessive disorders which render people asymptomatic carriers, there is 
additionally no threat to the health of the carrier. Only future progeny might 
be affected. Facts such as this can have a bearing on how one views particular 
complex scenarios.
The nature o f genetic testing. The point has already been made forcefully several 
times that predictive genetic testing (and family history) are inaccurate in 
assessing future risk. Apart from the problems of determining likelihood of 
onset, date of onset, and severity of condition, genetic mutations make genetic 
tests fallible and reduce significantly their accuracy
The nature o f the request. If individuals are asked to disclose or receive genetic 
information, the specific nature of the request might have a particular influence 
on the outcome one would recommend. For example, if an individual is asked 
simply to take part in linkage tests to determine a relative's particular risk (for 
procreative purposes) and the tested individual receives guarantees that s/he will
201 Pqj- example, current tests for cystic fibrosis can only detect up to 75% of at risk individuals in 
society. As Gostin states: '[a]pproximately one in every two couples from the general population 
identified by CF screening as "at-risk" w ill be falsely labeled.', in 'Genetic Privacy', loc. city at 323.
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not be given the test results, then such an altruistic gesture is unlikely to conflict 
in any way with that indiviual's interests. Compare this with an unexpected 
advance from a health care professional or relative requesting a moment of 
one's time to disclose a 50% chance of developing Huntington's disease within 
the next five years.
9.1. - THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Many of the principles and values discussed above are enshrined in law, and in 
particular medical law, in the United Kingdom. For example, the principle of 
respect for patient autonomy receives legal recognition in several ways: patient 
consent must be obtained if a health care professional is to avoid a civil suit either 
for assault and/or negligence, and patient refusal of treatment must be respected 
save in rare circumstances^^ .^ Similarly, the duty of health care professionals to 
respect patient confidences receives legal sanction through the common law of 
confidence-^^, and the concept of public interest serves to limit the scope of both 
autonomy and confidentiality when harm might result to third parties o^ .^ 
Noticeable by its absence, however, is a legally protected right of privacy. As has 
been stated in chapter one, this thesis argues that such a legal privacy right has a 
place in the legal systems of the United Kingdom. To facilitate the argument the 
following scenarios will be examined, first from the perspective of the law’s 
protection of patient autonomy in chapter two, and then from the perspective of 
the law of confidence in chapter three. It will be shown that each area fails to 
protect adequately the interests at stake. A discussion of the 'public interest' will 
naturally feature in both of these chapters. Chapter five will consider in more detail 
the nature of the privacy concept advanced in this work and will test the concept
Chapter three, infra.
Chapter four, infra.
See infrUy chapters three and four.
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by an examination of its solutions to the problem scenarios already mentioned. The 
final chapter of this work will explore possible legal mechanisms for the 
introduction of such a privacy right in the United Kingdom.
10.1. - SCENARIOS
The range of interests in genetic information which has been outlined above has 
been used in this section to create four case studies, each one of which deals with 
different interests and different problems surrounding genetics. Inevitably, 
however, there will be overlap between the interests under scrutiny, and often it 
may be possible to put the same or similar arguments in different contexts. 
Certainly, the common theme which ties the scenarios together is that of privacy: 
how are the privacy interests of individuals affected by competing claims to have 
access to their genetic information? However, each scenario offers a different 
perspective on this question. Scenario one considers the interests of employers and 
insurers in introducing testing and requesting information as against the privacy 
interests of those from whom the information is taken. Scenario two considers the 
interests of the state in introducing various programmes of screening or testing, and 
again sets this against the privacy interests of citizens. Scenarios three and four 
focus on the family unit. Scenario three considers the merits and demerits of a 
family's 'right to know' a relative's genetic information and tests such familial 
claims against the privacy interests of the relative in question. Finally, scenario four 
considers the question of a family's 'right not to know' genetic information. In 
other words, the issue at stake here is the privacy interests of family members in not 
receiving information about themselves. Simply the facts each of these four 
scenarios will be offered here. N o argument will be put at this stage. In chapters 
three, four and five, however, the merits of each case will be considered from, 
respectively, the perspectives of autonomy, confidentiality and privacy. That is, the
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utility of an appeal to each of these concepts to protect the privacy interests under 
scrutiny will be examined.
10.2. - SCENARIO ONE: Employers and Insurers
Alpha^ - antitryphsin is a genetic enzyme deficiency. Those with the gene have a 
high risk of developing adult-onset emphysema. The condition can be exacerbated 
by adverse environmental factors such as dust or smoke-filled environments. 
Consider the acceptability of either employers or insurers:
a) having access to individual medical records to determine whether someone has 
this condition or whether they have been tested for the condition.
and/or
b) carrying out tests on individuals to determine current or future risk of 
developing the condition.
10.3. - SCENARIO TWO: State interests
A “ Premarital Screening for Cystic Fibrosis
It has been the custom for many years in many American states, to require 
individuals to undergo premarital testing for various conditions such as syphilis or 
Rhesus compatibility205. Although this is no bar to marriage as such^ o^ , it has been 
justified as best, most responsible practice. Consider the acceptability of such a
205 See Brandt, A.M.; 'AIDS in Historical Perspective: Four Lessons from the H isto iy  of Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases', in McKenzie, N .F ., (ed.); 'The AIDS Reader: Social, Political and Ethical 
Issues', London, Penguin Books, 1991.
206 ihid.
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programme of premarital screening of prospective couples for Cystic Fibrosis in the 
United Kingdom. This is the most common fatal recessive condition among 
Caucasians. Around 1 in 2000 people are affected. The risks are those common for 
recessive disorders; namely, when both parents are carriers there is a 50% chance 
that each child born of their union will also be a carrier. There is a further 25% 
chance that each child may be afflicted by the disease, and only 25% chance that a 
child will not be affected in any way. However, because all affected males and most 
affected females are infertile, it is unlikely that people will know of their carrier 
status before marriage o^ .^ The condition is present from birth and is characterised 
by salty sweat and the accumulation of mucous in the lungs. This leads to chronic 
and ultimately fatal lung disease. There have been some attempts to cure Cystic 
Fibrosis by somatic gene therapy with limited success.
B - Prenatal and Neonatal Screening
Consider the acceptability of a National Health Service programme of ante and 
post natal screening.
Prenatal screening is already offered for a range of condition including trisomy 21 
(Down's Syndrome) and around 150 other 'single gene' disorders^o .^ Neonatal
screening occurs for hyperthyroidism^o^ and phenylketonuria2io^2ii Should, 
however, these programmes include testing for the following :
207 is, if few of those affected have children, there w ill be even fewer children of affected
persons w ho w ill know  that they are carriers. Unless relatives have had children w ho affected by 
CF, in most cases people w ill be unaware of their carrier status.
See Lippman, A.; 'Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening' in Clarke, 'Genetic Counselling; 
Practice and Principles', op. cit., chapter 7, note 22 and related text.
209 Hyperthyroidism is a condition affecting the functioning of the thyroid gland which regulates 
metabolism.
21° Phenylketonuria affects around 1 in 10,000 births. It is caused by the build up of toxic by­
products of phenylalanine which itself is a natural bi-product of diet and digestion. If untreated this 
can lead to severe brain damage. However, if detected early enough the condition can be treated 
w ith almost 100% success by strict dietaiy control throughout childhood and sometimes into 
adulthood.
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- Sickle Cell Anaemia. This is a recessive condition which affects primarily persons 
of Caribbean decent. The condition causes the red blood cells to adopt a sickle 
shape making them less efficient at carrying oxygen and more likely to block 
capillaries. Affected individuals are chronically anaemic and will die if the 
condition goes untreated. Although no cure is available, sickle cell anaemia can be 
treated with regular blood transfusions.
- Huntington's disease. This is a late onset dominant condition which therefore 
carries a 50% chance of affecting each child of an affected individual. The condition 
initially develops in adults of between 30 and 50 years of age and progresses in 
roughly four stages. Affected individuals typically exhibit abnormal 'jerk' 
movements and increasing dementia. Each stage lasts roughly 4-5 years. There is at 
present no cure for Huntington's disease.
- Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy. This is an X-linked disorder and therefore 
predominately affects male children. Around 1 in 4000 male births are affected. 
This is also an incurable degenerative disease, causing progressive muscular 
degeneration and weakness. Eventually affected individuals die from heart failure. 
This usually occurs in the mid to late twenties. DMD is the largest known gene and 
consequently has a high number of possible mutations. Not only does this affect 
the reliability of test results but also the severity with which individuals are affected 
: different mutations produce different levels of disability.
- Ischaemic heart disease. It is now widely recognised that many forms of heart 
disease have a genetic component to their pathogenesis. In combination with
211 Pqj. indication of the range o f screening programmes operating in the U K  as o f September 
1993 see the N uffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit., at 27.
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environmental factors a genetic predisposition to heart disease can reduce 
considerably one's life expectancy.
10.4. - SCENARIO THREE: A  Family's R igh t to Know?
Dr Ian Smith discovers from a colleague that Kenneth, the nephew of Dr Smith's 
patient Ewan, has recently been diagnosed with h a e m o c h r o m a t o s i s ^ ^ ^  This is the 
most common recessive disorder in the UK. Around 1 in every 500 people have the 
gene (HFE). The condition causes excess accumulation of iron in the body. Where 
the iron collects fibrosis occurs. Liver cirrhosis, diabetes and heart failure are 
common related conditions. The symptoms and severity of the condition vary 
considerably between individuals but if caught early, the condition can be treated 
by periodic phlebotomy (blood letting). The condition is late onset and might not 
affect women until after menopause (menstrual loss of iron delays onset). As far as 
Dr Smith is aware there is no history of the disease in Ewan's family. However, 
because the condition is recessive both of Kenneth's parents must be carriers. This 
means that there is a chance that Ewan might also be a carrier since he is the 
brother of Kenneth's father (50%). Also, Ewan is married to Kenneth's mother's 
sister, Elizabeth who consequently runs the same risk of being a carrier (50%)2i3. 
This clearly has implications for Ewan and Elizabeth's children, Michael and
212 As will become apparent in chapter four, such a scenario involves a potentially serious breach of 
confidentiality on the part o f Kenneth's doctor. The ethical problems which this in itself gives rise 
to are important, but are not the immediate concern of this work.
215 In order for Kenneth's father and m other to be carriers at least one of their respective parents 
must also have been a carrier. If this was so then 50% of their offspring could also be carriers. That 
is, both Kenneth's father and Ewan and Kenneth's mother and Elizabeth each had a 50% chance of 
being a carrier and a 50% chance of being unaffected. N ote, however, it is also entirely possible that 
both of the parents in the respective families were carriers. If so, then again 50% of children would  
be carriers, but 25% w ould have the condition and only 25% would be unaffected. It is entirely 
possible that no child o f any o f the parents had the disease, but the fact that both parents were 
carriers reduces Ewan and Elizabeth’s chances of being unaffected from 50% to 25%.
166
Marlene, both of whom are patients of Dr Smith. If Ewan is the only carrier in the 
family, the risk of the children being carriers is 50%^^^. If Elizabeth is also a carrier 
the children run the same risk of being carriers, but in addition run a 25% risk of 
being affected and only have a 25% of being unaffected. However, if Ewan or his 
wife Elizabeth is actually affected by the condition the children will not only have 
a 50% risk of being carriers but a 50% risk of disease. Marlene is in her early 
teenage years and shows no symptoms. Michael is similarly asymptomatic and 
recently got married. He is trying for a baby with his wife. Ewan's wife Elizabeth 
is pre-menopausal. She too shows no signs of disease. Dr Smith faces several 
dilemmas:
• What is his obligation, if any, to Kenneth? Should Kenneth be approached and 
if so, to what extent should Kenneth's response dictate the subsequent acts of 
the doctor?
• Should he seek to inform Ewan, Elizabeth, Marlene and/or Michael? If so, how 
should he go about this?
• What about Michael's wife, Michele, who is hoping to become pregnant? 
Should the doctor, or indeed anyone else who knows, inform her of the family 
risk?
10.5. - SCENARIO FOUR: A  R ight N o t to Know?
BRCAl is the gene responsible for between five and ten percent of female breast 
cancers. It was discovered in 1994 and is known to be ten times longer than most 
human genes i^ .^ This fact means that the likelihood of mutations is increased and 
this in turn has implications for the efficacy of test kits designed to identify the
2U That is, what is said in the above footnote equally applies to Michael and Marlene.
215 It is thought that the gene contains around 100,000 base pairs of nucleotides. It was discovered 
on 15 Spetember 1994 by a team of researchers at the U niversity of Utah, USA.
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gene2i6. There is a high risk of secondary cancers associated with this disease, but 
early detection and radical intervention in the form of mastectomy can reduce this 
risk. Preventative measures, also in the form of mastectomies, can also reduce the 
instances of disease. The condition is also thought to be multifactorial, further 
complicating matters.
Nicola is aware of a history of breast cancer in her family. Her mother, her great­
grandmother and one of her aunts died from the disease. Nicola has a sister, Nadia, 
and three female cousins, Norma, Romana and Elvira. She does not know the 
extent to which the rest of the family are aware of the pattern of disease in the 
family. Recently, Nicola discovered a lump in her breast which was diagnosed as 
malignant. She is concerned that the family has the BRCAl gene and that her sister 
and cousins are at risk. Nicola's GP has advised a mastectomy and has strongly 
urged Nicola to contact her relatives to arrange testing. Nicola considers the 
following question :
• Should she approach her sister and cousins with the news of her own disease 
and urge them to seek medical advice? She is aware, for example, that Nadia is 
phobic about operations and that Elvira is prone to bouts of depression.
2^ 6 As Pence has noted, even once a test is developed, 'a negative result w ould be indeterminable and 
could be expressed only as a probability', see Pence, 'Classic Cases in Medical Ethics', op. cit., at 411 
-412.
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CHAPTER THREE
AUTONOMY
AND
GENETIC INFORMATION
1.1. - INTRODUCTION
In the first chapter of this work parameters were set for this thesis. Those parameters 
are the role of privacy in regulating the relationship between individual and society in 
the western liberal democracy. In particular, the work focuses on the role of privacy in 
the health care setting in relation to genetic information. It is, however, also necessary 
to consider the consequences of this choice. What does it mean to be an individual in a 
western liberal democracy? How do the values and mores of such a culture affect 
individuals in the different spheres of their lives and, in particular, how are such values 
and mores reflected in the health care setting? This chapter will seek to examine these 
issues. The discussion will focus on the concept of autonomy as a medico-legal 
phenomenon and its role in addressing the genetic privacy issues identified in chapter 
two.
2.1. - AUTONOMY IN THE WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
It has been shown that fundamental social changes in the last three centuries have 
culminated in the emergence of the western liberal tradition and a concomitant rise in 
concern for individual rights and personal privacy. Yet, such changes were not brought 
about without considerable assistance from writers of the times. Philosophical, 
political, legal and social writers have all had a crucial part to play in the development 
of western society. Principal among these was John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873). His 
seminal work On Liberty is one of the foundational treatises of modern liberal theory 
and thought h
 ^ Mill, J.S.; 'O n Liberty', London, Penguin Books, 1974, In the introduction to this edition 
Himmelfarb notes that, '...Mill's...immediate predecessors and contemporaries: Adam Smith, the 
Founding Fathers, Paine and G odwin, Emerson and Thoreau, Proudhon and Stirner...[e]ach celebrated 
liberty in one fashion or another, to one degree or another. But it remained for Mill to convert the idea 
of liberty into a philosophically respectable doctrine, to put it in its most comprehensive, extensive, and 
systematic form, the form in w hich it is generally know n and accepted today.', ibid, at 9. O f course,
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2.2. - Joht Stuart Mill
On Liberty represents a search for the limits of public interference with individual 
action. For Mill, the only purpose for which power may be exercised over an 
individual, against his or her will, is to prevent harm to others^ : '[ojver himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign'^. The motivation behind his 
exposition was what he called the 'tyranny of the majority*' .^ This has been explained 
thus,
...the reason a new doctrine of liberty had become so 
urgent, was the new form of tyranny confronting 
mankind. The old, familiar tyranny of despotic 
government in which rulers imposed their will upon the ruled, had ceased to be a threat in civilised society 
boasting representative or popular government, where the 
interest and will of rulers was becoming more and more 
identified with the interest and will of the ruled. But it was precisely the rise of popular government that [Mill] 
saw as the pre-condition of a new and more formidable 
despotism. For the 'tyranny of the majority' was now 
exerting itself not so much in politics as m the entire area 
of social life. "Society is itself the tyrant", and more oppressive than any tyrant of old because "it leaves fewer 
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the 
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself" .5
this is not to say that Mill's work was not the subject of criticism, see pp.35 - 44. In particular, see 
'Liberty. Equality Fraternity' by James Fitzjames Stephen in 1872, This can be found under the same 
title edited by R.J. White, Cambridge, 1967.
2 ibid, at 68. Fie continues, '[h]is ow n good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.', ibid. 
Indeed, Mill accepts on ly  one further restriction: preventing a person selling him or herself into slaveiy. 
Flowever, others have argued that the principle should be wider than this. In particular, it has been 
argued that the principle should, in certain circumstances, include prevention of harm to oneself, see, 
for example, Raz, J.; 'The M orality of Freedom'. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, at 412. In this work  
Raz also argues for the justification o f certain paternalistic measures which prom ote safety and further 
that such measures, affecting matters which are merely of instrumental value, do not interfere with  
autonomy.
5 Mill, op. cit., at 69.
ibid, at 62 - 63, As is stated in the edition, this phrase was used most prom inently by Alexis de 
Tocqueville in his w ork 'Dem ocracy in America', see, for example, volume I, chapter XV.
5 ibid, at 34. Quotes from Mill are found at 63, ibid.
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Thus as Mill himself put it,
There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective 
opinion with individual independence; and to find that 
limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as 
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as 
protection against political despotism.^
His work therefore represents an attempt to identify a means by which the limit 
between public and private life can be established and maintained.
Mill's concern was with the distinction between what he called self-regarding and other- 
regarding behaviour. The latter encompassed conduct which interfered, to a material 
extent, with the rights and interests of others. Such conduct was, according to Mill, the 
legitimate subject of social control. The former category, that of self-regarding 
behaviour, pertained to the sphere of life,
...in which society, as distinguished from the individual, 
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all 
that portion of a person's life and conduct which afreets 
only himself or, if it affects others, only with their free, voluntary and undeceived consent.^
For Mill, all interference with self-regarding behaviour was unwarranted interference. 
This was so even if the interference was benevolent in nature.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise, or even right.®
ibid, at 63. 
 ^ ibid, at 71. 
® ibid, at 68.
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Mill thought it not only possible^, but also highly desirable^®, to draw a division 
between public and private life^h Over the years this view has not gone unchallenged. 
Feinberg argues, for example, that 'self-regarding' behaviour can be as dangerous and 
harmful to others, and indeed society in general, as 'other-regarding' b e h a v i o u r  
Although the latter has a more direct effect, Feinberg argues that this is no more 
profound than the ultimate deleterious effect of 'self-regarding' behaviour. He states,
A non-productive life devoted entirely to lotus-eating, 
opium smoking or heroin shooting, in which all of one's waking moments are spent cultivating or enjoying 
dreamy euphoric states, may be "no one else's business" 
when one, or a hundred or ten thousand self-supporting 
persons do it of their own free choice. But when 10% of the whole population choose to live that way, they 
become parasitical, and the situation approaches the 
threshold of serious public harm. When 50% choose to 
live that way it may become impossible for the remainder 
to maintain a community at all.^ ^
According to Feinberg the notion of community can be deprived of meaning by the 
selfish acts of individuals. As a result other individuals will in turn be harmed. He 
argues that individualism, taken to extremes, undermines the whole notion of 
community and society and thwarts its end as an homogeneous collection of souls all 
directing their efforts towards the greater good of the whole. Whereas his approach 
tends to view individuals as adjuncts of society rather than important constituent parts, 
the concerns expressed are common among the critics of Millian-type t h e o r i e s
9 ibid, at 147 - 152. 
ibid, at 69.
M ill permitted only two exceptions to his theory: harm to others, or conduct preventing an 
individual from fulfilling a duty or obligation. In such cases society could inteivene to prevent the harm 
or to remedy the breach o f duty, ibid, at 148 - 9.
2^ Feinberg, J.; 'Harm to S e lf . Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, at 22 - 23.
5^ ibid.
As John D onne wrote, 'N o man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a 
part of the main.’ Others have refined the basic ideas as represented by Mill's work. For example, Raz 
considers that '[a]utonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable 
projects and relationships', see Raz, J.; 'A utonom y. Toleration, and the Flarm Principle', in Gavison, 
R. (ed.); 'Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy'. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, 313 - 333, at 330.
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2.3. - Immanuel Kant
In contrast to Mill, Immanuel Kant (1734 - 1804) - another 'founding father' of the 
western philosophical ethos - put forward a theory of moral conduct based on the 
conception of persons as free and equal moral agents^  ^ poj- him Reason governs the 
conduct of individuals. Each self-sufficient rational individual is guided by his reason to 
behave in a certain manner in social situations. Since every such individual is possessed 
of the same reason which guides him or her to act, interaction between individuals 
results in common behaviour which, according to Kant, includes a mutual respect for 
other members of the community. Similarly, the moral code of society derives its 
content from reason and serves therefore to reinforce the principle of mutual respect. 
For Kant, to respect others is to treat them as ends in themselves, and not as a means to 
an end. And, because individuals have reason and are therefore capable of determining 
their own destiny, to interfere with their chosen life path is to disrespect them. Thus, 
albeit by different means, we arrive at the same point; like Mill, Kant was concerned 
with the separation of public and private spheres of life.
This view  is also found in Raz, J.; 'The M orality of Freedom', op. cit. Rapaczynski comments that, 'The 
standard critique of liberalism, whether it comes from the political right, nostalgic for the ancient or 
medieval model o f a closely integrated social order, or from the political left, hopeful o f a future society  
based on universal brotherhood, is that liberal individualism is predicated on a philosophical th eo iy  that 
makes moral and political obligations into functions of man’s (mostly material) interest and that its 
lofty  ideas are but a thin cover for a brutal system of com petition and exploitation. The basic 
argumentative strategy of this critique was discovered by Rousseau, later developed by Hegel, the 
utopian socialists, Mai-x, the ideologues of nationalism, and many contemporary social critics. The 
positivistic or utilitarian approach to moral and political issues that these critics have seen as 
characteristic of capitalist society and its liberal doctrine leads, according to them, to ultimately nihilistic 
consequences.', see Rapaczynski, 'Nature and Politics : Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau', London, Cornell Univerlsty Press at 213. For a well-argued defence of individual rights 
and liberalism see, D w orkin, R.; 'Taking Rights Seriously’, Cambridge, Flaivard U nivesity Press, 1977, 
especially chapters 10 and 11. For a range of liberalist viewpoints see, Pennock, J.R. and Chapman,
J.W.; 'Liberal Dem ocracy'. N ew  York, N ew  York U niversity Press, 1983, and Salvadori, M. (ed.); 
'European Liberalism'. N ew  York, John W iley and Sons, 1972.
O f all of Kant's works, perhaps the most relevant for this thesis is 'Metaphysics of Morals' first 
published in 1785. The translation used in this w ork is that by T.K. Abbot, N ew  York, Prometheus 
Books, 1988.
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It is however for the exposition of his 'categorical imperative' that Kant is most 
famous. Kant posited a single 'categorical imperative' for testing the moral 
acceptability of all conduct. That is, he proposed one rule from which one could derive 
the rightness or wrongfulness of human actions. An act is only 'right' if it possesses 
moral worth and an act only possesses moral worth if it is performed by a moral agent 
possessed of 'good will'. To achieve good will is to act for reasons of moral duty and in 
accordance with the principle of mutual respect. Thereby one can see, once again, that 
central to Kant's thesis is the notion of respect for persons.
Yet, irrespective of the precise nature of the theory which provides an accurate account 
of the philosophical underpinnings of western society (if such a unitary theory even 
exists), it is irrefutable that in such a society individuals are perceived to be unique 
entities possessed of dignity and worthy of respect in se. The value system of a liberal 
democracy places much emphasis on concepts such as liberty which are considered to 
further the aims of the society and protect the rights and interests of individuals.
The 'freedom from interference' conception of liberty expoused by Mill has been a 
central theme in the works of many later writers on liberty^°. Further, his treatise put 
forward a view of the individual as a self-governing, self-choosing social animal: the 
'autonomous' individuaF^. This view has assumed increasing importance with the
56 According to D w orkin, 'Historically there have been tw o influential traditions that have explicated 
the idea of liberty in contrasting terms. O n one view, associated with the names of Hobbes and John 
Stuart Mill, liberty is the absence of interference with a person's actions. Coercion and force are the 
main enemies of liberty. A nother tradition, that o f Jean Jacques Rousseau and T.FI. Green, understands 
liberty as being more than sim ply the absence of intereference. as including the presence of a range of 
alternatives and opportunities. But whether the emphasis is on restrictions or opportunities the core 
notion of liberty is the ability of a person to effectuate his decisions in action.', see D workin, G.; 'The 
Theory and Practice of A utonom y', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, at 105.
52 For example, at 123 he describes the kind of Individual w ho, for him, is important, '[h]e who lets his 
world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape­
like one of imitation. H e w ho chooses his plan for himself em ploys all of his faculties. He must use
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advance of the twentieth century. Yet, the boundaries between the two concepts of 
liberty and autonomy are not easy to establish^®. At a general level of abstraction these 
concepts embody an ethos that holds that one is free to choose how to live one's life 
and to exercise that choice, save in exceptional circumstances, without challenge. Every 
individual is entitled to be respected, to have their choices respected and to be free 
from unwarranted interference^^. This is not to suggest that autonomy and liberty are 
facets of the same notion, nor indeed that they are necessarily overlapping concepts^o. 
But, it is accurate to say that in western liberal society, which values the role of liberty, 
the autonomous individual is generally accepted as the norm. That is, in terms of the 
relationship between society and individual, in the western liberal democracy the 
individual is a free and autonomous agent^ .^
This view is also found in the philosophy of Kant. As has been said, his thesis requires 
that persons be treated as 'ends in themselves' and not as 'means to an end'. Kant 
posited that respect for the autonomy of individuals is a necessary adjunct to the
observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, and when he has decided, firmness and self- 
control to hold his deliberate decision.'
5® Many have tried, see chapter 5, infra.
5^  T o clarify, not eveiy individual w ho exists is treated as autonomous. Mere 'presence' in the 
com m unity is not sufficient. There are certain criteria which have to be met before one w ill be 
considered to be 'autonomous' and thereby enjoy the benefits of such a state. For example, children, the 
m entally incapax and animals are not deemed to be, or treated as, autonomous agents. In each case the 
principal reason for this is the same: they are not possessed of freewill and are thereby deprived of the 
capacity to exercise the choices which is the kernel o f autonomy. Benn, 'A  Theory of Freedom'. N ew  
York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, at 240, is o f the opinion that it is the existence of a 'natural 
personality' in a human being and not m erely the fact that he is human which distinguishes men from  
animals and entitles the former to a degree o f respect as persons.
2° For an interesting discussion see. Young, R.; 'Personal Autonom y: Beyond Negative and Positive 
Liberty'. London, Groom Helm , 1986.
25 In recent years these concepts have even been the subject o f criticism which challenges their value. 
For example, Benn points out that the entire liberal individualistic tradition has come under fire from  
critics w ho denounce it as 'dehumanising' and w ho consider the society which it forms as 'alienating'. 
As he states "[critics argue that the tradition] rests...on a model o f man that is descriptively inadequate 
and morally defective, and the quasi-contractual theories of human association which derive from it are 
invalidated by their faulty foundation.", Benn, S.I.; 'A Theory of Freedom', op. cit., chapter 12, esp. at 
p. 213. H e cites Sheldon W olin ('Politics and V ision') as a proponent of this rejection of liberalism and 
all o f its so-called ideals.
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recognition that all persons have unconditional worth: as a moral agent each person 
has the capacity to determine his or her own destiny^ .^ To fail to respect a person's 
autonomy is therefore to treat him or her as a 'means' and not an 'end': the 'means' 
being one's own ends and not that of the other person.
Of course, this is not to contend that the general theories of Mill or Kant are the same 
or even that they are in any way similar. But, as Beauchamp and Childress have 
pointed out,
Mill's position requires both noninterference with and an 
active strengthening of autonomous expression, whereas 
Kant's entails a moral imperative of respectful treatment 
of persons as ends rather than merely as means. In the 
final analysis, however, these two profoundly different 
philosophies both provide support for the principle of respect for autonomy.25
That is to say, the underlying reason why we consider that persons are worthy of 
respect, or that their choices ought to be respected, is secondary to the recognition that 
our actions towards each other, and the actions of the institutions of social order 
towards us, are driven by the acceptance of the view that each of us is an autonomous 
person2'5.
22 See Kant 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics o f Morals and 'The Doctrine of Virtue'. Part II of 
Metaphysics of Morals.
25 Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J.F.; 'Principles of Biomedical Ethics', Fourth Edition, N ew  York, 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1994, at 125.
2'5 Yet, as D w orkin has indicated, '...unlike the concepts of liberty and equality, [autonom y] has not 
received careful and comprehensive philosophical examination.', see Dworkin, 'The Theory and 
Practice of A utonom y', op. cit., at 4.
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3.1. - AUTONOMY IN THE HEALTH CARE SETTING
O n e  im p o r ta n t  fea tu r e  o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  a u to n o m y  o f  p a rticu la r  im p o r ta n c e  fo r  th is  
th e s is  h as b e e n  h ig h l ig h te d  b y  D w o r k in ,
. . . th e  id ea  o f  a u to n o m y  h as e m e r g e d  as a ce n tr a l n o t io n  in  
th e  area o f  a p p lie d  m o r a l p h i lo s o p h y ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  
b io m e d ic a l c o n t e x t .25
In d e e d , D w o r k in  argu es th a t  a u to n o m y  is o f  p a r ticu la r  im p o r ta n c e  in  h e a lth  care . H e  
c ite s  t w o  rea so n s  fo r  th is .
F ir s t , o n e 's  b o d y  is ir re p la c ea b le  an d  in esc a p a b le . If m y  
a r c h ite c t  d o e s n 't  l is te n  t o  m e  a n d  th is  re su lts  in  a h o u s e  I 
d o  n o t  lik e , I ca n  a lw a y s  m o v e . I c a n n o t  m o v e  fr o m  m y  
b o d y . In  a d d it io n  b eca u se  m y  b o d y  is m e , fa ilu r e  t o  
re sp ec t  m y  w is h e s  c o n c e r n in g  m y  b o d y  is  a p a rticu la r  
in s u lt in g  clen ia l o f  a u to n o m y .2 6
T o  th is  can  b e  a d d ed  t w o  fu r th e r  rea so n s . In  r e c e n t  y ea rs  th e  e m p h a sis  in  h e a lth  care in  
m a n y  w e s te r n  sta te s  h as m o v e d  fr o m  p a te r n a lis t ic  p ra c tic e s  to w a r d s  th e  g rea ter  
in v o lv e m e n t  o f  p a t ie n ts  in  th e  h e a lth  care p r o c e ss . T h is  is e v id e n c e d  in  p a r t ic u la r  b y  
th e  r ise  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  in fo r m e d  c o n s e n t  t o  m e d ic a l treatm en t22 . T h e  in fo r m e d  
c o n s e n t  d o c tr in e  d ic ta te s  th a t  th e  p a tie n t  b e  g iv e n  k n o w le d g e  w h ic h  t h e y  u n d e r s ta n d  
a b o u t  th e  n a tu r e  a n d  r isk s  o f  th e  tr e a tm e n t  p r o p o s e d  b y  th e  h e a lth  care p r o fe s s io n a l  
an d  th a t  t h e y  g iv e  fre e  a n d  v o lu n ta r y  c o n s e n t  to  th e  sa id  tr e a tm e n t. T o  r e q u ir e  th a t  
su c h  in fo r m e d  consent2®  b e  fo r th c o m in g , is t o  r e c o g n ise  th e  p a tie n t  as an  a u to n o m o u s
25 ibid, at 4 - 5.
2^  ibid, at 113.
22 See McLean, S.A.M.; 'A Patient's Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the D octor and the Law'. 
Aldershot, Gower, 1989, Faden, R.R. and Beauchamp, T.L.; 'A  H istory and Theory of Informed 
C onsent'. N ew  York, Oxford University Press, 1986, and Schultz, M.M.; 'From Informed Consent to  
Patient Choice: A  N ew  Protected Interest'. 95, Yale Law  Journal, 219, 1985.
2® Or, indeed, consent simpliciter, for the doctrine of informed consent is not universally accepted in the 
western world. For com ment see, Kennedy I. and Grubb, A.; 'MedicaLLaw: Text with Materials'. 
Second Edition, London, Butteiworths, 1994, at 151 - 233.
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agent and to accept the need to respect his/her autonomy. The doctrine emphasises 
that the patient is an integral part of the therapeutic alliance between him/herself and 
the health care professional.
Second, the intimate connection between body and self which leads Dworkin to 
conclude that disrespect for wishes concerning the body is disrespectful of autonomy, 
is equally applicable to personal information. It has already been argued in chapters 
one and two that the nature of personal information is such that it represents an 
extension of the abstract notion of the self. It assumes the same character and 
importance as the body. Thus, just as disrespect for the body is an affront to individual 
autonomy, disrespect for personal information is equally so.
These examples demonstrate the increasing acceptance of the importance of the 
concept of patient autonomy in the western health care setting^ .^
3.2. - THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOM Y
What then, is autonomy? What does it mean to be autonomous? Autonomy is derived 
from the Greek words autos ('self') and nomos ('law' or 'rule'). As several writers have 
noted, the term was first used to refer to self-rule in Greek city states which had 
autonomia when their citizens legislated for themselves and were not subject to some 
conquering poweN^. Yet, applied to an individual, autonomy can mean a number of 
things. For example, to call a person autonomous can refer to the fact that they are in
29 For v e iy  different perspectives, see, Abdel Flaleera, M.A.S.; 'Medical Ethics in Islam.', in Grubb, A. 
(ed.); 'Choices and Decisions in Health Care', Chicester, John W iley and Sons, 1993, at 1, and Morgan, 
P. and Lawton, C.; 'Ethical Issues in Six Religious Traditions', Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1 9 9 6 .
5° See Dworkin, 'The Theory and Practice of A utonom y', op. cit. at 12 - 13, Beauchamp and Childress, 
op. cit. at 120 - 121, and Feinberg, 'Harm to S e lf , op. cit., at 28, note 1.
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an autonomous state: a state in which they are independent and in which they make 
their own choices. Similarly, one can refer to an autonomous person and mean that the 
person has capacity to make choices. Clearly, this precludes all persons from being 
autonomous. A person in a coma has no capacity to choose. In the same way, infants, 
children and persons suffering from serious mental dysfunction might not have the 
capacity to make choices. On this conception of autonomy, a person must be possessed 
of certain characteristics or traits before they can be called autonomous. Usually, these 
include reason and ability or competences^. Sometimes, however, it is argued that a 
person is only autonomous if certain strict criteria are met such as consistency in 
decision-making, resistance to external influence, and self-sufficient independence in 
the establishment of personal values and beliefs^ .^ Other conceptions of autonomy 
perceive it as an ideaps or as the sovereign authority to govern oneself, akin to political 
independence enjoyed by States^ '^ .
Unfortunately, these different conceptions do not provide us with a unifying definition 
of the principle of autonomy^^. Nevertheless, it is submitted that certain core elements 
can be identified which offer us a workable model of autonomy for use in the health 
care setting.
First, as has already been stated, it would seem that central to the principle of 
autonomy is the idea of choice^^. To be respected as an autonomous person is to have
55 See, for example, D ow nie, R.S. and Teller, E.; 'A utonom y'. 15, Philosophy, 301, 1971.
52 See, for example, Benn. S.I.; 'Freedom, A utonom y and the Concept of a Person'. 76, Proceedings o f  
the Aristotelian Society, 123, 1976. See also, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, op. cit., at 379 - 382.
55 For example, see D ow nie, R.S. e ta l, 'Health Promotion; Models and Values', op. cit., at 139.
5*5 See, Feinberg, 'Harm to S e lf , op. cit., at 27ff.
55 This point is cogently made by D w orkin, 'Theory and Practice', op. cit., at 5 - 6.
56 See, for example, Feinberg, 'Harm to S e lf , op. cit., at 54: '[t]he kernel of the idea of autonom y is the 
right to make choices and decisons...[p]ut com pendiously, the most basic autonom y right is the right to 
decide how  to live one's life'. In a discussion of 'positive' liberty, Berlin puts forward the view that this 
sense o f liberty derives from the w ish on the part o f the individual to be his ow n master. As he says, 'I 
wish m y life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of any kind,', see, Berlin, I;
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one's choices respected. Second, crucial to this respect is non-interference. In order to 
make one's own choices - that is, for those choices to be autonomous - one must be 
unrestrained by unwarranted interference by others^ .^ Finally, bound up with all of 
this is possession of the capacity to make one's own choices^®.
In addition to this, it is suggested that for a 'working' model of autonomy it is not 
necessary to conceive of the principle as an ideal or a condition achievable only on the 
attainment of certain elusive characteristics or qualities^ .^ Although autonomy is
T ou r Essays on Liberty'. Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, 1969, at 131. Similarly, D w orkin, 'The 
Theory and Practice of A utonom y', op. cit., at 20, defines autonomy as, '...a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes and so forth and the 
capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values.' For Raz, 
to be autonomous is to  be 'the author o f one's ow n life'. The autonomous life is opposed to coerced 
choices and further, to be autonomous a person must not only be given a choice but he must be given 
an adequate range of choices, see Raz, J.; 'The Morality of Freedom', op. cit., at 370 - 373. This 
argument is repeated, in part, in 'A utonom y, Toleration, and the Harm Principle', in Gavison, R. (ed.); 
'Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy', op. cit.„ at 313 - 333. D ow nie and Caiman opine that '[t]o 
be an autonom ous person is to have the ability to  be able to choose for oneself or more extensively to 
be able to formulate and carry out one’s ow n plans or policies', see D ow nie, R.S. and Caiman, K.C.; 
'H ealthy Respect : Ethics in Health Care'. Second Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, at 
52. Finally, consider Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., at 121, '...we start w ith  what we take to be 
essential to personal autonom y, as distinguished from political self-rule: personal rule of the self that is 
free from both controlling interferences by others and from personal limitations that prevent 
meaningful choice, such as inadequate understanding.' In support they cite Berlin, op. cit., at 118 - 172, 
Feinberg, op. cit., chapters 18 and 19, and H ill, T.E., Jr.; 'A utonom y and Self-Respect'. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, chapters 1 - 4.
52 See, Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit. at 121 - 122, Berlin, op.cit., at 131, and D w orkin, 'The Theory  
and Practice of A utonom y', op. cit. at 18 - 19. Raz, 'The Morality of Freedom', op. cit. at 408 - 411, 
argues that although autonomy is a valuable thing, and a constituent element o f the 'good life', he does 
not include in his conception of autonom y as valuable the right to make 'bad' choices. H e argues that 
restriction can be placed on autonom y and the making of autonomous choices if to fail to do so would  
result in harm to others, or even harm to the individual in question in the future. In this latter position  
Raz departs from Mill.
5® D w orkin, 'The T h eoiy  and Practice of A utonom y', op. cit. at 20, considers 'capacity' a constituent 
element of his definition of autonomy. For Raz, 'The Morality of Freedom’, op. cit., at 408, the 
autonom ous person has the 'capacity' to control and create his 'good life'. In 'A utonom y. Toleration, 
and the Harm Principle', op. cit., at 314, he argues that, '...a person is [not] autonomous if he is 
paralysed and therefore cannot taken advantage of the options offered to him.' D ow nie and Caiman, op. 
cit. at 52, consider that autonom y include not on ly  choice but the 'ability' to choose. Beauchamp and 
Childress, op. cit., at 132 - 141, discuss the role of 'competence' to take decisions and note that, 
'[cjompetence judgments serve a gatekeeping role in health care by distinguishing persons whose 
decisions should be solicited or accepted from persons whose decisions need not or should not be 
solicited or accepted.', at 132. They point out, however, that '...a person should rarely be judged 
incom petent w ith  respect to every sphere of life.', ibid, at 134.
59 See, for example, Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., at 122 - 123.
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concerned with choice and the exercise of that choice in relation to life decisions, 
realistically it must be accepted that no person can control, at all times, all aspects of 
his or her life'5°. Yet, that this is so does not mean that no person can be autonomous. 
In like manner, simply because some influence is exerted on an individual in making a 
choice'^b or that the individual has diminished capacity in some aspects of his/her life 
but not others'52, does not mean that such a person is not autonomous or that s/he 
cannot take autonomous decisions. For a working model of autonomy it is only 
necessary that a certain degree of autonomy is reached and that capacity to make a 
choice is present in relation to the choice which must be taken. One could argue ad 
infinitem  about the characteristics which make a person 'autonomous', or the 
necessary degree of independence which equates with 'autonomy', but it is submitted 
that in practical terms the standard which is required is always a question to be 
answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case'55. Rather, what is 
important is that autonomy is respected and, ancillary to this but in no way less 
important, that autonomous choices be respected. The question which then requires an 
answer is, how does one ensure that such respect is forthcoming?
See Raz, 'A utonom y. Toleration, and the Harm Principle', op. cit., at 314.
5^5 Indeed, arguably noone has an entirely influence-free life since we live in communities and families, 
are subject to cultural, religious and moral influence and are conditioned by our education and 
surroundings.
'52 I may not have the capacity to run because I am disabled, I may not have the capacity to vote because 
I am too young, I may not have the ability to understand quantum physics because m y IQ is too  low , 
but none of these limitations means that I cannot exercise m y autonom y in other aspects o f m y life, see 
Skegg, P.D .G.; 'Law. Ethics and M edicine', Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, at 56 - 57. (This is also 
available in a 1988 edition).
'55 This point is made by Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., at 123.
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3.3. - RESPECTING AUTONOMY: ETHICS
In the context of medical ethics, Downie and others have argued that the concept of 
autonomy is a basic and guiding principle which is presupposed by other principles'^ .^ 
That is, autonomy is a fundamental ethical principle from which other ethical 
principles derive their authority'55. For Downie and Caiman, for example, to respect 
the autonomy of an individual is to employ the four core principles of ethics in one's 
dealing with others: namely, the principle of beneficence, the principle of non­
maleficence, the principle of justice and the principle of utility'’'^ .
Downie and Caiman argue that in the first instance the best way in which to accord 
respect to others is to leave them alone and do them no harm: the principle of non­
maleficence. Flowever, as they note, 'sometimes plans and projects go wrong and then 
benevolence [beneficence] might become appropriate''^ .^ By this they mean 
compassionate attitude and behaviour towards a person which involves emotional 
empathy or sympathy, positive help and imaginative understanding'*®. Regarding the 
principle of justice, they comment that it can have at least two meanings in this 
context. First, it can require that all autonomous individuals are treated equally, in that 
they are accorded the same level of respect. Even if we ultimately treated them 
differently, we respect them because they have been considered on an equal basis and a 
defensible justification is offered for any different treatment which might occur. 
Second, on a purely individual level, justice can mean treating individuals 
appropriately in light of their own wants, needs and merits'*^ . As the authors say.
'*'* See, for example, D ow nie and Caiman, op. cit., chapter four and D ow nie eta l, 'Flealth Promotion: 
Models and Values', op. cit., chapters 9 and 10.
'55 D ow nie and Caiman, ibid.
'5° ibid, at 54ff. See also, chapter two, supra.
'52 id.
*5® ibid, at 56.
'59 idem.
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'[jjustice or fairness in this sense is sometimes expressed by the concept of 'deserts'. For 
example, we might say "He deserves better care than he got."'^° Thus, to treat the 
individual 'fairly' is to respect him/her. Finally, the principle of utility is, for Downie 
and Caiman, slightly less amenable to respecting individuals,
The principle of utility tells us that we ought to seek the 
best possible consequences, or the greatest happiness, for 
the greatest number of people. In other words, utility is 
not concerned with individuals but with majorities, with 
aggregates.^^
Yet, despite this recognition of utility as a means of developing policies and acceptable 
rules of behaviour, the authors still consider that the principle draws its authority from 
the principle of autonomy. For,
...there can be no sense in promoting the interests or 
happiness of aggregates of people unless one is already 
presupposing the supreme value of the persons who make 
up these aggregates.
In this way they consider utility to be 'an administrative expression of respect
N ot all ethicists agree with this analysis of ethical principles or the role of autonomy in 
this context. For example, Beauchamp and Childress consider that,
...making respect for autonomy a trump moral principle, 
rather than one moral principle in a system of principles, 
gives it an excessive value.
id,
ibid, at 57 - 58. 
idem.
53 id.
5"^ Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., at 181. See also, G illen, R.; 'Medical Ethics: Four Principles plus 
A ttention to Scope'. 309, British Medical Journal, 184, 1994.
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Yet, what is agreed is the central role of autonomy in the theoretical and practical 
framework of modern ethics. The principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, justice, 
utility and autonomy underpin the entire ethos of current ethical th inking^ ^ . Bioethics 
- which is the branch of ethical study devoted to the application of these principles in 
the medical sphere - is a relatively 'new' discipline which has developed out of a 
combination of factors which typify late-twentieth century life^ -^. These include, an 
increase in concern for human rights, rapid advances in technology which have 
expanded the limits of medical science, and a rejection of the attitude that health care 
providers have authority to act as the sole arbiters in questions of health care. All of 
these changes have impacted considerably on the lives of individuals throughout 
western society. As a result bioethics and the concept of autonomy are more relevant 
and more pertinent to our lives than ever before. In the health care setting then, 
respect for autonomy is required by the common ethical principles which constitute 
medical ethics and which dictate the appropriateness of the conduct of health care 
professionals towards their patients.
3.3.1. " Conflicts in Ethics
It should not be thought that the principle of respect for autonomy and the other 
ethical principles discussed above always function harmoniously and without conflict. 
Indeed, it is easy to imagine situations where an individual might wish to exercise his 
or her autonomy in a manner which might interfere with the autonomy of others 
and/or cause them harm and/or treat them unfairly. As Beauchamp and Childress 
point out,
55 See, for example, Beauchamp and Childress, op. cit., chapters 4 - 6 ,  Gillon, R.; 'Philosophical Medical 
Ethics' , N ew  York, John W iley and Sons, 1985, and generally for discussions of ethics in different 
settings, see Gillon, R., (ed.); 'Principles o f Health Care Ethics'. N ew  York, W iley and Sons, 1994.
5^  It is generally thought that bioethics began as a 'discipline' in the early 1960s.
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Respect for autonomy...has only prima facie standing and 
can be overridden by competing moral considerations. 
Typical examples are the following: If our choices 
endanger the public health, potentially harm innocent 
others, or require a scarce resource for which no funds are 
available, others can justifiably restrict our exercises of 
autonomy. The justification must, however, rest on some 
competing and overridding moral p r in c ip le s .57
Thus, just as the principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and utility can serve 
to accord respect to individuals and their autonomy, the same principles can be used to 
impose restrictions on individual action and autonomy if this conflicts with wider, 
third party interests. This reflects the concerns of Mill with other-regarding behaviour. 
when one's conduct begins to affect the lives of others it becomes legitimate to curtail 
it to a degree. This, however, poses serious questions. How is one to decide when a 
conflict arises which is of sufficient seriousness to merit intervention and also, what 
form should such intervention take? The answer from ethics is a resounding silence. 
The principles of ethics do not and cannot provide us with guidance about when or 
how the limits should be set on autonomous individuals. Rather, they provide us with 
a framework of moral reference within which to analyse human behaviour and human 
interaction. Only in a very crude way do they provide us with the means of resolving 
conflict. Here is not the place to consider the intricacies of ethical debate concerning 
the resolution of conflicts between ethical principles. It is sufficient to note that given 
that this thesis considers its subject matter from the legal perspective, ethics can be 
helpful only in pointing the way forward or in giving broad guidance about the 
acceptability of proposed courses of conduct.
57 op. cit., at 126.
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3.3.2. - Ethics: A Conclusion
The importance of ethics to modern medical practice cannot be underestimated. 
Crucial to this body of knowledge is the principle of respect for patient autonomy. 
Unfortunately, ethicists disagree about the importance of this principle relative to 
other ethical principles, but do agree that it is a fundamental individualistic right. A 
non-trivial limitation of ethics is its inability to provide clear solutions to real 
problems. The discipline is such that it makes it possible to support competing 
arguments using the same core principles. This, however, is in no way meant as a 
criticism of the discipline of ethics. Rather, it is to state that the aim of ethics does not 
accord entirely with the aim of this work. The aim of ethics is to inform debate and 
provide a framework within which valuable discussion can take place using a common 
language and by reference to accepted principles. It is not the aim of ethics to provide 
concrete solutions. In contrast, it is the aim of this work to provide solutions to the 
problems posed by genetic information. And further, it is the aim of this work to 
provide such solutions by legal means. That is not to say, however, that in providing 
solutions law should not be informed by ethics. Indeed, this writer would argue that it 
is crucial that there be a relationship between the two. Thus, the discipline of medical 
ethics will remain central to this work and will provide both a framework within 
which, and a standard against which, the arguments and conclusions made herein can 
be tested.
3.4. - RESPECTING AUTONOMY: LAW
The centrality of autonomy to the western conception of the individual, and in 
particular its importance in health care, is reflected in legal decisions of the courts of 
most western states. The classic formulation of patient self-determination by a court
186
was offered by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Schloendorff v  Society o f New York 
HospitaN^. In this case an operation was carried out despite express patient wishes to 
the contrary and as a result the patient was physically injured. Although the action was 
u n s u c c e s s f u l ^ ,  in his judgment Justice Cardozo affirmed categorically the importance 
of autonomy in medical treatment,
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; 
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.^^
This reflects current thinking is society generally, for the idea of the human body as an 
inviolate entity is now common in the laws of western states. In cases where the body 
has been violated, the law provides that a civil action in assault or battery can be 
brought by the 'victim', and, usually, that criminal prosecution is also possible at the 
discretion of the state. In this way, 'respect' for autonomy is a legally prescribed 
phenomenon.
The importance of the role of the law in 'protecting' patient autonomy has often been 
reiterated ever since Cardozo's statement in 1914^b In the UK, arguably the turning
5^  211 N .Y . 125 (1914). For an excellent discussion of this case in the context o f informed consent see 
Faden, R.R. and Beauchamp, T.L.; 'A H istory and Theory o f Informed C onsent*, op. cit., chapter 4.
5^  For a discussion see, Faden and Beauchamp, ibid, at 123.
^'^Schloendorff, ibid, at 128.
See, Chatterton v  Gerson [1981] QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257; Hills v  Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, [1984] 
1 WLR 641; Sidaway v  Board o f  Governors o f  the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] A C  871, [1985] 1 All ER  
643, FIE; Reibl v  Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 and Canterbury v  Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC, 1972). M ore 
recently, see Airedale v  NHS Trust v  Bland  [1993] 1 A ll ER 821 and Re F (mental patient: sterilisation)
[1990] 2 A C  1. In Canada, Malette v  Shulman (1990) 67 D LR  (4th) 321 and in Australia D epartm ent o f  
Flealth v  JWB and SMB (1992) 66 ALJR 300. For com m ent on these cases see Kennedy and Grubb, 
'Medical Law ; Text W ith Materials', op. cit., chapter 3.
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point of the movement towards recognising the right of patients to be autonomous and 
self-determining was the case of Re
3.4,1. - Re T  (Adult : Refusal o f Medical Treatment)
Miss T, a pregnant Jehovah's Witness, suffered serious injuries as a result of a car 
accident. On arrival at the hospital and after discussion with her mother. Miss T signed 
a form refusing any future blood transfusion. Unfortunately, after a caesarean delivery 
of a stillborn baby. Miss T's condition deteriorated and a court order was obtained to 
authorise the transfusion of blood. The Court of Appeal heard arguments on the 
legality of this action. As part of the judgment the Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Donaldson, stated in very clear terms the position of the law in regard to patient 
autonomy. He said,
[A patient's] right of choice is not limited to decisions 
which others might regard as sensible. It exists 
notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice 
are rational, irrational, unknown or non-existent.63
A similar view was put by Butler-Sloss LJ,
A man or woman of full age and sound understanding 
may choose to reject medical advice and medical or 
surgical treatment either partially or in its entirety. A 
decision to refuse medical treatment by a patient capable 
of making the decision does not have to be sensible or well-considered...64
62 [1992] 4 All ER 649; [1992] 3 WLR 782. See also, Re F (mental patient: sterilisation), supra cit. The 
H ouse o f Lords has also endorsed the view  that autonomous persons have an 'absolute' right to conduct 
their lives as they wish. This includes the right to refuse medical treatment, even if this w ill result in 
death see, Airdale NHS Trust v  Bland  [1993] 1 A ll ER 821.
63 ibid, at 653, quoting Sidaway, supra, at 904 - 905.
64 ibid, at 664, quoting Sidaway, supra, at 904 - 905.
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Despite these strong words, on the facts before it, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
legality of the blood transfusion administered to Miss T. This was so because, in the 
opinion of the Court, Miss T was not 'capable' of making the decision which it had 
been argued required respect. The Court was of the view that the patient's condition 
had deteriorated to such an extent that she had not the capacity to make a decision 
between life and death. Faced with ambiguity, the court preferred life. Moreover, the 
court was not convinced of the strength of Miss T's belief and was doubtful that her 
'decision' was entirely unfettered: she had consulted with her mother before signing 
the refusal form. In other words, because Miss T did not have the ability to make an 
autonomous choice, the Court of Appeal was not disposed to accord to her legal 
protection of her autonomy^^- That this case was so decided on its facts, however, does 
not detract from the point at hand. For, it was made clear that had Miss T met the 
requisite degree of competence the Court was in no doubt that her autonomy would be 
respected by the law^ .^
The words of Lord Donaldson and Butler-Sloss LJ are strong words indeed. They 
affirm a legal conception of patient autonomy which holds out as a supreme value the 
unfettered choice of the individual irrespective of the consequences for the individual 
chooser. Arguably this is a modern day expression of the Millian conception of 
individuality, all interference is unwarranted interference when it concerns self- 
regarding behaviour67.
65 For com m ent, see Mason, J.K. and M cCall-Smith, R.A.A.; 'Law and Medical Ethics'. Fourth  
Edition, Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1994, at 229 - 231.
66 supra, at 653, 664.
67 It should also be noted that the authority of Re Thas been upheld m  Airedale N HS Trust v  Bland 
[1993] 1 A C  789; [1993] 2 WLR 316, discussed in chapter one, and also in the recent case of Secretary o f  
State fo r  the Home Department v  Robb  [1995] 1 A ll ER 677 in which the right o f a 27-year-old prisoner to 
go on hunger strike was upheld by the Family D ivision of the High Court of Justice on the basis o f Re 
T. As Kennedy points out, however, this is strange given that the individual concerned was not a patient 
but a prisoner and the feeding in such case could hardly be termed treatment in the absence o f any 
medical complication, see 'Com m entary'. 3, Medical Law Review, 189, 1995.
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3.4.2. - Re C (Refusal o f Medical Treatment)
The authority of Re T  was applied shortly afterwards in very interesting circumstances 
of the case of Re This was a decision by Thorpe J. in the Family Division of the 
High Court of Justice. Although simply a decision at first instance, the case is 
nevertheless an extremely important one. N ot only does it reaffirm the authority of Re 
T, but it is the first case in which the right to refuse treatment has been respected by 
the UK courts.
The case concerned a 68-year-old patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia who 
had developed gangrene in a foot while serving a seven year term of imprisonment in 
Broadmoor. On removal of the patient to a general hospital, a consultant diagnosed 
that the patient would die if the gangrenous limb was not amputated below the knee. It 
was estimated that the patient only had a 15% chance of survival without amputation^^. 
The patient, however, refused the operation; he said that he preferred to die with two 
feet than live with one. The hospital nevertheless sought to proceed with the 
operation. An application was lodged on C's behalf to the court for an injunction 
restraining the hospital from carrying out the operation without his express written 
consent. The hospital questioned C's capacity to exercise his autonomy in this way.
Thorpe J. held that C was entitled to refuse the treatment even if this meant that death 
would result^o. Quoting with approval to the dicta of Lord Donaldson in Re T, he 
stated th.2it prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to accept or refuse medical 
treatment. He acknowledged that this might be rebutted by evidence of incapacity but
68 [1994] 1 A ll ER 819;[1994] 1 PER 31.
6^  This was however averted by other surgical intervention short of amputation, at 821 (All ER). 
70 ibid, at 823 - 824.
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this onus must be discharged by those seeking to override the patient's choice^k If 
capacity is challenged, as in this case, the sufficiency of capacity is to be determined 
according to the following criteria; has the capacity of the patient been so reduced (by 
his chronic mental illness) that he did not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose 
and effects of the proffered medical treatment? This depends on whether the patient 
has comprehended and retained information, has believed it and has weighed it in the 
balance with other considerations when making his or her choice^^. As Thorpe said.
Applying that test to my findings on the evidence, I am 
completely satisfied that the presumption that C has the 
right to self-determination has not been displaced. 
Although his general capacity is impaired by 
schizophrenia, it has not been established that he does not 
sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and effects of 
the treatment he refuses. Indeed, I am satisfied that he has 
understood and retained the relevant treatment 
information, that in his own way he believes it, and that 
in the same fashion he has arrived at a clear choice^ .^
Several points of interest arise from this judgment. First, it reaffirms the commitment 
of the law to the principle of respect for patient autonomy. The value of autonomy is 
set up as a primary value which cannot be dispensed with lightly. There is a prima facie 
presumption of its existence and value which can only be overridden in established 
circumstances. Furthermore, the particular facts of the case show that incapacity in one 
or several areas of one's life does not preclude autonomous behaviour in other areas 
nor does it remove the presumption of competence to refuse. Indeed, the injunction 
obtained by the plaintiff extended not only to the particular operation contemplated 
by the hospital but to all future attempts to interfere with his bodily integrity without
73 ibid, at 824. 
77 ibid, at 824. 
73 id.
191
his express written consent^^. If however incapacity can ever be established, then the 
patient must be dealt with in a manner which furthers his or her own best interests.
A problem with the judgment, however, concerns its vagueness. A patient's 
competence can be successfully challenged if it can be shown that s/he does not 
comprehend or absorb information to the extent that s/he understands it or if s/he is 
thought not to believe the information or if s/he cannot balance this information 
against other considerations when making his or her choice. These criteria place 
hurdles in the path of those seeking to exercise their autonomy when their capacity to 
do so is in question. What is not clear is how high they must jump in order to clear 
these hurdles. For example, the requirement that the patient must actually comprehend 
the information is not easy to assess. Importantly, it can depend as much on the 
amount of information which is given to the patient and the manner in which it is 
given as on the capacity of the patient to understand. Yet, the test is not can the patient 
understand, but rather does the patient understand. This places an onerous burden on 
medical staff to ensure that actual understanding is reached. This is, however, slightly 
paradoxical given that treatment staff might not want the patient to understand if they 
disagree with the nature of the decision which the patient seeks to make, as in the 
present case. Relatedly, it is not clear exactly what the patient must understand. The 
decision talks of the 'nature, purpose and effects' of the treatment. This is potentially 
very broad and can encompass elements ranging from the general aim of the procedure, 
to the technique to be employed during the procedure, to the risks of the procedure, to 
the consequences of refusal and beyond. Arguably, and as Andrew Grubb has pointed 
out, if excessive amounts of information require to be disclosed and understood, the
74 The importance of this should not be underestimated. In effect, this is tantamount to judicial 
recognition of the validity of advance refusals of treatment.
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category of 'autonomous person' is reduced to all but the most 'comprehending' of
individuals^^.
Finally, Re C  confirms the role of the best interests test in the medico-legal field. If self- 
determination is successfully challenged then the only option left is to treat the patient 
in his or her best interests. Flowever, as has been argued in chapter one, this concept is 
also vague and leaves considerable control and power with health care professionals. 
Neither the precise nor the general nature of best interests is defined by the UK courts. 
Cases such as Re T  and Re C demonstrate that the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy and therefore patient choice is prima facie prescribed, but the tests which 
have been laid down do not give us more than a general idea of where the limits of the 
principle lie/G. Moreover, these cases have to be read in conjunction with other 
decisions in which patient autonomy was overridden and the right of patients to 
choose for themselves denied.
3.4.3. - The Legal Limits of Autonomy
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Re T  was not without its caveats. Just as Mill 
condoned (and even encouraged) intervention to prevent harmful other-regarding 
behaviour, so too the court in Re T  imposed limits on its account of patient autonomy. 
At pp.652 - 653 Lord Donaldson said the following.
An adult patient who...suffers from no mental incapacity 
has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to 
medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather 
than another of the treatments being offered. The only
75 See Grubb, A.; 'Com m entary'. 2, Medical Law Review, 92, 1994, at 95.
76 For com m ent on the problems arising from the issue of patient competence or incom petence, see, 
Jones, M .A. and Keywood, K.; 'Assessing The Patient's Competence to Consent to Medical Treatm ent', 
2, Medical Law International, 107, 1996.
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possible qualification is a case in which the choice may lead 
to the death o f a viable foetus, [emphasis added]
This 'possible qualification' was quickly tested in the soon-to-follow decision oî Re S7^ .
3,4.4. - Re S (adult: refusal o f medical treatment)
In Re S a health authority applied for a declaration to authorise the surgeons and staff 
of an authority hospital to carry out an emergency Caesarean section operation on a 
30-year-old woman who had been admitted to hospital with ruptured membranes and 
in spontaneous labour with her third child. On religious grounds the woman refused 
to submit to a section. The surgeon in charge was adamant that without intervention 
of this kind both patient and baby would die. After six days of Mrs S's labour, the 
health authority sought a judgment. The case was heard by Sir Stephen Brown.
The decision of Sir Stephen is approximately one page in length, one half of which is 
concerned with relating the facts. In agreeing to make the declaration there is nothing 
in Sir Brown's judgment which resembles legal argument or analysis. As he said,
I [make the declaration] in the knowledge that the 
fundamental question appears to have been left open by 
Lord Donaldson MR in Re T..., and in the knowledge 
that there is no English authority which is directly m point.78
Despite the absence of authority^^, the decision in Re S nevertheless demonstrated a 
serious qualification to the 'absolute' right of choice expounded by Lord Donaldson^o.
77 [1992] 4 A ll ER 671. This case was decided only tw o and a half m onths after Re T.
78 ibid, at 672.
79 Sir Stephen did make a passing com ment concerning American authority in the case of A C  (1990) 
573 A  2d 1235 at 1240, 1246-1248, 1252, in w hich a pregnant wom an w ho had been fighting cancer for 
15 years, and w ho was dying, had her apparent refusal o f consent overruled by the court in favour o f a 
caesarean to attempt to save the 26 and a half week fetus. N either mother nor foetus survived. What the 
H igh Court in Re S failed to consider was the subsequent overturning of Re A C  by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals three years after the woman's death. By a majority of seven to one the
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It has been observed by commentators that the vagueness of the dictum of Sir Stephen 
Brown left open the possibility of further limitations being imposed on the autonomy 
of pregnant woman^  ^ This has already happened in the U.S. where pregnant women 
with substance abuse problems have been detained until their pregnancy reaches term 
in order to avoid 'harm' to the fetus®^ . In the UK, although such draconian measures 
have not yet been employed, the conduct of women during pregnancy has been 
influential on courts in later decisions regarding such individuals. For example, in D  v  
Berkshire County Council the House of Lords considered a mother's ante-natal conduct 
when deciding if 'a child's proper development had been avoidably prevented or its 
health had been avoidably im p aired 'for the purposes of granting a care order^ .^ The 
child had been born prematurely with drug dependency. The order was granted and 
the child removed. Although the establishment of this precedent involved no direct 
interference with the mother's autonomy, in an indirect manner her autonomy was 
affected. She was denied the chance of proving her capacity for motherhood and she 
was effectively put 'on warning' about her future conduct: if that was not curtailed the 
same result might signal the end of any subsequent pregnancy85.
cou it held that pregnant w om en retain an almost unfettered right to determine their ow n health 
choices, even if their decisions conflict w ith the apparent 'best interests' of the foetus. Maternal rights 
could only be trumped by the "most extraordinary and almost unthinkable circumstances". The facts of 
R e A C  were  held not to fall into such a category.
8G For brief, yet astute com m ent on Re S, see Morgan, D.; 'Whatever Flappened to Consent?'. O ctober 
23, New Law Journal, 1448, 1992.
83 See, Mair, J.; 'M aternal/Foetal Conflict: D efined or Diffused?' in McLean, S.A.M. (ed,); 
'Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics', Aldershot, Dartm outh Publishing, 1996, chapter 5, 
Morgan, loc. cit., Stern, K.; 'Court-Ordered Caesarean Sections: In W hose Interests?'. 56, M odem Law  
Review, 238, 1993, and Alldridge, P.; 'Let me D ie - M y M other Insists', N ew  Law Journal, 1691, 1992.
87 For comment on such practices, see D e Gama, K.; 'A Brave N ew  World? Rights Disclosure and the 
Politics o f Reproductive A u tonom y'. 20{J), Journal o f  Law and Society, 114, 1993 and Storall, M.T.; 'In 
Re Valerie D  and State Intervention in Prenatal Drug Abuse', 25, Connecticut Law  Review, 1265, 1993. 
85 This is the wording of s. 1(2)(a) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 under which the care 
order was sought.
84 [1987] 1 All ER 20.
85 N ote , in Re F (in utero) [1988] 2 A ll ER 193 the Court of Appeal refused to extend the cloak of 
wardship over an unborn fetus. O nly  on its birth did the fetus become a legal person to w hom  the
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That the exception in Re S was allowed in the case of the viable fetus demonstrates a 
more serious limitation on the autonomy principle for women. Because of the unique 
relationship which a pregnant woman has with her fetus, namely, that the conduct of 
the former has direct implications for the well-being and life of the latter, the court felt 
justified in refusing to respect the choice of the woman not to receive treatment. This 
was so even although the fetus was not, in the eyes of the law, a 'legal person' and 
therefore had no legal rights^ .^ The consequence of this was that the woman was 
subjected to direct interference with her bodily integrity against her express wishes. In 
the particular circumstances of Re S this was, unfortunately, in vain for the child 
nevertheless died. The problems with this decision are manifold.
First, the case was seen simply as one of conflict between the interests of the woman 
and those of the fetus^ .^ Yet, in 'resolving' the conflict the court made no attempt to 
weigh the relative merits or demerits of the respective interests. There was no 
discussion of the competency of the woman to make such a choice, nor was there any 
attempt to quantify the validity of her choice. Moreover, there was no attempt to 
establish criteria for determining in future cases when, if at all, such forced caesarean 
sections would be permitted. For example, must the fetus have a 'reasonable' or 'good' 
prospect of living? Or, would it be enough that it has a 'marginal' chance of survival?
jurisdiction of wardship extended. A lso, the court was reluctant to interefer w ith  the woman's rights 
w hile pregnant.
86 The legal position of the fetus is that it has no legal rights unless and until it is born alive, see in 
Scotland, Hamilton v  Fife Health Board 1993 SLT 624, (1993) 13 BMLR 156; in England and Wales,
Paton V British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1978] 2 All ER 987, Burton v  Islington Flealth 
Authority; de Martel I v  Merton and Sutton Health Authority [1992] 3 A ll ER 833 and the Congenital 
Disabilties (Civil Liability) Act 1976. M ost recently in England in the criminal law context see. Attorney  
General's Reference (No.3 o f 1994) [1996] Crim LR 268. Finally, the Inner H ouse of the Court of Session 
has held in Kelly v  Kelly that 'the fetus is part of its mother's body, in the eyes of the law, in the same 
way as the placenta or umbilical cord.', The Times, 5 June 1997.
87 This is not, however, the only approach w hich one can take to such cases, see, for example, Mair, 
op. cit.
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Does the decision represent an exception to the 'absolute' right of choice laid down in 
Re T  or does it reverse the burden of establishing validity of interference: that is, unlike 
Re C  in which it was held that the right to self-determination prima facie exists, must a 
pregnant woman prove or establish her right to determine for herself what should 
happen to her body? It is also important to note that what this decision does not do is 
go so far as to impose a duty on doctors to intervene in such cases, it simply offers 
them a discretion to do so. Thus, the legality of intervention was established by the 
court but the power to interfere with the autonomy of pregnant woman was given to 
the health care professionals.
3.4.5. - Re M.B. (Caesarean Section)
Most recently, however, the Court of Appeal has considered again the relationship 
between a pregnant woman and her fetus, and has ruled in a much more articulate 
manner on the position of the law in resolving conflict between the interests of the 
two. In Re M . B it was held that where a competent woman refused medical treatment 
in the form of a caesarean section the courts had no jurisdiction to declare such 
treatment lawful. On the facts of the case, however, the pregnant woman was declared 
incompetent because of a fear of needles which had led her to refuse the caesarean. At 
the end of the day she consented to the operation and a healthy child was delivered. 
This, of course, in no way detracts from the authority of the decision.
88 It is interesting to note that tw o recent decisions have been made by the H igh  Court in England 
ordering w om en to have sections against their wishes, with no reference to legal authority to justify 
doing so: see, Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v  W [\996 ]  2 FLR 613 and Tameside and 
Glossop Acute Services Trust v  C H (a patient) [1996] 1 FLR 762; 31 BMLR 93. In the latter it was held that 
the performance o f a caesarean section on a schizophrenic woman could be 'treatment' of her mental 
disorder within the terms o f the Mental Health Act 1983. For comment on this decision see Grubb, A.; 
'C om m entary*. 1996, Medical Law Review, 193 - 198.
R e M.B.(Caesarean section : 26 March 1997), The Times, 18 April 1997.
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This decision is to be welcomed for it clarifies significantly the question of the respect 
due to the autonomy of the pregnant woman. The Court of Appeal was adamant in its 
ruling that a woman carrying a fetus is entitled to the same degree of respect for her 
wishes as anyone else. Furthermore, the court reiterated the general principle laid 
d o w n 'm Re that a person of full age and sound mind cannot be treated against his 
or her will without civil and criminal law consequences. It also endorsed heavily the 
view that a refusal of medical treatment can be for any reason, rational or irrational, or 
for no reason at alF .^ In particular, it was stressed that the only circumstances in which 
non-voluntary treatment is permissible arise when the patient cannot give consent and 
the treatment is in the patient's best interests. But, in circumstances where a competent 
pregnant woman decides to refuse medical intervention, even although this might have 
as a consequence the death or serious handicap of the fetus she bore, the court has no 
jurisdiction to declare medical intervention lawful. In such circumstances, the question 
of the woman's own best interests do not arise.
This decision clearly prefers the autonomy interests of the woman to any interests 
which the fetus might have, including an interest in being born alive^ .^ Yet, it is 
important to bear in mind that all of this is subject to the woman being competent 
when she makes her refusal. If she is not, she must be treated in her best interests. In 
the particular circumstances of Re M.B. the assessment that the operation was in her 
best interests is open to little question: both the woman and her husband wanted the 
child to be born, subject to her needle phobia. It is interesting to speculate, however,
9® supra cit.
93 See, Re T, supra cit., at 653.
97 Indeed, the court specifically stated the under English law as it stands, the submission that the court 
should consider and weigh in the balance the rights of the 'unborn child' was untenable, see Times 
Report, supra cit. The court referred to the decisions of Paton v  British Pregnancy A dvisory Service 
Trustees [1979] QB 276, C v  S [1988] QB 135 and in re F (in utero), supra cit., in holding that the dictum  
of Lord Donaldson in Re T, supra, cit., (regarding the possible different situation of a choice which  
might lead to the death of a viable fetus) could not be upheld. The same approach has been endorsed by  
the Inner H ouse of the Court of Session in Kelly v  Kelly, supra cit.
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how the patient's best interests would be assessed if there was no clear indication of 
how the mother felt about the birth, or even if a previous statement of her wishes 
requesting that she and the fetus die together - made when she was competent - were 
available. In the final analysis, and despite the significant moves forward which Re M.B. 
represents, the decision does nothing to remove from the medical profession the 
discretion and power to decide on patient capacity to act autonomously, and 
ultimately, in cases of incapacity, to decide on patient best interests. These matters are 
explored further in the next section.
3.4.6. " Further Limits on Autonomy: The Minor and the Adult Incapax
Further limits on the scope of the principle of autonomy as laid down in Re T  are 
found in the words of Butler-Sloss LJ in that decision,
A man or woman of full age and sound understanding 
may choose to reject medical advice and medical or 
surgical treatment either partially or in its entirety^).
This clearly shows that one must be of 'full age' and 'sound understanding' to qualify 
as an autonomous chooser. This suggests that in two categories the scope of autonomy 
is likely to be limited: the minor and the mental incapax. This has been borne out by 
the case law.
~ Minors
Re S (A Minor) (Consent to Medical Treatment) was a decision of the Family Division of 
the High Court of Justice and concerned a fifteen and a half year old girl who was
95 In re T, supra, per Butler-Sloss LJ at 664.
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suffering from a genetic condition, beta minor thalassaemia major^ .^ The condition 
renders the body unable to produce red blood cells. Affected persons must receive 
monthly blood transfusions and daily abdominal injections in order to survive. S had 
been receiving such treatment since birth. In 1989 S and her mother began to attend 
meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses and in May 1994 S refuse a blood transfusion. An 
order was sought by the local authority requesting the court to authorise treatment 
under its inherent jurisdiction. In authorising the treatment the court held that 
although it had the power so to do, it must start from the premise that the patient's 
wishes should be respected unless the circumstances strongly indicated intervention. 
To be weighed in balance with the wishes of the patient (refusal) are the 'best interests' 
of the child. In determining such best interests the court held that one must examine 
the extent to which the decision to refuse treatment had been reached independently, 
and was based on a proper understanding of the illness and the consequences of refusal. 
In the particular circumstances of S, the court held that because the child entertained a 
hope of a miracle cure she did not fully understand the nature or implications of her 
choice. She was not, therefore, competent to make the decision and the treatment 
could go ahead contrary to her w is h e s ^ ^ .
At first sight this case seems to uphold the principle of autonomy: prima facie the 
patient's wishes must be respected. However, an analysis of the judgment reveals that 
in practice it will be very difficult for minors to choose for themselves when that 
decision goes against the views of attending health care p r o f e s s io n a l s ^ ^ .
94 [1994] 2 FLR 1065.
95 Consent and refusal cases concerning minors in England and Wales are governed by the Flouse o f  
Lords decision in Gillick v  West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority  [1986] A C  112; [1985] 3 A ll 
ER 402, LIL.
96 For a vociferous attack on the approach of the English and Welsh courts see, Elliston, S.; 'If.You 
K now  What's G ood for You: Refusal o f Consent to Medical Treatment by Children', in McLean,
S.A.M ., (ed.); 'Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics', op. cit., chapter 3.
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The court overturned the refusal of the minor on the authority of previous case law 
which clearly established a 'best interests' analysis for the treatment of minors^ .^ What 
is of interest, however, is the nature of the test which the court laid down to establish 
'best interests'. It is hard to reject the view that what is in someone's best interests 
should ideally be determined by that person him or herself. However, if one cannot 
determine one's own best interests then this must be done on one's behalf. The 
question of competency to decide therefore arises here. In the present case the court 
held that because the child entertained a belief in a miracle cure and because she failed 
to appreciate 'thé manner of the death and pain and the distress' which her decision 
would entail, she was not competent to refuse. This is to set a very high standard; some 
would argue, an impossibly high standard's. Johnson J. held that it was not enough 
simply that the child had 'an understanding that she will die'. What is required is not 
only a fairly detailed understanding of the processes of one's demise, but also evidence 
of having come to terms with one's own end. This standard is unlikely ever to be met 
by any child. Indeed, as one commentator has pointed out, it is also unlikely to be met 
by most adults^ .^ Thus, in treatment decisions where refusal is likely to result in death, 
this case would tend to indicate that minors will never have the capacity to refuse and 
will, therefore, be treated in their best interests as determined by the treatment staff. 
As with cases previously discussed, in practice the same staff will be responsible for 
determining competency.
97 The position in England is currently that provided a court can find a consent to authorise medical 
treatment, then treatment of a m inor w ill be lawful. Such consent can com e either from the child, or if 
s/h e  refuses, the parents w ho retain a residual right to consent even if faced with a refusal by the child. 
Indeed, by virtue o f its wrrdship jurisdiction, the court itself can consent for the child. O f course, all 
consent must be given in the child's 'best interests', see -R e R (a  minorjfwardship : medical treatment)
[1991] 4 All ER 177, CA; (1992) 7 BMLR 147, CA and Re W (a minor)(medical treatment) [1992] 4 All 
ER 627, CA. For comment see, Brazier, M. and Bridge, C.; 'Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent 
A u ton om y',16. Legal Studies, 84, 1996.
98 See Gunn, M.; 'The Meaning o f Incapacity', 2, Medical Law Review, 8, 1994.
99 Grubb, A.; 'Comm entary'. 4, Medical Law Review, 84, 1996, at 86.
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3.4.6.2. - Minors in Scotland
In Scotland, the position of children is governed by the Age o f Legal Capacity (Scotland) 
Act 1991 and the Children (Scotland) A ct 1995. The law is clearly established that 
persons over 16 have legal capacity to govern their own affairs, including medical 
decision-making3°o. On the position of those under 16, Elliston has suggested that,
[a]lthough the question of a child refusing consent to 
treatment has yet to be litigated in the Scottish courts, 
there are powerful arguments that suggest a child who is 
competent...would have their decision respected. Such 
arguments hinge first on an interpretation of the existing 
legislation and second on the grounds of public policy.3°3
Elliston and others o^  ^ point to the fact that the 1991 Act contains specific provision 
regarding medical treatment of minors which allows a minor to consent on his/her 
own behalf 'to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment where, in the 
opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable of 
understanding the nature and possible consequences of the procedure or t r e a t m e n t . ' 3 ° 5  
These commentators argue that although no express mention is made of a child's right 
to refuse, logic dictates that this correlative right must accompany a right to consent^o .^
100 gf Legal Capacity (Scotland) A ct 1991, s ,l(l)(b ).
3^ 3 loc. cit., at 49.
3°7 Elliston, op. cit., W ilkinson, A. B. and N orrie, K.McK.; 'Parent and C hild'. Edinburgh, 
W .C R E E N /Sw eet & Maxwell, 1993, at 183, and Edwards, L.; 'The Right to Consent and the Right to  
Refuse: M ore Problems w ith Minors and Medical C onsent', 1993 Juridical R eview , 52.
3*55 supra cit., s.2(4).
394 For a very different view  , see Mason and McCall-Smith, op. cit., at 229: '...w hile consent involves 
acceptance of an experienced view, refusal rejects that experience - and does so from a position of limited 
understanding. Furthermore, a refusal o f medical treatment may close dow n options - and this may be 
regretted later in that the chance to consent has now  passed. The implications o f refusal may, therefore, 
be more serious and, on these grounds, refusal o f treatment may require greater understanding than does 
acceptance. A  level o f comprehension sufficient to justify refusal of treatment certainly includes one to
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They submit that, unlike England^ o^  ^ Scotland is not burdened by unhelpful court 
decisions which have twisted the law relating to minors and rendered it u n j u s t i f i a b l e ^ ^ ^ .  
The relevant provisions of the 1991 Act are preserved in the Children (Scotland) Act 
1995, section 90 of which ensures that a minor's consent is sought even in 
circumstances where the Act requires that the child submit to examination or 
treatment (for example under a warrant or supervision r e q u i r e m e n t )  397.
Of course, even if these views of the law in Scotland are correct, one should not forget 
that the respect for a minor's refusal is entirely contingent on a medical practitioner's 
view that the minor has sufficient capacity to take a decision for him/herself. In this 
respect, the laws of both Scotland and England are entirely in accordance.
3.4.7. - The Incapax Adult
It has already been established in chapter one that incapax patients are to be treated in 
their best interests. This was demonstrated by considering the PVS cases and that line 
of authority need not be re-examined here. It is important to note, however, that in 
addition to PVS cases (in which the individual is incapax to the extent that s/he cannot 
express his or her wishes), there also exist cases in which a person can express wishes 
but where s/he is nevertheless deemed to be incapax because s/he is thought to be 
incompetent through ill health or mental disorder. The Mental Health Act 1983 and
accept treatment but the reverse does not hold; the tw o conditions cannot be regarded as being on  a 
par.'
395 See, Re R (A Minor) (Wardship : Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177, CA and R e W (A  Minor) 
(Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, CA.
396 See Elliston, loc. cit. at 50 - 51, W ilkinson and Norrie, op. cit., at 182 - 189, and generally Edwards, 
loc. cit. N orrie points out in his commentary in Scottish Current Law Statutes on s.90 of the Children 
(Scotland) A ct 1995 that, 'Lord James Douglas H am ilton accepted in the Special Standing Com m ittee o f  
the H ouse o f Com m ons that capacity to consent implied the capacity to refuse (March 7 1995, col.532) 
as did Lord Fraser of Carmyllie in the Com m ittee of the W hole H ouse in the H ouse of Lords (June 13 
1995, cols. 132- 134).'
307 For com m ent see N orrie in Scottish Current Law Statutes.
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the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 both allow for involuntary treatment of 
individuals suffering from mental disorder398. This is, however, restricted to treatment 
for the mental condition from which the individual suffers. This begs the question of 
what amounts to a mental condition suitable for involuntary treatment under the 
Acts399. Conditions such a schizophrenia, manic depression, psychoses and neuroses are 
clearly within the scope of the provisions. However, some recent force feeding cases 
demonstrate that the definition is open to much wider interpretation.
\ n  B V  Croydon Health Authority^^'^ the Court of Appeal was asked to rule on the 
legality of force-feeding a woman compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983. The woman only had 2 -3 months life expectancy as a result of her refusal to eat. 
In holding that tube feeding against the patient's wishes was lawful, the court adhered 
to an interpretation of the 1983 Act which had earlier been advanced by the High 
Court in Riverside Mental Health Trust v  Ao%33i and South West Hertfordshire Health 
Authority v  Brady^ '^^. That view is that anorexia nervosa is a 'mental condition' within 
the terms of the 1983 Act and that feeding to avert death of the patient is 'treatment' of 
that condition under section 63. Because s.63 of the Act permits involuntary treatment, 
there is no need to determine the competency of the patient or to seek their consent.
398 See sections 58, 62 and 63 o f the 1983 A ct and ss. 97, 98 and 103 of the 1984 Act. For com m ent and 
analysis of the provisions see Mason and McCall Smith, 'Law and Medical Ethics', op. cit., at 397 - 398.
399 The term 'mental disorder' is v e iy  broadly defined in the Acts. For example, in the 1983 A ct 'mental 
disorder' is defined as 'mental illness, arrested or incom plete development of the mind, psychopathic 
disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind', s. 1(2). Similar provisions determine the scope of 
the Scottish legislation.
339 [1995] 1 A ll ER 686.
33 3 In Riverside Mental Health Trust v  Fox [1994] 1 FLR 614 the English Court of Appeal heard an 
application from an N H S  Trust requesting a declaration o f lawfulness o f force feeding a patient suffering 
from anorexia nervosa. The patient had been admitted to the respondent hospital under the Mental 
Health A ct 1983. ITer consultant feared that her condition had reached a stage where complications 
were likely to arise w hich could lead to death. An interim declarator allowing force feeding was granted 
at first instance but overturned on appeal on the procedural ground that such an interim declaration was 
ultra vires the court.
332 sub. nom. Re K.B. (Adult) (Mental Patient : Medical Treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144. This case also 
dealt w ith the force feeding of a patient suffering from anorexia nervosa.
204
Implicit in the section is the authority to use force to administer the treatment. Most 
recently in Re V.S. (Adult .'MentalDisorderf^'^ the High Court applied the authority of 
B to declare lawful the feeding of a woman held for treatment under the 1983 Act and 
who faced imminent renal failure as a result of her persistent refusal to eat^ ^^ .
These cases demonstrate several things. First, 'treatment' of a mental condition extends 
to things done both to alleviate the condition directly as well as to remove symptoms 
of the condition, such as not eating. This is interesting because treatment of the 
symptoms does ' not necessarily do anything to alleviate the underlying mental 
disorder. The reason these women were made to eat was not to address their anorexia 
or depression but to prevent them from dying. Clearly, death is not a mental disorder. 
Is this interpreting the provisions too widely? Neill LJ considered in B that such an 
interpretation was necessary because to hold otherwise would lead to impractical 
distinctions and would make the provisions difficult to apply. It should also be noted 
that the court in that case was careful to delimit the scope of s.63 in holding that the 
condition to be treated must be 'connected to' the mental disorder. That is, the section 
does not authorise involuntary treatment of patients for any disorder or condition 
which arises while they have a mental disorder. Otherwise all medical treatment 
decisions concerning mental patients detained under the relevant provisions of the Act 
could be taken without any need to consult the patient. If, therefore, the patient suffers 
a condition unrelated to his or her mental condition then the common law rules must 
apply as laid down in Ae
333 This case is discussed in 1995 Medical Law R eview  292.
334 N o te  too that R e W (A  Minor) (Medical Treatment : Court's Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 W LR 758 (CA) is a 
case in which the Court of Appeal authorised the force feeding of an anorexic 16-year-old competent 
girl.
335 supra.
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Second, even if one accepts that it is accurate to categorise a condition such as anorexia 
nervosa as a 'mental disorder', it is not clear that to feed someone classifies as 'medical 
treatment'. Simply because the feeding is done by medical staff in a health care setting 
does not necessarily make it medical treatment. The médicalisation of the 
circumstances of these women makes it easier to apply the provisions of the Mental 
Health Acts but it is nevertheless difficult to accept that the administration of
s u s t e n a n c e  is ' t r e a t m e n t ' 336.
Third, these cases throw the net wide and authorise serious interference with patient 
autonomy. As has been said, implicit in the terms of the Acts is the power to use force 
to 'treat' the patient. And, despite dicta by Douglas Brown J. in Re it is now
settled that the scope of the Acts includes force feeding: it will not, therefore, be 
necessary to apply to the courts in the future to force feed patients suffering from 
anorexia nervosa or other conditions which lead them to refuse to eat. Thus, once 
again considerable power to usurp patient autonomy rests with the medical profession. 
The difference with the statutory cases compared to the common law cases, however, 
is that, in the former, there is no legal requirement to consider the capacity of the 
patient to consent or refuse nor is there any obligation to consider as a relevant factor 
the autonomy of the patients.
336 This is essentially the same objection as has been made about the Bland  case, discussed in chapter 
one. In response to that case, many commentators argued that it was not justifiable to classify artificial 
feeding and hydration as 'medical treatment' because such sustenance is essential for the very 
continuation of life itself and not for the alleviation of any pain or illness. Yet, for the argument of the 
H ouse o f Lords to succeed it was crucial that feeding and hydration could be so classified. For criticism  
of the case on this point see, Finnis, J.; 'Bland: Crossing the Rubicon'. 109, Law  Quarterly Review, 329, 
1993.
337 Supra . For a persuasive argument dismissing Douglas Brown J.'s dictum see Grubb, A.; 
'Com m entary'. 3, Medical Law Review, 292, 1995.
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Finally, and most recently, consider the judgment in Tameside and Glossop Acute 
Services Trust v  C.H. (a patientf^^. In this case the English Fligh Court ordered a 
woman detained under s.3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for paranoid schizophrenia 
to be subjected to a caesarean section, with reasonable restraint if necessary, on the 
grounds that this was 'treatment' of her mental disorder under s.63 of the Act. Wall J. 
in that case said, '[i]t is not...I think stretching language unduly to say that achievement 
of a successful outcome to her pregnancy is a necessary part of the overall treatment of 
her mental disorder'. This, however, is clearly to take the step which the courts have 
avoided taking in the past; namely, to establish that treatment of any physical 
condition which can have an effect on one's mental condition can be 'treatment' for 
the purposes of the Act. This is surely to stray too far from acceptable qualifications to 
the principle of respect for patient autonomy^^^. What such a decision clearly displays 
is an unwillingness to let the fetus, and possibly the woman, die. This is an entirely 
understandable sentiment, but to attempt to achieve such an end in such a manner 
makes for astoundingly 'bad' law. We saw in the previous section which discussed 
forced caesarean sections that the Court of Appeal has recently upheld the right of a 
competent woman to refuse medical intervention even if this will result in harm or 
death to her fetus329. In cases where a woman has been declared incompetent, however, 
she must be treated in her own best interests32i. Of course, the obvious questions are, 
when is a woman incompetent?, and what are her best interests? Arguably, a decision 
such as Tameside and Glossop endorses the power of the medical profession to declare 
pregnant women incompetent in very dubious circumstances and further, it sanctions
338 [1996] 1 FLR 762.
339 For com m entaiy on Tameside and Glossop see, D olan, B. and Parker, C.; 'Tameside and Glossop  
Acute Services U nit v C H  (a patient)', 314, British Medical Journal, 1183, 1997, Bewley, S.;
'Commentary: Bad Medicine and Bad Law'. 314, British Medical Journal, 1184, 1997, W hitfield, A.; 
'Commentary: A  Decision that Stretches the Law T oo  Far'. 314, British Medical Journal, 1185, 1997, and 
Bastian, H , and Conroy, C.; 'Commentary: Is Caesarean Section a Treatment for Medical Paranoia?', 
314, British Medical Journal, 1187, 1997.
329 Re M.B., supra cit.
323 ibid.
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the view that to give birth to the child is necessarily in the patient’s best interests. This 
fundamentally undermines the autonomy interests of pregnant women^^-.
3.5. - PATERNALISM
One cannot talk of the principle of autonomy, either in ethics or law, without 
reference to the concept of paternalism. An absolutist conception of autonomy 
considers respect for autonomy to be even more important than individual well-being, 
so that it is irrelevant if in the exercise of the former the latter is jeopardised. The case 
for such a view is based on pragmatism and the logical extension of the beliefs which 
underpin the concept of autonomy. If autonomy relates to an individual’s ’right’ to 
take decisions affecting his or her life - uninhibited by interference (because, after all, it 
is his or her life) - then it should make no difference what the nature of the decisions 
taken is. What is important is the fact that such persons can take the decision in at least 
three senses of the word; they have the ability and capacity to take the decision and 
also the unfettered opportunity to exercise that cap acityG en era lly , however, such a 
view is not followed in western democracies. Rather, and as we have seen, a 
compromise solution is reached which allows unchallenged exercises of autonomy only 
in certain circumstances. This has already been noted above in relation to the 
possibility of harm to others. However, it is also the case that if there is the possibility 
of harm to oneself, or if some dubiety about the autonomy of the individual can be 
inferred, such exercises of autonomy wdl not be allowed unless they coincide with
A  judicial review case has most recently been com m enced by a wom an w ho was forced to have a 
caesarean section under the provisions o f the Mental Health Act 1983: see D yer, C.; 'Court Case May 
Clarify Law on Caesarean Sections', 314, British Medical Journal, 624, 1997.
This view  is discussed by Feinberg, H arm  to S e lf , op. cit., at 59. See also, Feinberg, J.; 'A utonom y. 
Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the C onstitution'. 58, The Notre Dame Law Review, 445, 1983, 
at 457 - 461.
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what is objectively considered to be in the 'best interests' of the subject^ 24_ Intervention 
is therefore justified to curtail the individual's exercise of his/her 'rights' when such an 
exercise of rights departs from the individual's perceived 'best i n t e r e s t s ' * 2 5 .  And, i t  
sometimes also happens that an assessment of best interests is used to decide for others 
even when those persons have the capacity to decide for themselves. The act of deciding 
and acting in another's 'best interests' is commonly known as paternalisTrP-^. Of 
particular relevance to this thesis is the willingness and frequency with which the State 
takes a seat at the bedside of most persons receiving health care and acts
paternalistically*27.
In essence, paternalism is the very antithesis of autonomy and self-determination 
because implicit in its operation is a disregard for the wishes of the subject towards 
whom the paternalism is directed. Paternalism can take a variety of forms and in most, 
but not all, cases the patient is deemed to be incapax and therefore unable to exercise 
his or her autonomy. This is not to say, however, that the patient's wishes are not 
known or cannot be a s c e r t a i n e d * ^ ^ .
*2'* For a discussion of this latter point see, Grubb, A.; 'Treatment Decisions: Keeping it in the Fam ily', 
in Grubb, A ., (ed.); 'Choices and Decisions in Health Care', Chichester, W iley, 1993, at 37 - 96.
125 approach is very similar to a model discussed by Feinberg in 'A utonom y. Sovereignty, and 
Privacy; Moral Ideals in the Constitution?', loc. cit., at 460 - 461. This model is not, however, supported  
by him, ibid.
126 P q j . comment on paternalism, see, D w orkin, 'The Theory and Practice o f A utonom y', op. cit., 
chapter 8, Kleinig, J.; 'Paternalism', Manchester, Manchester U nivesity Press, 1983, Shapiro, D.L.; 
'Courts. Legislatures and Paternalism', 74, Virginia Law Review, 519, 1988, Feinberg, 'A utonom y. 
Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the C onstitution', loc. cit., esp. 457ff., and Buchanan, A.; 
'Medical Paternalism', 7(4), Philosophy and Public Affairs, 370, 1978.
*22 Jinnett-Sack, S.; 'A utonom y in the Com pany of Others', in Grubb, 'Choices and Decisions in 
Health Care', op. cit., at 111.
*2® It is interesting to note that neither Mill nor Kant imagined the adoption of a paternalistic role by  
the state regarding the 'best interests' o f its citizens. As Beauchamp and Childress note, op. cit., at 273, 
'Philosophical analyses o f paternalism are at least as old as Immanuel Kant, w ho denounced paternalistic 
government ("imperium paternale," he called it) for benevolently restricting the freedom of its subjects. 
Kant was concerned about a government that "cancels freedom". H e never considered the possibility  
that a parental model of benevolent intervention - one that likens the state to a protective parent caring- 
for an incompetent m inor - might be considered paternalistic. N or  did John Stuart Mill contemplate the 
possibility that paternalism might encompass interventions w ith those w ho have limited or no 
autonomy.'
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First, let us consider the situation where a patient is unconscious and treatment is 
required to avoid a threat to his or her life. To carry out such treatment without first 
attempting to ascertain the wishes of the patient is paternalistic, not only because it is 
done in what are considered to be the 'best interests' of the patient, but because it is 
done irrespective of his/her wishes. In such cases the law presumes that the urgency of 
the situation provides the health care professional with a defence of necessity and no 
action can be brought subsequently by the p a t i e n t * ^ ^ .  An example of this is the case of 
Marshall v  Curry in which a Canadian court denied a claim in battery brought because 
a doctor removed a patient's diseased testicle discovered during the course of a hernia 
operation*2o. The court was of the opinion that it would have been unreasonable to 
delay the operation in order to seek the patient's specific consent*^*.
Second, paternalistic approaches to patient treatment have been legally sanctioned even 
in circumstances where the patient has expressed wishes against treatment prior to 
lapsing into an incapacitated state. In the U.S. case of Werth v  Taylor a civil action in 
battery failed against a health care professional who had authorised a blood transfusion 
to one of the plaintiffs despite her having signed a 'Refusal to Permit Blood 
Transfusion' form*22. The fact that the patient had been unconscious at the time when 
a transfusion became necessary was decisive for the court. The conclusion reached by 
the justices was that the refusal of the patient was not 'informed' because it was not 
made at a time contemporaneous with the threat to her life. This permitted her refusal 
to be overridden. The difference between this and the first scenario is the evidence of a 
view/wish of the patient. However, the similarity between the two scenarios lies in the
*29 See, Mason and McCall-Smith, op. cit., at 220 - 221. 
*20 [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260.
*2 * C/*- M m ray v  McMurchy [1949] 2 D .L .R . 442.
*22 (1991) 475 N W  2d 426 (Mich. CA).
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paternalistic practice of disregarding the patient's view: either it is not sought (a form 
of disrespect in itself) or it is ignored. In other words, absent from each scenario is the 
patient's consent: arguably, the ultimate expression of autonomy and self-
determination in the health care setting.
A third example relates to the disclosure of information to a patient. If a health care 
professional considers that for a patient to hear that he or she has a terminal disease 
will advance his or her condition and seriously affect the patient's mental state, then to 
omit to convey this information is paternalistic. The disrespect for the patient's 
autonomy is once again present*^). In the U.K. this practice is condoned by the courts 
which consider that no legal action can lie for non-disclosure of a medical condition 
provided that the judgment of the health care professional in withholding information 
was in accordance with a 'responsible body of medical o p i n i o n ' * 2 4 .  That is, the 
standard against which the paternalistic conduct is tested is one set by the medical 
profession itself. No 'objective' or 'subjective' patient test is accepted in the UK*25.
Fourth, the courts might deem that a patient is not sufficiently autonomous to merit 
respect of their wishes (presuming that such can be expressed) and in such cases medical 
care will be approved, once again, in the best interests of the patient. This point has 
already been made above concerning children*2  ^ and mentally ill adults*22. Also, as
*22 O n this matter see, Bok, S.; 'Lying: Moral C hoice in Public and Private Life'. N e w  York, Pantheon 
Books, 1978, at 220 -241 .
*2'* See, Bolam v  Friern Hospital Management Committee, supra cit.,Chatterton v  Gerson, supra a t ,a n d  
Sidaway, supra, cit. It is thought that the position in Scotland is the same, see H unter v  Flanley 1955 SLT 
213, Moyes v  Lothian Health Board [1990] 1 Med. L.R. 463, Goorkani v  Tayside Health Board [1991] Med. 
L.R. 33, and Gordon v  Wilson 1992 SLT 849. For com m ent see, Norrie, K. McK.; 'C om m on Practice 
and the Standard of Care in Medical N egligence', 19^5, Juridical Review, 145. For a recent change of 
opinion on  information disclosure in Australia, see Rogers v  Whitaker [1993] 4 Med. L.R. 79.
*22 The same is not true in other jurisdictions, for com m ent see Geisen, D.; 'International Medical 
Malpractice Law'. London, N ijhoff, 1988.
*2^  See R e W (a  minor)(medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, (1992) 9 B.M.L.R. 22.
*22 For com m ent, see Kennedy and Grubb, op. cit., chapter 4, 'Consent by Others'.
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happened in Re T*2S^  those who are subjected to undue influence, or who are ignorant 
of the consequences of their acts, can also be deemed 'incapax' for the purposes of the 
medical intervention in question*29.
Finally, in some (albeit rare) situations the law will sanction forced treatment of 
competent adults. Thus, it is common for Mental Health legislation to provide for 
compulsory detention and treatment of individuals suffering from prescribed 
disorders*'***. In this latter example it should be borne in mind that it is not simply 
because an individual suffers from a mental condition that they are thereby 
automatically incapax regarding all aspects of their life and incapable of making 
autonomous choices concerning those aspects. However, as we have seen above, recent 
decisions tend to blur this distinction (or ignore it all together*"**) and this, it is 
submitted, is wholly unacceptable.
It can be seen from the examples in this section that in many ways the 'absolute' right 
of autonomy is limited and fettered, either on grounds of public policy or paternalism. 
In other words, the State is concerned not only with behaviour likely to harm others 
(other-regarding behaviour) hut also with matters of personal concern (self-regarding 
behaviour).
*28 supra.
*29 There is also the possibility o f decisions on the basis of 'substituted judgment', that is, decisions 
taken by others on behalf o f the patient. The courts in the U .S. seem unsure about the status o f this test, 
and both it and the 'best interests' test have been applied in various states. There has been no express use 
of the substituted judgment test in the UK, and there is dubiety about its usefulness and possible role, 
see. Re T , supra,^nd A iredale NHS Trust v  Bland, supra cit., discussed by Kennedy and Grubb, op. cit., at 
288 -289 .
*"*** Supra.
*'** See, in particular, Tameside and Glossop Acute Service Trust v  C H  (a patient), supra cit.
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3.6. - A U T O N O M Y  A N D  LAW: A C O N C L U S IO N
The brief survey of cases carried out above gives us a clear picture of the state of 
protection accorded to patient autonomy by the law in the United Kingdom. In cases 
where one is an adult of sound mind there is an obligation on others to respect one's 
wishes and to consider as of paramount importance respect for one's autonomy. Three 
important limits are, however, placed on patient autonomy.
• Conflict
First, where the autonomy of the individual conflicts with other interests, the former 
may be compromised and/or sacrificed. Unfortunately, we have no clear indication of 
the extent to which the courts will consider other interests nor how they propose to 
approach the problem of resolving conflict. The only cases which deal with 'conflict' 
as such, have been those concerning pregnant women and forced caesarean sections*'* .^ 
We have seen that in the case of Re S (adult: refusal o f medical treatmentf'^^ the court 
resolved the matter in the singularly unhelpful fashion of stating a preference for the 
interests of the fetus over the express wishes of the woman without offering any 
reasoned argument or analysis*'*'*. This decision has been overruled, however, in Re 
M.BM^ in which the Court of Appeal upheld the right of pregnant women to refuse 
treatment provided they are competent. As has been stated, this later decision is 
undoubtedly correct since, in law at least, there is no real conflict in such cases because
*'*2 supra.
*'*2 supra cit.
*'*'* A lthough it of course possible to see R eS  slsz case in which the interests of both the wom an and the 
fetus were protected, since the medical consensus was that both would die if a caesarean was not 
performed.
*'*2 supra ctt.
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the fetus has no legal personality and therefore no autonomy to speak of. How the 
courts will respond to other 'conflict' cases, however, remains a mystery.
• Minority
Second, non-age restricts one's capacity to act as an autonomous chooser and this is 
especially so in circumstances where the choice in question is refusal of treatment and 
when that refusal entails a risk of death. Indeed, it is arguable that in such 
circumstances there is no choice available to a child in light of the high standards set by 
the case oi Re S (A Minor) (Consent to Medical Treatment)^^^. In Scotland powerful 
arguments have been put that a minor can refuse treatment if s/he has capacity to do 
so, but the determination of this issue rests squarely with the medical professionals 
responsible for the care of the child. This gives rise to problems which are detailed in 
the following section.
• Incapacity
Whether one is an adult or a child, if one is unable to exercise choice one cannot act as 
an autonomous chooser. Choices must be made on our behalf. In the health care 
context incapacity can arise in myriad ways, but in each case the question of capacity 
will be judged by the medical profession. In refusal cases this leads to a potentially 
paradoxical situation because a Health Care Professional (HCP) is faced with the 
difficult task of assessing the competence of someone to do something which the HCP 
does not want them to do. This militates against the chances of the HCP respecting the 
patient's autonomy. In cases involving adults who have been admitted to health care 
under the provisions of the Mental Health Acts, treatment of their mental disorder can
146 supra.
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proceed without the need to determine the patient's wishes or capacity to act. In all 
other cases of incapacity the onus is on those seeking to override the patient's wishes to 
challenge patient autonomy; Re C (Refusal o f Medical Treatmenif"^^. Unfortunately, the 
courts have not been clear about what must be shown in order to determine 
(in) capacity.
4.1. - AUTO NO M Y A N D  GENETIC INFORM ATION
In this section the principle of autonomy will be examined as a possible means of 
protecting the privacy interests which individuals have surrounding their own genetic 
information. That is, we shall apply an autonomy analysis to the four scenarios 
detailed at the end of chapter two, to determine the success with which the principle of 
autonomy can protect individual interests in genetic material against claims from 
others such as employers, insurers, the state and relatives.
The relevance to genetic information of what has been said about autonomy in 
previous sections should be obvious. It has already been argued that aspects of the self 
such as the body and personal information require respect under the principle of 
autonomy. The principle also dictates that individuals deserve respect concerning the 
choices which they make about what happens to their bodies and/or personal 
information. Thus the principle prescribes that choices concerning genetic information 
are equally deserving of respect. Several problems, however, become immediately 
apparent. First, given that genetic information concerns many individuals in a family, 
how can the principle of autonomy help us to resolve conflicts which arise about the 
control and use of the information? For example, if Patient A is tested and found to be 
a carrier of cystic fibrosis, does his sister who is pregnant have a right to the
*^ *2 supra cit.
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information so that she can make an appropriate and autonomous choice about her 
pregnancy? In other words, what is to be done when two autonomies conflict?
Second, it was noted earlier in this chapter that there exist in both ethics and law 
certain fundamental criteria which are necessary to be an autonomous individual. 
Central to the principle of autonomy is choice. In particular, choices must be taken free 
from interference and by someone who has the capacity to make those choices. 
Fundamental to such choices is knowledge. One cannot choose in a meaningful sense if 
one is not informed of the parameters within which one must choose. This is why 
informed consent is crucial to ethically and legally acceptable health care. However, in 
the context of genetics this causes a problem. In order to choose one must have 
knowledge, but in many circumstances the problems surrounding genetic information 
are precisely concerned with the absence of knowledge: this is the basis of the claim 
to respect the interest in not knowing genetic information. In such cases, the choice is 
one about 'knowing' itself: the choice is whether to receive or not to receive 
information about oneself. This is problematic for the concept of autonomy because it 
is difficult to see how one can exercise meaningfully a choice not to know unless one 
has a certain degree of knowledge about the subject matter of one's choice. Of course, 
an obvious practical solution would be to approach the individual and ask, 'do you 
want to know this information', but as Wertz and Fletcher have pointed out,
[tjhere is no way...to exercise the choice of not knowing, 
because in the very process of asking, 'Do you want to 
know whether you are at risk...?' the geneticist has 
already made the essence of the information known.*'*®
*^*® See W ertz, D .C . and Fletcher, J.C.; 'Privacy and Disclosure in Medical Genetics Examined in an 
Ethics of Care', 5(3), Bioethics, 212, 1991, at 221.
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This is not to say that one cannot simply state T wish to know no information about 
my genetic make-up whatsoever', nor is it to suggest that such a wish should not be 
respected. However, the requirement that autonomous choices be informed choices 
tends to imply that the credibility of an uninformed choice is more easily questioned. 
It leaves the way open for it to be argued that actual knowledge about circumstances 
might nevertheless affect the chooser who might choose differently if furnished with 
relevant information. The situation might be seen as analogous to the problem of the 
incapax. The individual who is incapax cannot choose for him/herself and so must 
have choices made for him/her. In the same way, the individual who is ignorant of 
genetic information might be seen as a pstxxào-incapax and therefore it might be 
assumed that is legitimate to make choices about the genetic information on his or her 
behalf. At present and as we have seen, choices for the incapax are made in the best 
interests of the incapax. It is far from clear, however, how one would determine an 
individual's best interests concerning genetic information.
Let us consider the scenarios laid out in chapter two from the perspective of 
autonomy. This will clarify the nature of these problems and lay out the solutions 
offered by this concept.
5.1. - SCENARIOS
5.2. - SCENARIO ONE: EMPLOYERS A N D  INSURERS
In the context of alpha^ - antitryphsin which is a genetic condition which can be 
exacerbated by adverse environmental factors such as dust or smoke, the question has 
been asked whether employers and insurers can:
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a) have access to individual medical records to determine whether someone has this 
condition or whether they have been tested for the condition.
and/or
b) carry out tests on individuals to determine current or future risk of developing the 
condition.
5.2.1. - A n  Autonomy Perspective
The principle of autonomy dictates that an individual has the right to control what 
happens to personal information, including personal genetic information. From the 
perspective of insurers and employers a common interest which they have in genetic 
information is the financial interest which might be served by having a better idea of a 
particular individual's likelihood of developing disease. Also, both Insurers and 
employers have a claim to genetic information in order to avoid harm, but in rather 
different fashions. From the insurers' stzndpomli financial harm to the general body of 
the insured can arguably be averted or minimised if the risks of particular individuals 
can be better determined. From the employers' perspective, potential physical harm to 
other workers can be avoided if 'at risk' workers are identified and dealt with 
appropriately.
From the perspective of the individual, the prospect of employers and insurers seeking 
genetic information about them gives rise to concern about both kinds of privacy 
interests identified in this work. An individual's informational privacy interests are 
interfered with by requesting access to existing information. An individual's spatial
2 1 8
privacy interests are interfered with by requiring him/her to undergo testing in 
circumstances when s/he is not entirely free to refuse.
5.2.1.1. - Access to Existing Records
An autonomy model sets up a paradigm of respect for the right of choice of the 
individual. It also calls on us to question the freedom of the choice of the individual 
when faced with requests for access to information by insurers or employers because 
the individual firids him or herself in a substantially weaker position compared to the 
other party. This has been explained in chapter two. Moreover, earlier in this chapter 
it has been explained that autonomy may properly be compromised if a threat of harm 
to others exists. However, this does not extend to financial harm. This point has 
already been established in the context of limiting autonomy for the financial interests 
of the State in the provision of health care. Thus, arguably an autonomy model renders 
unacceptable infringement of autonomy simply to further financial interests. By way 
of contrast, if physical harm is likely to occur to other persons, the autonomy of 
individuals may be curtailed. This, however, requires that there is a real likelihood of 
actual harm occurring. If not, then prima facie respect should be forthcoming to 
individual autonomy. Relatedly, for harm to be averted autonomy should be interfered 
with in the least intrusive manner. Thus, for example, it is not acceptable to dismiss an 
employee because a genetic condition is likely to affect his or her ability to work, if 
another position for the individual can be found. We can see then how the principle of 
respect for autonomy allows us to make a strong argument to protect an individual’s 
informational privacy interests. Access to existing records should not be allowed 
except in the most justified of circumstances. The autonomy principle adds 
considerable weight to the arguments made in chapter two for reform of the current 
position regarding insurer and employer access to individual information.
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5.2.1.2. - Requiring Genetic Testing
To require an individual to undergo genetic testing when his/her consent is not 
forthcoming or is given after subtle forms of coercion (for example, the threat of losing 
or not gaining employment or not receiving insurance), also offends against the 
principle of autonomy. Whereas this does not mean that genetic testing can never be 
legitimate, it does require strong justification to merit such an interference with 
autonomy. An example might be significant threat of serious harm to others. The onus 
is clearly on those seeking the information. Once again, arguably financial interests are 
not of sufficient seriousness or weight to justify coercive testing. As regards the threat 
of harm to third parties, this must be immediate and serious and must arise directly 
from the genetic ill health of the individual to justify coercive testing measures. An 
example might be a genetic condition which predisposes an individual to a sudden and 
fatal stroke. Clearly for those responsible for the safety of others, such as airline pilots 
or bus drivers, testing might be acceptable, again if no other means exist of ensuring 
that the potentiality for harm is kept to a minimum.
Another possibility is testing to further the interests of the individual. However, 
similar arguments have not gone down well in the United States. In 1991 the Supreme 
Court examined the issue of the legitimacy of employers claiming an interest in 
potential damage to the fetuses of female workers due to work-related environmental 
factors. The Court held that the employer could not claim a legitimate interest in 
denying fertile women employment supposedly in the employee's best interests: the 
decision about exposure to risk was for the women t h e m s e l v e s * ' * ^ .  Similar reasoning 
might be used to defeat claims by employers to have access to genetic information.
*"*9 See, International Union United A uto Workers v  Johnson Controls, Inc. 499 U S 187, 1991.
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In the UK the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has taken the view that,
...where the concern is limited to the health of the 
employee, it should be a matter for the individual 
employee to decide whether or not to participate in a 
screening programme*20.
Thus whereas the current legal position in the UK does not preclude employers from 
requesting employees to take genetic testing*^*, it is the view of the Council that 
individuals should not be coerced into doing so. This reflects the attitude of respect due 
to the individual's autonomy to decide for him or herself whether or not to undergo 
testing. There is no valid reason why this should be any different in the context of an 
insurer's request for testing. In this way, the principle of respect for autonomy helps to 
protect the spatial privacy interests of individuals because it dictates that they should 
be given the choice whether or not to participate in any testing or screening 
programmes.
5.2.2. - Employers' and Insurers'Interests: A  Conclusion
We can see that the principle of autonomy can help to protect an individual's 
informational and spatial privacy interests when faced with a request for genetic 
information from employers and insurers. The first line of defence is the concept of 
consent. Autonomy requires that consent be given both for release of personal
*20 N uffield Council on Bioethics, 'Genetic Testing: Ethical Issues', December 1993, at para.6.20.
*2* The only U K  em ployer known to the Council to conduct testing is the Arm ed Forces w ho screen 
applicants likely to be involved in atypical atmospheric conditions for sickle cell disease. A s the N uffield  
Council says, 'Candidates w ho are carriers o f the sickle cell gene are considered to be unfit for duty in 
such occupational categories. They may, however, be accepted for other duties. This is primarily 
because o f the risk of sickling on exposure to reduced atmosphereic pressure or hypoxia. (Sickling is a 
change in the shape of the red blood cells which can lead to blockage of blood vessels).', op. cit., at 6.18.
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information (which has informational privacy implications) and for the collection of 
information by testing (which has spatial privacy implications). Unfortunately, in the 
context of employment and insurance the individual is in a substantially weaker 
position compared to the employer or insurer. This means that consent might be 
forthcoming, but not be entirely voluntary. Nonetheless, the principle of autonomy 
requires that before autonomy can be interfered with strong justifications are required. 
Thus, any claim to require access or testing must be well founded and must interfere 
with individual autonomy as minimally as possible. This too helps to protect the 
informational and spatial privacy interests of individuals.
5.3. - SCENARIO TWO: STATE INTERESTS
The interests of the State in screening programmes have been divided into two 
categories: pre-marital screening and ante-natal & post-natal screening. Let us consider 
the acceptability of such programmes from within an autonomy model, remembering 
that we are concerned with the efficacy of an appeal to autonomy to protect the 
privacy interests of citizens. In particular, it is the spatial privacy interests of 
individuals which are of concern here because the giving of knowledge in unwarranted 
circumstances impinges on the interests of citizens in maintaining a sphere of 
separateness around their 'self.
5.3.1. -Pre-marital Screening fo r  Cystic Fibrosis
The aims of any State in instituting screening programmes are varied*22. Yet whatever 
the aims, the interference with individual autonomy which such programmes
*22 These include a desire to reduce the incidence of disease, a need to further epidemiological studies 
and the m otive of ensuring that individuals take informed reproductive choices.
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necessarily entail must be justified both in the interests of individuals as well as the 
general public interest. Axiomatically, if such programmes do not achieve this, their 
justification is lost and their continuation is offensive by virtue of the affront they 
represent to the principle of autonomy. In the present context the question under 
scutiny is whether a screening programme for Cystic Fibrosis, which has as its aim the 
reduction of the instance of the disease, can be a justifiable interference with 
autonomy? Several arguments can be advanced which would suggest that this is not the
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First, genetic testing can never detect all cases of genetic disease or carrier status. In the 
particular case of Cystic Fibrosis only 75% of CF chromosomes can be detected in the 
population because of the problem of mutations*24. As Gostin has stated.
Approximately one of every two couples from the general 
population identified by CF screening as "at risk" will be 
falsely labeled.*25
Also, it has been asserted by the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee that,
reduction of the birth incidence of CF through screening 
and genetic screening will have minimal effect on the gene 
pool.*2^
*25 See also, Brandt, A.M.; 'AIDS in Historical Perspective : Four Lessons from the H isto iy  o f Sexually- 
Transmitted Diseases', 78, American Journal o f  Public Health, 367, 1988, in which the author gives an 
historical account of the US syphilis screening programmes and argues against similar measures for HIV. 
H e makes the interesting point that even w ith a disease such as syphilis which can be treated, screening 
programmes did not radically alter the incidence of disease in the com m unity.
*2^ * See, Gostin. L.; 'Genetic Privacy', l l .  Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics, 320, 1995, at 323.
*22 ibid.
*2^  H ouse of C om m ons Science and Technology Committee, 'Report on Human Genetics', Third 
Report, HM SO, 1995, at xxxiv.
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For the particular condition of Cystic Fibrosis this clearly fundamentally undermines 
any proposed screening p r o g r a m m e * ^ / .
Second, and more generally, it is crucial to bear in mind that unlike conventional
disease (with the notable exception of sexually transmitted diseases), genetic conditions
can only be transmitted and, in the absence of cure can only be controlled, through
reproductive decisions and choices*28, Undeniably, the public interest in preventing the
spread of disease is an extremely important one but in the context of genetic disease its
furtherance through screening is hindered by one factor: there is no certainty that even
if disclosure is made people will no longer reproduce. Western society takes the view
that reproductive autonomy forms part of the fundamental civil liberties of persons;
liberties which can only be Interfered with in very rare circumstances*29. Given that
society does not (or at least does not often*2**) actively prevent persons from
*22 A  further complicating factor in the U nited Kingdom concerns the cost-cutting practices adopted by 
CF screening services. In evidence to the Science and Technology Com m ittee it was revealed that not all 
carriers of CF were informed o f their status : 'A system  of avoiding the costs involved in genetic 
counselling and informing the population on a large scale has been developed; this is based on offering 
the test to pregnant w om en and their partners. A ll they have to do is to provide a mouthwash sample in 
a bottle, both of them, these are both tested and the only people w ho are informed of their results are 
the couples where both are carriers; so that means that for several thousand tests you  may only have to  
provide counselling to, say, eight or ten couples.’, ibid, at 94. Clearly this is not only ill-advised because 
partnerships do not necessarily last for ever, but also It is offensive not to give individuals information 
about themselves when they have requested it, for reasons of financial saving.
*2® See Suter, S.M., 'Whose Genes Are These Anyway? : Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic 
Information', 91, Michigan Law Review, 1854, 1993, at 1860.
*59 P q j .  ^  discussion see, McLean, S.A.M.; 'The Right to Reproduce' in Campbell, T., Goldberg, D ., 
McLean, S. and Mullen, T., (eds.), 'Human Rights; From Rhetoric to Reality', Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1986, at 99 - 122, Writing in the U S, Andrews notes that, '[i]n April 1990, a federal judge explicitly held 
that the right to privacy specifically covers decisions concerning pre-natal genetic screening. 
Consequently, if a law infringes upon couples' reproductive decison-making rights w ith respect to the 
use o f genetic seiwices, the law w ill be upheld as constitutional only if it is necessary to further a 
compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner possible.', see Andrews, 'Legal Aspects of 
Genetic Information', loc. cit., at 37. The case in question is Lifchez vH artigan , N o .82 C 4324 N .D . 111. 
(April 26, 1990).
160 For comment on the limits to such a 'right' see, Heginbotham, C ., 'Sterilizing People with Mental 
Handicaps' in McLean, S.A.M ., (ed.), 'Legal Issues in Human Reproduction', Aldershot, Gower, 1989, 
at 141 -163 . Recent cases o f court-ordered sterilizations include that of a m entally incompetent adult {Re 
F [1990] 2 A .C  1) and that of a ward of court suffering from a chromosomal disorder {Re H G  [1993] 1 
F .L.R 587). For commentary on recent developments in the US concerning the use o f long-term  
contraceptives and in particular their use as a punitive or coercive measure, see Hastings Center Report,
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reproducing, it is unclear that the argument in favour of screening adults to prevent the 
spread of genetic disease succeeds. Also, there exist potentially more effective means by 
which this public interest can be furthered which, do not involve interfering with the 
autonomy of individuals. Ante-natal counselling services, the direct availability of 
testing for fetuses* *^ and the option of termination of p r e g n a n c y * ^ ^  are other means 
which are available to further this interest and which do not involve interfering with 
individual autonomy. Thus we see that to the extent that a screening programme 
interferes with the spatial privacy of individuals, autonomy can help in building an 
argument that such interference is unwarranted.
The situation is slightly different if a cure is available for the condition which might be 
passed on and if this condition can affect the health of the individual who has become 
the subject of State attention. Arguably in such cases the public (State) interest in 
public health is matched by an interest in the health of the individual. However, if 
testing is done to achieve such a dual 'benefit', it is submitted that the decision to force 
the individual to undergo testing must be followed through and accompanied by a 
compulsion to undergo treatment. Otherwise the interests of the state and individual 
are not served. Again, this is something which is extremely hard to justify in our 
so c ie ty * ^ 5  This is particularly poignant given the eugenics movements of the recent 
Western past which, if they teach us anything at all, teach us that social engineering
'Long-Acting Contraception; Moral Choices. Policy Dilem m as'. 25(1), Special Supplement January- 
February, 1995, especially Dresser, R.; 'Long-Term Contraceptives in the Criminal Justice System ' at 
S15 - S18, and Steinbock, B.; 'Coercion and Long-Term Contraceptives' at S19 - S22.
Such testing can, however, give rise to a new  set of problems. An amniocentesis test carries a 1 in 200 
chance o f losing a normal pregnancy. In addition, such a test might reveal genetic defects w hich were 
not anticipated and not counselled for thereby giving rise to the problem of what to do w ith  such 
information.
*^ 2 It is, o f course, appreciated that for many w om en termination is not an option.
163 F o r  example, from the American perspective Suter has argued that mandatory genetic 
testing/screening is unconstitutional, loc. cit, Part III,
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through forced genetic manipulation is not only flawed, but comes at a price which 
few today would be willing to pay.
In light of these arguments it is submitted that mandatory screening programmes of 
adults, either for CF or other conditions, are highly questionable. By all means testing 
should be made available to permit individuals to choose to know their own status, but 
screening programmes are very hard to justify where the element of choice is removed 
and the principle of autonomy thereby compromised with the concomitant effect on 
the spatial privacy interests of the indviduals involved* '^*.
5.3.2. - Pre-natal and Neo-natal Screening
This section considers the acceptability of ante-natal and post-natal screening 
programmes for four genetic conditions. Before proceeding, however, several issues 
merit comment.
First, it should be noted that the motivation and reasons for offering such programmes 
are different depending on whether they are offered before or after birth. At present, 
pre-natal screening is offered principally to provide parents with the choice to continue 
with a pregnancy involving an affected or potentially affected child. In contrast, post­
natal screening in the United Kingdom has so far only been carried out when a cure or 
treatment is available. Thus with pre-natal screening the practice facilitates parental 
choice and with post-natal screening it prevents harm to the child.
For com m ent on CF screening programmes, see, Elias, S., Annas, G.J. and Simpson, J.L.; 'Carrier 
Screening for Cystic Fibrosis : A Case Study in Setting Standards of Medical Practice', in Annas, G.J. 
and Elias, S.; 'Gene Mapping : Using Law and Ethics as Guides', N ew  York, O xford U niversity Press, 
1992, chapter 11.
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Second, the question of whether such screening should be voluntary or compulsory is 
likely to be answered differently for ante and post-natal programmes. For example, it 
has been argued that compulsory ante-natal screening programmes represent a means 
for health authorities to avoid the costs of disabled children*^  ^ Such programmes 
would have serious implications for the rights and interests of parents who might come 
under considerable pressure to abort or who might be labelled as irresponsible for 
deciding to proceed with an affected pregnancy. For example, the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee noted that.
We heard that in Edinburgh that if after counselling a 
prospective parent with Huntington's Disease insists on 
pre-natal testing for the condition this will only be 
offered on the understanding that the pregnancy will be 
terminated if the test proves positive; to do otherwise 
would burden the child with knowledge of its early 
death.
This clearly offends against the principle of autonomy to an unacceptable degree.
In contrast, for compulsory post-natal screening the State has to date been able to 
advance strong justifications for potentially impinging on parental choice (autonomy) - 
if, for example, the parents refuse testing - when screening can lead incontroveitibly to 
the avoidance of harm to another individual (the child). Examples include screening for 
PKU and Hyperthyroidism. These are, however, easy cases. Matters are not so 
straight-forward when the benefit to the child is less obvious - for example where no 
cure or treatment is available.
*^ 2 See Science and Technology Comm ittee, op. cit., at 86, and the evidence cited therein. 
ibid, at 90,
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Third, the ethical and legal rubrics discussed above must be borne in mind. As regards 
ante-natal testing, the law in the UK provides a woman with the 'right' to abort a fetus 
at any time if it suffers from serious mental or physical handicap. Thus, a screening 
programme entails no illegal practices and on one view supports the principle of 
respect for autonomy because it allows the woman to exercise her right to choose 
a b o r t io n * ^ 2  The ethics of abortion is, however, a different matter. This thesis is not an 
appropriate forum in which to discuss this issue. From the ethical perspective it will be 
assumed that the right of the woman to choose is of considerable importance. This at 
least accords with the current legal position. For post-natal testing, the law requires 
that those with responsibility for a child act in its best interests*^®. Ethically the same 
view is prescribed. At the very least this means that some benefit must come from 
testing for the child which should not entail, or should at least outweigh, any harm to 
the minor in question.
Finally, we must determine whose privacy interests are at stake here. Primarily, it is 
the privacy interests of (a) the 'future person', that is, the fetus in the womb, and (b) 
the neonate. Both spatial and informational privacy interests are under threat. 
Concerning spatial privacy the threat comes from others deciding on one's behalf that 
information should be known. As regards informational privacy, the threat exists once
*^ 2 Strictly speaking it is not accurate to speak of a woman's 'right' to choose abortion in the U nited  
Kingdom because her so-called 'right' is entirely dependent on her receiving the approval of tw o  
registered medical practitioners (or in som e circumstances only one such practitioner), see s .l o f the 
Abortion Act 1967, as amended.
In England, see for example, the Children Act 1989 and the Family Law Refrom Act 1969, Gillick v  
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A C  112, R eR  (A Minor) (wardship : medical 
treatment) [1992] Fam 11, and R e R  (A M inor)( Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 FCR 544. In Scotland, see the 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) A ct 1991. N ote  recently, the English Court of Appeal has upheld a 
decision of parents to refuse a liver transplant for their child on the basis that this was an accurate 
assessment o f the child's best interests and that the parents were best placed to decide those interests. 
This was so even in the face o f overwhelm ing medical support for the procedure to be carried out. A n  
influencing factor might have been, however, the fact that both parents were themselves, 'health care 
professionals', see Re T(A Minor)(wardship : medical treatment) The Times 28 O ctober 1996, 146 NLJ 
1577.
228
information is known because then questions arise about the security and control of 
such information.
From the autonomy perspective, let us consider the acceptability of a National Health 
Service programme of post and ante natal screening which targets the following 
conditions:
5.3.3. - Sickle Cell Anaemia
This is a recessive condition which affects particular ethnic groups*^ 9 and which is not 
curable but is treatable with blood transfusions. Pre-natal screening might be useful for 
couples who have no idea that they are carriers or that they are affected by the 
condition. This would allow couples to consider aborting an affected fetus. The offer 
of screening ensures that the choice of parents not to continue with pregnancy is 
facilitated. However, concerning post-natal screening, it should be noted that screening 
programmes of populations for this condition have already been have carried out in the 
United States with worrying consequences. The schemes had to be abandoned because 
of the serious adverse consequences which resulted for the racial groups who were the 
target of the programmes. They experienced racial and general discriminatory 
treatment, were denied insurance and employment and suffered a high degree of 
stigmatisation. Furthermore, through public ignorance, even those who proved not to 
be affected by the condition were treated in this way*20.
*^ 9 The condition primarily affects Afro-Caribbeans.
170 qEis experience is recounted by the N uffield Council on Bioethics in its report on 'Genetic 
Screening: Ethical Issues', op. cit. chapter tw o, at 8.13 - 8.14. Skene also notes that similar discrimination 
and stigmatisation has arisen in Greece as a result of sickle cell anaemia screening programmes, see 
Skene, L.; 'Mapping the Human Genome: Some Thoughts for Those W ho Say "There Should Be a Law  
On It’". 5, Bioethics, 233, 1991, at 238.
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From the perspective of autonomy the argument that individuals must be allowed to 
'choose' whether or not they would wish to know information about themselves 
carries all the more weight in such a context given the potential for serious adverse 
consequences which can arise from the fact of having been tested. Additionally, it is 
important to bear in mind that such group-centred programmes can lead to 
discrimination against persons even i f  they have not been tested because the mere 
existence of the programme gives 'cause' for such persons to be treated differently 
simply because of their membership of a 'high risk group'. This too has implications 
for autonomy, albeit in an indirect way. Such screening programmes can adversely 
affect the autonomy of the persons who constitute such a group because they can lead 
to a 'shutting down' of options and a 'closing off of avenues, all of which restrict 
choice and the ability of group members to act as autonomously as they would like.
Such experiences teach us valuable lessons about offering screening for conditions such 
as sickle cell anaemia. If programmes are to avoid the kinds of outcome outlined above, 
they should not be implemented without corresponding public education programmes 
and other measures such as anti-discrimination laws to ensure that the US experience is 
never repeated.
Note, however, the paradox which appears here when we try to use the principle of 
autonomy to protect the privacy interests of future persons and neonates. For, in the 
case of pre-natal screening the autonomy which is at issue is not that of the future 
person, but rather that of the couple - their right to choose whether or not to continue 
with a pregnancy. And, in circumstances where the couple choose to know but do not 
choose to abort, the child will be born In circumstances where information about its 
genetic constitution is known: potentially this can interfere both with the child's 
spatial and informational privacy interests, and the principle of autonomy has not
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helped to avert this. Similarly, where a newborn child is tested for a condition such as 
sickle cell anaemia which is incurable and which carries with it a high risk of 
discrimination and stigmatisation, the beneficent approach of the state in requiring 
testing cannot easily be challenged by an appeal to the child's autonomy since the child 
as a minor traditionally receives less respect for such autonomy. This latter point will 
be dealt with more fully in the next section.
5.3.4. - Hpmtington's disease
This is a late onset dominant condition which carries a 50% chance of affecting each 
child of an affected i n d i v i d u a l*21. There is no cure for Huntington's disease. The 
severity of the disease is such that it is not unusual for pre-natal testing to be offered 
solely on the condition that a positive test result will be followed by a b o r t i o n * 2 2 .  
However, to do so places considerable moral/social pressure on parents and can 
represent a subtle form of coercion to a b o r t* 2 3 .
*21 If an unfortunate soul finds him  or herself w ith  both parents affected by H untington's disease, his or 
her chances of developing the condition are increased to 75% in each case.
*22 See, for example, the 'Edinburgh experience', note 166, supra and text.
*25 For com m ent see, Clarke, A .; 'Is N on-D irective Genetic Counselling Possible?', Lancet, 998, 
1991, Chadwick, R.F; 'What Counts for Success in Genetic Counselling?'. 19, Journal o f Medical Ethics, 
43, 1993, and Clarke, A.; 'Response to: What Counts as Success in Genetic Counselling?', 19, Journal o f  
Medical Ethics, 47, 1993.
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The acceptability of post-natal testing for Huntington's disease is very questionable. As 
has been stated, parents can only legitimately request that their children be tested if it 
is in the childrens' best interests to do so. Arguably, the same should be true for the 
state. But, it is far from clear that to determine in an asymptomatic child a 
predisposition to develop an extremely debilitating and ultimately fatal disease later in 
life when nothing can be done to avert this outcome is in their best interests. For one 
thing such knowledge can be extremely upsetting for the child. But, even if the child is 
not informed of the result, it can be upsetting for the parents and can lead to the child 
being treated differently as a result. As Wertz et al have poignantly noted,
"Planning for the future," perhaps the most frequently 
given reasons for testing may become "restricting the 
future" (and also the present) by shifting family resources 
away from a child with a positive diagnosis...In families 
with a chronically ill child, there is less socialization to 
future roles for the children, including those who are 
"healthy". Parents are less likely to say "When you grow 
up..." or "When you have children of your own..." to any 
of their children, because they cannot say these words to 
the ill child..."Alleviation of anxiety," another reason 
commonly given by parents for predictive genetic testing, 
does not necessarily benefit the children. A positive 
diagnosis may create serious risks of stigmatization, loss 
of self-esteem, and discrimination [by] family or by 
institutional third parties such as employers or insurers. 
Testing may disrupt parent-child or sibling bonds, may 
lead to scapegoating a child with a positive result or to 
continued anxiety over a child despite a negative
result... *24
*24 See Wertz, D .C . et ah, 'Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents : W ho Decides?'. 172, Journal 
o f  the American Medical Association, 875, 1994, at 878, cited in Floffman, D .E . and Wulfsberg, E.A.; 
'Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions : Is it in Their Best Interest?', 23, Journal o f  Law, Medicine 
and Ethics, 331, 1995, at 333,
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In other words, such practices can have serious implications for the child's privacy 
interests; both spatial and informational. However, the principle of autonomy cannot 
help children in such circumstances. As minors, the respect due to them and their 
wishes is given through their guardians who must act in their best interests. However, 
it is submitted that the best interests of a child are not served by a parent who requests 
a test for a condition such as Huntington's disease. There is no reason not to delay 
testing until the child can understand the implications of testing and can decide for him 
or herself whether or not to proceed. This view is supported by bodies such as the 
House of Common Science and Technology Committee^^^, the International 
Huntington's Disease Association and the World Federation of Neurology^^* .^ 
Unfortunately, the treatment which minors receive under the principle of autonomy, 
as we have seen, does not augur well for ensuring that their privacy interests are in fact 
protected.
5.3.5. - Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy
DMD is an X-Hnked disorder which predominately affects male children. DMD is the 
largest known gene with a high number of mutations. Testing can, therefore, only 
detect a proportion of affected persons. Moreover, one third of boys born with DMD 
have no previous family history. This is because the gene defect has arisen 
spontaneously in the germ cells of one parent^ ^ .^ As with Huntington's disease, no cure 
is available for DMD. Yet, the British Medical Association has recently considered the 
merits of the introduction of screening for the condition. In evidence to the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee the justification was put thus.
op. cit., at 80.
See Ball, D , Tyler, A., and Harper, P.; 'Predictive Testing of Adults and Children' in Clarke, A., 
(ed.); 'Genetic Counselling : Practice and Principles', London, Routledge, 1994, chapter 3, at 69 - 74. 
See, Science and Technology Com m ittee, op. cit., at 92.
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One of the advantages of early screening is that it warns 
parents of the risk of recurrence in subsequent 
children...potential carriers in the family can be informed 
of the risk. The knowledge would also avoid a delay in 
diagnosis...and would enable parents to prepare 
themselves for the future, such as modifying their home 
to accommodate a wheelchair.
However, as we have seen each of these justifications is open to question. First, a 
positive or negative diagnosis in one child tells us little about the future risk in future 
children: if present, the condition might be the result of spontaneous pathology; if a 
negative result is returned, this might simply be because the test is unable to detect a 
particular mutation. Second, early diagnosis and preparedness are not always beneficial 
as we have seen with the example of Huntington's disease. Third, the test is done not 
in the best interests of the child, and certainly not to protect the privacy interests of 
the child, but rather to favour the reproductive autonomy of the parents. The 
acceptability of this has already been questioned. And, as has already been argued, 
because the principle of autonomy is less strongly invoked for minors, the claim on 
behalf of the minor to prevent such an 'interference' with his/her privacy (and 
autonomy) is less well grounded if it is grounded in the principle of autonomy.
The above challenges would, it is submitted, render a screening programme for DMD 
unacceptable and probably unethical. For both Huntington's disease and DMD the 
nature of the disease as late onset and the absence of a cure are determinant factors^ ^ .^
ibid. Memorandum, V olum e II, at 116. The Association did also note disadvantages : '[p]arents are 
told  that their son w ill develop a fatal condition for which there is no cure, years before the first 
sym ptom s appear.', id.
The Science and Technology Com m ittee recommended that '[tjhere should be no mass screening for 
public health reasons in childhood unless a treatment for the disorder exists.', ibid, at 92.
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5.3.6. - Ischaemic heart disease
The question of the acceptability of ante and post-natal screening programmes for 
ischaemic heart disease raises in a particularly acute form questions about the limits of 
value of genetic testing. More than any of the other diseases so far discussed, a 
condition such as ischaemic heart disease is affected by a plethora of factors only one of 
which is genetic defect. A test can, therefore, at best only give an indication of a 
possible predisposition to disease at some far future date. This calls into question the 
legitimacy of a pre-natal test for the disease. Moreover, if such a test proves positive - 
that is, if it shows that there is some remote likelihood in the future and given the 
wrong conditions that the child might develop disease - does this entitle the woman to 
abort the fetus? In other words, would this be sufficient reason to allow the woman to 
exercise legitimately her autonomy and 'choose' an abortion? It is informative to 
examine this question in order to have a better understanding of the limits of women's 
autonomy in this field and the corresponding effect on the interests of fetuses.
5.3.7. - The Abortion Act 1967  ^as amended
The law in the United Kingdom provides that prior to 24 weeks of pregnancy a 
woman can lawfully request a termination of a pregnancy provided that, in the 
opinion of two registered medical practitioners who have formed an opinion in good 
faith, the continuation of the pregnancy would involve a risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman or any existing children of her family^ ®®. In practical terms, abortion is 
relatively easy to obtain since the definition of physical or mental health is drawn very
Section 1(1)(a) o f the A bortion Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Em bryology  
A ct 1990, S.37.
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widely. In such circumstances, the question of whether or not the fetus is affected by 
disease or is likely to be affected by disease is irrelevant.
After 24 weeks an abortion is only lawful if one of a set list of circumstances is present. 
These are : a) there is a risk of grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health 
of the woman^^h b) that the continuation of the pregnancy would involve risk to the 
life of the woman^^ .^ or, c) that there is a substantial risk that, if the child were born, it 
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be severely 
handicapped^® .^ Clearly it is the last of these that is relevant to the present discussion. 
The question arises: is a possible predisposition to heart disease in future life a 
'substantial risk...of physical or mental abnormalities...as to he severely handicapped.'} At 
first sight, one would reply no to this question. As has been stated, a test for ischaemic 
heart disease could not disclose a substantial risk and furthermore the disease, if it ever 
were to manifest itself, would only do so much later in life, probably when the child is 
no longer a child but an adult responsible for his or her own well-being. Thus, as a 
child, there would be no evidence whatsoever of serious handicap. Indeed, even as an 
adult it is unclear whether heart disease can easily be classified as a handicap. However, 
it has been argued by several commentators that the provision of section 1(1) (d) is not 
to protect the child from a seriously diminished life, but rather to protect the mother 
from having to rear a 'defective' infant^ ®"^ . This has several consequences for the 
possible interpretation of this provision. Williams justifies his assertion that the 
provision in question is designed to protect the mother/parents by stating.
ibid, section I(l)(b). N o te  the requirement of grave permanent injuiy, cf - s .l(l)(a ). 
ibid, section l(l)(c). 
ibid, section 1(1)(d).
See, for example. Mason, and McCall-Smith, 'Law and Medical Ethics', op. cit., chapter 5, Mason, 
J.K.; 'Medico-Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood', Aldershot, D artm outh, 1997, chapter 5, 
Kennedy, I. and Grubb,A.j 'Medical Law : Text w ith Materials', op. cit., at 875 - 878, quoting, inter alia, 
Williams, G.; 'Textbook o f Criminal Law'. Second Edition, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd,1983.
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[tjhat this is the philosophy of the Act is borne out by the 
fact that it allows termination only where the child if 
born would be seriously handicapped, not where it is 
merely carrying undesirable genesd®^
His view on what constitutes a 'substantial risk' and 'serious handicap' is that it is a 
matter to be determined by the clinician asked to perform the termination.
In addition, Kennedy and Grubb point out that crucial to the interpretation of this 
provision is the meaning of ' i f  born'. As they state,
Does this mean that the abnormalities must constitute or 
amount to a handicap at birth or will it suffice that a 
latent condition exists at birth which will, or may, 
manifest itself later in life? And, if the latter, must it 
manifest itself during childhood since section 1(1) (d) refers 
to the 'child' suffering serious handicap?!®^
Their answer is that the provision is open to an interpretation which does permit 
abortion even i f  the indication is only one of a likelihood of future, adult illness^ ®^ . 
Their point is that there is nothing in the provision which requires that the child must 
suffer handicap at the time that it is born. This they conclude means that the provision 
can be interpreted to cover a situation where disease manifests itself later, for example - 
Tays Sachs disease. They continue that if one accepts that, then '[ajlthough it is more 
difficult to interpret the section as covering th[e] situation [of adult onset], once it is 
accepted that the handicap need not manifest itself at birth, it would seem to 
undermine the purpose of the provision narrowly to restrict it to childhood.'^®® 
Moreover, they note that what constitutes a 'substantial risk' of disease is very
ihid, at 297. 
1®^  ibid, at 877.
id.
1®® id.
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subjective and therefore open to wide interpretation. Indeed, we have already 
witnessed the attitude in some quarters of the medical profession towards ante-natal 
testing for Huntington's disease: the 'Edinburgh experience' demonstrates that section 
1(1)(d) is in practice interpreted to justify abortion in the case of late onset diseases.
A positive ante-natal test for ischaemic heart disease differs from a positive result for 
Huntington's disease only in one respect: the likelihood of onset is more uncertain. 
Yet, given the heavy reliance on the subjective interpretation by the medical 
profession, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that this too could be the basis of 
a 'lawful' abortion. This is especially true if one sees the rationale of section 1(1)(d) as 
lying with protecting the woman - as opposed to the fetus - from harm: the likelihood 
of giving birth to progeny that might develop disease is certainly potentially harmful.
What the above proves is simply that the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 (as 
amended) could be extended to cover a situation where a test for a multifactorial 
condition shows a predisposition for onset later in life. The question of whether this is 
ethically acceptable is another matter.
For example. Post has argued in the context of Huntington's disease that to test for this 
condition pre-natally is ethically abhorrent^® .^ It is argued, inter alia, that to deny a 
person years of asymptomatic life by preferring death to life is an abuse of the limits of 
the abortion decision. Along similar lines, Lippman has argued that to offer a range of 
genetic ante-natal tests and to label a fetus as 'malformed' is to fail to appreciate that it 
might be society which is 'malformed' in being unable to 'accommodate the disabled in
®^^  Post, S.G.; 'H untington's Disease : Prenatal Screening for Late Onset Disease'. IS, Journal o f  Medical 
Ethics, 75, 1992.
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its midst'll®. This latter point is a very important one. Although it might be possible to 
'legalise' the abortion of countless fetuses by wide interpretation of the provisions of 
abortion legislation and by offering a wide range of ante-natal genetic tests, it should 
not go unquestioned what the motivation for such testing actually is nor should one
imagine that a woman's 'choice' of abortion is necessarily an unfettered one. This
point has already been made above. It is equally valid here. To offer ante-natal testing 
for multifactorial and/or late onset disorders such as ischaemic heart disease by its very 
nature encourages abortion. As the Science and Technology Committee noted,
...providing a pre-natal screening test for a genetic defect, 
in the absence of any treatment for that defect, gives a 
signal that many people, at least, may consider the 
condition so serious it justifies termination of a 
pregnancy. If that is not the case, offering pre-natal 
screening is a waste of resources.
The conclusion of the Committee was that,
The objection to termination for late onset disorders may 
be so great that it outweighs the desire of parents to spare 
their child eventual suffering. There should be some 
mechanism whereby such matters can be d i s c u s s e d .
Finally, regarding the acceptability of post-natal testing for ischaemic heart disease, 
most of the arguments made above concerning Huntington's Disease and Duchenne's 
Muscular Dystrophy apply equally here. Even if the condition is multifactorial and 
there therefore exists a possibility of avoiding the onset of disease by changing other
Lippman, A.; 'Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening : Constructing Needs and Reinforcing 
Inequalities', in Clarke, A ., (ed.); 'Genetic Counselling : Practice and Principles', op, cit,, chapter seven, 
at 160. See also, Schubert-Lehnhardt, V.; 'Selective Abortion after Prenatal D iagnosis'. 15, Medicine and  
Law, 75, 1996. 
op. cit. at 90. 
ibid.
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influential factors such as diet, there is a strong likelihood that knowledge about 
potential future onset of disease can lead to what has been called 'vulnerable child 
syndrome'^ 3^. That is, the parents become over-protective of the child and over- 
restrictive of the child's activities for fear of 'causing' the onset of disease. Clearly, this 
can have adverse consequences for both child and parents and interferes significantly 
with the privacy Interests of the former. Yet, post-natal screening for such a condition 
becomes more acceptable the more one can do to affect the onset of disease. If, for 
example, it is known that a very low fat diet can reduce the chances of onset by 50% 
then screening becomes more justifiable. However, If the limit of knowledge is that 
certain factors such as diet and exercise might have a role to play in disease onset, it 
becomes more difficult to justify burdening parents and ultimately the child him or 
herself with such knowledge. Once again, for the child, an appeal to the principle of 
autonomy affords little in the way of protection: the question of whether or not such 
knowledge will be sought will be one for the parents who might fail to appreciate the 
significance of the knowledge and Its effects on the lives of all concerned. Thus once 
again, the principle of autonomy does not do much to help the child protect his spatial 
privacy interests in such a scenario.
5.3.8. - State Interests: A  Conclusion
For reasons similar to those advanced in scenario one, a state must offer strong 
justification to make acceptable a compulsory programme of adult screening. Such a 
programme necessarily interferes with the autonomy and the spatial privacy interests 
of adults and if its utility is to be at all doubted, it cannot be justified. In the context of 
ante and post natal screening, the principle of autonomy is of less use when one is 
concerned with the spatial and privacy interests of the future persons and newly born
See, Hoffm ann and Wulfsberg, loc. cit., at 334.
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children who are the subjects of such programmes. This is so for two reasons. First, in 
the case of ante-natal screening the 'autonomy' with which we are concerned is likely 
to be that of the parents of the future person, rather than the future person itself. 
Second, even when we consider the autonomy of the child^ '^^ , the respect which is due 
is dictated by others in the child's best interests, and it is not certain that the 
assessment of those interests will adequately take account of the spatial and 
informational privacy interests which the child has in his/her own genetic 
information.
5.4. - SCENARIO THREE: A FAMILY’S RIGHT TO KNOW?
In this scenario we are concerned with the role which autonomy might play in 
resolving conflict between (a) family members who want to know about a relative's 
genetic information^^^, and (b) the individual to whom the information relates who 
does not want to reveal it. On the one hand we have the autonomy rights of family 
members to 'choose to know', and on the other we have the question of whether or 
not the autonomy principle can help to protect the individual's informational privacy 
interests in not revealing personal information.
5.4.1. - Scenario Three: The Facts
It will be remembered that Dr Ian Smith discovers from a colleague that Kenneth, the 
nephew of Dr Smith's patient Ewan, has recently been diagnosed with 
haemochromatosis. Because the condition is recessive this means that there is a chance 
that Ewan and his family might be affected. This is particularly worrying because there
It is not possible to  consider the autonom y of the future person.
N ote, we are not concerned in this scenario with the problem of family members w ho do not wish  
to know  genetic information.That is dealt with in scenario four.
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is also a history of the condition in the family of Ewan's wife, Elizabeth. The dilemmas 
which Dr Smith faces are the following:
• What is his obligation, if any, to Kenneth? Should Kenneth be approached and if 
so, to what extent should Kenneth's response dictate the subsequent acts of the 
doctor?
• Should he seek to inform Ewan, Elizabeth, Marlene and/or Michael? If so, how 
should he go about this?
• What about Michael's wife, Michele, who is hoping to become pregnant? Should 
the doctor, or indeed anyone else who knows, inform her of the family risk?
5.4.2. - A n  Autonomy Perspective
As  an autonomous individual Kenneth has the right to control the uses of his genetic 
information. He also has the right to choose what to do with that information. That is, 
autonomy prima facie help to protect Kenneth's interests in informational privacy. 
Thus, his first objection is likely to be to the fact that his doctor has disclosed personal 
information to Dr Smith without his permission. As will become clear in chapter four, 
this is technically a breach of confidence, and Kenneth could bring an action against his 
doctor for damages and an interdict/injunction to prevent further disclosure. Our 
primary concern here, however, is not with such a scenario, but rather with the 
dilemma of Dr. Smith who now possesses information which can affect his own 
patients. Undoubtedly, he will feel a professional ethical obligation to protect his 
patients, and ethically speaking Dr. Smith has an obligation to avert harm to his 
patients if this is possible. Certainly, informing the patients of the risks involved might 
have several health benefits. First, if there is a chance of anyone being affected, then 
blood transfusions can be commenced as soon as possible to avoid any tissue damage. 
Second, for those who are carriers, the information might allow them to make
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informed future choices about reproduction. This is particularly relevant for Michael 
and Mlichele who are trying to have a baby. There is, therefore, a strong argument that 
Kenneth should be approached to disclose the information. Best practice probably 
dictates that this should be done via Kenneth's own doctor. Ideally, if Kenneth agrees 
then Dr. Smith can discharge his obligations and maximise the number of informed 
choices which the family as a unit and as individuals can make. Clearly this has no 
adverse consequences for Kenneth's privacy or autonomy given that he consents to 
disclosure. If Kenneth disagrees, however. Dr. Smith must decide whether or not he 
should nevertheless use the information. From the perspective of autonomy, this 
dilemma can be viewed as follows. On the one hand. Dr. Smith faces disrespecting 
Kenneth's wishes and therefore disrespecting him as a person. In turn this involves a 
direct interference with Kenneth's informational privacy interests. On the other, Dr. 
Smith faces the problem of possessing information about patients which could avert 
harm if disclosed. Although the absence of information on the part of the relatives does 
not, in se, affect their capacity to make autonomous choices or to act autonomously 
(for all life decisions are based on a shortfall of information). Dr. Smith can 
nevertheless consider that he is in a position whereby he can enhance the autonomy of 
the relatives by furnishing them with information which will allow them to make 
informed choices about their l i v e s C a n  the principle of respect for autonomy help 
Dr. Smith resolve this dilemma?
196 P q j .  account (and ultimately a rejection) of the sorts of arguments one might offer concerning the 
'enhancement of the autonom y of third parties' in just such a context, see Husted, J.; 'A utonom y and a 
Right N o t to K now ' in Chadwick, R., Levitt, M. and Shickle, D ., (eds.); 'The Right to Know and the 
Right N o t to Know', Aldershot, Avebury, 1997, chapter 6.
Chadwick has argued that 'the tension between the autonomous desires of tw o parties, especially if 
they are family members, is best resolved by the individuals thenselves. W hilst a geneticist should 
respect the wishes of their patient to be tested or not, they should encourage their client to consider the 
implications and implications for others w ho w ill be affected.', see Chadwick, R.; 'Introduction' in, 
Chadwick, Levitt and Shickle, op. cit., chapter one, at 7.
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5.4.3. - Ethics
In ethical terms, the answer to the question, 'what happens when two autonomies 
conflict', is that such exercises of autonomy can be restricted if they cause 'harm' to 
others. In Millian terms, the shift has taken place between self-regarding and other- 
regarding behaviour^^®. Thus, when a person infected with a highly contagious disease 
poses a direct and serious threat to others in a community by his or her mere presence, 
the state feels justified in acting in a manner likely to minimise the threat of infection, 
even if this means imposing restraints on individual a u t o n o m y T h e  'good' which is 
thought to flow from such impositions is also thought to justify the intrusion^°°. Yet, a 
generally accepted definition of what is a 'good' outcome remains elusive.
For example, Downie et al argue that in a liberal democracy health Is a value worthy 
of pursuit in They posit that an application of the autonomy principle in a health 
care setting means that patients can only freely make decisions about their own health 
care if to do so does not harm others in their health. But, as they note, many forms of 
ill health by their very nature pose risk to others. This, they argue, justifies health 
legislation which curtails patient autonomy in the interests of others^ ^^ .^ This has 
already been noted in chapters one and two, supra. However, they argue further that, 
because the interconnected nature of modern society means that the consequence of
1^ ® supra.
A n obvious example is quarantine.
200 Jinnet-Sack, op. cit., obseives that in the U.S. the State's interest in medical matters has been defined 
by the courts to encompass four matters: preseivation of life, prevention of suicide, protection of third 
parties, and protection of the integrity of the medical profession. A  fifth concern was enunciated by the 
Nevada Supreme Court in the case of McKay v  Bergstedt (1990) 801 P2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Nev.): '[the 
concern] in encouraging the charitable and humane care o f those whose lives may be artificially 
extended under conditions w hich have the prospect of at least a modicum of quality living.', at 621. C f - 
Cruzan v  Director, Missouri Department o f  Health 760 S.W. 2d. 408 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1988), aff'd (1990) US, 
110, S. Ct. 2841, 111 L Ed 2d 224.
201 D ow nie eta l, 'Health Prom otion: Models and Values', op. cit., at 149 - 152, esp. 152.
202 ihid, at 151.
244
one individual being unable to perform his or her social duties is either that others will 
be inconvenienced and/or harmed, or that someone else will have to perform the 
duties on his or her behalf, the ill-health of one individual can have a deleterious effect 
on the autonomy of others. This then, they submit, is the basis for arguing that we all 
have a moral duty to others to maintain our own health o^ .^
By extension, such a view would dictate that in our scenario Kenneth has a moral duty 
to share the information with his family members. The unique circumstances of shared 
genetic make-up within the family group arguably removes from Kenneth his right to 
claim unfettered control over his genetic information. Dr. Smith would then have an 
ethical basis for justifying disclosure of the information to Ewan and his immediate 
family. If, however, Kenneth refuses, can anything be done in law?
5.4.4. - Law
From the legal perspective little help is at hand for Dr. Smith. As we have seen, the 
question of conflict has only been dealt with by the courts in the context of forced 
caesarean section cases, and the Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that the 
preference is to be given to the wishes of the competent pregnant woman^ O'^ . Of 
course, one would be correct to argue that such cases do not, in any event, represent an 
example of a conflict between two autonomies because the fetus is not an autonomous 
individual until born alive. The question therefore arises whether the courts would act 
differently faced with the present scenario which does involve a potential of harm to 
others and a conflict of autonomies? The uniqueness of the familial relationship 
demonstrates how the conduct of one person can adversely affect the lives of others.
203 ibid, at 151 - 152,
20^  ^In re M.B., supra cit.
245
Given this, would a court be justified in intervening to prevent harm through 
unacceptable exercises of choice? This need be no more than a declaration stating that a 
particular course of conduct was lawful, such as informing family members of genetic 
information. Certainly, an argument along these lines could be made, but it is 
unfortunate that the courts give us no guidance on how such an argument might 
proceed or what, if anything, would be the relevant factors for a court.
Harm certainly, or rather the avoidance of harm, is a crucial factor. Yet, as always with 
genetic information one must bear in mind the caveat that test results carry limited 
certainty and should be regarded with caution as to their predictive value. With a 
condition such as haemochromatosis, or any other recessive disorder, the chances of 
family members being carriers or affected are quite clear and also high. The same is also 
true of dominant disorders. However, the picture is very different with multifactorial 
conditions, and one must always be alert to the risk of false positive and false negative 
results.
The nature of one's interference with an individual's autonomy and the likelihood of a 
'successful' outcome from that interference must also be relevant factors. For Dr. 
Smith, there are three possible 'successful' outcomes. First, the avoidance of harm to 
Ewan's family. To achieve this the proposed course of conduct is disclosure of the 
family risk despite Kenneth's wish not to have the information divulged. What 
guarantee does Dr Smith have, however, that this will best achieve his ends? N o cure is 
available for the condition and therefore harm cannot be avoided incontrovertibly, 
although treatment is available for those affected. This could be commenced early and 
minimise the risk of fibrosis, but it requires the individuals in question to take 
responsibility for themselves once furnished with the information in question. That is,
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in order to avoid harm the relatives must 'choose' to do something positive with the 
knowledge. Dr. Smith has no guarantee of this.
Second, the aim in disclosing the information to those who are carriers can further 
their autonomy by facilitating future choices. However, as Ngwena and Chadwick 
have said,
[i]t is not clear...why choice in this area should be given 
higher priority than choice over the use of personal 
information...[and] it is not clear that harm to choice 
itself is sufficiently serious to warrant d i s c l o s u r e .
Third, it should not be overlooked that Dr. Smith might decide to disclose the 
knowledge of Kenneth's status simply to respect the other family members as 
autonomous choosers, as opposed to disclosure to avoid harm. Such individuals have a 
strong claim to the information simply by virtue of the fact that in part it relates to 
them. Although Dr. Smith might not know the particular views of the relatives as to 
whether they would wish to know or not know such information, he might decide 
that it is in their best interests at least to be offered the information. Is it acceptable 
that he do so? From a legal perspective, once again, there is little guidance apart from 
the now defunct Re S which would suggest that there is a need to identify some harm 
to be avoided^o .^ This is not the motivation of the health care professional in these 
circumstances. It is simply to offer the relatives information about themselves. 
Ethically, the principle of beneficence might support disclosure but it is difficult to 
reconcile this with the consequent disrespect for Kenneth's autonomy and privacy.
205 and Chadwick, 'Genetic D iagnostic Information and the D u ty  of Confidentiality : Ethics
and Law', Medical Law International, 73, 1993, at 86.
20^  supra c it
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Ill this scenario the dilemma faced by Dr. Smith is that he can facilitate many choices 
by revealing the genetic information of Kenneth. For, not only can he facilitate the 
choice of Michael and Michele in reproducing, but he can facilitate the 'choice' of 
other relatives to know whether or not they are at risk and thereby he can facilitate the 
'choice' whether or not to seek further information by being tested themselves and/or 
seeking treatment. If he were able to establish that the relatives did want to know the 
information, their 'choice' to know would import a strong imperative to respect that 
choice, irrespective of the outcome which may ensue for those self-same individuals^o .^ 
Unfortunately, Dr. Smith cannot simply ask the relatives if they would wish to know 
without interfering both with Kenneth's autonomy and his privacy.
Can an autonomy model resolve the conflict? Arguably, in such a scenario one could 
assert that it is the autonomy of Kenneth which deserves most respect. This could be 
so for several reasons. For example, Kenneth is the proband and as such is the 
autonomous chooser who has sought the information. His connection with the 
information is greater by virtue of this fact and the fact that the information is 
specifically about his genetic make-up. The claim of relatives is based on their 
connection with that information through common heritage but knowledge of a 
relative's genetic constitution is no replacement for knowledge of one's own. The 
autonomy of the proband can easily be respected by maintaining security of the 
information. Respect for the autonomy of relatives and avoidance of harm to them 
cannot be guaranteed by such a course of action. In such circumstances, the balance 
should perhaps be tipped in favour of the original chooser. If this approach is prefered 
then the inference is that Kenneth's informational privacy interests will also be 
protected.
207 w ould be entirely in keeping w ith the decisions in Re T, and Re M.B., supra cit.
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However, consider this passage from Ngwena and Chadwick from a discussion of the 
role of confidentiality and genetic information,
...what has to be taken into account is the fact that 
respecting the autonomy of one person may have 
implications for the autonomy of others. As the Royal 
College of Physicians argue, "Blood relatives have an 
interest in knowing the truth which has nothing to do 
with influencing their behaviour towards affected 
individuals in their families, but as a necessary means to 
finding out the truth about themselves"...How is the 
choice between the autonomy of different people 
made?...What is clear is that the decision cannot be taken 
on autonomy groundsP^
This suggests that the inherent conflict which can arise in such a situation is 
irresolvable if one appeals simply to the principle of autonomy. Stalemate is reached 
and the concept ceases to have a meaningful or useful role. Thus, although we might 
argue that we should prefer Kenneth's autonomy (and privacy) over his relatives 
interests in furthering their own autonomy, it is not really possible to argue this 
conclusively simply by an appeal to autonomy alone. Other factors such as 
confidentiality and privacy in se and their potential role in helping to break stalemate 
will be discussed infra,
5.4.5. - A  Family's Right to Know: A Conclusion
It is submitted that Dr. Smith owes a general obligation of respect to Kenneth as an 
autonomous individual in society. An argument can be made that Kenneth should be
20® See, N gw ena and Chadwick; 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D uty  of Confidentiality: 
Ethics and Law', loc. cit., at 77. This point is also made by Chadwick in 'The Philosophy o f the Right to 
K now  and the Right N o t  to K now ' in Chadwick, Levitt, and Shickle, op. cit., chapter one, at 15,
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approached, perhaps through the medium of his own doctor, and an attempt should be 
made to persuade him to reveal his knowledge to family members. Should he refuse to 
do so. Dr. Smith could invoke the ethical principle of non-maleficence to justify 
contacting Ewan, Elizabeth, Marlene and Michael directly because of the availability of 
treatment for the condition. However, it is less clear that he would be justified in 
contacting Michael and Michele to further their reproductive autonomy. Even less 
obvious is the acceptability of offering information to relatives simply to further their 
autonomy where the motivation is not or cannot be the avoidance of harm, for 
example, if no cure or treatment is available for the condition in question. 
Importantly, it would seem that conflict between autonomies cannot be resolved 
simply by reference to the principle of autonomy itself.
This offers us a hierarchy of issues to balance against the autonomy of Kenneth, which 
if respected protects his informational privacy interests. First, if harm can be avoided 
by treatment then disclosure can be justified. Second, if that harm is simply harm to 
choice disclosure is less justified. Third, if disclosure is contemplated simply to further 
the autonomy of others generally, we face difficulties in resolving this solely through 
an autonomy model.
In practical terms Dr. Smith could best follow this guidance in the following manner: 
if those who can be treated deserve to know, his first task is to identify such 
individuals. In Ewan's family the starting point should be Ewan and Elizabeth. If one 
or both of them is not affected and/or is not a carrier then there is no need to proceed 
to inform Michael and Marlene since they themselves cannot be affected by disease. 
The only reason to inform them might be if they could be carriers but this, as has been 
argued, is less justified given that the perceived harm is simply one to ‘choice’. In like 
manner, Michele cannot herself be affected by disease and the potential harm to her
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reproductive choice by not informing her of the family history is arguably not a 
justification for disrespecting Kenneth and invading his informational privacy interests.
5.5. - SCENARIO FOUR: A RIGHT N O T  TO KNOW?
Scenario three considers the informational privacy interests of an individual in keeping 
secure from family members personal genetic information. The entire discussion 
proceeds on the assumption that the family members in question desire to know the 
information of their relative. Of course, this might not necessarily be the case and we 
must consider the possibility that members in a family unit might prefer not to know 
familial genetic information. Scenario four considers this question in the context of a 
problem concerning the breast cancer gene BRCAl. Everything that is said here, 
however, is equally applicable to a claim in other family contexts (such as that of 
scenario three) where family members might not want to know. Another contrast 
with scenario three concerns the nature of the privacy interest under discussion. Here 
it is the spatial privacy interest of individuals in not being given unsolicited 
information. Finally, as with all of the scenarios in this chapter, we shall examine the 
problem from the perspective of autonomy, and in particular we shall consider the 
extent to which the principle can afford adequate protection to spatial privacy 
interests.
5.5.1. - The Facts o f Scenario Four
To recap briefly: Nicola is aware of a history of breast cancer in her family. After her 
own diagnosis of breast cancer linked to the BRCAl gene she faces the following 
dilemma:
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• should she approach her sister Nadia and her cousins Norma, Romana and Elvira 
with the news of her own disease and urge them to seek medical advice? She is 
aware that Nadia is phobic about operations and that Elvira is prone to bouts of 
depression. She is also aware that for those who run an increased risk a mastectomy 
is the preferred clinical treatment.
5.5.2. - Autonomy Perspective
The question to be considered here is that of the validity of a claim not to know 
genetic information. The arguments concerning a claim to know the information 
would be the same as those advanced in scenario three, and in the context of this 
particular scenario these would be affected principally by two factors: one, the gene for 
BRCAl has been discovered and direct testing is now available, making a claim to have 
access to a relative's test results less valid; two, BRCAl is only one factor in the 
development of breast cancer, making the predictive nature of a relative's test results 
less certain and thereby giving less weight to an argument for access by relatives.
It has already been argued that autonomy makes an uneasy basis for a claim not to 
know information, and therefore is dubious as a basis for adequate protection of spatial 
privacy interests. The principle of autonomy requires informed choice based on 
knowledge. Axiomatically, the foundation for a claim not to know sits awkwardly 
within the framework of autonomy. The only way in which one can be sure of 
whether or not an individual might want to know information is to determine his oi­
lier views, but this in itself can cause harm by alerting the individual to the fact that 
something might be wrong. Even if an individual has offered a 'blanket refusal' of 
genetic information, it might be argued that this is not a valid exercise of autonomy
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since the choice not to know was made in ignorance of relevant factors, such as the 
'benefits' of low risk results or 'treatment'.
In the absence of any views about her relatives wishes, Nicola must determine whether 
to approach her relatives. What guidance is offered by ethics and law?
5.5.3. - Ethics
Ethically, because no views have been expressed by the relatives the principle of 
autonomy is of no help. Unfortunately, the principle of non-maleficence and 
beneficence are also unhelpful because of the nature of the condition and the 
circumstances of the family. These principles require that harm should be avoided and 
benefit conferred wherever possible. It is not clear, however, whether this could be 
achieved by Nicola disclosing information about her condition and the risk to 
relatives. As has been argued supra, harm can result from the mere fact of disclosure 
and the personal circumstances of both Nadia and Elvira would tend to indicate that 
psychological trauma is probable. Also, it is important to consider the nature of the 
treatment which is offered. Mastectomy is a very traumatic and potentially devastating 
operation for a woman to undergo. The sequelae can include altered perception of self- 
image and feelings of loss of identity. The preference for some women might be not to 
have the operation. This is likely to be particularly true of Nadia who is phobic about 
surgery. These factors mean that Nicola should consider very seriously whether or not 
to disclose the information. On an ethical basis the women might found their claim 
not to know genetic information on the principle of non-maleficence.
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5.5.4. - Law
Once again the law in the United Kingdom provides little guidance for such a 
dilemma. If no individual views are available, an option for Nicola is to treat her 
relatives as incapax. The basis of her decision then becomes her interpretation of their 
best interests. The relevant factors to consider are the same as those outlined above. 
Should disclosure be forthcoming, however, and harm result, there is no existing legal 
remedy which would entitle any person so harmed to claim a breach of an interest not 
to know209.
5.5.5. - Autonomy and the Right not to Know
Jorgen Husted has argued that one can base a right not to know in the principle of 
autonomy, provided that one adopts a 'thick conception' of autonomy^io, By this he 
means a view of the autonomous individual as one who takes direct responsibility for 
his/her life, and for the decisions which form and shape that life^ h^ Central to this 
conception is the idea of "self-definition": 'what makes a life ours is that it is fashioned 
by our choices, is selected from alternatives by a human being taking his or her life 
seriously and wanting to be, and be recognised as by others as [sic], the kind of person 
who makes decisions and accepts the responsibility for them . '212
209 If one accepts that this is a privacy issue, then an argument might be put that the com m on law o f  
Scotland could protect such a 'privacy' issue invoking the actio injuriarum. However, this action is by  
no means established in Scots law. This is discussed in chapter six, infra.
210 See Husted, 'A utonom y and a Right N o t to K now ', in Chadwick et a i ,  op. cit.
211 H e contrasts this w ith  the 'thin conception' o f autonom y which 'aims to explain the autonomous 
person and the autonom ous life by w ay of explaining the kind o f choice characteristically made by the 
former and defining the latter, viz. the autonomous individual choice.’, ibid., at 59,
212 ibid., at 61 - 62.
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Husted argues that the imposition of unwarranted information is an autonomy issue 
because choices and decisions must now be taken in the knowledge of information 
never previously requested, and thereby the individual loses the ability to direct 
his/her life as s/he might otherwise have wished^!). To the present writer this 
argument is not entirely convincing because it requires us to adopt a view of autonomy 
which is unrealistic - a view which requires us to say that informed choice is not 
autonomous choice. Consider this passage,
...in many cases [of unsolicited information] what were 
initially very valuable options for the person to choose 
(for one set of reasons) or not to choose (for a different set 
of reasons) were being closed down by disclosure. Of 
course, the option still remained open for the person, but 
the reason why he or she did not choose it was not that 
another one was considered more valuable. The reason 
was that she or he could not take the responsibility for 
choosing it, i.e. choosing it being aware of the genetic 
warning, because it would be a morally wrong thing to 
do, e.g. start building a family knowing in advance what 
kind of suffering this project of one's is bound to create 
for other people. Where the person concerned was 
formerly pondering the various options for trying to 
make something worthwhile out of life, accepting the 
normal hazards of life, she or he may now be struggling 
for survival. And as a result of this the history of that 
person's life may very well not be the history of an 
autonomous life, a life whose contents, for a significant 
part, are freely chosen among different and morally 
valuable alternatives. The history of that person's life 
might rather come to resemble the life of a person who 
had to become an electrician in order not to have to 
murder someone else i^  ^ _ a life of morally forced 
choices2i5.
2^ 3 dyid, at 66.
214 yjais example to the person w ho must choose between becoming and electrician or a murderer is a 
reference to a discussion w hich occurs earlier in the chapter concerning Joseph Raz's view  of autonom y. 
Raz opines that autonomous choices must be choices between moral 'goods' and that a choice between 
good and evil is not an autonom ous choice, ibid, at 62.
213 ibid, at 6 6 - 67 .
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This is a strange view of autonomy for several reasons. First, it is not the case that 
decisions taken in the light of knowledge (solicited or otherwise) are not autonomous 
decisions. A ll decisions we take are taken in light of the information and options 
available to us, and whereas it is correct to say that we may choose differently once 
exposed to certain knowledge, it is not accurate to imply that choices in light of 
unasked-for knowledge are somehow not our decisions.
Second, it is difficult to see how one can resolve the problem posed by Husted from 
within an autonomy model. He advocates a view of autonomy which is predicated on 
'free' choices, but this seems to suggest that it is entirely possible to make 'free' choices 
about the direction of one's life. This is simply not accurate, or at least one must accept 
that 'freedom' in this context is a relative term. N o choices are completely unfettered, 
and few choices are taken in a moral vacuum. And, whereas one's choices can certainly 
be adversely influenced by pressure from others, it is not clear that there is a significant 
enough degree of pressure from merely offering people information to warrant the 
conclusion that this somehow interferes with their autonomy. It does not, in the sense 
that these persons can still make choices for themselves according to their own values 
and moral code. The situation would be different if the information was accompanied 
by a prescribed course of conduct, for example - the offering of an ante-natal test for 
Huntington's disease on the condition that the pregnancy be terminate if the result is 
positive^i^.
Finally, Husted does not draw any distinction between choices not to know and no 
choices at all. For, it is accepted that to offer unsolicited information to a person who
21  ^This is the so-called 'Edinburgh experience', supra note 166 and text.
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has expressed a wish not to know it, is to disrespect the autonomy of that person^^ .^ In 
the circumstances spoken of by Husted, however, when there is no previously 
expressed wish (ie - an exercise of autonomy) in respect of the information, then it is 
unconvincing to argue that to offer the information is an unwarranted interference 
with autonomy.
Of course, the general sentiment expressed by Husted is shared by the present writer; 
namely, that it is unacceptable in many circumstances to give individuals unsolicited 
genetic information. However, it is argued here that the interference is with the spatial 
privacy interests of the individuals in question, rather than with their autonomy per se. 
This displays an interesting area of overlap between the two concepts of privacy and 
autonomy. So far in this chapter we have considered the extent to which autonomy 
can help to protect privacy interests. Here, it is argued that to attempt to subsume 
'privacy interests' under a modified view of autonomy is unacceptable because not 
only does it distort autonomy, but also it denies a further possibility; namely, that 
protection for privacy in se is preferable. This, of course, is the thesis of this work, and 
it shall be pursued further in the following chapters.
5.5.6. - A Right Not to Know: A  Conclusion
It is submitted that the principle of autonomy is particularly unhelpful in addressing 
the question of a right not to know. If a 'blanket refusal' is made it is submitted that it 
should be respected, but obviously for such a refusal to be possible some degree of 
information must be available to the individual who is refusing - for example, a family 
history or knowledge that test results exist. If there is no such knowledge it is difficult 
to see how such a refusal can be meaningful. Moreover, choices in such circumstances
This point has already been made, supra.
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make a best interests or substituted judgment approach easier and ostensibly at least, 
more justified. However, in the absence of clearer guidelines from either ethics or law, 
it is hard to distinguish such an approach from the approach of following the 
subjective decision of the person with the genetic information. In the case of Nicola 
and her family, Nicola must weigh the 'benefit' of early discovery of cancer against the 
concerns of individual relatives such as Nadia and Elvira who might suffer as a result of 
information disclosure. A very relevant factor is the multifactorial nature of the 
condition. This means that the reliability of test results from relatives is limited. This 
affects the utility of disclosure in at least two ways. First, the chances of developing 
disease are not only more difficult to predict but are also reduced compared to 
monogenic disorders. The likelihood of multifactorial disease can be as low as a few 
percent^^ ®. Second, one can predict with much less certainty the range of relatives 
likely to be affected by multifactorial genetic disease^ ^^ . To be truly effective disclosure 
would require to be made to a wide circle of persons with possible diminishing 
utility220.
Ethically, an acceptable outcome might be to approach family members with the news 
of Nicola's own condition and the possibility of diagnosis and treatment for others. 
Given that the condition in question is potentially fatal and that some form of 
treatment is available, such an approach not only satisfies the principle of non­
maleficence but also seeks to further individual autonomy. This way, individuals can 
choose whether to proceed with further tests to determine their own status and/or to
See, W ilson, J.D ., Braunwald, E., Isselbacher, K.J., Petersdorf, R.G., Martin, J.B., Fauci, A .S., and 
R oot, R.K.; Principles o f Internal Medicine. Twelfth Edition, (McGraw-FIill Inc. 1991), at 30.
ibidy '...as the degree of relation becomes more distant, the likelihood of a relative inheriting the 
same combination o f genes becomes less. M oreover, the chances of any relative inheriting the right 
combination of genes decrease as the number of genes required for the expression of a given trait 
increases.'
It should be noted, however, that if a high number of close relatives are affected by a severe disorder 
there is more o f a chance that relatives w ill be affected. That said, the percentage rate remains below  or 
around fifteen percent, ibid.
258
undergo a mastectomy and thereby hopefully avoid fatal consequences. If Nicola does 
decide to disclose the information to her relatives, then unlike scenario number three, 
there will be no problem about respecting her autonomy since she herself has chosen 
to disclose personal information. However, it cannot be overlooked that such 
disclosure might come as a burden to some relatives who might suffer a form of harm 
as a result and/or for whom the treatment option is not available. If so, even if the 
initial approach is thought to be ethically justifiable, in law no remedy currently exists 
to redress such a form of hurt. Importantly, this would tend to indicate that the basis 
for a claim not to know information cannot be the principle of autonomy .
6.1. - GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY: 
A CONCLUSION
An important consequence of recognising the value of the concept of autonomy is that 
we recognise a duty to strive wherever possible to accord respect to the wishes of 
individuals. This in turn has several other consequences. First, in many cases there is a 
prima facie presumption of the existence and value of autonomy and therefore an onus 
on those who would seek to challenge such a presumption. Second, it means that if 
there is some way by which to avoid harm to the principle while furthering other ends 
then that solution should be preferred. That is, compromise is preferable to outright 
defeat of the principle, which is seen to have inherent value.
However, we can also see that in the legal context several restrictions are placed on 
individual autonomy in the health care setting. That limits must be imposed is not 
problematic, but the arbitrariness with which the courts have imposed restrictions has 
far reaching consequences for patient autonomy. The scope of the restrictions is 
unclear, the possibility of future restrictions is very real and the implications for
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individual autonomy are not always fully considered by the courts^^h Similarly, from 
the ethical perspective there is little agreement about the relative weight which one 
should accord to the principle of autonomy relative to other principles. Furthermore, 
ethics is most unhelpful in assisting to determine particular outcomes in particular 
cases. Yet, from both the ethical and legal perspective it might be said that the potential 
for harm to others, in the main, 'trumps' the autonomy of patients in the health care 
setting, reducing considerably the value of the latter in real terms. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that it is not only when faced with the threat of harm to others that 
one can restrict autonomy. If an individual fails to 'qualify' as autonomous, then other 
measures are employed to deal with that person. Most notably, paternalistic 
approaches can be adopted and reference is made to the concept of 'best interests'. Yet 
once again the precise nature of how such interests are to be determined is not clear 
from either the discipline of ethics or the pronouncements of the UK courts. Rather, 
authority in this sphere is placed at the feet of the medical profession which exercises 
considerable discretion in dealing with patients.
More particularly, it is not at all clear that an appeal to the principle of autonomy will 
help to protect the interests of individuals who have been tested for genetic conditions 
nor that it will assist in resolving satisfactorily conflicts which might arise over familial 
genetic information. This is so for several reasons.
First, it is arguable that the principle of autonomy has received short shrift because it 
lacks a precise and clear definition. This is certainly true of ethics and, from the legal 
perspective no law has been passed in the United Kingdom which defines the essence 
of autonomy or its limits. This task is left to the courts. Yet, faced with emotive 
appeals which often involve matters of life and death, the courts have been quick to 
A n extreme example of this is Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v  C H  (a patient), supra cit.
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favour the opinions of the medical profession and/or to take decisions which avoid any 
prospect of harm, rather than to prefer the principle of autonomy. In this way the 
principle of respect for autonomy is whittled away by default. The result is that the 
concept of autonomy is ill-equipped to protect the individual interests which stem 
from 'new' problems such as those which arise from genetic information.
A second problem concerns the inherent nature of the concept of autonomy. It has 
already been established that autonomy is concerned with choice and the ability to 
choose. In order to choose meaningfully one must be sufficiently informed about the 
subject matter of one's choice. That is self evident. However, as has been discussed 
supra, one of the issues which arises from genetic information is the question of a right 
not to know one's genetic constitution. That is, can one ever claim the right not to be 
forced to know about a predisposition to a genetic condition? It is submitted that to 
argue for such a 'right' one cannot make an appeal to the concept of autonomy because 
autonomy requires choice which requires information. Yet in these circumstances, to 
inform the person of their predisposition in order to ascertain whether they want to 
know of any risk, is to defeat the purpose of the right not to know. Although one 
could argue that it is an exercise of one's autonomy to state simply that one does not 
wish to know of any predisposition, this is problematic from the competence aspect of 
autonomy: how can one be sure that one does not wish to know about something of 
which one knows nothing? Arguably, some other basis for such a right is required. 
Chapter four will consider the role of confidentiality in addressing the issues so far 
raised concerning genetic information.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONFIDENTIALITY
AND
GENETIC INFORMATION
1.1. - INTR O D U C TIO N
This chapter will consider the legal, ethical and professional basis for the duty of 
confidentiality which is owed by health care professionals to patients in the United 
Kingdom. The relevance of confidentiality to the present discussion arises because 
in the health care context concerns about the use or abuse of personal health 
information have traditionally been addressed through the concept of 
confidentiality. Following the format of previous chapters, the chapter will 
conclude with a consideration of the role of confidentiality in resolving the 
problems and conflicts surrounding genetic information which were identified in 
chapter two.
2.1. - THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality is concerned with security of information. To be precise, it is 
concerned with the security of confidential information. To be confidential, 
information must be in a state of limited access from individuals and institutions 
generally. Confidentiality is therefore characterised by a relationship involving two 
or more individuals one or more of whom has/have undertaken, explicitly or 
implicitly, not to reveal information concerning the other individual in the 
relationship h Most particularly, it is accepted universally (and almost 
unquestionably) that health care professionals owe a duty of confidence to their 
patients and that only exceptionally should disclosure without consent be made .^ 
Although exceptions to the duty exist, in practice no breach is made lightly or
 ^ Information w hich is in the public domain cannot be confidential and therefore cannot be 
protected by confidentiality. Similarly, once information moves from the private sphere where it is 
confidential to the public sphere, it loses the necessary quality of confidence,
 ^Ngw ena, C. and Chadwick, R.; 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D uty o f Confidentiality: 
Ethics and Law'. 1, Medical Law International, 73, 1993, at 74, state that '[cjonfidentiality has been 
elevated to the status of a principle of Medical Ethics'.
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without good cause .^ Legal, ethical and professional justifications are advanced for 
this.
2.2. - THE BASIS OF THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
2.2.1. - The Professional Duty o f Confidentiality
The General Medical Council (CMC) is the governing body of the medical 
profession in the United Kingdom'^. Inter alia, it has the responsibility of keeping 
the register of those professionals who are fit to practise^, of disciplining those who 
are not^, and generally of maintaining professional medical standards .^ In October 
1995 the CMC issued Duties o f a Doctor ~ guidance to clinicians on the views of the 
CMC as to acceptable medical standards and the levels of care which patients are 
entitled to expect from British doctors®. The guidance comprises four booklets 
concerning the following matters: 'Good Medical Practice’, 'Advertising', 'HIV and 
AIDS: The Ethical Considerations' and 'Confidentiality'. The importance of the 
information contained therein is two-fold : first, it provides patients with an 
account of their rights when dealing with health care professionals. Second, it 
establishes a minimum standard of care expected from those professionals which, in 
turn, implies that behaviour which falls below such a standard leads to questions of 
professional competence and possible disciplinary action. Of direct relevance to this 
work are the contents of the booklet on ' Confidentiality'.
 ^ See, W  V Egdell [1990] 1 A ll E.R 835 per Bingham LJ at 851, '[ojnly the most compelling 
circumstances could justify a doctor in acting in a way w hich w ould injure the immediate interests 
of his patient, as the patient perceives them, without his consent,'
 ^See, the Medical Act 1983 as amended by the Medical (Professional Performance) Act 1995,
 ^ ibid, s.2 and ss.30 - 34, as amended, see schedule to 1995 Act.
 ^ ibid, ss 36 - 40, as amended.
 ^ ibid, s.35, as amended.
® This replaces the so-called 'Blue Book', officially know n as 'Professional Conduct and Discipline : 
Fitness to Practise', last produced in December 1993. A lthough this guidance does not have 
statutory authority, as has been stated : 'the General Medical Council in exercising its disciplinary 
jurisdiction does so in pursuance of the provisions of the Medical A ct 1983', in W v  Egdell, supra 
cit., at 843f. N ote , too, that guidance is also offered by the Department o f Health, see, for example, 
'Confidentiality. U se and Disclosure o f Personal Health Information', Department o f Health, 1994.
263
The GMC outlines several 'principles' which form the basis of its guidance on 
confidentiality^. As it states,
Patients have a right to expect that you will not 
disclose any personal information which you learn 
during the course of your professional duties, unless 
they give permission. Without assurances about 
confidentiality patients may be reluctant to give 
doctors the information they need in order to provide
good care. 10
This displays two reasons for protecting patient confidences. In the first place, the 
intimate connection between the patient and his or her personal information gives 
the patient the right to control what happens to that information: this can be seen 
as a form of autonomy argument such as that advanced in chapter three. In the 
second place, there is the important social or public interest in ensuring that 
patients trust medical professionals which is thought to be best advanced by 
guaranteeing security of confidential information.
The guidance goes on to specify the nature of the duties which are encompassed by 
confidentiality. These extend to the following: the duty to ensure that confidential 
information is effectively protected against improper disclosure; the duty to ensure 
that when patient consent is given for disclosure patients are fully informed of the 
nature and consequences of their choice; if information is to be disclosed to other 
health care professionals then patients should be informed of this and given the 
opportunity to withhold permission; requests that information not be disclosed to 
third parties must be respected save in exceptional circumstances (see infrd)\ 
information should be released only to the extent necessary for the particular 
purpose; all professionals are under a duty to ensure that other health workers to
 ^GM C, 'Duties o f a D octor', London, GM C, October 1995, 'Confidentiality', paragraph 1. 
ibid.
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whom information is disclosed understand that the duty of confidence exists and 
that it must be respected; and, importantly, professionals must understand that if 
they decide to disclose confidential information, they must be prepared to explain 
and justify their decision^h
This final provision makes it clear that the prima facie obligation is to respect 
patient confidences as something of value. Failure to do so places a professional 
burden of the health worker to justify his or her conduct. Thus, in this way, 
confidentiality is seen as a professional obligation, the sanction for breach of which 
can be disciplinary action^ .^
It should not be thought, however, that in the eyes of the GMC the duty of 
confidentiality which health care professionals owe to patients is an absolute one. 
The guidance goes on to outline the exceptions to the duty. For example, where 
disclosure of relevant information between health care professionals is essential to 
the treatment of a patient, and the patient has agreed to that treatment, then it is 
not necessary in each and every instance to seek patient consent^^. Similarly, if 
because of an emergency the patient's consent cannot be obtained and information 
must be transferred to health workers, this can be done provided that it is in the 
patient's interests '^ .^ It is also stated that disclosure of patient information can be
id.
In the past discipline o f doctors has been carried out by the Professional Conduct Comm ittee 
w hich ultimately has five methods of disposal o f any disciplinaiy case : it can dismiss the case it can 
postpone determination o f the outcom e, it can impose conditions on registration (for example, that 
the doctor seeks help for alcohol abuse problems), it can suspend the clinician for up to a year, or it 
can remove his or her name from the register. The Medical (Professional Performance) Act 1995 
modifies the procedures som ewhat in that it creates tw o additional GM C com m ittees ; the 
Assessment Referral Com m ittee and the Com m ittee on Professional Performance. Both of these 
com m ittees allow the GMC to do what it has not been able to do in the past; namely, to deal 
effectively w ith  incompetent or unfit professionals w ho represent a danger to the public. The remit 
of the PCC has only ever been concerned w ith criminal offences, serious professional misconduct or 
impairment of health so as to render the professional unfit to perform h is/her duties. This left 
much behaviour unregulated and did not give the GM C the power to assess and control the 
com petency of its professionals. The tw o new  comm ittees now  allow it to do so.
'Confidentiality', op. cit., paragraph 5.
ibid, paragraph 6. An example of where disclosure w ould not necessarily be acceptable concerns 
H IV  infection. Imagine that an unconscious patient is brought into hospital bleeding and the staff
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justified if it is in the patient's medical interests to do so^ .^ For example, if the 
patient is incapable of giving consent because of immaturity or incapacity then the 
GMC advises that disclosure of necessary information to an appropriate person or 
authority is justified^ .^ Interestingly, this includes circumstances where the health 
care professional believes that to seek consent from a patient would be damaging to 
the patient, but that disclosure to another could be in the patient's medical 
interests. The example given is where the professional determines that it would be 
in a patient's interests that a close relative should know about the patient's terminal 
condition, but that the patient would be seriously harmed by the information. In 
such cases it is the view of the GMC that information may be disclosed without
consent^2_
Disclosure for medical teaching, medical research and medical audit are all thought 
to be acceptable by the GMC provided that patient consent is sought, or if this is 
not possible then the information must be anonymised. In research cases, where 
consent cannot be obtained, the proposed action should be brought to the attention 
of a research ethics committee for approvaF®.
Disclosure required by law is an obvious exception to the duty of confidentiality 
and this is sanctioned by the GMC^ .^ A clear example is notifiable diseases^o. 
However, it is interesting to note that 'in the absence of a court order, a request for
wishes to know  his or her HIV status in order to determine whether they should take precautions. 
In such a case arguably the disclosure o f the information is not in the interests o f the patient but in 
the interests of others and is therefore not authorised by this provision. O f course, k  might be 
argued that the information is necessaiy in order to avoid harm to third parties, but if the on ly  
thing that can ultimately be done is to take precautions then it is not clear w hy such precautions 
cannot be taken in the first place thereby obviating the need to breach patient confidentiality. 
ibid, paragraph 10. 
ibid, paragraphs 10 - 12 .  
ibid, paragraph 12. 
ibid, paragraphs 15 - 17 .  
ibid, paragraphs 20 - 2 3 .
2® Discussed in chapters one and tw o, supra.
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disclosure by a third party, for example, a solicitor, police officer, or officer of the 
court, is not sufficient justification for disclosure without a patient's consent'll.
Finally, the most complicated exception to the duty of confidentiality concerns 
disclosure in the interests of others. The GMC explains thus,
Disclosures may be necessary in the public interest 
where a failure to disclose information may expose the 
patient, or others, to risk of death or serious harm. In 
such circumstances you should disclose promptly to 
an appropriate person or authority.22
Only three examples of this exception are given by the Council. 1) a patient who 
continues to drive when unfit to do so. The advice is to inform the Driver and 
Vehicle Licensing Agency. 2) a colleague and patient who places others at risk by 
continuing to practise medicine while ill. The advice is offered in the booklet 'HIV 
and AIDS: The Ethical Considerations' which recommends that those professionals 
who are ill should seek specialist advice on the extent to which they should limit 
their practice. For professionals who have an ill patient who is a doctor, the advice 
is to inform the appropriate regulatory body23. 3) Disclosure is necessary for the 
prevention or detection of serious crime.
2.2.2. - The Professional Duty o f Confidentiality: Conclusion
The basis for the professional duty to respect patient confidences is the guidance of 
the medical profession's governing body, the General Medical Council. The 
Council in turn seems to base its advice on two values : a) patient autonomy (the 
right to choose what happens to personal information) and, b) what might be
21 ibid, paragraph 21.
22 ibid, paragraph 18.
23 GM C, 'Duties o f a D octor', London, GM C, O ctober 1995, 'ITIV and AIDS : The Ethical 
Considerations', paragraphs 8 - 9 .
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termed the public interest in maintaining trust in the doctor/patient relationship. 
This is public in the sense that if ill people are dissuaded from seeking treatment 
this has serious implications not just for the individuals concerned but for others as 
well. Moreover, it signals the demise of the social institution of medicine as we 
currently know it. However, there are extensive exceptions to the duty which 
cover a wide range of situations. This substantially weakens the right of the patient. 
Arguably, this is further compounded by the vague nature of some of the 
exceptions and the superficial advice of the GMC. This is particularly true of the 
'public interest' exception which concerns the avoidance of harm to others. The 
terminology employed is vague: there must be a risk of 'death' or 'serious harm' 
(what is 'serious'?) and this must be linked to failure to disclose information, 
implying that there must be a likelihood that harm will be averted by disclosure. 
The opportunity to avert harm might not, however, be within the powers of the 
medical professional. This is especially true of the extremely vague example of 
'disclosure for the prevention or detection of serious crime' (again, what is 
'serious'?). In practical terms, this guidance places considerable onus on the health 
care professional to determine for him or herself the limits of the duty which s/he 
owes to patients.
2.2.3. - Ethics and Confidentiality
Although confidentiality does not form one of the core principles of ethics which 
were discussed in chapters two and three, for many the concept has nevertheless 
'...been elevated to the status of a principle of Medical Ethics'2'^ .
Ethical justifications for the duty of confidentiality are found in principles 
considered to be fundamental to our social value system. These appeal both to
2'^  See, Ngwena, C. and Chadwick, R.; 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D uty of 
Confidentiality : Ethics and Law ', op. cit., at 74.
2 6 8
public and private interests in security of personal information. For example, 
Ngwena and Chadwick argue cogently that justifications for protecting confidences 
are found both in the principle of utility and the principle of autonomy^^. They 
contend that considerable utility can flow from respecting confidentiality since this 
can protect individuals from harm. Discrimination and stigmatisation can result 
from disclosure of sensitive personal information of any kind, and this is certainly 
true of genetic information. This point has been argued in chapter one. In addition, 
to keep confidences fosters trust in the health care relationship generally which can 
only be seen as a 'good t h i n g ' B y  the same token, and as has already been argued 
in previous chapters, adherence to an autonomy model of health care requires 
respect not only of individual patients per se but also of their interests, including 
interests in personal information. To protect confidentiality is, therefore, to respect 
the individual.
Raanan Gillon endorses this view. As he has stated,
[The principle of autonomy] requires us to consult 
people and obtain their agreement before we do things 
to them. As an individual we do not have any general 
obligation to keep other people's secrets, but health 
care workers explicitly or implicitly, promise their 
patients and clients that they will keep confidential, 
the information confided to them. In other words, 
medical confidentiality is another implication of 
respecting people's autonomy. Without such promises 
of confidentiality, patients are far less likely to divulge 
the often highly private and sensitive information that 
is needed for their optimal care; thus maintaining 
confidentiality not only respects patients' autonomy 
but also increases the likelihood of our being able to 
help them.27
25 ibid, at 74 - 79.
2^  ibid, at 75.
22 Gillon, R.; ’Medical Ethics : Four Principles Plus A ttention to Scope'. 309, British Medical 
Journal, 184, 1994, at 185.
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2.2.4. - Ethics and Confidentiality: A  Conclusion
It can be seen that these justifications are in essence the same as those used by the 
General Medical Council as the basis of its guidance. This is surely no coincidence. 
An appeal to principles such as autonomy and utility is important because it 
provides strong justification for protecting personal health information through the 
concept of confidentiality. It imbues confidentiality with a value of its own for the 
interests which it serves and protects. This sets up the concept as being of prima 
facie value and worthy of respect, in much the same way as the principle of 
autonomy. Yet, as has been shown in chapter three, ethics is concerned with the 
balancing of several, at times competing, values. Thus, it is also accurate to state 
that an ethical perspective on confidentiality, as with the professional perspective, 
does not permit a view which holds confidentiality out as a supreme value. If to 
maintain confidentiality risks harm to others the principle of non-maleficence 
might be invoked to justify not respecting confidentiality. Similarly, if to disclose 
personal details without the consent of the patient is thought to be in the patients' 
medical interests reference can be made to the principle of beneficence^®. In each 
case the outcome depends on the facts and circumstances and the arguments which 
are put. Unfortunately, and again this has been noted in chapter three, this makes 
the value of an appeal to ethics limited and leaves much scope for uncertainty. For 
the health care professional ethics adds little if anything to the guidance s/he 
receives from the General Medical Council.
2.2.5. - Confidentiality and the Law
2® The term inology used here is that o f medical ethics, but as was noted in chapter tw o, the concept 
of 'ethics' is not homogenous across different disciplines. For example, in m any scenarios one 
w ould  not use the principle of non-maleficence to justify not respecting confidences, but rather 'the 
public interest', see infra.
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In law, confidential information is protected by the tortious/delictual action of 
breach of confidences^. This action is by no means restricted to the medical sphere 
or the protection of personal health information^^. Indeed, it would appear that 
almost any form of information can come within an obligation of confidence 
provided that k has 'the necessary quality of confidence's^ Thus trade secrets^s, 
business practices^s, government data^ '^  as well as personal information can be 
confidential. The law in respect of all of these forms of information is the same. 
Thus medical confidentiality is merely a subset of the wider set of cases which 
make up the law of confidence generally.
The law of confidence is found in the common law and in the past much 
dissatisfaction has been expressed about its state. In 1981 and 1984, the English & 
Welsh and Scottish Law Commissions looked respectively at the law in their 
jurisdictions^^. Both Commissions recommended reform of the law, and the 
English Commission went as far as to recommend a form of statutory protection. 
There has, however, been no parliamentary intervention subsequent to the release 
of these reports^ .^ That this is so may be because many of the reforms 
recommended by the Commissions are no longer necessary because of common law 
developments in this field. In particular, the decision of the House of Lords in
2^  For an account o f the Scottish position see, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 'Breach of 
C onfidence'. V olum e 18, Part II: Title 10, Butterworths/Law Society of Scotland, 1993. For more 
'anglicised' views see, Toulson, R.G. and Phipps, C.M.; 'Confidentiality'. London, Sweet &  
Maxwell, 1996, and Gurry, F.; 'Breach of C onfidence', Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.
3^  For an historical account o f the action of breach of confidence, see Toulson and Phipps, op. cit., 
chapter I.
31 See, Megarry J in Coco v  A N  Clark (Engineers) [1969] RPC 4L This does not, however, cover 
'trivial tittle tattle', ibid, at 48.
32 See, Printers and Finishers Ltd. v  Holloway [1965] 1 WLR 1.
33 See, Faccenda Chicken v  Fowler [1986] 1 All ER 617; [1987] 1 Ch. 117.
34 See, A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No.2 [1990] 1 AC 109 and Lord Advocate v  Scotsman 
Publications Ltd. 1989 SLT 705, HL.
35 See, Law Commission; 'Breach o f C onfidence'. Law Com. n o .110; Cmnd 8388, 1981, and 
Scottish Law Commission; 'Breach o f C onfidence'. Scot. Law Com. no.90; Cmnd 9385, 1984.
3^  The Scottish Law Comm ission made the follow ing criticisms o f the law : (1) the uncertainty of 
its extent, especially in relation to third parties; (2) the inadequacy o f the structure o f remedies; (3) 
the uncertain balance between private and public interests; (4) the lack of response to improper 
m ethods o f obtaining information, and (5) the difficulty of protecting information disclosed in 
litigation: ibid, paragraphs 3.1. - 3.5.
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Attorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No.2 in 1990 clarified considerably the 
uncertain nature of the law of confidences^.
2.2.5.1. - Attorney General v  Guardia?2 Newspapers No.2
Peter Wright was a former MI5 employee who sought to publish his memoirs 
under the title ' Spycatcher'. This contained an account of alleged irregularities in 
MI5, and alleged unlawful activities of its members. Wright could not publish his 
book in the United Kingdom because of the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 
1911, but he did seek to publish the volume in both Australia and the United 
States. On 22 and 23 June 1986 the 'Observer' and 'The Guardian' newspapers each 
published in the United Kingdom an article on the UK Government's attempts to 
prevent Wright publishing in Australia. Included in this was an account of Wright's 
allegations against MI5. The British Government successfully obtained an 
injunction preventing the newspapers from disclosing or publishing any 
information which they knew or had reasonable grounds to believe came from 
Wright and which concerned information obtained in his capacity as a member of 
the British Security Services. On 12 July 1987 'The Sunday Times' began to 
serialise Spycatcher. An injunction was sought by the Attorney General but this was 
rejected at first instance : it was held that although a duty of confidence was owed 
by the newspapers, the Government no longer had an interest in the information in 
question because it had ceased to be confidential, having been published in at least 
two other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeal similarly dismissed the appeal of the 
Attorney General and the cross-appeal by 'The Sunday Times'^®. Both parties 
appealed once more to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords held as follows:
32 supra.
3® The cross appeal o f the newspaper concerned a challenge to the ruling that a duty o f confidence 
was owed at all.
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• A confidant who acquires or receives information in circumstances importing a 
duty of confidence, is bound to maintain the confidentiality of the information 
in question.
• A third party who acquires or receives information in circumstances in which 
s/he knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is confidential 
is equally bound by a duty of confidentiality^^.
• In the particular circumstances of this case, the onus was on the Crown to 
establish that disclosure would damage or had damaged the public interest 
before relief would be granted^ .^ Because publication had already taken place in 
other jurisdictions, the secrecy of the information had been lost, and therefore 
no relief could lie.
• Neither the 'Observer' nor 'The Guardian' had been in breach of their duty of 
confidentiality by publishing the article on 22 and 23 June 1986, but 'The 
Sunday Times' was in breach of its duty by commencing serialisation and as a 
result was bound to account for its profits^k
• Finally, because the information over which the dispute had arisen was now in 
the public domain, it was no longer and could no longer be confidential. Thus, 
no further harm could be done to the public interest. This meant that no 
further injunction could be placed on newspapers preventing them from 
publishing the contents of the book.
This seminal decision has done much for the law of confidence. It establishes that a 
general duty of confidentiality can arise whenever one has knowledge of the 
confidential nature of information or when one ought to have such knowledge 
given all the circumstances of one's position. That is, there is an objective 
assessment of the circumstances which can lead to the imposition of an obligation
3^  For example, at 268E - G.
40 at 258A - 259H.
41 at 260A - 264A .
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of confidence. Furthermore, the decision goes a long way to settling the question of 
whether detriment requires to be shown^ .^ In the case of the UK Government this 
was most necessary and its failure to establish this proved to be the downfall of its 
case. On a more personal level, however, the question arises of what an individual 
would have to show to show detriment. This is addressed, inter alia, by Lord 
Keith,
Information about a person's private and personal 
affairs may be of a nature which shows him up in a 
favourable light and would by no means expose him 
to criticism. The anonymous donor of a very large 
sum to a very worthy cause has his own reasons for 
wishing to remain anonymous, which are unlikely to 
be discreditable. He should surely be in a position to 
restrain disclosure in breach of confidence of his 
identity in connection with the donation. So I would 
think that it is sufficient detriment to the confider that 
information given in confidence is to be disclosed to 
persons whom he would prefer not to know of it, 
even though the disclosure would not be harmful to 
him in any positive way.43
This is an extremely important passage. It demonstrates that the law places 
considerable weight on the protection of individual interests through the medium 
of this cause of action.
Finally, it should be noted that this decision by the House of Lords paved the way 
for a harmonisation of the legal position in both England & Wales and Scotland as 
regards the action of breach of confidence. Shortly after the Spycatcher decisioiT^, a 
Scottish version of the case with very similar facts reached the House of Lords.
42 Lord Griffiths certainly believes this to be so, at 270D  - H , although Lord G off wished 'to keep 
open the question whether detriment to the plaintiff Is an essential ingredient of an action for 
breach of confidence.', ibid, at 281LI, see also com ments on 282A - B.
43 ibid, at 256A - C . N o te  too , ' m X v Y ,  infra. Rose J held that 'the initial disclosure and its 
immediate consequences, not subsequent publication...found the plaintiff's claim in...breach o f  
confidence' at 658a - b.
44 Spycatcher was decided on June 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23; October 13 1988. LA v  The Scotsman 
Publications Ltd. was handed dow n on 6 July 1989.
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2.2.5.2. - Lord Advocate v  The Scotsman Publications LtdP^
This case concerned Anthony Cavendish, a former employee of MI6 from 1948 to 
1953. In 1987 Cavendish sought authorisation to publish a book about his life 
including information about his time as a member of the British Security Services. 
This book was entitled Inside Intelligence. Authorisation to publish was refused. 
Nevertheless, Cavendish had published 500 copies of the book, 279 of which he 
distributed to various private individuals as 'cards' for Christmas 1987. Copies of 
the book came into the hands of 'The Sunday Times' and 'The Scotsman' 
newspapers both of which published articles about the book and its contents. In 
England, the Attorney General was granted an injunction by the High Court of 
Justice against the Times Newspapers Ltd. restraining it or any other person with 
notice of the order from publishing any information obtained from Mr Cavendish 
and concerning the British security or intelligence services. In Scotland, the Lord 
Advocate brought a petition against the publishers and editor of 'The Scotsman' to 
prevent 'any person having notice...from disclosing or publishing or causing or 
permitting to be disclosed or published to any person all or any material or 
information obtained by Anthony Cavendish in the course of his employment 
with the British security and intelligence services . . .The  case proceeded through 
the courts to the House of Lords^ .^
In the course of its judgement the House of Lords confirmed that 'Scots law in this 
field [is] the same as that of England'^®. Thus, applying the law as outlined in 
Spycatcher, the court came to the conclusion that the newspaper would indeed be 
under a duty of confidentiality if it had received confidential information.
45 Lord Advocate v  The Scotsman Publications L td  1989 SLT 705 (TIL).
46 at 706.
42 For com m ent on  the case, see Walker, N .; 'Spycatcher's Scottish Sequel'. 1990, Public Law, 354.
4® at 708 - 709, per Lord Keith o f Kinkel quoting w ith  approval the judges of the Second D ivision of 
the Court of Session.
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However, this could not be so in the present case because the appellants had 
conceded that the book did not contain any information damaging to national 
security. In this way, it was held, the appellant deprived themselves of a basis for 
their interdict because they had 'not pleaded a good arguable prim-a facie case that 
further publication by the respondents would do any damage to the public 
interest'49.
This is a different conclusion from that reached in Spycatcher. In that case 
(Spycatcher) the appellants had clearly established a duty of confidentiality on the 
respondents but failed to show detriment because the information was part of the 
public domain. In the present case, because the contents of the book were 
innocuous, the respondents came under no duty of confidentiality at all. That is, 
the information failed to have the necessary quality of confidence. As Lord Keith 
said.
It was argued for the appellant that dismissal of this 
appeal would have the effect that any newspaper 
which received an unsolicited book of memoirs by a 
present or former member of the security or 
intelligence service would be free to publish it. That is 
not so. If there had been no previous publication at all 
and no concession that the contents of the book were 
innocuous the newspaper would undoubtedly itself 
come under an obligation of confidence and be subject 
to restraint.50
This raises a fundamental question about the basis of the law of confidence in this 
country. What, exactly, is being protected by the law? If it were simply the wishes 
of the confider then it should not matter that the information was innocuous. What 
would be of concern would be the need to respect the confider's wish that the
49 ibid, at 709 - 710.
50 ibid, at 710,
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information not be noised abroad. This is a serious consideration in this area of law 
for it is not clear what is the true basis of the action of breach of confidence.
3.1. - THE FO UN D A TIO N A L BASIS OF TFIE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
Libling has argued that if one expends time, money and effort in obtaining or 
creating information, this is a 'valuable entity' in which one has a property right^k 
By extension one could argue that the basis of the action of breach of confidence is 
a desire to protect the property interest in the information. Yet, a property analysis 
of information suffer from serious problems. For example, what if the information 
arises from a relationship between two or more persons or bodies? Who owns the 
information? Is it an example of common or joint ownership? If so, how does one 
decide who should control the information? Moreover, how can one resolve 
disputes between parties given that the parties to the relationship can, 
simultaneously and yet independently, possess and control the 'valuable entity' in 
its entirety? For these reasons and others, Jones has argued that property cannot be 
the basis of the action of breach of confidences^. Rather, he posits that the basis of 
the action is the 'broad equitable principle of good faith', namely, that he "who has 
received the information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it"'53 This 
relates, in part, to the general notion that one should not be allowed to take unfair 
advantage of another. This avoids the problems of trying to fit a concept such as
5^  Libling, D.F .; 'The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles'. 94, Law Quarterly Review , 
103, 1978.
52 Jones, G.; 'Restitution o f Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another's Confidence', 86, Law  
Quarterly Review, 463, 1970, at 464 - 465. H e notes that: 'A cursory study of the cases, where the 
plaintiff's confidence has been breached, reveals great conceptual confusion. Property, contract, 
bailment, trust, fiduciary relationship, good faith, unjust enrichment, have all been claimed, at one 
time or another, as the basis o f the judicial intervention. Indeed som e judges have indiscriminately 
intermingled all these concepts. The result is that the answer to many fundamental questions 
remains speculative.'
53 ihid, at 466 quoting Seagerv Copydex L td  [1967] 2 A ll ER 415, at 417 and Fraser v  Evans [1969] 1 
A U E R  8, at 11.
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information into an existing and rigid set of rules such as the law of property^'k 
Because good faith is based on principle this allows the notion of the legal 
protection of confidential information to develop along its own lines into 
something of a sui generis form of protections^. This is certainly the view taken by 
the Law Commission in its 1981 report,
...the courts do not confine themselves to purely 
equitable principles in solving the problems which 
arise in breach of confidence cases and it would seem 
more realistic to regard the modern action as simply 
being sui generis
However, the Spycatcher case gives considerable weight to the argument that the 
basis of the action lies in the law of EquityS .^ Most recently, Toulson and Phipps 
have argued that the foundation of the action of breach of confidence in England 
and Wales is indeed an equitable obligation, binding in conscience, and arising from 
the circumstances in which one receives the information^®. They agree with Jones 
that the law of confidence is sui generis in that has developed for itself a unique 
niche in law, but they argue that the foundational basis of the action is clear: 
Equity59.
54 A nother view is that the law seeks to protect the 'relationship' rather than the 'information' per 
se, see Wright, S.; 'Confidentiality and the Public/Private D ich otom y', 7, European Intellectual 
Property Review, 237, 1993. H ow ever, this argument is seriously undermined by the reality outlined  
by the H ouse o f Lords in the cases discussed above. In neither cases was there any form of 
relationship between the confider (the Government) and the third party com ing under an 
obligation of confidence (the newspapers).
55 See also, Wei, G.; 'Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information'. 12, Legal Studies, 302, 1992 
w ho states that, '...the majority view  is that the action is founded on equitable notions of good  
faith.'
56 op. cit., at 11.
52 See, for example, Lord Keith at 255E, Lord Griffiths at 268A and Lord G off at 28 ID  - E. For 
com m ent, see Capper, D .; 'Damages for Breach of the Equitable D uty  of C onfidence*. 14, Legal 
Studies, 313, 1994.
5® Toulson and Phipps, op. cit., chapter II generally, specifically at paragraphs 2.12 - 2.24.
59 ibid.
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Either way, whether the foundation of confidentiality be good faith or Equity, for 
the Scottish courts this poses a problem. First, to found the action in a general 
obligation not to treat others unfairly, lacks substance in both Scots and English 
law. There is, for example, no law of unfair competition as this is understood in 
other jurisdictions. Second, to imply that the basis of the action is founded in the 
English law of Equity tells us nothing about the Scottish source, for Scots law has 
no conception of the Law of Equity and such a law is of no standing in the Scottish 
system. Nevertheless, as Lord Keith stated in Lord Advocate v  Scotsman Publications 
Ltd, '[w]hile the juridical basis may differ to some extent in the two jurisdictions, 
the substance of the law in both of them is the same'^o.
Despite the above, it is submitted that one common source for the duty of 
confidentiality can be identified from the cases. That source is the public interest. 
Furthermore, this source explains why the Government was denied protection in 
Lord Advocate v  Scotsman Publications L td  and also allows us to draw non-parallels 
between the Government cases and cases which involve individuals.
In both the Spycatcher case and Lord Advocate v  Scotsman Publications Ltd  the 
House of Lords makes It clear that the protection of confidences finds considerable 
justification in the public interest. For example, Lord Keith in Spycatcher states that 
'...as a general rule, it is in the public interest that confidences should be 
respected...'61 and similarly in the same case Lord Goff states that,
I start with the broad general principle...that a duty of 
confidence arises when confidential information 
comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in 
circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have 
agreed, that the information is confidential,...[t]he 
existence of this broad general principle reflects the 
fact that there is such a public interest in the
66> supra, at 708.
61 supra, at 256A.
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maintenance of confidences, that the law will provide 
remedies for their protection.62
From this it should be clear why a remedy was denied in the Scottish Spycatcher 
case. The Government failed to establish that a public interest would be served by 
the grant of the interdict. To repeat the words of Lord Keith,
...the appellant has not pleaded a good arguable 
facie case that further publication by the respondents 
would do any material damage to the public interest.63
This is not to imply, however, that in all cases the onus is on the confidant to 
establish that a public interest must be served before his or her confidences should 
be respected64. In particular, it is important to note that the Spycatcher cases were 
influenced by a competing public interest; that of freedom of speech65. In contrast, 
when the confidentiality of individuals is at stake it is generally always presumed 
that a public interest is served by respecting such confidences. This is especially true 
in the health care setting.
3.1.1. - Confidentiality and H ealth Care
Legal decisions on medical confidentiality stress the important public interest(s) 
served by respecting patient confidences. For example, it has already been noted 
that the court m  X  v Y  preferred the public interest in maintaining confidences to 
the alleged 'public interest' in knowing the HIV status of two doctors66. And,
62 supra, at 281B - C.
63 Lord Advocate v  Scotsman Publications Ltd, supra cit., at 709 - 710.
64 N ote , however, that the Law Com m ission suggested this as a possible approach in its 1981 report; 
that is, it suggested that confidentiality should be protected only where it was in the public interest 
to do so, op. cit., paragraphs 6.77. - 6.84. For com m ent see, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, op. cit., 
paragraph 1484.
65 See Lord Advocate v  Scotsman, supra ck.,at 710.
66 A  V L, [1988] 2 A ll E.R 648, per Rose J at 653. See also, Attorney General v  Guardian Newspapers 
(No.2l [1988] 2 All E.R 545 at 659; [1988] 3 W .L.R 776 at 807, per  Lord Goff, '...the basis o f the 
law's protection o f confidence is that there is a public interest that confidences should be preserved
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although it is recognised that individuals have a private interest in personal 
information, it is generally accepted that the true justification for protection is an 
appeal to 'the public interest'. Thus, in W  v Egdell '^^, Sir Stephen Brown 
commented,
...in so far as the [first instance] judge referred to the 
'private interest' of W, I do not consider that the 
passage in his judgment^  ^ accurately stated the 
position...Of course W has a private interest, but the 
duty of confidence owed to him is based on the 
broader ground of public interest described by Rose J 
inXvY^^
The question of justification aside, the next issue to address is that of the 
mechanism of legal protection of confidences : what circumstances must exist or be 
proved to establish a duty of confidentiality?
4.1. - THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
For a legally enforceable right of confidentiality to arise several factors must be 
satisfied: first, the information must have the necessary quality of confidence about 
it^ o. Information which is part of the public domain cannot be considered to be 
confidentiaFh Second, the information must be imparted in circumstances which
and protected by the law.,.'. N o te  however he continued, '...neveitheless the public interest may be 
outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.', ibid.
W V  Egdell [1990] 1 A ll E.R 835, discussed infra.
[1989] 1 A ll E.R 1089 at 1105.
X v  K[1988] supra, at 660-661, W v  Egdell, supra cit., at 846g-h; also per Bingham LJ at 849d-e. See 
also, Lion Laboratories v  Evans [1985] Q.B 526 at 536.
Coco v A  N C lark  (Engineers), supra. Toulson and Phipps make the point that, '...information  
must be objectively confidential, and not m erely treated as such, in order to attract protection.', op. 
cit., at 3.04 - 3,05. A  contrary view  has recently been advanced by Jacob J in Car/low Products (UK) 
L td  V Linwood Securities (Birmingham) L td  and Others [1996] FSR 424 in w hich the judge preferred a 
subjective approach to the question of whether details o f a design for a wheel lock had been 
imported in confidence and had the necessaiy quality o f confidence. For com m ent on this see,
Clark, S.; 'Circumstances Im porting an Obligation of Confidence : A  Subjective or Objective Test?
: Carflow Products (UK) Ltd v  L inw ood Securities (Birmingham) Ltd and O thers'. 11, European 
Intellectual Property R eview , 632, 1996.
A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No.2, supra cit..
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import a duty of confidence. This is done if a person receiving the information 
realises or should realises that the information is confidential and that the 
confidence is to be respected^ .^ Finally, to be actionable the information must be 
disclosed or used by the confidant without authority from the confider or without 
lawful excuse^ .^ It is also probably the case that a form of detriment must be shown, 
although in personal information cases it is sufficient that the individual would 
rather that the information not be disclosed '^ .^
As with the professional and ethical conceptions of confidentiality, the law in the 
United Kingdom does not see the duty of confidentiality as absolute^ .^ The defences 
to an action for breach of confidence are: i) the disclosure or use of the information 
was in the public interest^ ,^ ii) the information is already in the public domain^ ,^ hi) 
disclosure is made with lawful excuse or justification, e.g. - statutory authority or 
discharge of a public function^^, and, iv) the defender already knew the information 
before it was disclosed to him in confidences^.
Clearly, in the health care setting information of a confidential nature is common 
currency. A ll health care professionals come under a legal duty to respect patient
S2 supra.
For a discussion of the elements see, Toulson and Phipps, op. cit., chapter III.
54 supra.
55 For argument in defence of an absolute duty see, K ottow, M.FL; 'Medical Confidentiality : An  
Intransigent and Absolute O bligation', 12, Journal o f  Medical Ethics, 117, 1986. For an account of 
the French position where an absolute duty is imposed and protected by the law . See, Lenoir, N .; 
'Aspects Juridiques et Ethiques du D iagnostic Prenatal : Le Droit et Les Pratiques en Vigeur en 
France et dans Divers Autres Pays', in 'Hum an Genetic Analysis and the Protection o f Personality 
and Privacy', International Colloquium , Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag Zurich 1994, at 49ff.
W  V Egdell, supra cit.; Lion Laboratories v  Evans, supra cit.; cf ■ X v Y ,  supra cit.
A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No.2, supra cit.
See Hunter v  Mann [1974] 2 A ll ER 414, Malone v  Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 2 All 
ER 620, andi? v  Licensing Authority established under Medicines A ct 1968, ex parte Stnith Kline and  
French Laboratories L td (Generics (UK) L td  intervening} [1990] 1 A C  64, [1989] 1 All ER 175, C A  
(affd sub nom  Smith Kline and French Laboratories L td  v  Licensing Authority (Generics (UK) L td  
in tervening  [1990] 1 A C  64, [1989] 1 A ll ER 578, HL. In this last case it was held that a public 
authority exercising powers under a U K  statute as well as Com m unity law could make use of 
confidential information to exercise properly its official function. The Court o f Appeal stressed the 
public health function of the body concerned.
Johnston v  Heat and A ir  Systems L td  (1941) 58 RPC 229.
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confidences. Problems arise, however, in determining the limits of such a duty. 
Primary among these is the question of when disclosure is in the public interests' .^ 
Several medical law cases have addressed this issue in recent years.
5.1. - THE LIMITS OF THE LEGAL DUTY OF MEDICAL
CONFIDENTIALITY
The cases oi X  v Y  and W  v Egdell have already been mentioned. They have been 
instrumental in clarifying to a degree the legal limits of the medical duty of 
confidentiality. For this reason alone they deserve closer attention.
S A A . - X v Y
The case oi X  v  Y  concerned the disclosure of personal health information relating 
to two general practitioners with AIDS by an employee of a health authority to a 
newspaper reporter of a national newspaper. The health authority sought and 
obtained an order restraining the publication or use of the confidential 
information. Nevertheless, an article was published and a further item was 
intended. The plaintiffs therefore sought, inter alia, an injunction restraining the 
defendants from identifying the two doctors and an order from the court to the 
newspaper requiring disclosure of its sources. In reply, the defendants argued that 
publication was justified in the public interest and that the public had a right to 
know that doctors were continuing to treat patients while infected by AIDS.
See Lord G off in Attorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No2, supra, at 282D - E : '...although  
the basis o f the law's protection of confidence is that there is a public interest that confidences 
should be preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed  
by som e other countervailing public interest w hich favours disclosure. This lim itation may 
apply...to all types o f confidential information. It is this lim iting principle which m ay require a 
court to  carry out a balancing operation, weighing the public interest in maintaining confidences 
against the countervailing public interest favouring disclosure'.
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Rose J refused to authorise disclosure in the public interest. He held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendants to prevent 
them from publishing the confidential information in any form. Whereas he did 
not deny that there was a public interest in public health, he did not accept the 
argument that this interest would be furthered by disclosure of the sensitive, 
personal and confidential information. Indeed, his view was that the public interest 
which formed the basis of the protection of confidence in the first place, would be 
compromised to an unacceptable degree if the confidences were not respected. He 
noted that public health was not under threat from doctors who continued to 
practise general medicine, although the situation might be different if they were 
engaged in invasive procedures. Also, he noted that there was a public interest in 
freedom of the press but that this was not sufficiently strong in the circumstances 
of the present case to merit breach of confidence^b Moreover, he approved of a 
very important distinction when dealing with the public interest : [t]here is a wide 
difference between what is interesting to the public and what it is in the public 
interest to make known
From this decision several conclusions can be drawn. First, there is a strong public 
interest in protecting patient confidences. Second, there is no absolute duty to do 
so, but when conflict arises the balance must be between competing public 
interests. Third, the breach of confidence, to be acceptable, must at least, assist in 
furthering the competing public interest. This was clearly not possible in X v Y .  
Finally, in determining legitimate public interests, some tangible benefit to the 
public must be demonstrated and not mere titillation or entertainment.
ibid, at 658d - 661g,
This is the frequently cited quote from Lord Wilberforce in British Steel Corporation v  Granada 
Television L td  [1981] A C  1096 at 1168.
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The value of this case lies in its defence of the individual's confidentiality. Its 
weakness lies in its failure to express more clearly the precise nature of the concept 
of public interest.
5,1.2. - W v  Egdell
The question of public interest arose again in the case oi W  v Egdell^^. This case 
involved a patient, W, detained in a secure hospital who had been convicted of 
criminal offences after having shot and killed five people and wounded two others. 
Ten years after his initial detention he applied to a mental health review tribunal to 
be discharged or transferred to a regional secure unit as a first move to his eventual 
release. As part of proceedings Dr Egdell was asked to prepare a report on W s  
mental health and suitability for transfer. The report which Dr Egdell produced 
was extremely unfavourable to W s chances and as a result W withdrew his 
application. However, Dr Egdell was concerned that neither the tribunal nor the 
hospital had sight of his report and so he took it upon himself to send copies of the 
report to the hospital which sent a copy to the Secretary of State who in turn 
passed it to the tribunal. On discovering this W issued a writ against Dr Egdell 
which sought (a) to restrain any use or disclosure of the report by its recipients, (b) 
delivery up of all copies of the report, and (c) damages for breach of confidence. 
This was contested on the basis that the action of the doctor was justified in the 
public interest.
The Court of Appeal took the same line as Rose ] m  X  v  V  and sought to consider 
the competing public interests at stake in this case: namely, the public interest in 
protecting confidences as against the public interest in ensuring that dangerous
supra cit.
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individuals were not released prematurely back into society '^ .^ This time the court 
preferred the public interest which supported disclosure. Bingham LJ put it like 
this,
Where a man has committed multiple killings under 
the disability of serious mental illness, decisions which 
may lead directly or indirectly to his release from 
hospital should not be made unless a responsible 
authority is properly able to make an informed 
judgment that the risk of repetition is so small as to be 
acceptable. A consultant psychiatrist who becomes 
aware, even in the course of a confidential 
relationship, of information which leads him, in the 
exercise of what the court considers a sound 
professional judgment, to fear that such decisions may 
be made on the basis of inadequate information and 
with a real risk of consequent danger to the public, is 
entitled to take such steps as are reasonable in all the 
circumstances to communicate his concern to the 
appropriate authorities.®^
There are several things to note about this judgment. First, the defence of public 
interest operates only in limited circumstances. For example, Dr Egdell's disclosure 
was only acceptable because it was to 'the appropriate authorities'. Had it been to 
other persons or bodies it would amount to a breach of confidence® .^ This re­
inforces the point made in X  v Y  that disclosure of confidential information is 
acceptable only if it has a likelihood of furthering the public interest which justified 
breaching the confidence. It would seem fair to assert that the degree of that 
likelihood is one of reasonable likelihood. Second, the threat to the public interest 
must be 'real'. Insignificant or trivial interference with public interests is not
It is interesting to note that at first instance in this case Scott J sought to balance the public 
interest defence against what he perceived to be the private interest of the prisoner, [1989] 1 A ll ER 
1089 at 1105. This was rejected by the Court of Appeal, ibid, at 846f - g and at 849d - e. 
ibid, at 852h - 853a.
ibid, per Sir Stephen Brown P : '[i]f...Dr Egdell had sold the contents of his report to a 
newspaper, I do not think any court o f equity w ould hesitate for a m oment before concluding that 
his conduct had been a breach of his duty o f confidence', at 842f -g. N ote , however, that it has been 
accepted that in some circumstances disclosure to the press is acceptable, see Lion Laboratories, v  
Evans, supra cit.
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sufficient. Finally, the case, unfortunately, gives no clearer indication of the precise 
nature of what counts as 'public interest'. Indeed, Bingham's dictum reads like a 
very case-specific judgment, although it is not intended to be. In this case the 
avoidance of harm to the public was clearly in the public interest. \n  X  v  Y  the 
public interests were freedom of the press and the public's right to know. But 
beyond this, neither of these cases gives any indication of what, in the future, this 
defence will encompass. This has two important consequences; one for the law and 
the other for the medical profession. The law remains in a state of uncertainty, 
condemned to piecemeal development. For the medical profession it represents an 
onerous burden, for it is clinicians themselves who must decide whether disclosure 
is to be justified in the public interest. And, should they do so wrongly, they may 
face a legal action for breach of confidence.
Other subsequent cases have extended the application of the public interest defence, 
notably; R v Crozier^^, Re C (a minor)(evidence : confidential information^^ and the 
non-medical case of Hellewell v Chief Constable o f  Derbyshire^^.
5.1.3. - R v  Crozier
The case o i R v  Crozier simply represents an application of the law as interpreted in 
W  V  Egdell. In criminal proceedings before the Crown Court at Reading on 3 
November 1988 the accused, Peter Michael Anthony Crozier, pleaded guilty to the 
attempted murder of his sister. Despite having gone through psychiatric evaluation, 
when sentence was pronounced one week later no report was available to the 
defence. The judge therefore proceeded in the absence of medical evidence and 
sentenced Crozier to nine years' imprisonment. As this was happening the doctor 
who had most recently assessed the accused entered the court and was alarmed to
[1990] 8 BMLR 128.
®® [1991] 7 BMLR 138.
[1995] 1 W LR 804.
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hear that a custodial sentence was to be imposed. He approached counsel for the 
Crown and disclosed the contents of his report which concluded that the accused 
was suffering from a mental illness of a psychopathic nature and that he should be 
detained under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983. As a result the 
Crown sought a variation of the sentence under S47(2) of the Supreme Court Act 
1981 to replace the custodial sentence with a hospital order. At the third hearing 
counsel for the appellant argued that the judge should disregard the evidence 
contained in the psychiatric report because it should never have been placed in the 
hands of the Crown as a confidential document between the appellant and the 
examining physician. It should have been a matter for the appellant and his counsel 
to decided whether or not to disclose the report. Had correct procedure been 
followed neither the Crown nor the judge would be aware of the report's contents. 
The judge ruled, however, that justice demanded that he consider any medical 
evidence put before him. An appeal was lodged to the Court of Appeal challenging 
the trial judge's disposal and arguing that it was invalid because it took into account 
a report which was released in breach of patient confidentiality.
The Court of Appeal asked two fundamental questions: did the psychiatrist (Dr. 
McDonald) breach confidentiality, and, if he did, was he justified in doing so? °^ 
Quoting heavily from the dicta of Bingham h] in W  v  EgdeW^, the Court regarded 
Dr. McDonald as very much in the same position as Dr. Egdell. That is, the 
clinician was in possession of information which he felt was of vital importance 
concerning the treatment of one who had previously committed violent crime. It 
was held that, as in W  v Egdell, there was a strong public interest which favoured 
disclosure. Dr. McDonald was, therefore, acquitted of any 'impropriety'^^ and the 
disposal confirmed.
ibid, at 134.
91 In particular (1989) 4 BMLR 96 at 111-112, [1990] Ch 359 at 419-420, and, (1989) 4 BMLR 96 at 
117, [1990] Ch 359 at 424.
R v  Crozier, supra, at 136.
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Typically for a medical confidentiality case, R v  Crozier does not contain any deep 
analysis of the content of the 'public interest'. The Court of Appeal relied 
exclusively on the decision m  W  v  Egdell but the facts of the two cases are not on 
all fours. In Egdell the decision which was to be taken concerned the first move in 
the process of release of the patient. In Crozier there was no question of release of 
the accused; rather it was a matter of appropriateness of disposal. That is, there 
could not have been any immediate or even foreseeable danger to the public arising 
from the instant decision of the trial court. Certainly, a difference in the two 
proposed disposals is the question of time limits: the initial imprisonment was for a 
period of nine years, whereas the hospital order could be imposed without limit of 
time. But it is surely better (and more credible) to argue that a hospital order was in 
the patient's (better) interests rather than in the public interest. Unfortunately, the 
law of confidence does not seem to provide for this. Another distinction between 
the cases concerns the relative 'threat' which the respective patients pose to the 
'public interest'. Unlike patient W who had attacked and killed several individuals 
randomly, Crozier's crime was person specific and arose from particular 
circumstances in his family^ .^ From this it is arguably less clear that Crozier posed 
as great, if any, threat to the general public. What the Court says about the public 
interest defence is in effect very little, except perhaps that it can be used to justify 
breaches of confidence when there is no immediate threat to the public interest and 
where it is far from clear how 'dangerous' the individual in question actually is.
5.1.4. - Re C (a minor) (evidence: confidentiality information)
Re C (a minor) concerned adoption proceedings and the fitness of the natural 
mother to care for her child. C was born on 26 September 1988 and four days later
9^  H e attacked his sister w ith  an axe w hen, as co-trustee for a trust set up for Crozier's daughter, she 
disputed Crozier's management of the monies.
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was placed with foster parents with a view to adoption. Maternal consent had been 
obtained. Subsequently, however, the mother withdrew her consent prior to the 
completion of adoption proceedings. In response the prospective adoptive couple 
served an affidavit on the mother detailing evidence from the mother's general 
practitioner which cast her in an unfavourable light and called into question her 
ability to care for her child. The mother's representatives argued that the doctor's 
evidence should be inadmissible on the grounds that by volunteering such evidence 
the doctor was in breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the mother. The 
judge ruled that the evidence was admissible but granted leave to appeal. The case 
was then heard by the Court of Appeal.
The argument put by counsel for the appellant was that the case involved a need to 
decide between two competing public interests : the public interest in maintaining 
confidentiality between doctor and patient and the public interest that justice in the 
particular case should be done^ .^ Sir Stephen Brown P, Stuart-Smith and Mann LJJ 
each delivered separate judgements; all agreed that disclosure was justified, but each 
differed on his reasons for so holding.
Sir Stephen Brown held that the doctor's affidavit was highly relevant to the matter 
of adoption of the child and that it should therefore be placed before the judge in 
that cause if it were at all p o s s ib le ^ ^ .  Although undecided on the question of 
whether in fact there had ever been a breach of confidence^*", he held that the 
doctor was justified in making available her evidence. This he argued was because 
the court should have before it all relevant and significant information which will 
assist it to make 'the right decision', and that if a judge had to carry out a balancing 
exercise between full disclosure and respecting confidentiality, he would be fully 
justified in admitting the doctor's evidence. Beyond this we are not offered a more
94 (1991) 7 BMLR 138, at 140.
9^  ibid, at 143.
9^  ibid.
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detailed account of why breach of confidence is acceptable or why full disclosure is 
to be preferred. He stressed, however, that an important feature of the disclosure 
was its limited nature. The doctor did not make her report available to the public at 
large but only to those who were directly involved in the question of the adoption 
of the child, that is, the judge and those who were bound by the confidentiality of 
the hearing in judicial chambers^ .^ This is in line with similar views expressed in W  
V EgdeW^.
Stuart-Smith LJ agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. Like Sir Stephen Brown 
he was undecided about the question of whether the doctor had ever breached her 
duty (although he indicated that he thought not)99. Nonetheless, he held that the 
judge was entitled to admit the evidence of the doctor as a matter of judicial 
discretion. In other words, he turned the case into one of judicial review, thereby 
tying the hands of counsel and the Court of Appeal by restricting them to 
considering whether or not the judge had exercised his discretion appropriately. To 
challenge successfully such an exercise of discretion one must establish one of only 
three things: either, that the judge took into account irrelevant matters, or that he 
failed to take into account relevant matters, or that his decision was plainly 
wrong^°°. Stuart-Smith LJ concluded that.
The adoption of a child is a matter of very great public 
importance. It affects the welfare of the child for the 
rest of its life, and the issue before the court in this 
case, namely whether the mother had unreasonably 
withheld her consent, is therefore one of very great 
importance. On the assumption, therefore, that there 
was a breach of confidence here, in my judgment, the 
judge was entirely correct to exercise his discretion as 
he did and to admit the evidence. There was not basis 
for saying that he was wrong.
9^  ibid, at 143.
9® supra cit.
99 ibid, at 144,
100 id.
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Like his fellow Lord Justices, Mann LJ also called into question the assertion that 
the doctor had breached her duty of confidentiality. This was so even although it 
had been conceded in the original hearing that a breach of confidence had occurred. 
The basis for his view seems to be that the evidence was relevant to the future of 
the child and that the dissemination of the evidence was restricted on a 'need to 
know' basisi°i. At the end of the day, however, he too seems to turn the case into 
one of judicial discretion and concluded that the judge was 'plainly right' in the 
exercise of his discretion in allowing the evidencei°^.
This judgment calls us to question several aspects of the duty of confidentiality. For 
instance, what is the difference between a breach of confidence for which one has a 
defence - for example, the defence of public interest - and the disclosure of 
confidential information in circumstances which do not amount to a breach of 
confidentiality even when the confider objects to disclosure? Does the latter imply 
that no duty exists in those circumstances? In this case it would seem that the 
Court of Appeal was suggesting that it is possible for information to be disclosed 
without a confider's consent and yet that this would not amount to a breach of 
confidence. Unfortunately it is not clear whether this means simply that a defence 
is available or whether the court intended that there was no breach of duty because 
in those circumstances there was no duty at all to breach. As we have seen, if the 
former is the case, it is not clear which defence was relied upon by the court to 
justify its decision. The most likely candidate, once again, is the public interest, but 
no argument is made for this defence except for a few comments in the course of 
the judgement which do not bear close scrutiny. Stuart-Smith states, for example, : 
'It is in the public interest, it seems to me, that the doctor should have had in mind 
the welfare and well-being of this c h i l d . M a n n  LJ simply states : 'I think it could
ibid, at 146. 
103 ibid, at 144.
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be argued that there is a strong public interest in the future of the child.'104 
However, nowhere is an argued case made which sustains these views. This is not a 
matter of mere sophistry. It matters very much whether or not a prima facie duty is 
owed but breach is justified or whether no duty is owed at all. For one thing, it 
means that patients are not entitled to expect that as a matter of course their 
confidences will be respected. Furthermore, it has consequences for evidential 
burdens. If no prima facie duty is owed then the task of proving breach of 
confidence becomes increasingly difficult for the pursuer/plaintiff. Clearer 
explication of the parameters of the duty and indeed of when such a duty comes 
into being, or ceases to be, is required. Perhaps the closest indication we have of the 
true views of the court comes from Stuart-Smith LJ,
It seems to me that the doctor was plainly under a 
duty to treat the information given by the patient in 
confidence in general terms. For example, she would 
plainly be in breach of that duty to disclose any 
matters to the press or people who were not 
concerned. The court is concerned with the breach of 
the duty. I am by no means satisfied that, in the 
circumstances of this case, there was any breach of 
that duty in disclosing these matters to those who 
were concerned with the welfare of the child, namely 
the court and the solicitors for the adopters.
[emphasis added]
It is reasonable to interpret this passage as meaning that the duty owed by doctors 
to patients is one of a general nature, which does not necessarily extend to specific 
circumstances, an example of which arose in the instant case. If this is true, 
arguably it removes the prima facie assumption that health care professionals owe 
their patients a duty of confidentiality over all information received as soon as the 
therapeutic alliance is formed. This then has the consequences outlined above^°6
*^34 ihict  ^ at 146. 
ibid, at 144.
A lthough it is not argued in the case, support for such a view  can be found (albeit tentatively) in 
the dicta of Lord G off m  A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers L td  (No.2), supra cit., where at 281 
([1990] 1 A C  109) he says : T start from the broad general principle (which I do not in any way
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Even if this is not the case, and the justification of the court in its decision is the 
public interest defence, the judgment extends the defence quite considerably. It is 
not immediately clear to the present writer how the case of one prospectively 
adopted child fits into the rubric of public interest. Certainly there is a private 
interest at stake, in that the child should be dealt with according to its best interests. 
To say, however, as does Stuart-Smith LJ, that, '[i]t is in the public interest...that 
the doctor should have in mind the welfare and well-being of this child' does not 
necessarily transform the child's case into a matter of public interest. While it is 
undeniable that a child's interests are of considerable importance, it would seem 
logical that if these are to be preferred to the public interest in protecting 
confidentiality, an account of the relevant factors to be weighed should at least be 
given. That the court fails to do so in Re C further weakens the duty of confidence 
owed to patients and renders potentially unruly the public interest defence.
intend to be definitive) that a duty of confidence arises w hen confidential information comes to the 
knowledge o f a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have 
agreed, that the information is confidential, w ith  the effect that it would he just in all the circumstances 
that he should be precluded from  disclosing the information to others.' [emphasis added]. Arguably, by  
extension this w ould  mean that in certain circumstances justice w ould dictate that a duty need not 
arise. O n  the facts o f this case, it w ill be remembered that the interests at stake (as articulated by  
counsel for the appellant) were those in maintaining confidentiality and those of justice. Rather 
than balancing the tw o (as counsel argued) one m ight choose, on the authority of Lord Goff, to  
submit that justice requires that no duty be seen to arise in the first place. This is borne out if one 
accepts the arguments that, in England and Wales at least, the duty of confidence is based in Equity. 
What this means is that a court can recognise a right but refuse to protect it in particular 
circumstances because the rights are discretionary. See, for example, Wacks, R.; 'Privacy and Press 
Freedom ', London, Biackstone Press Ltd, 1995, at 96. This w ould certainly provide an explanation  
for the decision o f the Court o f Appeal in Re C  even if the judges in that case do not choose to  
articulate their judgements in such terms. O f course, this explains nothing from the Scottish  
perspective. Finally, it is interesting to note that Toulson and Phipps are of the opinion that '...no  
obligation o f confidence exists in contract or equity, in so far as the subject matter concerns a 
serious risk of public harm (including but not lim ited to cases of "iniquity") and the alleged 
obligation w ould prevent disclosure appropriate to prevent such harm', op. cit., at 6.11. A t 6.19 - 
6.20 they discuss W v  Egdell and conclude that, '[t]he danger to the public was such that, although  
there was a confidential relationship between the parties, the duty of confidence impliedly  
undertaken by the defendant d id  not extend to w ithholding information about the plaintiff’s state of 
health from the responsible medical authorities.' [emphasis added] 
ibid, at 144.
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5.1.5. - Hellewell v Chief Constable o f Derbyshire
The final case to be examined does not concern medical matters but does clarify 
certain issues surrounding the action of breach of confidence. This case involved 
one Paul Hellewell who was detained by police on 11 May 1989 and charged with 
offences of theft of petrol and attempted theft of petrol. At the time of his arrest he 
was fingerprinted and photographed. He was later convicted of the said offences 
and by February 1993 he had a total of 32 convictions, 19 of which were for theft. 
On 16 November 1992 the police of Long Eaton in Derbyshire, where the plaintiff 
lived, issued photographs of known criminals to the Long Eaton Shop Watch 
Scheme: a crime prevention group established with the support of the police force. 
This was done in an attempt to assist staff to know who was likely to be a 
troublemaker and to identify those who were banned from shops. The photographs 
were distributed on the understanding that only staff of shops, and not the general 
public, should have access to the photographs. In June 1993 the plaintiff learned 
that his photograph had been distributed and he commenced proceedings for 
declaratory relief, injunction and damages against the Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire for use of the photograph taken in May 1989. In response, the Chief 
Constable applied to have the claim struck out on the grounds that there was no 
cause to answer and the claim was scandalous and an abuse of process.
The case was heard by Laws J. in the Queen's Bench Division and he delivered his 
opinion on 21 December 1994^ °®. In that judgment he proceeds on the basis that 
there could only be one potential cause of action, namely; breach of c o n f id e n c e ^ ° 9  
Moreover, he starts from the premiss that the unauthorised disclosure of a 
photograph can be actionable as breach of c o n f i d e n c e Fhe first question with 
which he had to deal, however, was whether or not the police could be the subject
The case is reported at [1995] 1 W .L.R 804.
109 ibid, at 807.
110 Q uoting Pollard V Photographic Co (1888) 40 C h.D . 345.
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of a duty of confidence in the circumstances of the present casein. To determine 
this Laws J. considered the criteria for establishing a right of confidentiality as 
summarised by Sir Robert Megarry V.C. in Malone v  Metropolitan Police 
CommissioneP^^, the dicta of Lord Goff in Attorney General v  Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd (No.2) (which suggest that a duty of confidence can arise when an objective 
perspective would so dictate^), and the case of Marcel v  Commissioner o f Police o f 
theMetropolis^^^ (which concerned documents seized by police officers and in which 
it was held that a private law duty to the owner of such documents existed and that 
the nature of that duty was one of confidentiality^). In light of this he held that a 
duty of confidence was owed to the plaintiffn^. However, the confidential 
information which was the subject of the duty was not just the photograph of the
plaintiff, but the photograph taken in police custody which would 'convey to
anyone looking at it the knowledge that its subject is or has been known to the 
police.'112 Clearly, someone's facial features are a matter of public knowledge and 
cannot count as confidential information. In contrast, the fact that someone is 
known to the police is not 'a public fact'n®. The consequence of establishing this 
duty was that the police could not use the photograph in any way they liked.
In my judgment, the use which the police may make
of a photograph such as this is limited by their
obligations to the photograph's subject as follows.
They may make reasonable use of it for the purpose of 
the prevention of and detection of crime, the 
investigation of alleged offences and the apprehension
111 Pollard  concerned portrait photographs o f a woman taken by a professional photographer, one 
of w hich was used by him as a Christmas card and displayed in his shop.
112 [1979] C h.344 at 375. These have already been discussed supra. They are : 'first, the information  
must have the necessary quality o f confidence about it. Secondly, that information must have been 
imparted in circumstances im porting an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an 
unauthorised use o f that information to the detriment of the party com m unicating it...'.
113 [1990] 1 A C  109 at 281.
114 [1992] Ch. 225.
11^  ibid, per N olan  LJ at 261.
11^  Hellewell, supra at 810.
112 ibid. The photograph was of the nature of a 'mugshot' - instantly recognisable to anyone as a 
police photograph.
11® id.
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of suspects or persons unlawfully at large. They may 
do so whether or not the photograph is of any person 
they seek to arrest or of a suspected accomplice or of 
anyone else. The key is that they must have these 
purposes in mind and must, as I have said, make no 
more than reasonable use of the picture in seeking to 
accomplish them.^^
This clearly sees the duty of confidentiality as of prima facie value. The question 
then for the court was whether or not the activities of the police fell within such 
'reasonable use'. Laws J concluded that they didi^o. In framing his dictum into the 
rubric of the public interest defence, he held that the police use of the photograph 
was done in good faith for the prevention or detection of crime (accepted 
unquestioningly as a public interest). Moreover, the dissemination of the 
photograph by the police was limited to shopkeepers in the shop watch scheme, 
that is, only to persons who had a reasonable need to make use of it^ i^. Thus, the 
Justice held that although a duty of confidentiality was owed, if the case went to 
trial the Chief Constable was bound to succeed in establishing a public interest 
defence.
This case does nothing to further our understanding of the public interest. As noted 
above, it was accepted unquestioningly that the prevention and detection of crime 
is in that interest which few would, or could, dispute. However, the case is 
interesting for several other reasons. First, it confirms Lord Goff's view from 
Attorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No2 that a duty of confidence can arise 
irrespective of a specific contract between parties, or a 'traditional relationship' 
(such as doctor/patient), or express notice from confider to confidant. Second, it 
has been argued that this case provides the basis for the protection of many privacy
119 zW.
120 ibid, at 811.
121 id.
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interests which, to date, have not been protected in the United Kingdomi22_ This 
possibility will be discussed in more detail in chapter six where we shall also 
examine the desirability of accepting such an a r g u m e n t i23_
As a final point, it should be noted that the question of the scope of the public 
interest defence has been addressed in other non-medical cases dealing with breach 
of confidence. Traditionally, it was thought that the general rule that 'there is no 
confidence as to the disclosure of an i n i q u i t y . . . '124 embodied the entire scope of the 
defence. That is, matters of serious misconduct or criminality could not be 
protected by the law of confidence and their disclosure would clearly be in the 
public interest 125. However, a series of cases beginning in the late 1960s took a view 
of the public interest defence which was much broaderi2 .^ The zenith of this 
movement came with the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Lion 
Laboratories L td  v  Evans^'^^. Here, two ex-employees of Lion Labs disclosed to a 
newspaper internal memoranda concerning a breath test device developed by Lion 
Labs for the detection of drink drivers. This device was already in use but the 
memoranda revealed concerns about its accuracy. In holding that such a disclosure 
fell clearly within the public interest, the Court of Appeal said that the public 
interest defence was not restricted to cases of iniquity. Such cases were merely 
instances of the public interest defence : there was not always the need to show 
criminality or misconduct on the part of the confider. Cripps has stated in relation
122 See, for example, W ee Loon, N-L.; 'Emergence o f a Right to Privacy from W ithin the Law of  
Confidence?', 5, European Intellectual Property R eview , 307, 1996. For a more general argument that 
the law of confidence can protect privacy interests see, Fenwick, H . and Phillipson, G.; 'Confidence 
and Privacy: A  Re-Examination', 55, Cambridge Law  Journal, 447, 1996.
123 The passage w hich has excited interest is the follow ing : 'If som eone w ith  a telephoto lens were 
to take from a distance and w ith  no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his 
subsequent disclosure o f the photograph w ould, in m y judgment, as surely amount to a breach of 
confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary in w hich the act was recounted and 
proceeded to publish it. In such a case, the law w ould  protect what might reasonably be called a 
right to privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action w ould be breach o f confidence.', 
see Hellewell, supra cit., at 807. This passage is also discussed infra.
124 Gartside v  O utram  (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 at 114.
123 For a discussion o f this see Wacks, R.; 'Privacy and Press Freedom ', op. cit., chapter 4.
12^  ibid.
127[1985] 1 QB 526.
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to this decision that it is: '...a deeper inroad into actions of breach of 
confidence...than any previous case on the public interest d e f e n c e . ' But, as Wacks 
points out,
...an important feature of this case is that the alleged 
inaccuracy of the Intoximeter could have had an effect 
on "the life, and even the liberty, of an unascertainable 
number of Her Majesty's s u b j e c t s " .  1 2 9
That is, the likelihood of averting considerable, possibly immeasurable, harm was a 
strong influential factorise,
5.2. - CONFIDENTIALITY A N D  THE LAW: A CO NCLUSIO N
The above survey of legal cases concerning the protection of confidential 
information reveals the essential features which give rise to a legal duty of 
confidence and also the circumstances in which such a duty can be breached with 
just cause. It is now well settled that a duty arises where confidential information 
(that is, information to which there is limited access) is exchanged between parties 
in circumstances where the parties know, or ought to know, that the information 
should remain confidential. This is so even if there is no contractual agreement 
between the parties or even an express undertaking to maintain confidentiality. 
Clearly then, in the health care setting a duty of confidence is owed by all health 
care professionals to their patients by virtue of the nature of their relationship and 
the sensitive nature of information which is exchanged in the course of the 
relationship. This view is supported by both ethical principles and professional 
guidelines. The question of when confidential information can be disclosed to
2^® See Cripps, Y.; 'A lcohol Measuring Devices and Breaches of Copyright and C onfidence'. 44, 
Cambridge Law Journal, 35, 1985, at 36.
429 Wacks, 'Privacy and Press Freedom ', op, cit., at 104, quoting Stephenson LJ in Lion Labs at 546.
430 This view  was endorsed by Lord G off m  A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No.2, supra 
cit., at 282.
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persons outside the relationship is dealt with, in the first instance, by reference to 
patient consent. Since confidentiality is the right of the patient and gives rise to a 
duty on the doctor, the patient should prima facie be consulted about any disclosure 
of information to others. If consent is forthcoming there can be no question of 
breach of confidence. If, however, consent is not forthcoming and the health care 
professional nevertheless discloses the information in question, this constitutes a 
breach of duty. The only justification possible is that the disclosure was necessary 
and within the terms of one of the defences to an action for breach of confidence. 
These have been articulated above. As we have seen, the most frequently used 
defence, and yet the most difficult to define, is that of public interest. In such cases, 
when faced with a question of justified breach of confidence, the courts must 
balance two public interests : that of maintaining confidentiality and that put 
forward as a defence for the breach.
The category of public interests which can qualify for the defence is clearly not 
closed. From the above cases this includes: the prevention and detection of crime, 
the protection of the public from dangerous individuals, and the welfare of children 
(or a child). However, as has been argued, the courts have been reluctant to define 
in clear terms the scope of this defence. In certain cases one might consider that the 
defence has been stretched to justify a particular outcome, as for example, the 
decision in Re C. In each case, however, the concern of the courts has been to 
avoid harm to third parties, be they a non-specific group such as 'the general public' 
or even a single child.
Thus, the determining factor in recognising third party interests - and indeed in 
balancing such interests with those of the confider - has been whether significant 
harm can be avoided by disclosure of confidential information. All of the above 
cases demonstrate that just as the duty of confidentiality is founded on public 
interest, so too can health care professionals invoke the public interest to justify
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breaching individual patient confidentiality if this will avoid harm to others^^i. In 
practical terms this places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the health care 
professional for neither law nor ethics nor their own professional body offers clear 
guidance - except in the most general of terms - as to the circumstances in which 
breach of duty of confidence will be justified. The matter is left entirely to the 
discretion of the individual health care professional.
By way of contrast consider the situation in the United States. There the courts 
have taken a further step in holding that in certain circumstances there is a duty to 
disclose information to third parties if this can avoid harm. If the duty is not 
discharged, the health care professional can face an action in negligence. Authority 
for this was established in Tarasoffv Regents o f the University o f Califomia^^'^.
5,2,1. - Tarasoffv Regents o f the University o f California
The facts of this case involved a young man, Prosenjit Poddar, who became 
infatuated with a young woman, Tatiana Tarasoff. She rejected his advances and he 
consulted a therapist at the University of California, to whom he disclosed fantasies 
about killing Ms. Tarasoff. The therapist alerted the police who failed to detain 
Poddar successfully. On his release he disappeared and did not return to the 
therapist. A short time later Poddar shot and killed Tatiana Tarasoff. An action was 
brought by the deceased woman's parents against the University alleging that the 
therapist owed a duty of care in negligence to their daughter because of the 
knowledge he had gained from Poddar. The Supreme Court of California agreed
434 The public interest in maintaining confidentiality was noted m X v Y ,  supra. A  recent example of 
the balance being struck in favour o f confidentiality is found in Morrow and Others v  D irector o f  
Public Prosecutions and others (1993) 14 B.M.L.R. 54.
432 Tarasoff V Regents o f  the University o f California 529 P 2d 55 (Gal,1974); 551 P 2d 334 (Gal, 1976).
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and found the University vicariously liable. This judgment has now been applied in 
many of the United States433.
The scope of the obligation to inform third parties was laid out by the Supreme 
Court of California as follows,
[w]hen a [professional] determines, or pursuant to the 
standards of his profession should determine, that his 
patient presents a serious danger of violence to 
another, he incurs an obligation to protect the 
intended victim against such danger. The discharge of 
this duty may require the [professional] to take one or 
more various steps, depending on the nature of the 
case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended 
victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the 
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other 
steps are reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances. 434
The justification for this is found, once again, in the need to balance competing 
public interests. Quoting the American Medical Association the court took the 
view that the revelation of a communication in a Tarasoff-scen^no is not a breach of 
trust or a violation of professional ethics,
'[a] physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted 
to him in the course of medical attendance...unless he 
is required to do so by law or unless it becomes 
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the 
individual or of the community.'...[i]f the exercise of 
reasonable care to protect the threatened victim 
requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or 
those who can reasonably be expected to notify him.
433 For com m ent see, MacKay, R.D.; 'Dangerous Patients : Third Party Safety and Psychiatrists' 
Duties - Walking the Tarasoff T ightrope'. 30(1), Medicine, Science and the Law, 52, 1990. Much 
criticism has, however, been levelled at the decision. First, because it requires an assessment of 
'dangerousness to others’ w hich is, arguably, impossible, it places an intolerable burden on health 
care professionals. Second, because the decision gives no definition of public interest this not on ly  
makes the burden on professionals doubly onerous, but also leaves the status of patient rights in a 
state of considerable uncertainty.
434 ihid, (1976), at 340. The original text refers to the duty of the 'therapist' but in various states this 
has been extended to include a range of health care professionals, see MacKay, loc. cit.
302
we see no sufficient societal interest that would 
protect and justify concealment. The containment of 
such risks lies in the public interest.433
This was an exceptionally unpopular decision with the professional bodies of 
psychiatrists and other therapists - so much so that the Supreme Court heard the 
case twice. Nonetheless, the decision stands to this day and has been adopted by a 
considerable number of states. This is an example of clear conflict of legal duties 
between which health care professionals are caught. The question of whether such 
reasoning could be extended to the UK and further, whether it could apply to the 
subject matter of this thesis; namely, genetic information, will be discussed in the 
next section.
6.1. - CONFIDENTIALITY A N D  GENETIC INFORM ATION
As with the principle of respect for autonomy discussed in chapter three, the 
relevance of what has been said to genetic information and the topic of this thesis 
should be self-evident. Clearly, although a health care professional owes a duty to 
respect as confidential a patient's genetic information, conflicts can arise about 
access to that information and its control, and the problem becomes whether or not 
legally, ethically or professionally the health care professional would ever be 
justified in disclosing such confidential genetic information. In the particular 
context of this chapter, two questions present themselves. First, how do the rules 
relating to confidentiality apply to genetic information, especially when one 
considers that third parties such as relatives or the state can claim a significant
433 ibid, (1976) at 347, M ost recently the Supreme Court of Tennessee has affirmed the Tarasoff 
principle In Bradshaw v  Daniel (1993) 854 S.W .2d 865, This decision takes the rule further because it 
concerned a duty to warn third parties o f a risk of infection from disease. Clearly, unlike Tarasoff 
there was no threat of violence between individuals, and indeed the decision is all the more 
interesting because the disease which was transmitted was not contagious. For com m ent see, 1994 
Medical Law R eview  237 - 239.
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interest in such data? Second, can there ever be a duty to disclose genetic 
information based on the reasoning in Tarasoff
6.1.1. “ A Duty to Disclose? : Confidentiality and Negligence
It is pertinent to answer the second of these questions first. What significance does 
Tarasoff ]\2iYQ to genetics? It is interesting to note the considerable differences which 
exist between the facts in Tarasoff and any possible scenario involving a health care 
professional disclosing genetic information to relatives of a proband or some other 
interested third party. The case of Tarasoff was brought by the parents of Tatiana 
Tarasoff who had been killed by Prosenjit Poddar, a former patient of a therapist 
employed by the University of California. The action in negligence against the 
therapist's employers was successful : the court held that a duty of care was owed 
by the therapist to the identified third party and that this could only have been 
discharged by breaching the confidentiality of the original patient. The justification 
for imposing this duty was the avoidance of harm.
What do the facts about genetics tell us about the possibility and propriety of a 
Tarasoff duty to warn being imposed on health care professionals who deal with 
genetic information?436
First and foremost, we must remember that genetic information only allows an 
uncertain prediction of risk concerning the relatives of a proband. With diseases 
such as Huntington's Disease there can be a one in two chance that first degree 
relatives will be affected, but with multifactorial conditions this probability drops
436 This matter is also discussed by Ruth Macklin in her chapter 'Privacy and C ontrol o f Genetic 
Inform ation' in Annas, G J. and Elias, S.; 'Mapping the Human Genome: U sing Ethics and Law as 
Guides', N ew  York, Oxford U niversity Press, 1992, chapter 9, at 162 - 163. See also, Flusted, 
'A utonom y and A  Right N o t  to K now ', in Chadwick, R., Levitt, M. and Shickle, D ., (eds.); 'The 
Right to  K now  and the Right N o t to K now ", Aldershot, Avebury, 1997, at 64 - 65.
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c o n s i d e r a b l y 437. It might therefore be very difficult to predict the likelihood of 
harm to relatives43®. Second, we must ask what kind of harm merits the imposition 
of a duty of care. In Tarasoff the harm in question was the death of a third party. 
Although with some genetic conditions death is an inevitable consequence of 
disease, with many more the most likely way in which relatives will be affected, if 
at all, is that they will be carriers of the condition. That is, they will suffer no 
adverse effects on their own health and the only physical harm which might occur 
will be to their future p r o g e n y 4 3 9 .  Is this threat of harm enough to impose a duty of 
care on the health care professional? Could it ever be argued that a duty is owed to 
such 'future' persons? Third, we must consider the purpose of disclosure. In 
Tarasoff the court held that had confidentiality been breached, the harm would 
probably have been averted. With genetics, given the very limited number of 
conditions for which there is a cure, should a duty be imposed if nothing can be 
done to prevent the onset of disease? Arguably not, because the public interest 
advanced to justify disclosure cannot be realised by that disclosure. A final point to 
note concerns the cause of harm. In Tarasoff the duty of care to the third party was 
imposed because of the therapist's relationship with the patient and his knowledge 
that the patient might cause harm to the third party: if the therapist determines 
that 'his patient presents a serious danger...to another...he incurs an obligation to 
protect the intended victim'440. Genetic conditions are not 'caused' by relatives in 
this sense. N o person poses a 'serious threat' to any living relative. This must surely 
be seen as another relevant factor. Yet, the extent to which these factors might 
influence the imposition of a Tarasoff duly  in the context of genetics is unclear. It is 
submitted, however, that courts should be very cautious about making such a move
437 See chapter tw o, supra.
43® A  similar argument was put in Tarasoff that the im possibility of predicting dangerousness should  
mean that no duty be imposed, supra, (1976) at 344 - 345. Although this was rejected, It is subm itted  
that it should remain a valid consideration for any future extension of the duty to genetics.
439 As is always the case w ith  genetics, exceptions to the rule exist. For example, carriers o f fragile-X 
syndrome do suffer adverse health. In the main, however, carriers are asymptomatic. Those persons 
w ith a balanced chrom osom al translocation are also know n as carriers.
440 Tarasoff {197€), supra cit., at 340.
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for it is not certain that a duty could be justifiably imposed except in a few rare
cases 141
Although a Tarasoff duty to warn has found favour in many US states^ '^ ,^ the 
likelihood of such a duty ever being imposed in the United Kingdom is slight. As 
Norrie has correctly stated,
[tjhere is no 'Good Samaritan' principle in our law.
The law only requires positive preventative action 
when there is a special relationship between the 
parties, or when the danger is caused by one of 
them.^ '^  ^[emphasis added]
Thus, only if a third party were a patient of the same health care professional (and 
therefore there existed between the two the necessary 'special relationship' spoken 
of by Norrie) would a duty of care be imposed. However, if both proband and 
relative are owed duties of confidentiality and duties of care there is real possibility 
of conflict for the clinician. Consider the following example. If a health care 
professional is aware of a genetic disorder in a family through tests on patient A, 
yet does not wish to offer a pre-natal test to patient B (a relative of A) for fear of 
alerting them to A's afflicted status, if no test is done and a baby is born with a 
debilitating condition, might an action lie in negligence?
A n additional factor warrants consideration. If a duty to warn were imposed, which did not take 
account of the particular facts o f each condition, and primarily whether or not a cure existed, then 
'a duty to warn...w ould not on ly  conflict w ith the right of confidentiality of the patient but also 
w ith the right not to k now  o f the relatives.' see, N ys, H.; 'Genetics and the Rights o f the Patient: 
Informed Consent and Confidentiality Revisited in Light o f Reproductive Freedom', in Westerhall, 
L. and Phillips, C., (eds.), 'Patient's Rights - Informed Consent, Access and Equality' (Nerenius and 
Santerus Publishers 1994) at 137 - 154 especially 153. The essence of such a potential 'right' is 
discussed infra. If, however, it is accepted that such a right might exist, this is another reason not to 
impose a duty to disclose.
See MacKay, loc. cit., for com m ent.
See Norrie, K. McK.; 'Medical Confidence: Conflicts o f D uties’. 24, Medicine, Science and the 
Law, 26, 1984 at 29. A lso, N gw ena and Chadwick, loc. cit., at 87 - 89. More recently, see advice of 
Kennedy and Grubb in the case com m ent on Bradshaw v  Daniel, supra cit., 1994 Medical Laiv 
R eview  237.
Clearly, the appropriate action w ould  be one o f negligence or 'wrongful birth'. A  wrongful life 
action brought by the child w ould  be unsuccessful in the U K . For a discussion of these actions see, 
J.K. Mason and R.A. M cCall-Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, Fourth Edition, London, 
Butterworths, 1994 at 134 - 145. See also, Beaumont, P.M .A.; 'Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth'.
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This writer knows of no case decided in the UK which addressed this issue directly. 
Nonetheless, there might be a strong case in negligence for the general failure to 
inform of a risk of genetic disease^ ^ .^ Indeed, there is no difference between 
disclosure of a known risk of genetic disease and the disclosure of any other kind of 
known risk. Thus, in Gregory v Pembrokeshire Health Authority^‘^  ^ the failure of a 
doctor to inform of a failed amniocentesis t e s t w a s  held to be negligent '^^L
However, such a case is different from a three-party scenario because the latter 
involves a conflict faced by the doctor in trying to reconcile two duties: the duty of 
confidentiality to the original proband and the duty of care to prospective parents. 
In one respect this is akin to the circumstances in Tarasoff in. that the clinician faces 
a dilemma in the guise of two duties, only one of which can be discharged 
effectively. However, in contrast to Tarasoff a 'special relationship' does exist 
between the third party (as patient) and clinician and further, the knowledge of the 
risk imposes a considerable burden on the clinician to disclose information in order 
to meet the standard of care required.
It is submitted that in such circumstances disclosure is more advisable than 
maintaining confidentiality^. This is so for two reasons. First, the harm which is
in McLean, S.A.M.; 'Contemporary Issues in Law, Ethics and Medicine', Aldershot, Dartm outh, 
1996, chapter 6.
The determination of this question w ould almost entirely concern the domain o f 'current 
practice'. That is, the question to be asked w ould be, what would other clinicians have disclosed? 
See, H unter v  Hanley 1955 S.L.T 213; Bolam v  Friern Hospital Management Com m ittee  [1957] 2 A ll 
E.R 118; Sidaway v  Board o f  Governors o f  Bethlern Royal and Maudsley Hospital [1985] 2 W .L.R 480. 
In a few  recent cases, however, the English courts have been more w illing to challenge medical 
opinion on what should or should not be disclosed to patients, see Defreitas v  O'Brien and Another 
[1995] 6 Med LR 108, McAllister v  Lewisham and North Southwark Health Authority  [1994] 5 Med LR  
343, Smith v  Turnhridge Wells Health A uthority  [1994] 5 Med LR 334, and Bolitho v  C ity and  
Hackney Health Authority  [1993] 4 Med LR 381.
146 [1989] 1 Med. L.R. 81
Such a test can disclose fetal predisposition to a range of genetic disorders.
The case failed, however, on  the point o f causation: the plaintiff failed to show  that if she had 
know n of the result o f the first test she w ould have had an abortion.
This is subject to the application of a calculus o f risk test. That is, an assessment of likelihood of  
disease, severity o f injury likely to be sustained, the availability of precautions etc.
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likely to occur if disclosure is not forthcoming and which can be avoided by 
disclosure, will be enough to justify breaching the duty of confidence within the 
rules specified supra and further discussed infra. Second, on a pragmatic point, it is 
more likely that an action will be brought in negligence rather than breach of 
confidence simply because of the respective states of development of the two areas 
of law. The law of confidence is less well developed than the law of negligence and 
few are willing to act as test cases to further the development of an uncertain area of 
law. The myriad negligence actions mean that there is more certainty of the parties' 
rights in this field and even if this does not lead to a court action, the chances of an 
out-of-court settlement are highiso.
Such cases aside, if no 'special relationship' exists between the third party and 
practitioner, it is submitted that the only way sensitivity can be shown to all 
interests concerned is if no duty to disclose is imposed. At best, health care 
professional should be given a discretion to disclose confidential information^^h The 
limits within which such discretion could operate are dictated by the public interest 
exception.
6.2. - THE PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
It has been shown that an appeal is made to the public interest to justify both the 
existence of, and the limitations on, the duty of confidentiality. Prima facie it is 
assumed that the duty is owed by a health care professional to a patient but that 
this can, in justifiable circumstances, be overridden. Although the legal cases 
studied above offer little guidance, and ethics is also of limited assistance, it is
Mason and McCall-Smith, op. cit., are of the opinion that 'most cases [of wrongful birth] are 
settled out of court', at 135.
This view  is supported by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics; 'Genetics Screening: Ethical 
Issues', Decem ber 1993, at 5.29.
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nevertheless possible to identify certain factors according to which the public 
interest defence must operate.
Axiomatically, in order to determine which circumstances provide justification for 
breaching a confidence at the discretion of the health care professional it is 
necessary to identify a relevant public interest. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the breach of the confidence will de facto further the competing 
public interest, or at least that there is a reasonable likelihood of this. Thus, for 
example, the public interests of preventing harm to others and halting the spread of 
disease are relevant factors when treating patients infected with HIV. Arguably, 
these interests can be furthered by informing the sex partner of an intransigent 
seropositive patient of the infected state of the latteri^z. In this way, the sex partner 
can make future informed decisions, inter alia, about unprotected sexual relations 
with the infected person. If they choose to act responsibly infection will not take 
place and the public interests which served as justification for breaching the 
patient's confidentiality will be furthered^^ .^
If, however, a public interest cannot be realised, the justification for breaching 
patient confidentiality is, arguably, lost. It might be argued, for example, that it is 
in the public interest to make HIV and AIDS notifiable d i s e a s e s ^ ^ 4 ^  but in the 
absence of therapeutic treatment this would not, of itself, prevent further spread of 
either condition. What possible justification for disclosure could then be made? 
One might argue that other public interests could be served such as the collection 
of valuable data about the spread of HIV and AIDS. Whereas this is true, it poses 
the question of whether other means could be used to realise such an aim while at
152 P q j -  commentary on  this see, Boyd, K.M.; 'HIV Infection and AIDS: The Ethics of Medical 
Confidentiality'. 18, Journal o f  Medical Ethics, 173, 1992 and Guttmacher, S.; 'H IV Infection: 
Individual Rights v. Disease C ontrol’. \7{Ÿ), Journal o f  Law  and Society, 66, 1990.
O f course, this must always be balanced against the perceived risk of harm to the therapeutic 
relationship more generally, see X v Y ,  supra cit.
In the U K  neither AIDS nor H IV  is notifiable.
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the same time maintaining patient confidentiality: in this case, anonymised 
screening programmes.
From the above, several conclusions can be drawn about the role of 'the public 
interest' in determining the scope of the duty of confidentiality in the therapeutic 
alliance between health care professional and patient. First, it is important to 
identify the public interests which might compete with the weighty public interest 
in maintaining confidences. Second, it must be asked whether such interests are 
strong enough to compete. Third, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the 
competing interest will be realised if a breach of confidence is made. Finally, 
alternative means of realising the competing public interest should be explored and 
if such exist, they should be preferred to a breach of confidence.
In addition, what has been said about the nature of genetic disease and the relative 
paucity of cures must be borne in mind. These factors have a direct bearing on any 
decision concerning the use to which genetic information is put. Indeed, together 
with what has been said about the role of the public interest, these facts provide a 
model to determine the legitimate boundaries of the duty of confidentiality with 
regard to genetic information.
A consideration of the genetic information conflict scenarios outlined in previous 
chapters will facilitate a full and proper discussion of the adequacy of the law of 
confidence in addressing the issues detailed above and the problems surrounding 
genetic information and the protection of individual privacy interests. That is, as 
with the format adopted in chapter three, we shall apply the concept of 
confidentiality to each of the four scenarios in order to determine the extent to 
which it provides adequate protection of the informational and spatial privacy 
interests of the individuals who are the subject of these scenarios.
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7.1. - SCENARIOS
It will be remembered that the privacy interests which arise in the four scenarios 
are as follow:
First, scenario one concerns (a) the informational privacy interests of individuals in 
preventing employers and insurers gaining access to existing genetic information, 
and (b) the spatial privacy interests of individuals in resisting testing at the behoof 
of employers and insurers.
In the second scenario we are concerned primarily with the spatial privacy interests 
of adults, children and 'future persons' who are subjected to screening programmes 
by the State. Relatedly, in the case of ante and post-natal screening the 
informational privacy interests of neonates and 'future persons' are also at stake.
In scenario three the privacy interest under scrutiny is the informational privacy 
interest of a proband who resists disclosure of his test results to relatives.
Finally, scenario four concerns the spatial privacy interests of family members in 
not being given unsolicited information by a relative about a familial genetic 
disorder.
It should be immediately apparent that the law of confidence can only assist in 
addressing two of the scenarios outlined. These are :
• Scenario one which relates to an employer or insurer’s right to have access to 
patient files, and
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• Scenario three concerning the family's right to know the genetic information of 
a relative who is a sufferer of haemochromatosis.
Scenario two - which involves questions of the acceptability of state programmes for 
premarital, ante-natal and post natal screening, and scenario four  - which deals with 
a family's right not to be told genetic information - cannot be considered 
successfully from the perspective of confidentiality for the reasons offered below.
7.2. - Scenario Four: The Limits of the Law of Confidence
It is appropriate to begin by examining scenario four because it most clearly 
involves a relationship between the parties in conflict (important for the law of 
confidence), and furthermore it most clearly demonstrates the reasons why 
confidentiality is not helpful in protecting the spatial privacy interests of 
individuals.
In scenario four the question at issue is whether a sister should tell family members 
that she is affected by breast cancer and that they too might be affected. We are 
concerned here simply with the question of a right not to know information, and 
that right - if it exists - is that of the family members^^ .^
Prima facie, the sister will be owed a duty of confidence by her health care 
professional. This entitles her to decide whether and how the information which is 
the source of the duty should be disclosed to others. If, then, she decides to disclose 
it to the other members of her family then there could be no question of a breach 
of the doctor/patient duty of confidence. Clearly she cannot herself breach a duty 
which is owed to her by another. Her's is not the duty but the right. Thus, for her
Sim ilady, w e are not concerned w ith  the question of whether the sister is required to disclose 
genetic information.
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disclosure to amount to a breach of confidence it must be seen to be an invasion of 
someone else's right and a breach of her duty to maintain confidentiality. Can the 
family scenario envisaged by scenario four fit into this rubric?
The first matter to determine is whether a duty of confidence arises as between the 
relatives. In order to determine this it is necessary to ask the following questions: 
does the information have the necessary quality of confidence, and was the 
information imparted in circumstances which impose an obligation of 
confidence^^ .^ The answer to the first of these questions is easily given as yes. It is 
now well settled that personal information which is not of the nature of tittle tattle 
and which is not part of the public domain can be protected as confidential 
information 1^ .^ The second question is unfortunately less easy to answer. The 
confidential information must be imparted in circumstances which give rise to an 
obligation of confidence. This would tend to imply that the confider must furnish 
the confidant with the confidential information. Yet, in our scenario the person to 
whom a duty might be owed, namely the relative, does not even know that the 
information exists, and therefore certainly could not impart it to any other person. 
That said, in the context of the doctor/patient relationship one can easily imagine a 
scenario where information might be known to the doctor about the patient and 
yet the patient might not be aware of its existence. In such a case one would never 
say that a duty of confidence is not owed. An example of this is blood test results. 
A doctor may be in receipt of blood test results and feel that it would not be in a 
patient's interests to reveal them, but, if the doctor revealed the results to a third 
party without just cause, there can be no doubt that he would be in breach of 
patient confidentiality. O f course, this might be because of the professional ethical 
obligation - embodied in materials such as the Hippocratic oath - which binds a 
clinician in the terms such as the following : d ll  that may come to my knowledge
supra, section 4.1.
First confirmed in Stephens v  A very  [1988] Ch 449 at 454 - 455.
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in the exercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce 
with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never 
r e v e a l . ' I f  so, this example does not help us in our present problem.
In the Spycatcher decision^^ ,^ it was held that persons can come under a duty of 
confidence even when confidential information is not given to them by the 
confider directly or by someone who is clearly under such a duty: for example, 
where an obviously confidential document is wafted by a fan out of a window into 
a crowded street, or a private diary is dropped in a public p l a c e O n e  could then, 
perhaps draw the analogy between reading someone's private diary without their 
permission and having knowledge of the person's genetic information without the 
other's knowledge (through one's own test results). Again, however, this analogy is 
not helpful because in the example of the diary the person to whom the duty is 
owed is aware of the existence of the confidential information. The same is not true 
concerning the genetic information. In essence the question being asked here is the 
following: do we require an original confider or can information assume the 
necessary quality of confidence even if the person to whom the right is owed does 
not know of its existence. A possible answer might come from the recent decision 
in Hellewell v  Chief Constable o f Derbyshire, discussed above. In that case, albeit in 
obiter dicta, it was stated that.
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a 
distance and with no authority a picture of another 
engaged in some private act. His subsequent disclosure 
of the photograph would...as surely amount to a 
breach of confidence as if he had stolen a letter or 
diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to 
publish itiGi.
There are various texts of this Oath, all o f w hich, however, em body the same sentiment. The 
passage cited was taken from Mason and M cCall-Smith, 'Law and Medical Ethics', op. cit., Appendix  
A .
supra cit.
ibid, at 281, per  Lord Goff. 
ib id  at 807.
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This is interesting and helpful for several reasons. Note, first, that there is no need 
that the person 'taking' the information be engaged in illegal acts in doing so. In 
previous cases it had been held that those who acquire confidential information 
illegally are bound by a duty of confidence, even if there is no relationship between 
the parties^^ .^ Second, there is no need for a pre-existing confidential relationship 
between any parties from which the duty of confidence can be passed to others. In 
older decisions it was always thought to be the case (except with illegally obtained 
information) that such a relationship must exist. Wacks has argued that authority 
exists to support the view that a relationship is no longer n e c e s s a r y a n d  if this is 
so, one might be able to argue in the circumstances of our problem that a duty of 
confidence can be owed between the sister who has been tested for breast cancer 
and her female relatives also likely to be affected by the disease.
A related issue concerns the question of the proper person to whom the duty is 
owed. In the Hellewell example the implication is that a duty of confidence is owed 
to the person who is the focus of the telephoto lens because the information which 
is received is about that person. In the context of genetic information, as has been 
discussed in previous chapters, the information relates only in part to relatives. It is 
not, therefore, entirely about them. This might alter the view one takes of the 
appropriateness of saying that a duty of confidence is owed to relatives concerning 
such information^ '^ .^ That said, if one accepts the points put in the foregoing 
paragraphs, it would be sufficient to take a marginally liberal view of the 'shared' 
nature of the genetic information to hold that a duty could be owed between 
relatives.
See, for example, Franklin v  Giddins [1978] 1 Q dR  72.
163 "Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom, op. cit. at 59 - 71.
This is not a merely pedantic point. It matters very much whether or not a duty can be ow ed to  
som eone sim ply because the confidential information is about that person. If, on the other hand, 
the duty is ow ed to the confider (who him or herself might be under a duty of confidence) then the 
person w ith  w hom  the information is concerned w ill not be able to avail him or herself o f a remedy 
using the law of confidence.
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Yet, even if one is persuaded that a duty of confidence exists, the far more crucial 
question is whether or not that duty can be breached by one relative telling the 
person to whom the duty is owed the information in question. This must surely be a 
nonsense. A duty of confidence is breached when the confidential information is 
used or disclosed to those outside the confidential relationship. This is well 
established^‘^5. Inherent in the concept of confidentiality is the idea that a breach of 
duty is constituted by the making of the information in some way 'public' 
Precisely how 'public' use or disclosure must be is a matter of debate, but it cannot 
be the case that disclosure of information from one party to a confidential 
relationship to the other party in anyway makes the information 'public'. This 
then means that even if a duty of confidence is owed by one sister in our scenario 
to her female relatives, she could not breach that duty by disclosing the 
information to the women themselves
To conclude these arguments concerning scenario four: it is submitted that the law 
of confidence cannot help to establish a valid legal basis for a right not to know  
information because it is not clear that, even if a duty of confidence is owed 
between relatives concerning their common genetic information, such a duty could 
ever be breached simply by telling the relatives themselves about their own 
personal information.
See, for example, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volum e 18, op. cit. at para. 1476, Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, Fourth Edition, volum e 8(1), paras. 480 - 482, Gurry, Breach of Confidence, op. 
cit., chapter twelve.
If the information is already in the public domain no duty of confidence can arise. Relatedly, if 
a duty does exist but the 'confidential' information is put into the public domain then the duty in 
question immediately ceases to exist. If the confidant is the person w ho has put the information  
into the public domain, s /h e  can, at least in commercial circles, be barred from exploiting the 
information thereafter for his/her ow n ends by virtue o f the ‘springboard doctrine’, see; Terrapin 
Ltd. V Builders' Supply Company (Hayes) Ltd. [1967] RPC 375.
O f course one might argue that for A  to disclose information to C would be a breach of the 
duty that A  ow ed to B, but given that the same information is the source of the same duty to the 
respective relatives, it is not clear that this argument w ould  succeed because this w ould be to argue 
that A  was in fact breaching her duty to B by disclosing information to C w hich was nevertheless 
also about C and concerning w hich A  also ow ed a duty to C.
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7.3. - Scenario Two: The Limits of the Law of Confidence
It should also be noted that scenario two as described above - which concerns the 
acceptability of screening programmes - cannot be addressed adequately through 
the law of confidences*" .^ This is because the requirement by the State that certain 
persons undergo genetic testing may well give rise to a duty of confidence (which 
would exist between those who receive test results on behalf of the State and those 
who are the subjects of such tests), but the law of confidence cannot help in 
addressing all of the interests which arise from such testing practices. Principally, 
and as discussed in previous chapters, such interests include an interest in not being 
forced to know information which might be to one's detriment. The arguments for 
this are essentially those made above in relation to scenario four. Thus the 
interference with spatial privacy interests which is inherent in the practices 
outlined in scenario two, cannot be prevented by an appeal to the law of 
confidentiality. The only help that the law could offer in such cases concerns the 
screening of new-born children who have informational privacy interests in the test 
results. Arguably, as has been stated, those who possess such results should 
maintain confidentiality.
It thus becomes apparent that the law of confidence cannot address the question of 
protecting a possible right not to know information that might arise in either of the 
two scenarios described above. As with the law of autonomy, this is a serious 
limitation on the role of the law of confidentiality in the field of genetic 
information given the not inconsiderable interests which individuals might have in
The same is true of part o f scenario one w hich deals w ith the right of employers and insurers to 
require individuals to undergo genetic testing.
317
such a right. Put otherwise, the law of confidentiality is entirely ill-equipped to 
protect individual spatial privacy interests.
Accepting this limitation, what now follows is an account of how the law of 
confidence deals with the issues arising in scenarios one and three.
7.4. - Scenario One: The Interests of Employers and Insurers and the Law of 
Confidence
Does confidentiality protect individual informational privacy interests of those 
suffering from alphaj - antitrypsin when employers or insurers seek access to 
medical records to determine whether someone has this condition or whether they 
have been tested for the condition?
In these circumstances it matters very much whether the health care professional is 
in the employ of the insurance company or the employer in question. If so, then he 
or she owes a duty of fidelity to his or her employer and this will require that they 
pass relevant information on. This is why insurers will frequently require that 
prospective insured attend the insurers' own clinicians. Similarly, a workplace 
doctor who is employed to carry out regular 'check ups' on staff is bound by the 
terms of his or her contract to deliver information to the employer which might 
have a bearing on the employer's business. In such circumstances the legal 
positions of the doctor and the 'patient' are laid out primarily in the Access to 
Medical Reports Act 1988. This Act establishes a right of patients to have access to 
reports prepared by a health care professional for employment or insurance 
purposes^^°. Section 3 of the Act provides that an employer or insurer shall not
The other question posed by scenario four cannot be adequately dealt w ith by the law of 
confidentiality. The question is whether employers or insurers can carry out tests on  individuals to  
determine their genetic status. For the same reasons argued in respect of state practices which  
amount to the same, the law of confidence cannot adequately address the issues and interest which  
arise.
Access to Medical Reports A ct 1988, c.28, s . l .
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apply to a medical practitioner for a medical report relating to any individual unless 
(a) the individual is notified in advance, and (b) written consent is provided by the 
individual. In this way the possibility of breach of confidence is avoided because 
consent is provided by the subject in question^^h
The rights provided to the individual under the Act include^^ .^ the right to be 
informed that disclosure is sought^^ ,^ the right to request sight of the report before 
it is suppliedi74, the right to refuse disclosure^^ ,^ the right to request amendment of 
the report^^ ,^ the right to attach one's own comments to a report which the health 
care professional (HCP) has refused to a m e n d a n d  the right to have access to any 
report supplied in the previous six months
It should be noted that the right of access is limited in certain important respects. 
First, access to the report in whole or in part^ ^^  can be denied if the HCP considers 
that disclosure would be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental 
health of the individual or others or would indicate the intentions of the 
practitioner in respect of the individuaP^°. Second, disclosure need not be made if 
the report - in whole or in part^ ^^  - is likely to reveal information about another 
person, or to reveal the identity of another person who has supplied information to 
the HCP about the individual, unless the third party consents or the third party is 
an HCP182.
O f course, one could easily m ount an argument that consent in such cases will rarely be 'freely' 
given in that the individual is in a substantially weaker position compared to the em ployer or 
insurer for fear that a refusal w ould affect em ploym ent or insurance chances.
The Act only relates to reports prepared after 1 January 1989, the date of coming into force of 
he Act. 
ibid, s. 3. 
ibid, s.4(1). 
ibid, s,5(l). 
ibid, s.5(2). 
ibid, s.5(2)(b). 
ibid, s .6(2). 
ibid, s.7(3). 
ibid, s.7(l). 
ibid, s. 7(3). 
ibid, s.7(2).
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The most important limitation on this Act is, however, that it only extends to 
reports prepared by an HCP who 'is or has been responsible for the clinical care of 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' Th u s  an insurer or employer can avoid these provisions simply 
by requiring the individual to see a new doctor (possibly their own). In such cases 
before information is revealed to the employer or insurer it will be taken that the 
patient has tacitly consented to disclosure by virtue of the fact that s/he has 
presented him or herself for examination. However, the question of whether such 
'consent' can be seen to be valid or informed consent arises. Certainly, if the 
examination is carried out as a form of 'fishing expedition' it is hard to see how 
previously unknown information about one's health can be disclosed with one's 
consent, if one does not know that it exists and if one is not informed of this before 
disclosure. Moreover, the element of coercion which is inherent in a request to see 
an unfamiliar health care professional further calls into question the validity of tacit 
consent. An individual may of course refuse to attend for examination but the 
consequence may well be refusal of insurance or employment or adverse 
consequences for current employment!®' .^ Fear, rather than a willingness to allow 
disclosure, might be the motivating factor in such cases. Nevertheless, this analysis 
of tacit consent is the most convincing to explain the limits of an HCP's duty in 
confidence to those examined on behalf of employers or insurers.
Thus, although it has already been explained that genetic testing in such cases does 
not presently occur in the UK, and further it has been argued that it should not, the 
present legal view of such medical examinations from the perspective of 
confidentiality is that disclosure to those seeking the information, namely the 
employer or insurer, would not be a breach of confidence because of the 'consent' 
implied from the individual's apparent willingness to undergo examination.
ibid, s.2(l) tind Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) O rder 1987, S.l. 1987/1903. 
Subject, o f course, to  protection measures in em ploym ent law.
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7.4.1. - Scenario One: A Conclusion
The law of confidence is stretched to its limits in the context of requests for access 
to information by employers and insurers. It is questionable whether it adequately 
protects the informational privacy interests of individuals from whom the 
information is sought. In the main, the concept of individual consent 'authorises' 
disclosure in such cases. If the request for a medical report is made to an HCP who 
has treated the individual in the past the provisions of the Access to Medical Reports 
A ct 1988 require that written consent be obtained and that access be granted within 
limited circumstances. Arguably on one view this goes a long way to ensuring that 
the interests of the individual are taken into account. However, if the request 
concerns an HCP who has never before treated the individual then the provisions 
of the Act do not apply. In such cases an argument can be made that tacit consent 
to disclosure can be inferred from the fact that the individual attends the HCP, but 
the nature and quality of such consent is open to serious question. That said, it is 
the opinion of the present writer that in circumstances where such an HCP 
disclosed medical data to an employer or insurer on request and to no other person, 
an action for breach of confidence would not be successful. This is so even if the 
medical information was not previously known to the individual in question.
7.5. - Scenario Three: The Family's Right to Know and the Law of Confidence
Scenario three concerns the dilemma of a health care professional (HCP) who has 
knowledge that a relative of his patients has haemochromotosis. From what has 
been said about the law of confidence it should be clear that the unauthorised 
receipt of such information by the health care professional from the doctor of the 
affected relative is in itself a breach of confidence for which a common law remedy 
could be sought. From the perspective of the HCP who receives this information,
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the dilemma which he faces is whether he should reveal the information to his own 
patients when this directly interferes with the original patient's informational 
privacy interests. It has already been argued in chapter three that in the first 
instance the most ethically acceptable course of conduct would be to approach the 
affected individual (either directly or through his own health care professional) to 
encourage him to inform relatives or to seek permission allowing others to do so. 
If, however, permission is refused but the health care professional considers that he 
should nevertheless inform his own patients of their relatives' condition, the 
obvious question which arises is whether he can do so without breaching the law 
of confidence.
However, the logically prior question is whether the health care professional (Dr. 
Smith) owes a duty of confidence to the affected individual (Kenneth) given that the 
latter is not a patient of the former. For all of the reasons outlined above, and 
because of the nature of the practice of medicine itself, the answer to this must 
surely be affirmative. This means that prima facie Dr. Smith is bound to respect the 
confidentiality of Kenneth, and so the wishes of Kenneth to keep his genetic 
information private. Thereby, it would seem that the law of confidence can protect 
Kenneth's informational privacy interests. However, as we know, the duty of 
confidentiality is not absolute. And, given that Dr. Smith faces a dilemma about 
whether he should nevertheless inform his own patients of Kenneth's status, we 
must ask on what grounds could he justify disclosure against Kenneth's wishes? 
The most likely answer lies in the public interest.
7.5.1. - Competing Public Interestsf
One way to consider the public interest defence is to turn it on its head and ask; 
which public interests might be jeopardised by non-disclosure of genetic
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information?!®^ have seen, the interest in preventing harm to others is of
paramount importance and considered to be of sufficiently significant weight to 
challenge confidentiality. However, can harm be prevented by disclosure in the 
context of genetics? Arguably, if a cure for a particular debilitating condition 
existed it would be foolhardy not to inform relatives of their predisposition to such 
a condition. This is especially true if pre-emptive treatment could prevent the onset 
of disease!® .^ With haemochromatosis it has already been explained that although 
no cure is available early diagnosis can lead to effective treatment by phlebotomy 
and this can reduce considerably the risk of fibrosis. Because haemochromatosis is a 
recessive disorder the average chances of relatives in a family being affected range 
from 25% - 50% in each case!®^ . However, there is also a 25% - 50% chance in each 
case that relatives might be asymptomatic carriers and it becomes less clear in the 
case of these individuals that disclosure of information about risk which is in 
breach of another's confidence is justifiable in the public interest. In such cases the 
risk of harm is harm to choice (the choice whether or not to procreate) and this, it 
is submitted, weakens considerably the force of the public interest argument!®®.
One answer might lie in the minimisation of harm generally. This involves the 
recognition that various forms of harm can arise from disease; the unrelenting 
progress of disease itself is but one form of such harm. Psychological harm can
!®^  This is indeed how  the public interest is currently viewed by the courts, see Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, volum e 18, paragraph 1484. See the Law Com m ission w hich recommended in 1981 
that confidentiality should on ly  be enforced w hen it was in the public interest to do so, thus 
making it the case that a public interest defence w ould succeed if the public could benefit from  
disclosure, {ibid 1484).
!®^  Yet, in circumstances where a cure is available but an individual w ould  not choose to take it - 
perhaps for religious reasons - it is hard to see how  disclosure could ever be justified because the 
perceived harm could never be avoided. This point has been made in chapter three where it was 
argued that to proceed to disclose the information in such circumstances w ould  be unduly  
paternalistic.
!®^  Supra, chapter two.
!®® As N gw ena and Chadwick have pointed out (and as has been argued in chapter three) '[i]t is not 
clear...why choice in this area should be given higher priority than choice over the use of personal 
information...[and] it is not clear that harm to choice itself is sufficiently serious to  warrant 
disclosure.', Chadwick and N gw ena, 'Genetic Diagnostic Information and the D u ty  of 
Confidentiality: Ethics and Law', loc. cit., at 86.
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occur, for example, from the unpreparedness of sufferers faced suddenly with a 
clinical condition or the knowledge that they could pass such a condition to their 
progeny!® .^ Such harm can, arguably, be minimised by the knowledge that disease 
will, one day, manifest itself. This allows the individual time to come to terms with 
their fate and to commence, where possible, early supportive counselling. The view 
that this provides justification for disclosure of an individual's test results to 
relatives has found support from several commentators!^* .^ Yet, as has been argued 
above, if disclosure is made to avoid an ancillary harm such as psychological upset 
there is less of a guarantee that the harm in question will, de facto, be avoided!^!. 
That is, it is not clear that the public interest which one seeks to further by 
disclosure, will be achieved by disclosure.
Relatedly, the health care professional faced with this dilemma is restricted in at 
least one further way. Although one can establish statistically the abstract chances 
of members of a family being affected by a recessive disease (as has been done 
above), in practice there is no way of knowing which individuals might or might 
not be affected or have carrier status. To be truly effective disclosure would require 
to be made to a wide circle of persons with possible diminishing utihty!^^. Thus the 
confidentiality of the proband would be breached on many occasions with 
unpredictable, and possibly minimal, results. Whereas this is certainly true with 
multifactorial conditions, it is less true with monogenic conditions such as
!®^  See Ball, D ., Tyler, A. and Harper, P.; 'Predictive Testing of Adults and Children' in Clarke, A. 
(ed.), 'Genetic Counselling : Practice and Principles', London, Routledge, 1994, at 70 - 72 quoting 
several others including, Hayden, M .R.; 'Predictive Testing for H untington's Disease; Are We 
Ready for Widespread C om m unity Im plem entation?'. 40, American Journal o f  Medical Genetics, 515 
and Brandt, J. et al, 'Presymptomatic Diagnosis of Delayed-Onset Disease w ith  Linked D N A  
Markers: the Experience in H untington's Disease'. 261, Journal o f  the American Medical Association, 
3108, 1989.
!^ *^  ibid.
!^! Re vies, D.; 'In the N am e of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human H eredity'. London, 
Penguin Books, 1985, at 298, Andrews, L.; 'Legal Aspects o f Genetic Inform ation', 64, Yale Journal 
o f Biology and Medicine, 29, 1990, at 38, and Craufurd, D ., Dodge, A ., Kerxin-Storrar, L. etal.-, 
'U ptake o f Presymptomatic Predictive Testing for H untingto n's Disease'. 2, The Lancet, 603, 1989. 
! 2^ It should be noted, however, that if a high number of close relatives are affected by a severe 
disorder there is more o f  a chance that relatives w ill be affected. That said, the percentage rate 
remains below  or around fifteen percent.
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haemochromatosis. As has been argued, in the case of this family scenario, if Dr. 
Smith can establish that the parents are not affected and are not carriers then there 
can be no further risk to other family members. Thus if he decides to use the public 
interest defence to justify a breach of Kenneth's confidentiality, his approach 
should, in the first instance, be simply to those two individuals.
7.5.2. - Public Interest in Public Health
In addition to the above, the question arises of whether different public interests 
might be invoked to justify disclosure. For example, it might be argued that 
disclosure of genetic information to relatives could be justified on the grounds of 
halting the spread of genetic disease. Although little or nothing can be done for 
those already afflicted by genetic disorders, disclosure might prevent the 
transmission of defective genes to future persons.
The public interest in preventing the spread of disease is an extremely important 
one but the point has already been made in chapter three that in the context of 
genetic disease the furtherance of this public interest is hindered by one factor: 
there is no certainty that even if disclosure is made people will no longer reproduce. 
This, coupled with the fact that the interest can only be furthered through a breach 
of confidence, casts considerable doubt on this justification. Furthermore, 
potentially more effective means by which this public interest can be furthered 
exist (such as counselling services, prenatal testing and abortion) which do not 
involve breaching confidentiality.
7.5,3. - Who is the Public' in the Public Interest?
A final question mark hangs over the acceptability of an appeal to the public 
interest in our scenario. Who is the 'public' in the public interest? Clearly, it
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cannot be the general public, in the sense of the community at large, for the only 
public interest which serves them is that concerning the reduction of the general 
incidence of disease (primarily a cost argument), but this has been questioned 
above. More cogent is the argument that the public interest at stake is that 
concerning reduction of harm - even if such harm is restricted to members of the 
affected person's family who are patients of our doctor. In particular, our scenario 
identifies five individuals: Ewan, the uncle of Kenneth who is affected by 
haemochromatosis, his wife Elizabeth (whose family also has a disease history), 
their children Michael and Marlene, and Michael's wife Michele (who cannot be 
affected herself, but might give birth to a child who is a carrier). Do these people 
constitute a 'public'? The cases which have been decided on public interest to date 
do not address the question of 'who' is the public. Yet the case of Re C (a minor) 
(evidence : confidential information)^'^^ - in which it was held that a doctor was 
entitled to disclose a confidential report on the fitness of a mother to care for her 
child because it was in the 'public interest' to do so - might be seen as authority for 
arguing that the family could in our scenario constitute a 'public' which had an 
interest in receiving confidential information. Certainly the ruling in Re C  offers a 
generous interpretation of public interest, given that the interests at stake were 
those of a single child! '^!.
7.5.4. - Scenario Three: A  Conclusion
The above demonstrates that although Dr. Smith owes a duty of confidence to 
Kenneth, it might be possible for him to argue a public interest defence if he chose
193 siipya cit.
In Schering Chemicals L td v  Falkman L td  [1981] 2 WLR 848 at 869, Shaw L.J. said : Tf the subject 
matter [of the duty o f confidence] is som ething inimical to the public interest or threatens individual 
safety, a person in possession of knowledge of that subject matter cannot be obliged to conceal it 
although he acquired that knowledge in confidence'. Cripps has commented on this that, '[t]he 
specific reference to the safety o f an individual as opposed to the safety of "the public" or "the State" 
is new  and w elcom e', see Cripps, Y.; 'The Legal Implications o f Disclosure in the Public Interest'. 
Second Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994 at 198.
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to disclose Kenneth's medical condition to members of Kenneth's family. This 
would mostly justifiably be done with a view to avoiding harm. However, that this 
could be justified is due largely to the vague terms of the public interest defence as 
defined by the courts and this argument must be accompanied by the general caveat 
that the defence must satisfy the three basic criteria outlined at the beginning of this 
section, namely; (1) a relevant public interest must be identified (here it is 
avoidance of harm), (2) breach of the confidence should further the competing 
public interest or at least that there is a reasonable likelihood of this (there is some 
doubt about this in our scenario), and (3) if alternative means of realising the 
competing public interest exist, they should be preferred to a breach of confidence. '
7.5.4.1. - The Limits o f Confidentiality
The above analysis of the role of the public interest allows us to determine more 
clearly the rights and duties of the parties to the confidential relationship as well as 
those of interested third parties concerning genetic information.
From what has been said it is clear that the following factors are important and 
should be given due consideration when a health care professional is contemplating 
a breach of confidentiality. These are: the existence of therapies or cures for the 
condition; the probability of manifestation and the severity of the condition; the 
question of whether the individual relative will be affected directly or whether s/he 
is a carrier, and the question of whether disclosure can actually further the public 
interest which concerns the confidant. If disclosure is made, the problem arises of 
balancing the public interest in maintaining confidentiality and the public interest 
in disclosure to determine the nature and scope of the rights and duties of parties to 
the initial confidential relationship. Emphasis is placed on the restricted nature of 
the public interest exception: disclosure should only be to those who can further
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the public interest in question^^  ^ our scenario, these parties are the health care 
professional and Kenneth who is affected by the genetic condition, 
haemochromatosis. Prima facie, the law of confidence ensures that the security of 
Kenneth's information should be respected and this ensures respect for his 
informational privacy interests. An argument might, however, be made that breach 
may be justifiable in the interests of Kenneth's relatives. If this is accepted no action 
will lie against the health care professional. Arguably, for this to be accepted 
disclosure should only be made in the first instance to Ewan and Elizabeth to 
determine their status. This is in keeping with legal authority which holds that 
disclosure of confidential information in the public interest is acceptable only if it is 
done to those who can further the interest and if that circle of disclosure is 
restricted!^ .^ Yet, all of this presupposes that it is indeed in the interests of third 
parties to receive such information and further that the determination of this 
matter falls to the health care professional. However, and as has been argued, with 
genetic information this might not be the case. Furthermore, what the law of 
confidence cannot do is give any recourse to relatives if they feel that disclosure 
should not have been made or that they have been harmed as a result. Nor does it 
require that the health care professional take account of the willingness of third 
parties to receive such information. That is, whereas the law of confidence may 
protect in certain circumstances individual informational privacy interests, the 
same is not true for individual spatial privacy interests.
See, for example, W v  Egdell, supra cit. 
See Re C  and W v  Egdell, supra cit.
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8.1. - CONFIDENTIALITY 8c GENETIC INFORMATION: A
CONCLUSION
Despite the uncertain nature of the precise basis upon which the duty of confidence 
lies, in the medical context it is indisputably held out as a valuable principle 
drawing authority from ethical, professional and legal quarters. However, it has 
also been shown that the duty is by no means seen as absolute by any of these fields 
in the United Kingdom. Confidentiality is seen as the right of the patient and the 
duty of the health care professional within certain rather ill-defined parameters. 
Focusing primarily on the legal perspective, this chapter has attempted to outline 
the limits of the legal duty of confidence. From the perspective of genetic 
information, it has become clear that the law of confidence is of limited value in 
resolving the problems which arise from our case scenarios. In particular, it is 
wholly inadequate in protecting spatial privacy interests.
9.1. THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS BY AUTONOMY  
AND CONFIDENTIALITY
This section draws to a conclusion the first part of this thesis. We have examined 
the nature of privacy interests which individuals have in genetic information and 
identified those as being of two kinds: informational privacy interests which 
concern issues of security of existing information, and spatial privacy interests 
which relate to the protection of the self from unwarranted intrusion, including 
intrusion with information about one's own self. We have seen in the last two 
chapters how the existing concepts of autonomy and confidentiality fare in 
protecting both of these types of privacy interests. We can conclude easily that the 
major problem arises in the context of spatial privacy. The law of confidentiality is 
entirely useless in protecting this interest, and the law of autonomy does not 
achieve much better. Both confidentiality and autonomy can, to an extent, help to
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protect informational privacy but it is submitted that to leave protection to these 
concepts is a wholly unsatisfactory situation. What is needed is a useful, precise and 
effective means not only of talking about all of the interests involved, but also of 
protecting them in an appropriate fashion. The solution which is proposed in the 
next chapter is that of a legal concept of privacy. The notion of privacy which has 
so far been advanced in this work is expanded and fitted into the framework of the 
broader debate about privacy in se. The definition of privacy already argued for is 
defended further and applied to the genetic information scenarios to show how the 
privacy interests involved can best be protected by an appeal to privacy itself.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PRIVACY AND 
GENETIC INFORMATION
1.1. - INTRODUCTION
Previous chapters have outlined the nature of the definition of privacy offered in 
this work and have given an account of the problems which arise from genetic 
testing and the availability of genetic information. It has been argued that the 
concepts of autonomy and confidentiality go some way to addressing these 
problems but that in doing so these concepts give rise to problems of their own. 
This chapter seeks to give an account of how privacy - as a general concept - has 
been explained and applied to date. Broadly, the chapter will examine how various 
accounts of the concept lie with the view of privacy offered in this work. In 
particular, this chapter will defend this latter definition of privacy and apply that 
definition to the problem scenarios which are set out in chapter two and which 
have already been examined in chapters three and four from the perspectives of 
autonomy and confidentiality. The chapter will conclude that the concept of 
privacy as here presented is a valuable adjunct to the existing concepts of autonomy, 
confidentiality and liberty all of which already play an important role in the 
provision of health care. It will be argued that proper protection of individual 
rights and interests and the attainment of balance between these and competing 
rights and interests in the context of genetic information cannot be achieved 
without due recognition of the complementary value of privacy.
2.1. - THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
It has already been stated that the existence of a distinction between public and 
private spheres of life is central to the western liberal tradition^ This phenomenon 
arises from the commitment of that tradition to individualism. Thus, the 
public/private distinction grew in importance with the rise of popularity of
1 See chapter one.
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individualism in western culture in the course of the last few centuries^. The 
existence of such a distinction was 'concretised' in American legal and political 
thought in the nineteenth century. As Horowitz has noted,
One of the central goals of nineteenth century legal thought was to 
create a clear separation between constitutional, criminal, and 
regulatory law - public law - and the law of private transactions - torts, 
contracts, property, and commercial law .^
Similarly, writing in the middle of that century, Mill produced his classic treatise 
On Liberty which was concerned with the prevention of public intrusion into 
private action' ,^
There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with 
individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs 
as protection against political despotism^.
As this suggests, the public/private distinction is concerned with the identification 
of different spheres of life, and ensures that the legitimacy of interference with 
individual action is continually scrutinised. This implies that in at least one sphere - 
the private sphere - individuals and individual action are of considerable 
importance, and further, that it is a 'good' thing that the boundary between the two 
spheres is maintained. Two points should be noted concerning this. First, it is not 
to be inferred that the placing of conduct in the 'private' sphere automatically 
prohibits regulation. There might be strong and valid reasons for regulating such
 ^ For a collection o f a range o f views on  the public/private distinction, see ‘Symposium on the 
Public/Private D istinction'. 130, University o f  Pennsylvania Law R eview , 1289, 1992.
 ^ See, H orow itz, M.J.; 'The H istory o f the Public/Private D istinction '. 130, U niversity o f  
Pennsylvania Law Review , 1423, 1982, ibid, at 1424. H orow itz also links the development of the 
distinction w ith  the rise of the sovereign nation state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 
the emergence of 'natural rights' theories in the seventeenth century, ibid., at 1423. This is also 
noted in Wacks, R.; 'Personal Information. Privacy and the Law ', Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, at 
8 .
 ^ Mill, ‘O n Liberty*. London, Penguin Books, 1974.
 ^ ibid, at 63.
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conduct. For example, most people would classify the decision to abort a 
genetically defective fetus as a 'private' matter, yet all western governments require 
that abortions (if permissible) are carried out under medical supervision and are 
reported'". In this way the State seeks to prevent harm to pregnant women at the 
hands of unqualified individuals. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where abortion is 
accepted, women are frequently denied the procedure in the latter stages of 
pregnancy because the State considers that it has a 'good reason' to do so - that is, to 
allow the potential child to have an independent existence. Nevertheless, there is 
considerable normative appeal in classifying conduct as 'private'. Thus, although 
there is no absolute prohibition on regulation of conduct in the private sphere, it 
can be taken that there is a prima facie presumption that arbitrary interference is 
impermissible. Such a presumption is not irrebutable but requires strong 
justification to rebut it. The corollary of this is that conduct in the 'public' sphere is 
not subject to such a presumption. Regulation in the public sphere is, therefore, 
more commonplace and a priori permissible.
Second, it should not be thought that the importance attached to individuals and 
individual action in the private sphere signifies the location of all individual rights 
in that sphere. Many individual rights are located in, and protected in, the public 
sphere. Obvious examples include civil liberties and equal protection laws.
The public/private distinction assumes a role in a variety of forms in a wide gamut 
of social life. For example, in politics one talks of public and private sector 
ownership of utilities and services, thereby distinguishing between governmental 
and individual control. Similarly, we talk of individual existence in terms of public 
and private life. On this distinction we consider it to be more acceptable to examine
 ^ In the U K  the relevant law on abortion is the A bortion A ct 1967 as amended by s,37 o f the 
Fluman Fertilisation and Em bryology A ct 1990. In Scotland, abortion details m ust be reported 
under the A bortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991, s.4, SI 1991/460, and in England & Wales the same 
provisions are contained in the A bortion Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/490).
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the 'private' life of 'public' officials such as politicians simply by virtue of their 
status as 'public' figures. However, for those of us not considered to be 'public' 
figures, the unsolicited ingress by others into one's 'private' life is considered 
offensive and an unwarranted intrusion^.
On a philosophical level, we debate the function of public morality and seek to 
distinguish it from private morality: the subject of the classic Hart/Devlin debate. 
As a response to the Wolfenden Report of 1957, Lord Devlin wrote The 
Enforcement o f Morals in which he argued that,
'the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression 
of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of 
private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity'^.
This was a challenge to the conclusion of Wolfenden regarding the 
décriminalisation of homosexuality that.
'...there must be a realm of morality and immorality which is not the 
law's business.'^
In response to Devlin, H.L.A. Hart published Law, Liberty and Morality^^. This 
series of Stanford Lectures challenged Devlin and argued for a clear division 
between public and private morality. The debate continues today
 ^This o f course is not to suggest that ‘public’ figures do not and cannot have ‘private’ lives, but the 
mere fact that such categorisation is used does make it more difficult for such figures to maintain the 
boundaries between the public and private aspects o f their lives, see Prosser, W.L.; ‘Privacy [A Legal 
Analysis]’. 48, California Law  Review, 338, 1960.
 ^D evlin, P.; 'The Enforcement of M orals’, Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, 1959, at 13. -1 4 .
9 Sir John W olfenden (Chairman); Report o f  the Com m ittee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 
Cmnd. 247, 1957, paragraph 61.
0^ Hart, H .L .A .; 'Law. Liberty and M orality'. Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, 1963,
See, for example, D w orkin, G.; 'Morality. Harm and the Law'. Boulder, W estview Press 1994, 
also Benn, S.I.; 'Public and Private M orality : Clean Living and D irty  H ands', in Benn, S.I. and 
Gaus, G.E.; 'Public and Private in Social Life', London, C rook Helm , 1983.
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Finally, in the realm of the law one of the foundational divisions between legal 
categories is between public law and private law : the former concerns the regulation 
of State and its relationship with individuals, and the latter governs the relations of 
individuals between themselves. So pervasive is the schism between these two areas 
that the structural organisation of most western legal systems, courts and social 
interaction is based on this model.
Thus from this very brief survey we can seen how the public/private distinction 
pervades very many areas of our lives. The next section considers the value, if any, 
which is derived from such a construct.
2.1.1. - The Value o f the Public/Private Distinction
In a recent analysis of public and private roles Ruth Gavison provides valuable 
insight into the 'senses' of public and private used in the above examples^ .^ Gavison 
notes that a central sense of the distinction is concern about being known or 
observed. The private represents a sphere where one can remain anonymous and 
unobserved; the public sphere offers no such guarantee. Similarly, the private is 
seen to represent an aspect of freedom: freedom from interference and regulation. 
Finally, the division ‘polarises the unitary entity of the individual'll with the 
collective sense of the group. The 'private' concerns individual action, the 'public' 
regulates collectives such as the company, the village, the community or the society.
The above observations are premised on a view of the public/private distinction as 
an identifiable phenomenon. That is, it is presumed that such a distinction exists. 
However, this view is by no means universally held. Moreover, the above analysis 
might lead one to believe that the spheres of public and private (if, indeed, they do
1^  Gavison, R.; ‘Feminism and the Public/Private D istinction*. 45, Stanford L aw  Review, 1, 1992 at 
6 - 7 .
1^  ibid, at 7.
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exist) are clearly separate and independent states. To assert that this were the case 
however would be wholly misleading. The reality is that the spheres of public and 
private life exist in very indeterminate states. A constant shifting of classification of 
conduct occurs between the two and their interface is perpetually obfuscated. As a 
consequence, the limits of these spheres of life are not easily determinable and as a 
result require constant re-evaluation. This in turn has important consequences.
For example, if the private sphere is seen as the sphere of 'non-regulation' or 'non­
interference' then the main tool with which regulation and interference are 
legitimated, namely law, requires to be manipulated in very many different ways to 
accommodate the constant changes. Thus, in a real sense the question of the 
boundaries between public and private is a question about the legitimacy of legal 
intervention and the limitations of law as a social expedient.
Proponents of the public/private distinction hold it out as a thing of value to both 
society and the individual alike. Benn and Gaus, for example, argue that the 
concepts of publicness and privateness help to structure society^^. N ot only do these 
notions perform a descriptive function, but also they provide normative rules 
according to which our lives are organised. Thus, for example, to read 
correspondence without the permission of the addressee is normatively an invasion 
of privacy in western culture. Benn and Gaus argue further that in a liberal 
conception of society and its relationship with the individual, the public/private 
distinction has a key role to play. As they state.
[The] idea of the "public" as the overwhelming mass is central to liberal 
theory. Liberalism is committed to the protection of the individual's 
conscience and projects; and when his beliefs and plans are unpopular,
Benn, S.I. and Gaus, G.F.; 'The Public and the Private : Concepts and A ction’, in Benn, S.I. and 
Gaus, G.F.; (eds.); 'Public and Private in Social Life', op. cit., chapter one, at l lf f .
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this commitment translates into a defence of the individual from the 
pressure of public opinion/^
Ryan has argued for the maintenance of the public/private distinction as a means of 
allowing individuals to 'escape' the pressures and strains of everyday public life^ .^ 
He sees a division between the natural persons that we are and the social roles 
which we are called upon to play. Sometimes society (the 'public') requires that we 
assume roles not in keeping with our natural character and therefore the 'private' 
provides an opportunity to 'step out' of such roles and 'be ourselves'. Similarly, the 
division between these spheres of life allows individuals to assume different roles in 
different situations as an elaborate coping mechanism. Different personae can be 
adopted to cater for different scenarios. To remove this facility, it is argued, is to 
endanger the psychological security of the individuaF^.
In contrast, Sennett argues that trends in western civil society over the last two 
centuries have had profound effects on public life as a social institution. As a result 
this has blurred beyond recognition the divisions between public and private in 
social and political life^ .^ He contends that the twin influences of secularisation and 
capitalism have been instrumental in this phenomenons^. Their development has 
brought about a shift in individual expectations: bastions of the private sphere such 
as intimacy and the expression of personal feelings have broken free of their 
boundaries and assumed a role in the public sphere. For Sennett, this is to be 
regretted. For, not only does he recognise the existence of different spheres of life, 
but he calls for a separation in their function and a respect for their differences.
ibid, chapter tw o, 'The Liberal C onception o f the Public and the Private', at 36.
Ryan, 'Private Selves and Public Parts’, in Benn and Gaus, 'Public and Private in Social Life', op. 
cit.
This has already been discussed in chapter one. Additionally, and for an excellent discussion of 
this kind o f theory from the perspective o f anthropology/psychology see, Goffman, E.; 'The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life'. London, Penguin Books, 1969. See also, Schoeman, F .D .; 
'Privacy and Social Freedom '. Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1992, chapter four: 'Social 
Freedom from the Perspective o f Cognitive and Social Psychology'.
Sennett, R.; 'The Fall o f Public M an'. London, Faber and Faber, 1986. 
ibid, especially chapter seven and eleven.
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Running through Sennett's work is a mistrust of the private sphere and what it 
represents. He sees the concern of the western state with individualism as a near- 
narcissistic obsession with the self, a condition which leads to the imposing of 
individual 'values' on all spheres of life, public and private. This, he argues, results 
in the public sphere being regarded as an inferior state, one which cannot provide 
the individual with self-affirming affection and gratification through self-expression. 
His argument is that this destroys the worth of both the public and the private. The 
public is reduced to a state entered under feelings of obligation rather than volition. 
Political life and city life are thereby rendered hollow experiences. By the same 
token, the private sphere ceases to serve a useful function since intimacy is sought 
everywhere and yet can be found nowhere *^ .^ Moreover, for Sennett the public 
sphere has its own 'values' which can be sought and enjoyed only if the 
public/private distinction is not blurred. As he puts it,
'How is society injured by the blanket measurement of social reality in 
psychological terms? It is robbed of its civility. How is the self injured 
by estrangement from a meaningful impersonal life? It is robbed of the 
expression of certain creative powers which all human beings possess 
potentially - the powers of play - but which require a milieu at a 
distance from the self for their realization. Thus the intimate society 
makes of the individual an actor deprived of an art.' 21
In essence Sennett argues for a clear division between public and private life; which 
spheres he regards as having separate and distinct functions. For him, the two must 
work in tandem to produce a 'good' society inhabited with rounded individuals. 
His aim is to make a case for the maintenance of the public/private distinction. He 
does not, however, provide us with a view on how such a distinction is to be 
maintained.
ibid, chapter eleven, especially at 262 - 264. 
ibid, at 264.
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The above views of Benn & Gaus, Ryan and Sennett are similar, even if they argue 
for different ends, because they perceive the public/private distinction to be of 
value. Yet, a considerable body of opinion would refute such a claim. As an 
example of the rejection of the public/private distinction as a useful construct (that 
is, either as a construct at all, or as a useful one), it is appropriate to examine the 
feminist perspective.
2.1.2. - Feminist Views o f the Public/Private Distinction
The supposed existence of a public/private distinction in liberal society has been 
the source of much concern for many feminists^^. The main thrust of argument 
against the recognition or acceptance of the distinction focuses on the exclusion of 
women from legal rights and legal protection by the classification of many areas of 
women’s lives as ‘private’ matters and therefore beyond law and legal intervention. 
It is argued that this is so because the (male) organisation of (male) legal and social 
systems uses the public/private distinction to establish limits on the authority of 
law. That which is in the public sphere is open to scrutiny and can be regulated and 
controlled by law. By corollary, that which is private is in a sphere beyond 
significant regulation and control. On one view this can be liberating^^, but on 
another view this provides much opportunity for abuse. Feminists who have
22 As an example consider the follow ing works: Thornton, M. (ed.); ‘Public and Private: Feminist 
Legal Debates*. M elbourne, Oxford U niversity Press, 1994; Dallmeyer, D .G . (ed.); ‘Reconceiving 
Reality: W om en and International Law*, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, N o.25 , W ashington  
D .G ., The American Society o f International Law, 1993, Part Two; Thornton, M.; ‘Feminism and 
the Contradictions of Law Reform *. 19, International Journal o f  the Sociology o f Law, 453, 1991;
O 'D onovan, K.; ‘Sexual Divisions in Law*, London, Weidenfeld and N icolson, 1985, in particular 
Part One: ‘D efinition and Flistory o f Public and Private*; Burrows, N .; ‘International Law and 
H um an Rights: The Case of W om en's Rights', in Campbell e ta l  (eds.); ‘Human Rights: From  
Rhetoric to R eality’, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, chapter five; Olsen, F. E.; ‘The Family and the 
Market: A  Study of Ideology and Legal R eform ’, 96, H arvard Law Review, 1497, 1983, Pateman, C.; 
‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private D ich otom y*, in Benn and Gaus, op. cit., at 28Iff., Klare, 
K.E.; ‘The Public/Private D istinction in Labour Law*. 130, University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, 
1358, 1982, and MacKinnon, C.A.; 'Fem inism  U nm odified : Discourses on Life and Law', 
Cambridge, Harvard U niversity Press, 1987, 'Towards a Feminist Theory o f the State'. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1989.
2) See notes 3 and 4, supra and text.
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criticised the public/private distinction have argued that divisions in society such as 
the State/Civil Society dichotomy and the Market/Family dichotomy represent 
not only clear divisions between (respectively) public and private spheres, but also 
the division between (respectively) male and female worlds '^ .^ That is, men have 
constructed a social world in which men inhabit the public worlds of state and the 
market and in which women inhabit the private worlds of civil society and the 
home (family life). Women then tend to spend their lives in a sphere - the private 
sphere - which is beyond considered legal regulation and protection. This is not to 
say, of course, that women do not enter the public sphere nor that men cannot exist 
as individuals principally in the private sphere. Rather, it is suggested that as a 
group the lives of women are predominantly relegated to the private sphere. The 
public/private distinction is then seen to be a gendered construct which can be used 
as an instrument to control the lives of women. As one commentator has put it,
...the non-regulation of the private realm legitimates self-regulation
which translates ultimately into male d o m i n a n c e . ’^ 5
Such arguments have been made most recently in the context of the protection 
afforded to women by international law. For example, Burrows has argued that 
there are several reasons why the field of public international law has not addressed 
the question of women’s rights with particular vigour^ .^ First, international law has 
traditionally been concerned with the relations between states themselves and not 
between individuals themselves or relations between states and individuals. Second, 
even when international law does intervene in state/individual relations it does so 
in a limited fashion, bound by the principle of sovereignty. This principle dictates 
that states have exclusive control over those persons on or in its territory^^ and
2'^  See, for example, Olsen, loc. cit., Klare, loc. cit., and O ’Donovan, op. cit., chapter one.
25 See Charlesworth, H .; ‘Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis o f International Law’, in Dallm eyer, 
op. cit., at 1 0 -1 1 .
2^  Burrows, op. cit.
27 ibid, at 89.
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therefore only in the most serious of circumstances can there be interference with 
the relationship between state and individual. This is a view which is premised on a 
belief that international law should not interfere with the domestic relations of a 
staters. Looking at it another way, it is an example of the operation of the 
public/private distinction at international level: legal intervention between State 
and State is a public matter; but the legitimacy of legal intervention in matters 
between state and individual is essentially a private matter of the state c o n c e r n e d ^ ^ .  
This, Burrows argues, is particularly problematic for women seeking international 
legal protection since they predominantly exist in the private sphere of their State. 
Charlesworth puts it succinctly thus : ‘[t]he sovereign state is simply irrelevant to 
most women’s e x p e r i e n c e . Of course, the same can be true for men living within 
a state. The point, however, is that women are doubly disadvantaged. First, on an 
international level, except for the most gross of human rights violations, women are 
seen as an exclusively domestic (private) concern of the state. Second, compounding 
this is the national treatment which women receive - as we have seen, in the main 
they are relegated to the private sphere in family life and civil society where abuse 
can occur at the hands of private (male) individuals, yet where law rarely 
intervenes:
If states sustain gendered hierarchies in national contexts, this is 
reinforced on the international plane.^i
What is the response of feminists to this? Principally, responses fall into one of two 
categories. Either it is argued that the (male) view of the world as existing in two 
separate spheres stands in the way of protecting women and therefore a
2^  Article 2(7) o f the U nited N ations Charter (1945).
29 A lthough as Burrows points out, ‘...since 1945, it has com e to be accepted that states may not use 
the argument of domestic jurisdiction to mask gross violations of human rights.’, ibid, at 89 - 90.
5° loc. cit., at 9.
51 Charlesworth, op. cit., at 8. She later opines, ‘[the public/private distinction]...sustains w om en’s 
oppression on a global level.’, at 10.
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reconceptualisation of the public/private distinction is r e q u i r e d ^ ^ .  Alternatively, it 
is argued that the public/private distinction is a false construct which is used as an 
illegitimate tool to exclude women from the protection of law. On such a view the 
public/private distinction ‘is both irrational and inconsistently a p p l i e d ’ 5 3 .  It is 
irrational because the distinction ‘[is] drawn for political reasons... it is not one 
which is inherent in the nature of society, neither is it natural, nor n e c e s s a r y . ’ 5 4  It is 
inconsistently applied because law does intervene in the private sphere to prohibit 
offensive acts such as slavery, violence and child abuse. Advocates of this second 
view argue that the distinction should be ‘collapsed’ to allow the reach of law into 
the lives of women55.
These views stand in stark contrast to those expressed by commentators such as 
Benn & Gaus and Sennett who favour a distinction between public and private 
spheres of life. Each of these feminist standpoints holds out that private is ‘bad’ for 
women. Such a view is not, however, universally held among feminists.
Consider, for example, the writings of Karen EngeP^. She challenges the notion 
that ‘private’ is necessarily bad for women. She argues that the private sphere can 
afford protection to women, primarily in the areas of reproduction and termination 
of pregnancy :
The language of privacy, and sketching out zones of privacy, many 
would argue, is our best shot at legally theorizing women’s sexuality. In 
the United States legal jurisprudence, the First Amendment has been 
used to a similar end, as often seen in the debates about p o r n o g r a p h y . 5 7
52 For an explanation see Engel, K.j ‘After the Collapse of the Public/Private D istinction: 
Strategizing W om en’s Rights’, in Dallm eyer, op. cit., at 143 - 155.
55 ibid, at 144.
54 Burrows, op. cit.,zt 82.
55 See Engel, op. cit., at 143 - 145.
5^  ibid.
57 ibid, at 148. She also cites Schneider w ho has argued that privacy can have a role to  play in 
protecting w om en from those w ho batter and abuse them  : Schneider, E.M.; ‘The V iolence of 
Privacy’. 23, Connecticut Law Review , 973, 1991, at 994 - 998.
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Engel also warns that by collapsing the public/private distinction one runs the risk 
of not paying due respect to the principle of cultural relativism : not all women in a 
particular culture who are happy to stay at home or wear certain items of clothing 
are ‘replete with false c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ ^ ^
A further point made by Engel concerns the assumptions upon which much of 
feminist argument against the public/private distinction is based. A frequent 
assumption is that the private sphere is devoid of regulation making it a ‘bad’ place 
for women to be^ .^ However, Engel challenges this : ‘...the private - or protection 
of the private - does not have to mean lack of interference.’4° Her point here is that 
interference can sometimes be welcome if it protects women from threats to their 
rights by others (men). In other words, the private sphere need not be seen as an 
unregulated void and in particular, privacy can be used as a concept to further 
rather than defeat women’s rights4k
A reluctance to accept the ‘private’ or ‘privacy’ as undesirable notions is seen very 
clearly in the works of Ruth Gavison. Of particular interest in this context is her 
article, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction^'^. Here Gavison sets out to 
examine the nature of the arguments made by feminists who challenge the existence 
and/or worth of the public/private distinction. She identifies two forms of 
criticism which have been levelled at the distinction - internal and external,
Internal challenges are criticisms of specific uses of
terms like “public” and “private” or of specific
5^  ibid, at 149.
59 Yet, Engel’s point that such ‘freedom ’ can assist w om en ’s rights has already been made.
4° ibid, at 150.
41 As Engel says, ‘Privacy...is an indeterminate concept; in itself it neither creates nor requires a 
space outside o f the state’s protection or regulation.', ibid. For a similar view  and another defence of 
privacy against feminist arguments, see A llen, A .L.; ‘Taking Liberties : Privacy, Private Choice, and 
Social Contract Theory. 56, Cinncinnati L aw  Review , 461, 1987.
42 Gavison, R.; ‘Feminism and the Public/Private D istinction’, loc. cit.
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arrangements designated by these labels. External 
challenges invite us to abolish or delegitimate such 
distinctions altogether.^)
These two forms of challenge correspond to those broad categories of argument 
outlined above: either it is argued that the public/private distinction serves the 
wrong purposes and should be reconceptualised (an internal challenge for Gavison) 
or it is argued that the distinction is useless and/or harmful and should be collapsed 
as a result (an external challenge for Gavison). In assessing the validity of such 
arguments Gavison makes some distinctions of her own which are of fundamental 
importance to our understanding of ‘public’, ‘private’ and the ‘public/private 
distinction’.
Gavison examines what she calls ‘senses of public/private’ to determine what, if 
any, differences exist between these two concepts and further what, if any, purpose 
the making of a distinction between them actually serves or could serve. This is an 
invaluable exercise because it reveals that often, if not always, feminists and others 
who criticise the public/private distinction use different terminology and/or use 
terminology inconsistently as between themselves. Axiomatically, this has 
profound consequences for any debate about the use or value of the distinction. 
Gavison identifies the following senses of public/private.
• Accessible/Inaccessible-. ‘[t]he private is that which is unknown and unobserved; 
the public is that which is known and observed, or at least is capable of being 
known and observed, because it occurs in a public place’'^^^.
• Freedom/Interference: ‘[h]ere, the “private” is “free”, the sphere in which others 
do not interfere. The “public” will acquire a different meaning depending on the
45 ibid, at 2.
44 ibid, at 6.
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source of the interference’^ .^ That is, State interference renders the “public” 
‘political’. Market influences and communitarian influences cast the “public” as 
‘social’.
• Individuals/Society(Groups): ‘the public/ private distinction can highlight 
differences between individuals and various sorts of groups or collectives. The 
distinction here is a matter of degree, with small voluntary groups existing 
somewhere in-between - labelled “private” when compared to larger, more 
anonymous “publics”, but “public” when compared to individuals^^.
• Complex Meanings', ‘finally, all these senses may combine to create cluster-
meanings’47.
This sort of exercise greatly facilitates the clarification of issues. It shows how 
confusion is not easily avoided and it stresses the importance of conducting debate 
on the same, level playing field. Yet, such an exercise also demonstrates that 
although such different senses of public and private are used, they are not 
necessarily distinct from one another. That is, one might legitimately talk of 
something as ‘private’ in the normative sense of requiring not only non-interference 
hut also inaccessibility: a ‘private’ room or a ‘private’ meeting. Similarly, to use the 
expression ‘private life’ invokes normative feelings of non-interference, 
inaccessibility and individual, as opposed to societal, value. This realisation serves 
to complicate the task of ensuring that debate is indeed conducted on the same field.
45 id.
46 K/.
47 ibid, at 7. As an example Gavison offers the following: ‘we find such [com plex] meaning in the 
idea o f "private life” signifying that part o f life which is often unknow n and inaccessible, at least to  
the public at large. People often view  the “private life” as a realm entitled to non-interference and 
freedom from accountability due to its basic self-regarding nature, connection to the intimate, and 
importance to one’s self-indentity and welfare., id.
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A main point made by Gavison is that the arguments of feminists are valuable and 
insightful because they call us to question so-called social ‘norms’ concerning 
women and to assess the ways in which women are treated at the hands of men. 
Yet, she defends the use of the public/private distinction and warns against 
challenges which are misdirected,
...they become misleading and counterproductive and may actually 
facilitate the devaluation of important aspects of human life that are 
currently identified as “private” and “personal”^^ .
Gavison clearly finds utility and protection for women (and others) in the private 
sphere. She argues for this on a variety of grounds. For example, the recognition by 
the Supreme Court of the United States of women’s rights to abortion in Roe v  
Wade^"  ^ (using the concept of privacy^ )^ displays a commitment on the part of the 
US to protect individual (private) interests unique to women. Similarly, she puts 
forward the powerful argument that the development of individual interests such as 
intimacy, the establishment of relationships and personality can only be achieved 
through the protection of a private sphere of life. Moreover, she argues that such 
‘value’ in privacy or the private is recognised by most feminists,
...it is rare to find feminists who argue consistently either that 
everything should be regulated by the state, or that the family and all 
other forms of intimate relationships should disappear in favour of 
public communities...[w]hen pushed feminists explicitly deny that this is 
their ideal. They advocate only local changes in the existing mix of 
private and public and in the existing institutionalization of both 
realms, with more equal access to the two main realms for both genders.
They also want the freedom to explore these questions boldly and 
creatively5i.
48 ibid, at 2.
49 Roe V Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Gavison m ounts a strong argument against M acKinnon in this 
respect, ibid  at 30 - 35. The latter has argued that the Roe decision does not guarantee w om en  
anything beyond that which they could receive from men in private, see M acKinnon, C.; ‘Privacy v 
Equality: Beyond Roe v  Wade', in M acKinnon, ‘Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on  Life and 
Law', op. cit.
5® Discussed infra.
51 ibid, at 2 8 -2 9 .
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In other words, feminists who mount internal challenges to the public/private 
distinction do not ultimately consider that nothing should ever be private. Their 
challenge should thus be seen, not as one against the ‘private’ or ‘privacy’ as such, 
but rather as one against the use to which the distinction is currently put. Their 
solution then is re-establishment of the boundaries of the private and the public on 
more equal, less gendered grounds.
Gavison’s response to those who mount external challenges to the public/private 
distinction focuses on the call for the terminology of public and private to be 
‘abandoned or delegitimated’^ .^ This view holds that the language of ‘privacy’ and 
‘public and private spheres’ is somehow operational in the creation and 
maintenance of the marginalisation and ill-treatment of women. Gavison refutes 
this and warns against the sophistic attack on ‘public’ and ’private’ as the 
progenitors of the evil that subjugates women. Her argument is three-fold : first, 
attacking the concepts in se does not necessarily address the true reasons why 
women are marginalised and ill-treated in our society. Second, although ‘private’ 
and ‘privacy’ invoke, inter alia, normative responses of non-interference, the 
confusion which surrounds these terms and their meaning should not lead us to 
conclude that the terms are meaningless nor that the confusion cannot be clarified. 
And, in clarifying what we mean, we might have a better idea of which ‘private’ 
acts legitimately invoke non-interference and which do not. Consider the case, as 
Gavison does, of domestic violence. It is not because domestic violence occurs 
primarily in the ‘privacy’ of the home that one should accept that such behaviour 
is, by that fact alone, outside the boundaries of legitimate legal regulations^. It may 
be that we think that this is so because of normative confusion about what we mean 
by ‘private’, but Gavison argues that if we were less confused about what is truly
ibid, at 29.
S3 ibid, at 35 - 38.
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private - and therefore truly deserving of non-interference - then we would be more 
willing to intervene and more likely to address the true causes of domestic violence. 
In particular, Gavison notes that the abandonment of language alone cannot help us 
to achieve such an end,
Public treatment of domestic violence is plagued by dubious uses of the 
notion of privacy. The police are often extremely reluctant to interfere 
in domestic disputes, even when violence is alleged. Often, the reasons 
offered for this reluctance is the private nature of the marital 
relationship. The potential for confusion generated by this variety of 
uses is not unique to the public/private distinction or to the feminist 
context. In fact, this kind of problem is pervasive in legal reasoning, 
especially when the conclusion must be justified in terms of 
interpretations of authoritative texts. Moreover, the confusion appears 
in many different fields of law. Although these mistakes should be 
avoided, a reform of the language and terminology is not necessarily the 
cure. Reforming the language by delegitimating the use of “private” and 
“privacy” will not clarify distinctions between descriptive and 
normative claims. The descriptive-normative ambiguity exists for all 
alternative candidates^ '*^ .
Third, ‘privacy’ for Gavison has valuable uses and the abandonment of terminology 
which accurately reflects how we feel about private matters is lamentable, 
unnecessary and potentially harmful in itself. She asserts that the private can be 
‘good’ for women just as it can be ‘bad’ for women and therefore what is necessary 
is a differentiation between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ arguments about privacy^^. One 
way to do this is to determine the value of the conduct which occurs in the private 
sphere : if privacy facilitates the development of personality and relationships it is 
‘good’, but if it promotes domestic violence or other forms of exploitation of 
women it is ‘bad’. Gavison accepts this to a point but is quick to add a rider. The 
language of privacy should not be abandoned in favour of a ‘value’ analysis of the 
behaviour concerned because (a) ‘privacy’ provokes normative responses in us 
which can protect behaviour in which many may find no value but in which those
3'’' ibid, at 35.
33 ibid, at 37.
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involved might find much (for example homosexual conduct)3^  and (b) a respect for 
‘privacy’ as a social construct performs a valuable function in promoting association 
between individuals and ensuring non-interference from the state - to examine the 
‘value’ of such association rather than respecting its private nature would be 
detrimental in both social and personal terms37.
In sum, Gavison values the feminist debate as revealing much about privateness and 
publicness and about the potential abuses of women which can occur through such 
concepts. Her basic argument, however, is this : the abandonment of ‘public’ and 
’private’ as linguistic tools to describe our social order will not further the cause of 
women because it will not necessarily address the reasons why these tools have been 
used in the past to abuse women. Moreover, she argues that the tools of ‘public’ and 
(particularly) ‘private’ do have value both for women and men and that their 
abandonment would be a tragic loss,
2.1.3. - The Public/Private Distinction: A  Conclusion
The above section serves as an introduction to the discussion of privacy to follow in 
this work. It highlights many of the arguments which are made about privacy and 
which we shall encounter presently. Obviously, the role of ’privacy’ in the 
public/private distinction is crucial, but just as the function and parameters of the 
public/private distinction are by no means universally accepted, the same is true of 
the function and parameters of the concept of privacy. The following section will 
give an overview of the range of opinions which have been advanced about privacy 
and will include a brief account of how the concept has been used to provide legal 
protection of various interests in several legal systems.
3^  As Gavison says, ‘...while privacy and intimacy should not provide blanket im m unity from  
public interference, it does not fo llow  that w e always look  at the substance of the activity rather 
than its context...[w]e do not want to reduce the question to a debate about the m orality o f the 
conduct.’, at 37.
37 ibid, at 38,
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3.1. - PRIVACY: ANTI-SOCIAL CONCEPT OR FUNDAM ENTAL  
RIGHT?
Consider these two views of privacy;
[Privacy] can be seen as the protector of reputations and sanities, a 
developer of intimate and personal relationships, and even a defender of 
hard-done by individuals maltreated at the hands of overly-bureaucratic 
government departments^^.
[Privacy] is seen as creating the context in which both deceit and 
hypocrisy may flourish: It provides cover under which most human 
wrongdoing takes place and then it protects the guilty from taking 
responsibility for their transgressions once committed... Concern for 
one’s privacy may be regarded as a sign of moral cowardice, an excuse 
not to state clearly one’s position and accept whatever unpopularity 
may ensue. Privacy may be seen as a culturally conditioned sensitivity 
that makes people more vulnerable than they would otherwise be to 
selective disclosures and to the sense of comparative inferiority and 
abject shame - a sense engendered by ignorance about the inner lives of 
others^^.
To an extent these views of privacy mirror the arguments of Gavison and many 
feminists concerning the public/private distinction. These arguments have been 
advanced, however, not in the context of that debate, but in the context of privacy 
simpliciter. And, just as the views of feminists and those who disagree with them 
reveal much about the public/private distinction, so too do these two (competing) 
views reveal much about the nature of privacy. Furthermore, each view has much 
to support it and can be defended well depending on one’s perspective and 
theoretical standpoint. A communtarian, for example, would have no problem 
defending the negative view of privacy, for privacy seems to stand for many notions 
antithetical to communitarianism such as solitude, individuality and the furtherance
Schoeman, F .D.; ‘Privacy : Philosophical D im ensions of the Literature’, in Schoeman, F .D . (ed.); 
‘Philosophical Dim ensions o f Privacy : A n A nthology’, Cambridge, Cambridge U niversity Press, 
1984, chapter one, at 1.
3^  ibid.
350
of personal interests generally. In contrast, one committed to a more individualistic 
approach to social relations would favour the first interpretation offered^®. We have 
already seen that Ruth Gavison is one such individual and she has mounted a strong 
defence of the positive view of privacy^/ Indeed, the sorts of argument put by 
Gavison in defending the value of privacy for individuals, groups and society 
generally perhaps explains in part why some legal systems have chosen to protect 
the concept in law. By the same token, the indeterminate nature of privacy has 
caused problems of definition for those systems which have chosen to do so^ 7_ 
Indeed, the problem of defining a ‘valuable’ concept fit for legal protection has been 
a recurring problem in this field. As one commentator has rightly observed: 
'Privacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognised than d e s c r i b e d ' ^ 3  Such 
problems have prompted many writers such as Walter Pratt to conclude: '[a] 
concept flexible enough to comprise opposite ideals is not a likely subject for 
legislation' '^ .^ This might, in part, explain the dearth of specific privacy legislation
in the United K i n g d o m ^ ^
The above factors allow us to draw two important conclusions about the problems 
which face any writer or legislature examining privacy as a possible subject of legal 
protection. First, does ‘privacy’ have sufficient value to be deserving of protection? 
Second, even if the answer to this first question is given in the affirmative, is 
privacy sufficiently amenable to definition to make legal protection viable and 
effective? The rest of this chapter will be devoted to addressing the first of these 
questions and will argue that privacy is indeed a valuable concept, especially in the
For a good account of both individualistic and communitarian (or republicanism) arguments in 
respect of privacy, see Rubenfeld, J.; ‘The Right o f Privacy*, 102, H arvard Law  Review , 737, 1989, at 
761 - 770.
See, for example, Gavison, R.; ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law’, 89, Yale Law Journal, 421, 1980, 
‘Information Control : Availability and Exclusion’, in Benn and Gaus, (eds.), ‘Public and Private in 
Social Life’, op. cit., and ‘Feminism and the Public/Private D istinction’, loc. cit. 
see infra.
3^ Taken from  Young, J.B. (ed.); ‘Privacy’. Chichester, John W iley and Son, 1979, at 5.
Pratt, W .F.; ‘Privacy in Britain’. London, Association University Press, 1979, at 63.
3^ This has been discussed in chapter one, supra.
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context of genetic information. In the conclusion to this work we will accordingly 
examine the second question, namely; which legal means could best ensure a fully 
efficient and equitable protection of individual privacy in the United Kingdom in 
the context of genetic information.
3.2. - A REVIEW OF THE PRIVACY LITERATURE
One need only look at the bibliography of any work dealing with privacy to 
appreciate just how many diverse and interconnecting definitions of privacy have 
been proposed over the years. These are almost as numerous as the number of 
works written on the concept itself. Nonetheless, valuable work has been done by 
commentators such as Schoeman^^ and Parent*"^  ^ who have undertaken to categorise 
privacy writings into groups according to their approach to privacy. From works 
such as these and others, one can identify three categories of privacy commentators:
• Those who advance sceptical approaches to privacy and its value in society;
• Those who seek some fundamental core element which ties all privacy examples 
together and explains the concept as a whole, and
• Those who seek to define privacy in certain precise terms for use in specific 
areas.
Let us consider some examples of each of these approaches.
See Schoeman, F .D .; (ed.); 'Philosophical D im ensions of Privacy : An A nthology ’, op. cit., 
especially chapter one.
7^ Parent, W .A.; ‘Recent W ork on the Concept o f Privacy’, 20, American Philosophy Quarterly, 341, 
1983, Parent, W .A.; ‘A  N ew  D efinition of Privacy for the Law’. 2, Law and Philosophy, 305, 1983, 
and Parent, W .A.; ‘Privacy : A Brief Suiwey of the Conceptual Landscape’. 11, Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal, 21, 1995.
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3.2.1. - The Sceptical Approach
It has already been said that a problem for anyone interested in the study of privacy 
concerns the apparent indeterminate nature of the concept and its seemingly 
dubious functionality - sometimes promoting ‘good’, sometimes promoting ‘bad’ 
outcomes for individuals and society. Thus privacy writers divide, in the first 
instance, into those who see privacy as a ‘good’ thing and those who perceive it as 
‘bad’. As an example of the latter, we have already examined the feminist literature. 
But, even among writers who acknowledge that the private sphere (as opposed to 
privacy per se) does promote certain ‘goods’, many consider that ‘privacy’ as a 
concept is nothing more than an extension of existing concepts which can be 
protected by means other than an appeal to a difficult-to-define concept such as 
privacy.
One example of this is Judith Jarvis Thomson who has claimed that there is 
nothing morally significant about the concept of privacy as such^ .^ Instead, she 
argues that any right we may choose to claim as a privacy right can be more easily 
dealt with by reference to existing rights in other fields, such as property rights or 
rights over one’s person. Thus all problems can be resolved without having ever to 
refer to privacy at all. Thomson suggests that the reason a peeping-tom does wrong 
is not because he invades our privacy but because he breaches the personal right we 
all have not to be looked at. Similarly, if I read someone else’s correspondence I am 
not violating their right to privacy but merely their property right in owning the 
papers, which in turn gives them the right to control access^ .^
Thom son, J.J.; ‘The Right to Privacy*. 4, Philosophy and Public Ajfairs, 295, 1975. For a full 
critique of Thom son, see Scanlon, T.; ‘Thom son on Privacy*. 4, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 315, 
1975.
O f course this presupposes that I ow n the documents containing information about me. For 
personal correspondence that is likely to be true (although m y correspondee w ill ow n other papers 
from  me containing information about me), but in other contexts this model might be less helpful. 
In the health care setting, for example, it is n ow  settled in law that a doctor or a health 
board/authority owns medical records and not patients - see the R v  M id Glamorgan Family Health 
Services Authority and Another, ex parte Martin  [1995] 1 WLR 110. Thus, on T hom son’s analysis the
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Unfortunately, an obvious problem with Thomson’s view is that it requires us to 
accept the existence of a plethora of ancillary rights which in themselves have little 
or no moral justification. For example, what is the basis of a right not to be looked 
at? Even in circumstances where one could make an appeal to another area of 
existing, legally-recognised rights - such as property rights - the important question 
arises of whether the interests in not being looked at or in not allowing others 
access to one’s personal information are adequately protected by the existing area of 
law. Consider the central problem of this work : genetic information. In many 
respects the problems which have so far been discussed are unique as well as 
deserving legal recognition. Yet, chapters three and four of this work have shown 
that existing rights such as autonomy and confidentiality cannot adequately protect 
the interests surrounding genetic information. That is why this work argues for 
recognition of privacy and why this author would reject the work of Thomson as a 
meaningful way of examining the concept of privacy.
A similar sceptical treatment of privacy comes from William Prosser^o. In his 1960 
paper Privacy : A  Legal Analysis Prosser examines the US common law tort of 
privacy and outlines four distinct kinds of invasion of privacy which are recognised 
by the courts and three different kinds of interests protected by the “law of 
privacy”. Flis analysis is based on the ‘privacy’ cases decided before the US courts. 
Fîis approach is similar to Thomson’s in that he identifies abstract interests in need 
of protection, for example, protection of reputation, avoidance of emotional stress 
and property interests. He concludes that, on this view, all so-called privacy interests 
are adequately protected by the existing law. Yet, this view is subject to the same 
criticism made of Thomson above. Even if an argument can be made that many
doctor or health authority w ould have the right to control access. H ow ever, this right might be 
exercised in ways which offend me and m y interests. In such cases T hom son’s analysis offers me no 
means o f redress.
79 Prosser, W.; ‘Privacy : A Legal A nalysis’, 48, California Law Review, 338, 1960.
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‘privacy’ interests are already protected indirectly by other interests, it does not 
necessarily follow that ‘unique’ privacy interests cannot be found. Moreover, 
Prosser’s approach has been questioned as ‘philosophically unsound’. As Wacks has 
observed,
..it is a singularly unrewarding and pointless exercise to comb through 
the case law in search of instances where courts have either employed 
the word ‘privacy’ or accorded protection to certain interests which are 
now (rightly or wrongly) conceived as privacy issues. Since this process 
requires distortions in the meaning of privacy and involves the 
application of past situations to present problems, it is both legally and 
philosophically unsound^b
This is true up to a point. If one trawls the case law, as Prosser does, to prove that 
all interests so far decided upon as privacy interests are already protected by other 
laws, then it is not acceptable to draw the conclusion that all future  privacy interests 
will necessarily find protection in existing areas of law. If, however, one examines 
the law to measure the breadth of understanding of ‘privacy’ by the courts in a 
particular jurisdiction in order to evaluate the sorts of interests currently protected, 
then that is a valuable exercise^ .^
The approach of writers such as Thomson and Prosser has been called the 
Reductionist Model o f Privacy^ which denies that there is anything worthwhile or 
specific about privacy which is worth protecting. Plowever, some sceptics go 
further and argue the 'negative side' of privacy.
Richard Wasserstrom has suggested that not revealing information about oneself 
may be equivalent in moral terms to deception and therefore normatively
Wacks, R.; ‘The Protection of Privacy’. London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, at 5.
See, as an example, H ogg, M.; ‘The Very Private Life o f the Right to Privacy’, in H um e Papers 
on Public Policy, 2(3), ‘Privacy and Property’, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994.
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unacceptable^^. He posits that in society we make ourselves unnecessarily 
vulnerable as individuals by accepting the notion that there are thoughts and 
actions about which we ought to feel ashamed or embarrassed. He suggests that we 
would be less embarrassed and therefore less vulnerable if we were to be honest 
about our lives and by doing so we would realise that many other individuals share 
similar ‘embarrassing facts’. Unfortunately, such a view fails to take account of 
considerable anthropological evidence which indicates that the ‘desire’ to hide is 
culturally conditioned and therefore unlikely to change without fundamental 
changes in society '^ .^ In other words, Wasserstrom’s view may well be correct in an 
ideal world, but it is not accurate in our world.
Goffman has argued convincingly that a measure of privacy is necessary precisely 
because of the pressures (and hypocrisy) that each individual is subjected to by 
society^^. Likewise, Murphy has put the case for the value of social distancing 
mechanisms such as privacy. His view is that privacy is not only recognised and 
institutionalised in all societies (albeit in relation to different matters and to varying 
degrees), but that a measure of privacy is absolutely essential to the maintenance of 
both social relationships and one’s own sense of self^ .^
Westin considers this sort of evidence at length in his seminal work Privacy and  
FreedonP^ and concludes,
Wasserstrom, R.A.; ‘Privacy: Some Arguments and Assum ptions’, in Schoeman, F .D ., (ed.); 
‘Philosophical Dim ensions of Privacy: An A nthology’, op. cit.
See, for example, M oore, B. Jr.; 'Privacy', N ew  York, M .E. Sharpe Inc., 1984, Murphy, R.F.; 
'Social Distance and the V eil'. 6, Am erican Anthropologist, 1257, 1964, W estin, A.; 'The Origins of 
Modern Claims to Privacy', in Schoeman, F. D.; 'Philospohical D im ensions of Privacy', op. cit., at 
56 - 74, and Arendt, H .; 'The H um an C ondition’, Chicago, U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1958.
Goffman, E.; ‘Stigma’. London, Penguin Books, 1963, also ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life’, op. cit.
Murphy, R.; ‘Social Distance and the V eil*, loc. cit.
Westin, A.; ‘Privacy and Freedom . London, The Bodley Plead, 1970. For criticism of W estin see 
Lusky, L.; ‘Invasion of Privacy : A  Classification of Concepts’, 72, Columbia Law Review, 693, 
1972.
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...privacy appears to be a cultural value in all known human 
communities, although the forms it takes vary enormously^®.
The tension between writers such as Westin, Murphy and Goffman and 
Wasserstrom might best be explained as a tension between individualistic notions of 
privacy and communitarian notions of privacy. Wasserstrom’s negative view of 
privacy sees the concept as anti-social or anti-communitarian, and to a lesser extent 
anti-individual. This is because he sees the potential for harm rather than the 
potential for benefit seen by others. Yet the ‘need’ in humans for a sphere of ‘the 
private’ arguably forces us to go some way to accepting that recognising that need is 
a good thing^ .^ Of course, this is not to say that privacy should assume a place of 
paramountcy in our value hierarchy, and it certainly does not mean that we need 
accept protection of privacy if this has harmful or ‘bad’ outcomes®^, but it does 
suggest that a ‘core’ of interests can be served by recognising the need for a degree 
of privacy. If one accepts this view arguably Wasserstrom and those who think like 
him are not too far removed from Westin and his followers : the question becomes 
not one of the goodness or badness of privacy, but rather one concerning the 
drawing of limits of the kinds of interests which should and will be protected and 
the degree of privacy which can be expected®b
Richard Hixson has advanced an argument which would seem to follow this line, 
although ultimately it comes down in favour of a narrow construction of ‘privacy’. 
In Privacy in a Public Society Hixson considers privacy to be a ‘privilege’ and 
thereby ‘something well worth protecting’, but 'not on the grand scale that claims
ibid, at 87.
Compare, Collins, H.; ‘D ecline o f Privacy in Private Law', \A, Journal o f  L aw  and Society, 91, 
1987.
See C avison’s arguments above concerning feminist challenges to the public/private distinction. 
A nd in this respect this brings us to a position not too far removed from  that o f Cavison in 
respect o f feminist writings, supra.
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for privacy are pressed t o d a y . H e  asserts that: 'an open and democratic society 
cannot tolerate a high degree of privacy'® .^
The value which Hixson attributes to privacy is based on a view of the relationship 
between society and the individual which favours society as the ultimate value. This 
is a little surprising for a North American writer, given the considerable 
commitment of Americans to individualism. Nevertheless, Hixson considers that 
privacy threatens the American view of ‘community’ or rather ‘collective 
individualism’ His view of American society holds that a commitment to ‘public 
service’ is more important than ‘singularity’®^. Whether or not one agrees, his 
approach is interesting because it shows how our view of privacy can shift, even 
when we consider that it is important. It also shows that the question of protection 
is a question of degree, depending on how one views the relationship between 
society and the individual and what relative value one attaches to one or other 
party to that relationship. It has already been put in chapter one of this work that 
privacy in essence concerns the boundaries of the society/individual relationship 
and as Negley has pointed out,
...any consideration of whether privacy is a right of the individual will
entirely depend on what definition of the individual we accept®^ .
That definition is in turn dependent on the definition of society we accept. As has 
already been argued, the particular context for this work is the individual in the 
western liberal democracy. That view, which is committed to notions of liberty 
and autonomy, will find it hard to reject out of turn the idea that individuals have a
®^ H ixson, R.F .; ‘Privacy in a Public Society’. N ew  York, Oxford U niversity Press, 1987, at 4.
®^ ibid, at 96.
®4 ibid, at 100 -102.
®^ id. Thus, rather than recognising and protecting a w idely defined privacy right, H ixson  proposes 
that the law should direct itself to the protection of specific instances of abuse concerning sensitive 
information.
86 N egley , G.; ‘Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy’, 31, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
319, 1966.
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set of core interests in the private sphere of their lives where they can be free from 
interference, develop their relationships and personalities and engage in consensual 
acts which at times might be frowned upon by others. That this is so is related to 
the commitment of the liberal society to notions of freedom, liberty and 
autonomy. So many of the so-called ‘privacy’ interests overlap with liberty and 
autonomy interests that it becomes difficult to separate them or to deny that a 
degree of recognition should be forthcoming for privacy. We will discuss presently 
the problem of overlap between these concepts. For the moment, if one accepts 
what has been said then the arguments of privacy sceptics distil into arguments 
about the degree of protection which should be afforded to privacy rather than 
denying that privacy has any value whatsoever. This leads logically to a 
consideration of the question of which, if any, ‘core’ interests are privacy interests.
3.2.2. - Tlje Fundamentalist Approach
This section examines the works of those writers who search for a fundamental, 
internally consistent and distinctive core to privacy concerns. Their search is always 
motivated by the notion that there is something special about human or moral 
character - overlooked by reductionist accounts - which can be called ‘private’. 
Consider the following views.
Edward Bloustein focuses on the idea of an ‘inviolate personality’ which he 
associates with the ‘right to be alone’®^. ‘Inviolate personality’ is taken to include 
such notions as individual dignity and integrity, personal uniqueness and personal 
autonomy. Bloustein’s case is that respect for these values ‘both grounds and unifies 
our concept of privacy’.
See Bloustein, E.J.; ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human D ignity [An Answer to Dean Prosser]’, 39, 
N ew York U niversity Law Review , 962, 1964. A lso, Bloustein, E.J.; ‘Privacy is Dear at A ny Price : A 
Response to Professor Posner’s Econom ic T heory’. 12, Georgia Law Review, 429, 1978, Posner, 
R.A.; ‘An Econom ic Theory o f Privacy*, in Schoeman, 'Philosophical D im ensions o f Privacy', op. 
cit.
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Stanley Benn follows a similar line in asserting that the core element of privacy is a 
respect for persons as individual moral choosers®®. His argument is essentially one 
of consistency - a commitment to values such as freedom and autonomy require us 
to respect persons and to respect their choices, some of which are choices to be left 
alone or to be separate from others. For the sake at least of consistency, privacy 
interests should therefore be respected and protected.
Other writers such as Gerety®  ^contend that privacy is concerned with control over 
the intimacies of personal identity, and Jouard has posited that there are sound 
psychological reasons why individuals need privacy as an aspect of the control they 
have over others’ perceptions and beliefs vis-à-vis themselves^°. Yet others argue 
that the creation and maintenance of personal and social relationships are the key 
elements; see for example, Fried^h Reiman^  ^and Inness^ .^
Gavison argues that privacy consists of three elements: secrecy, anonymity and 
solitude^" .^ The functions which the combination of these elements serve are 
considerable and include, development of individual autonomy and growth and 
deepening of personality, establishment of human relations, promotion of liberty of 
action, and general support for the ‘desirable’ ends of a free society^®.
®® This argument is made in m any areas o f Benn’s work. For example, Benn, S.I.; ‘A  T h eoiy  of 
Freedom *. N ew  York, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1988, and Benn, S.I.; ‘Privacy, Freedom and 
Respect for Persons*. N om os XIII, 1971, chapter one. A lso, Benn, S.L; ‘The Protection and 
Limitation of Privacy*, in Schoeman, 'A nthology', op. cit., at 223.
®^ Gerety, T.; ‘Redefining Privacy*. 12, H arvard C iv il Rights and C ivil Liberties law Review, 233, 
1977.
Jouard, S.M.; ‘Some Psychological Aspects o f Privacy*. 31, Law and Contemporary Problems, 307, 
1966.
Fried, C.; ‘Privacy*. 77, Yale Law Journal, 475, 1968.
Reiman, J.H.; ‘Privacy. Intimacy and Personhood*. 6, Philosophy andPulbic Affairs, 26, 1976. 
Inness, J.C.; ‘Privacy. Intimacy and Isolation*. N ew  York, Oxford U niversity Press, 1992. 
Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law*, loc. cit. 
ibid.
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Finally, from the British perspective, Feldman has recently argued that privacy 
should best be seen as a civil liberty which consists of the following elements : 
secrecy (which he considers is concerned with control of personal information), 
autonomy (which he classifies as being concerned with choosing the direction of 
one’s life and social interactions) and dignity (which involves the giving and 
receiving of respect towards the choices and standards of oneself and others)^ .^
It is clear even from this brief account that the speculation on the fundamental 
nature of privacy concerns is wide-ranging. Agreement is unlikely to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, what is achieved by these writers is commitment to the protection of 
privacy. From the legal perspective this is a first but very crucial hurdle to 
overcome. The question of the details of any particular legal protection becomes 
jurisdiction-specific - details can always be defined in more specific terms depending 
on the particular aims of the particular legal system. It is the view of the present 
writer that each of these works presents a viable view of privacy and that each is to 
a high degree convincing. Of course, each view has its critics and no view is perfect. 
Clarity of terms and definition of scope are especially problematic for the concept 
of privacy. Privacy is very amorphous, and one cannot and should not deny that. 
This should not, however, lead us to conclude that privacy should not be protected 
by legal means. We use many ill-defined and indeterminate terms in law : the 
‘public interest’, the ‘reasonable man’, ‘freedom of speech’, ‘breach of the peace’ 
etc. Difficulty of achieving one’s aims should be no reason not to seek to achieve 
those aims. And, if one can agree on common aims, we make a sincere commitment 
to the protection of privacy. In the above account of the views of various writers on 
the fundamental nature of privacy we can identify common aims. Despite the broad 
range of views expressed about the specific nature of privacy, more generally there 
are clear common elements. For example, a commitment to the public/private
Feldman, D .; ‘Secrecy, D ignity, or Autonom y? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty*. 47, Current 
Legal Problems, 41, 1994.
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distinction, protection of individual interests, the recognition of the need of 
individuals to possess a degree of privateness, and the need to strike a balance 
between individual rights and public interests. The legal issue then becomes a search 
for a particular definition.
3.2.3. - The Search for a Definition o f Privacy
Our final category contains those works in which the authors have attempted to 
produce a definition of privacy, either in philosophical or legal terms. Stanley Benn 
and Ferdinand Schoeman have both very helpfully identified five different types of 
definition which have been advanced as possible means for explaining or protecting 
privacy^ .^ It is useful to follow this model. The following are the five basic 
categories which have been used in the search for a definition of privacy:
• Privacy as a right;
• Privacy as a claim;
• Privacy as an interest;
• Privacy as an aspect of control;
• Privacy as a state or condition.
Benn notes that those who define privacy as a right automatically beg the question 
of whether anyone ought to have the power to deny access to any places or 
activities called ‘private’. His view is that a ‘right’ only exists to provide someone 
with a normative capacity to choose whether or not to maintain or relax a state, A 
right is always something conveyed on a person by another (excepting natural 
rights) to provide protection and/or show acknowledgement of some capacity, state
Benn, S.L; ‘A  Theory o f Freedom*, op. cit., at 266ff. and Benn, S.L; 'The Protection and 
Limitation of Privacy'. 52, Australian Law Journal, 601, 686, 1978, (note, Benn also speaks o f  
privacy as a power which is a form of control theory). See also, Schoeman, F .D .; 'first chapter', in 
Schoeman, F .D ., (ed.), 'Philosophical D im ensions of Privacy: A n A nthology', op. cit.
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or entitlement. In this respect to classify the nature of privacy as a ‘right’ 
immediately confers a value on the concept as something worth protecting. 
Whereas this is not an undesirable end-point, many writers have warned against ‘ 
value bias’ in the search for a definition of privacy. For example, Lusky has opined 
that it is very simple to start with an idea that privacy is a good thing and then to 
claim that it must be protected : such a beginning ‘naturally demands affirmative 
justification throughout one’s discussion and biases of this kind are the enemy of 
just balance’^ ®. In other words, one must be careful about the use of value-laden 
language which presupposes value where that value might not exist. Thus we 
should not confuse the concept of a ‘right to privacy’ with privacy simpliciter. That 
said, as Gavison has stated,
Insisting that we start with a neutral concept of privacy does not mean 
that wishes, exercises of choice, or claims are not important elements in 
the determination of the aspects of privacy that are deemed to be of 
value^^.
Returning to Benn, he notes that a ‘claim’ is often described as an argument that 
someone deserves something, and so a ‘right’ is a justified ‘claim’. This too carries 
with it a value judgment on privacy^^°. Thus writers such as W e s t i n w h o  describe 
privacy as a ‘claim’ are presuming, as are those who use the term ‘right’, that 
privacy is automatically of value and therefore worth protecting. Benn’s objection 
to this is not that privacy is not or cannot be valuable, rather he objects to the lack 
of moral justification (in the absence of legal definition) which tends to accompany 
the writings of those who classify privacy as a ‘right’ or a ‘claim’.
®^ Lusky, Tnvasions of Privacy: A  Classification o f Concepts*, loc. cit., at 697.
Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law*, loc. cit., at 426.
Wacks, ‘Personal Information. Privacy and the Law*, op cit., at 14 also criticises this approach, 
quoting M cCormick, D .N .; ‘Privacy: A  Problem of D efinition*. 1, British Journal o f  Law and  
Society, 75, 1974.
op. cit.
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Those who argue that privacy is an ‘interest’ are thought to be mistaken on two 
grounds. First, they make the same mistake of evaluating privacy before offering a 
neutral definition of it. Second, as Benn says,
We cannot take for granted that giving people what they want is 
necessarily in their interests. Adults and children alike can be worse and 
not better off, for getting what they want^02_
Whereas Benn’s view is undoubtedly factually correct - that is, it is certain that in 
some cases giving people what they want might make them worse off - it is less easy 
to reject the strong normative imperative in western culture that would lead us to 
believe that the best determination of an individual’s interests are the wishes of the 
individual him or herself.
A different and popular option in privacy literature has been the control-based 
definition. Amongst others, this has been advocated by Westin^^ ,^ Lusky^ "^^ , 
Fried^ ®^ , Wasserstrom^®  ^ and Feldman^® .^ The majority of such writers views 
privacy as a concern about personal information (and sometimes access to the 
person) and quite naturally conclude that control of such information (or access) is 
the key element in privacy recognition and protection. And, as Benn further points 
out, such theories appear more attractive because they avoid the moral question- 
begging provoked by definitions couched in terms of rights, claims or interests^ ®®. 
Despite these apparent benefits, however, control-based definitions have been
®^^  Benn, 'A T h eoiy  of Freedom', op. cit., at 277.
®^^  op. cit.
®^'^  loc. cit.
®^^  loc. cit.
®^^  loc. cit.
Feldman, ‘Secrecy. D ignity, or AutonnomyP Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty*, loc. cit. 
®^® Benn, 'A Theory of Freedom ', op. cit., at 271 - 273.
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heavily criticised^® .^ In particular, Parent has argued that such theories fail because 
they are both conceptually and empirically too broad,
To define privacy as the control over (all) information about oneself 
implies that everytime I walk or eat in public my privacy is 
compromised^ ^ ®.
Even if one were to restrict such a definition to control over personal information. 
Parent would still challenge this as unacceptable: ‘The comatose patient example 
should convince us that control over personal information is not a necessary 
condition of p r i v a c y / T h i s  latter point is of particular interest to this work and is 
in line with arguments made earlier in chapter one using the example of the 
unconscious patient. To classify privacy as being solely concerned either with 
personal information or its control, arguably excludes much of that which can 
legitimately be claimed under the privacy rubric i^ .^ However, Parent also discredits 
definitions which focus on control of access to the person. Inter alia, his argument 
relies once again on the example of the comatose p a t i en t ^ I f  someone cannot 
exercise control, control-based theories offer us no option but to conclude that 
privacy has been compromised, yet this might not be the case. N o third party may 
have personal information about the comatose patient and similarly no third party 
may have access to the incapax. As Gavison has commented,
“control” suggests that the important aspect of privacy is the ability to 
choose it and see that the choice is respected. All possible choices are 
consistent with enjoyment of control, however, so that defining privacy 
in terms of control relates it to the power to make certain choices rather 
than the way in which we choose to exercise the power. To be non-pre- 
emptive (that is, non value-laden), privacy must not depend upon
®^^  See, in particular, Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law', loc. cit., Parent, ‘Recent W ork on  
the Concept of Privacy’, loc. cit., Parent, ‘A  N ew  D efinition of Privacy for the Law’, loc. cit., and 
Wacks, 'Personal Information. Privacy and the Law', op. cit., at 15.
^^ ® Parent, ‘Recent W ork on the Concept o f Privacy', loc. cit., at 344. 
ibid.
Wacks roundly criticises control-based arguments on this and other grounds in ‘The Protection  
of Privacy', op. cit. at 10 - 11. 
ibid, at 345.
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choice. Furthermore, the reasons why we value privacy may have 
nothing to do with whether the individual has, in fact, chosen it.^ '^^
Parent’s overriding objection to control-based theories is that they all ‘confuse the 
two distinct values of privacy and liberty or freedom’ i^^ . His definition of 
freedom/liberty is ‘absence of coercion or restraint on choice’^ w h i c h  some, this 
writer included, might see as overlapping with autonomy^Either  way, his point 
is a valid one : control issues are already dealt with by other ‘valuable’ concepts 
such as liberty or freedom (or autonomy) and it is necessary to avoid conceptual 
confusion between these and privacy. Whether or not one should conclude that 
such concepts are and need always be mutually exclusive is, of course, a different 
matter which will be discussed infra.
Parent’s solution is to conceive privacy as ‘the condition of a person’s not having 
undocumented personal information about himself known by o t h e r s . W i t h  such 
a definition he does many things, primary amongst which are the following two : 
first, he follows the lead of many writers who argue that privacy is concerned with 
personal information; second, he opts for Benn’s final category of candidates for 
best describing privacy, namely, - as a state or condition^
Parent defends his approach thus. By defining personal information as ‘facts that 
most persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves (except to 
friends, family, advisors, etc.) or...facts about which a particular person is extremely 
sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal about himself’ Le casts 
his net very wide and includes both objective and subjective assessments of the
Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law’, loc. cit., at 427 - 428.
ibid.
id.
See chapter three, supra, 
ibid, at 346.
Gavison also supports this, see ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law', loc. cit. 
120 Parent, supra, at 346 - 347.
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‘p e r s o n a l ’ His view that ‘personal information’ is crucial to privacy is motivated 
in large part by a desire not to confuse privacy with other social concepts such as 
liberty, autonomy, property, secrecy etc/ 2 2  gy  choosing to see privacy in terms of 
personal information he allocates a relatively clearly defined niche to privacy 
which, on his view, allows this latter concept to lie relatively easily within the 
community or family of concepts. That he insists on conceptual clarity is not likely 
to be a point of contention. However, that he focuses privacy concerns solely on 
personal information is more open to question. For example, it has already been 
argued in this work that privacy interests relate both to informational and spatial 
interests. Whereas it is not denied that these interests overlap to an extent with 
interests protected by other concepts such as confidentiality and autonomy it has, 
hopefully, been shown that this is indeed a matter of ‘overlap’ and not necessarily 
‘encroachment’. Furthermore, it has been argued that in the context of genetic 
information these existing concepts cannot protect all informational or spatial 
interests which exist. That a case might be made for privacy to ‘fill this gap’ and 
that in doing so one must produce a concept of privacy which overlaps in places 
with the reach of existing concepts is not, to the mind of this writer, fatal to the 
development of a clear concept of privacy. Indeed, it might lead us to understand 
better the relationships and inter-relationships of the family of concepts which are 
thought to be so important in our society.
Parent’s choice to categorise privacy as a condition is welcomed. Such an approach, 
which is advocated by B enn^ 23^  G a v is o n ^ 2 4  and Wagner D e C e w ^ ^ s ^  avoids all of the 
moral question-begging which arises from the use of value-laden language and 
allows us to see privacy for what it is, distinct from what we think it ought to be.
2^1 Parent refines his arguments about a subjective evaluation o f ‘personal information’ in ‘A  N ew  
D efinition of Privacy for the Law ’, loc. cit. at 306.
122 (W a t  3 4 7 -348 .
123 loc. cit.
124 loc, cit., especially ‘Privacy and the Limits o f Law’.
123 Wagner D eC ew , J.; ‘The Scope o f Privacy in Law and Ethics’, 5, Law and Philosophy, 145, 1986.
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That is, we attempt in the first instance to describe privacy and not to evaluate it. 
This is not to say that one might not in the future attribute value to privacy 
through one’s conduct or through laws, but to do so is a step beyond describing 
privacy for what in essence it is and in terms of the function which it serves. This 
approach is favoured by the present writer and we shall return to this point 
presently.
3.3. - A Core Concern for Privacy: Personal Information or Beyond?
It is important at this juncture to address one of the most common features found 
in the privacy literature which is concerned with defending privacy. This is the 
view that privacy is primarily concerned with personal information, and that this 
should be the proper subject of legal protection. We have already seen that Parent 
advocates such a position. He is by no means alone. Indeed, doyen among those 
who advance this position is Raymond Wacks.
The works of Wacks 126 have made a considerable contribution to the debate about 
the propriety and practicalities of privacy protection by legal means. In particular 
his work Personal Information, Privacy and the Law'^^^ sets out ‘to obviate the 
confusion that afflicts the question of “privacy” and obstructs the satisfactory legal 
protection of the interests with which it is concerned’128, Thus, while 
acknowledging that individuals might have a wide range of interests in privacy 
which can legitimately include the use of contraceptives, the abortion decision, or 
homosexual conduct, he argues that in order to secure viable legal protection of 
‘privacy’ one must start with a workable and relatively narrow concept of 
‘privacy’. This, he submits, we cannot do if we seek to include such wide-ranging
2^  ^ See bibliography.
2^7 op. cit., 1989, reprinted w ith  amendments in paperback in 1993. 
2^8 iNd, at 1.
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interests. Rather, Wacks identifies as crucial to privacy interests concerns with 
‘personal information’. This he defines as follows,
‘Personal information’ consists of those facts, communications, or 
opinions which relate to the individual and which it would be 
reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or sensitive and therefore 
to want to withhold or at least to restrict their collection, use orcirculation. ^ 29
Clearly this is an objective test; it determines the ‘personal’ nature of ‘information’ 
by reference to the ‘reasonableness’ of the individual’s expectations of privacy. 
Wacks argues that such an assessment is the only viable option since a subjective 
assessment of ‘personal information’ would not only require the protection of 
‘spurious’ privacy interests but would also require the protection of ‘illegitimate’ 
privacy claims, for example, the claim that the fact that I beat my children is 
personal information. In other words, Wacks’ definition sees the nature of the 
entity to be protected - namely, personal information - as something which earns 
protection by a combination of its quality and the reasonableness o f the expectation of 
the individual claiming protections^®. The reliance on ‘reasonableness’ is crucial 
here. In many ways this approach casts a wide net of protection. For example, as 
Wacks points out, a reasonableness-based assessment of what qualifies for 
protection allows an individual to claim that even if s/he has chosen to disclose 
personal information in one circumstance, it does not mean that s/he has forfeited 
protection for all circumstances. I might be happy to tell my doctor that I am 
impotent but would be very much aggrieved if my employer found out^ i^ 
Similarly, Wacks notes that his definition allows an individual to claim protection 
even if s/he has no idea that information about him or herself exists or has been 
used without authority. This is so because one can determine if the individual 
might reasonably be expected to view the information as sensitive or intimate ' i f
129 ibid, at 26.
130 i b i d y  at 24.
131 i b i d y  at 27.
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s/he were aware' of the unauthorised activities in questioni32. The obvious question 
which this approach begs, however, is how does one determine the matter of 
reasonableness? In turn, this question can be broken down into a number of related 
questions. For example, who is to answer the question of reasonableness? Are there 
any basic preliminaries which allow one to claim the status of ‘personal 
information’ for certain issues as a matter of course? And, is the determination of 
reasonableness open to influence from other interests of other individuals or from 
society at large?
Wacks’ approach to the practical problem of how to protect personal information 
is to apply to that general class of ‘personal information’ a model for assessing the 
normative degree of protection which can reasonably be expected by the subject 
depending o n , the sensitivity of the information in question. This he calls 
‘Information Sensitivity Grading’i^ .^ The models works as follows. Different types 
of personal information are categorised into one of three indexes: (1) High 
Sensitivity, (2) Moderate Sensitivity, and (3) Low Sensitivity. The purpose is to aid 
in determining the role of the law in regulating the collection and/or the use of 
such information. Information concerning how one voted at the last general 
election, how frequently one has sexual intercourse with one’s partner, one’s 
divergent sexual habits, one’s mental health, suicide attempts, misuse of drugs or 
alcohol and genetic predispositions to illness or congenital handicaps are classified 
as ‘Highly Sensitive’. In comparison, information relating to one’s previous address, 
the fact that one is adopted, one’s NHS number, one’s absences from work or one’s 
credit rating are examples of information of ‘medium sensitivity’. Finally, 
information of ‘low sensitivity’ includes one’s sporting activities, one’s membership 
of clubs, one’s employer details, one’s home address and the fact that one wears
3^3 at 226ff.
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glasses. To assist in the categorisation of personal information into one of these 
three categories Wacks identifies six factors. These are:
• The reasonable expectations o f the data subject
• The recipient o f the data
• The scale o f the disclosure
• The age o f the data
• The context o f the collection, use or disclosure
• The purpose o f collection, use or disclosure.
In this way he answers to an extent the question of how one determines the 
reasonableness of a claim to protection for personal information, in that he 
provides us with a means of assessing the claim through a range of objectively 
assessed criteria. That said, primary among these is still the very general question of 
how ‘reasonable’ are the expectations of the data subject.
Wacks also accepts that his model is principally a normative one, in that it is not 
value-free because it classifies information by reference to existing norms and 
attitudes towards certain kinds of information. Thus, as Wacks himself notes : 
‘medical information accounts for the preponderance of “highly sensitive” data’ 3^4. 
He also accepts that any such model can never be exhaustive and will never attract 
universal approval. This, however, he sees as an advantage rather than a 
disadvantage: information can shift between categories as social and political norms 
themselves change^^s
In essence, however, Wacks' classification system is based on a concern with harm. 
The over-arching question to be asked of information is this: to what extent will
3^4 ihid, at 242.
135 ibid, at 226 - 227.
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unauthorised use or disclosure of the information result in a greater or less degree 
of harm to the subject? Thus, the classification of personal information in Wacks’ 
model becomes an attempt at risk management and damage limitation. Whereas one 
can have no first degree objection to such an approach, it does suggest that 
information which - objectively assessed - is thought to cause little or no harm if 
misused, cannot be classed as highly personal and therefore is less likely to receive 
strong protection. But, in certain cases particular information which falls outside 
Wacks’ model or which has been classed as ‘low sensitivity’ might, for a particular 
individual, be de facto harmful if used or disclosed. That is, on a subjective analysis 
harm can still result but Wacks’ model is unlikely to protect against that. Now, this 
is not to say that Wacks’ adoption of an objective test is in itself wrong. It is simply 
to assert that a model which is concerned primarily with the avoidance of harm is 
weakened if it does not provide, at least in some small measure, for cases where 
harm is likely to result even if those cases do not fit neatly into the model which 
has been devised^^s jf Wacks’ response to this point is that his list of six factors 
which determine into which category should fall any particular form of 
information will operate in function of the particular views of the individual - for 
example, depending on how s/he views the purposes of disclosure, or how s/he sees 
the context of disclosure - then this is a move towards introducing a subjective 
element to his assessment of personal information, and should be recognised as 
such.
The consequence of Wacks’ threefold classification system is that the form of 
protection offered to personal information depends upon the category into which 
any particular piece of information falls. For information of a highly sensitive 
nature he suggests that there is a strong case to be made that such information
136 Aj^acks himself admits that his model is concerned w ith  the avoidance and/or reduction of harm: 
‘[t]he threefold classification used in the above index of ‘personal inform ation’ is based on the extent 
to which the collection or use o f the data holds a potential for serious harm  to the subject.’, ibid, at 
238.
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should, perhaps, not be gathered at all. The implication is that if such information 
is not gathered, control cannot be lost and therefore harm cannot result from 
misuse or unauthorised disclosure. For moderately sensitive information Wacks 
submits that it is difficult to argue that it should not be collected at all, but rather 
that once collected, it should receive a high degree of protection because ‘the 
potential for harm is of a very high order’ 3^7^  Finally, low sensitivity information 
concerns in the main biographical information about an individual; that is, 
information which is generally available (for example, address, telephone number, 
employment details etc). Of itself, this information is unlikely to cause harm, but it 
can become harmful when used to piece together other sources of information 
which are of a greater degree of sensitivity. In this respect low order information 
deserves a degree of protection.
Wacks’ aim in this exercise is admirable; he offers a model for dealing with personal 
information which is viable and which provides a relatively sound base upon which 
to further legal protection. He is, however, fully cognisant of the objections which 
might be raised, and does not pretend to offer a definitive account of how personal 
information should be classified. But, as he himself says,
...the purpose is to demonstrate that personal information is susceptible 
of this sort of analysis, and that it might offer a more effective means of 
regulating the collection and use of such data^ 3s_
This he does well and it is not the intention in this work to criticise that attempt in 
se. However, from the perspective of the present work there are two objections 
which can be raised in respect of Wacks’ analysis. First, the question of third party 
interests, and second, the restriction of his protection of privacy to personal 
information.
3^7 iNd, at 229.
3^8 iNd, at 230.
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The question has been asked above, to what extent is the determination of 
reasonableness open to influence from interests of other individuals or from society 
at large? In the first instance, Wacks avoids saying that information in which others 
have an interest is no longer ‘personal’ or ‘highly sensitive’. His model is designed 
to be applied to all kinds of personal information irrespective of ‘external’ factors 
such as third party interests^^ .^ However, when he comes to address the question of 
whether or not information which is highly sensitive should be gathered or used at 
all, Wacks then introduces the question of third party interests. In fact, this factor 
leads him to conclude - using the example of patients afflicted by AIDS - that 
legitimate third parties interests should be furthered if possible. He then argues that 
it is not an answer to the question of appropriate legal protection for (highly) 
sensitive personal information to say that it should not be collected at all. His 
solution in the context of AIDS is anonymisation. That way, he submits, the risk of 
harm to the individual is minimised but the public’s interest in statistical data 
concerning the spread of HIV and AIDS can also be furthered. Unfortunately, such 
a solution is not open to us in the context of genetic information when we are 
concerned with the interests of family members as well as individuals. Anonymity 
is not an option. Furthermore, we face the very difficult question with genetic 
information of determining to whom the information relates. Wacks’ analysis 
proceeds on the assumption that ‘personal information’ concerns one ‘person’ and 
therefore that s/he should control that information by virtue of that fact. As we 
have seen, the position is considerably more complex with genetic information 
when the ‘personal’ nature of the information becomes ‘familial’. Wacks’ model 
does not provide us with a means of assessing such circumstances. This can be seen, 
inter alia, from his views on the question of the use of medical data. He posits that 
one approach to the problem of the legitimacy of using highly sensitive medical
139 ihid, at 226 - 227.
374
information is to argue that the use occurs in the patient’s best interests^^'^. This, 
however, he rejects as paternalistic and prefers instead the option of seeking the 
patient’s consent. This is viable in the context of the single doctor/patient 
relationship, but individual patient consent provides us with a problem in the 
context of familial genetic information. Even if patient A refuses to allow access to 
genetic information, how does one assess the interests of patient B or patient C who 
are relatives of A and who might want or need to know the information? Arguably, 
Wacks’ model is insufficiently sophisticated to allow us to address such problems.
The second objection to be raised to Wacks’ thesis is his decision to restrict privacy 
protection to the protection of personal information. We have already considered 
his reasons for doing so - in the main such a construct encompasses most concerns 
we express in ‘privacy terms’ and it is suggested that such a concept is more 
amenable to effective legal protection. Against this, however, it is submitted that it 
is crucial to consider the thesis of the current work. It is conceded that the present 
thesis is narrow and relates to only a very small area of privacy concern. 
Furthermore, it is accepted that Wacks’ aims are much wider and seek to strike ‘the 
best deal’ for a plurality of privacy interests. And, it is acknowledged that in the 
main Wacks puts forward a convincing and important argument - one which has a 
sound basis and which provides much of practical utility for those considering the 
problems of legal protection of privacy. However, as has already been argued in 
chapter one, it is a primary aim of this thesis to show that privacy concerns are not 
restricted simply to concerns about information and further it is argued through 
the example of genetic information that to fail to recognise this leaves many 
important non-informational interests unprotected. As an illustration of this 
consider two examples which cause problems for Wacks’ model : the PVS patient 
and the individual who does not want to know about his/her own genetic
140 ihid, at 242 - 243.
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constitution. Both of these examples have been used in this work before to illustrate 
the limits of an information-based analysis of privacy.
In the case of the PVS patient, how is such a person ‘harmed’ by the taking of 
information about them? They are not conscious, they will never regain 
consciousness and the information which is gained is completely beyond their 
control. Arguably, Wacks' model would lead us to classify all information about 
such a person as of low or no sensitivity because the person cannot be ‘harmed’ by 
the misuse of such information. Yet intuitively one would still say that the patient’s 
privacy had been invaded if newspaper reporters burst into his/her hospital room 
and took photographs and recorded details of his/her condition. Surely, what is 
invaded here is not privacy in information, but rather privacy in the self - a sphere 
of physical privateness which others should not invade without authority and good 
reason. Moreover, arguably such a sphere exists irrespective of whether one can 
control it or is conscious of its existence. This is so because that sphere is linked not 
just to information and fear of harm, but rather individuality, dignity and respect 
for the person. Respect can be measured against the conduct of the aggressor and 
can therefore be forthcoming even if the aggressee is unaware of the other’s 
presence. A harm-based analysis such as that of Wacks requires a degree of 
likelihood of harm before one’s interests are protected. If that is not possible - 
protection is not possible.
The individual who does not want to know information about his/her own genetic 
make-up is similarly unlikely to be protected by Wacks’ analysis. Wacks’ entire 
assessment of sensitivity is concerned with harm arising from unauthorised use or 
misuse of information by others which occurs by the communication of that 
information to third parties '^^h However, the concern of an individual who does
141 Wacks' defines ‘personal inform ation’ as follows: '"Personal information" consists o f those facts, 
com m unications, or opinions w hich relate to the individual and w hich it w ould be reasonable to
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not want to know about familial genetic information is a concern that information 
about his/herself is communicated to him/herself. Furthermore, and as has been 
argued supra and will be argued further infra, it is not clear that the interest which 
an individual has in not knowing information is properly an informational interest. 
Rather, the view presented here is that such an interest is a spatial privacy interest: 
something which Wacks would reject as part of his model.
The above comments should be taken not so much as criticisms of Wacks, but 
rather as defences of the approach adopted in this thesis. This thesis argues for a 
view of privacy which encompasses both informational privacy interests and spatial 
privacy interests. The utility of this can be summed up as follows. At best it is 
hoped that the thesis of this work will facilitate a wider recognition of the range of 
interests which are legitimately subsumed under the privacy rubric. Less 
ambitiously, it is hoped that this thesis will draw attention to the fact that strong 
arguments can be made against ‘narrower’ constructs of privacy, even if in the short 
term one must concede that protection along the lines suggested by Wacks are 
necessary and important first steps. But, even if that is the case, this thesis argues 
that one should not stop at that point. One should not give up simply because we 
find a way to protect some privacy interests. This work is designed to show that the 
limits of the law can and should be pushed ever further forward in the pursuit of 
adequate protection for legitimate privacy interests. Thus, even if one must accept 
that Wacks provides a strong and viable first step towards privacy protection, we 
must see it for what it is : a first step. This work hopefully paves the way for future 
and further steps along the privacy path. For these reasons, this work rejects 
Wacks’ ‘narrow’ construction of privacy. Finally, the aim of this work and that of 
Wacks can be summed up in the following paradoxical fashion: Wacks seeks to 
‘narrow’ the meaning of privacy in order to ‘broaden’ the range of protection
expect him to regard as intimate or sensitive and therefore to want to w ithhhold or at least to 
restrict their collection, use or circulation .'
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which can be afforded to privacy by law. In contrast, this work seeks to examine a 
‘narrow’ area of privacy concern in order to ‘broaden’ the privacy debate itself. 
The following section will defend the current thesis.
4.1. - SPATIAL AND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY - A MEDICO-LEGAL 
DEFINITION OF PRIVACY
In chapter one 'privacy' was defined broadly as a state of separateness from others. 
Such a state encompasses two forms of separateness. Physical separateness from 
others {spatial privacy) and separateness of certain intimate adjuncts to one’s 
personality; namely personal information {informational privacy). The argument 
for viewing privacy in such terras has already been made and need only be repeated 
here cursorily.
First, consider informational privacy. Undoubtedly patients have considerable 
interests in their own medical information because it can be used against them by 
others and this can lead to harmful outcomes such as upset, discrimination, 
prejudice etc. Informational privacy therefore concerns the interest of the patient in 
maintaining such information in a state of non-access and preventing unauthorised 
use or disclosure of that information by third parties to other third parties. The 
question of what kinds of information qualify as ‘personal information’ need not 
lead us to an analysis such as that undertaken by Wacks. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the information in question is genetic information which relates to the 
individual. Thus a concern about informational privacy is a concern about 
maintaining a state of non-access to personal genetic information.
Second, let us examine spatial privacy. As a caveat to the above, it has been argued
earlier in this work that a concept of privacy which is defined solely in
informational terms does not adequately reflect the interests which patients have in
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privacy matters and so cannot purport to protect comprehensively such interests. In 
particular, the notion of spatial privacy has been advocated and this is 
complementary to the notion of informational privacy. The concern of spatial 
privacy is not simply information. Rather, spatial privacy relates to the sphere of 
the self - a ‘bubble’ of privateness around the individual which cannot and should 
not be invaded without due cause. Such a sphere can be invaded either by 
unwarranted physical contact (such as unauthorised treatment or continued futile 
treatment, e.g.- the PVS patient) or by unwarranted observation which can occur 
even when there is no trespass to the actual person. In the latter example it could of 
course be argued that what is offensive is the gathering of information rather than 
the observation, but such a view requires us to conclude that there is no invasion of 
privacy if no information is gathered. This surely cannot be true. The better view is 
that the invasion of privacy arises from the unwarranted observation and this is so 
even if no information is gathered. Yet, this view can be defended only if one 
accepts that the interest which is compromised in such cases is not an informational 
privacy interest but rather a spatial privacy interest "^^2 Moreover, in the context of 
genetic information, it has been argued that spatial privacy can be invaded by the 
revelation of genetic data about an individual to that self-same individual (if there is 
no indication that s/he would want to know such information). Again, this cannot 
appropriately be seen as an informational privacy issue because this latter privacy 
interest concerns the interest in maintaining non-access vis-à-vis third parties. In the 
example under discussion, the concern is revelation of information about oneself to 
oneself.
The justifications for this two-fold conception of privacy are numerous. First, as 
has been argued in chapter one, the conception of what is ‘private’ in lay terms - 
which has been established by the Younger Committee '^^3 and Raymond W a c k s -
^^ 2^ The basis for this interest is human dignity and respect, see supra.
4^3 Younger, The Report o f  the Com mittee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012, July 1972, discussed supra, 
chapter one.
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accords to a high degree with the view of privacy here advocated. This is important 
because it goes a long way to helping us formulate a view of the law which can 
address actual ‘social needs’.
Second, as the Calcutt Committees have made clear, concerns with spatial interests 
are particularly important to members of the public and, perhaps more 
importantly, are thought to be the appropriate focus of legislative action^ '*^ . Also, 
the point is made indirectly by Calcutt that these cannot be subsumed under the 
rubric of an informational analysis^ ^G
Third, for the reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, to define privacy as a state 
rather than a right or a claim helps us to describe the concept while at the same 
time avoids imputing value to the concept. As has been stated, privacy is defined as 
a state of separateness from others, be that society in general, the family or one or 
two other individuals. This is not to say that ‘others’ cannot enter that sphere or 
that individuals can simply act howsoever they would wish when in such a sphere, 
or that such a state necessarily protects undesirable activities. Rather, it is to say 
that prima facie a state of privacy places the individual apart from others. This 
notion can of course extend to the privacy of groups which are apart from other 
groups or society in general, but the common denominator is the individual and his 
or her separateness. Yet, merely to say that I am apart from others will not always 
lead us to conclude that I am in a state of privacy. For example, if I am marooned 
on an island I am certainly apart from others, but few of us would say that I have 
privacy. Certainly this is in part because privacy implies something more than mere 
isolation which can be seen as undesirable. As one commentator has said, ‘the 
problem for such a person [on an island] is that he has too much privacy’
Wacks, 'Personal Information, Privacy and the Law*, op. ciL, chapter four. 
See chapter one.
See chapter one.
Unattributed.
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However, in such a case the present writer would not say that such a person had 
privacy at all, simply that s/he was in a state of isolation. For, in order to be in a 
state of privacy there must be others from whom one can be separate. On a desert 
island this is not possible for I am alone. Isolation implies a state of enforced non- 
access to others. Privacy on the other hand is a state which can easily be relaxed or 
maintained since it occurs in a social context. Isolation concerns the removal of 
individuals from a social context and therefore cannot accurately be described as 
privacy^^ .^
Similarly, simply because I am in the presence of others does not necessarily mean 
that I cannot claim privacy interests. For example, an aspect of spatial privacy is the 
interest in maintaining bodily integrity. It is not because I am in a crowd that 
unwarranted interferences with my bodily integrity are not offensive and cannot be 
classed as invasions of privacy. O f course, mere jostling or accidental contact is 
subject to the de minimis principle, but intentional contact with my person by 
another can easily be seen as an invasion of privacy. By corollary, we would not say 
that one’s privacy interest in not being observed is invaded by being in a crowd. 
Arguably, in such a case one has consented to a degree of observation - that which 
flows directly and naturally from one’s presence in the public sphere^ "^ .^ However, 
if one’s movements were to be recorded clandestinely, a strong argument could be 
made that this does indeed infringe privacy interests. There is a big difference 
between the anonymity of the crowd and the specific identification of an individual 
within a crowd. In the former case any observation which occurs is merely 
incidental and can be readily anticipated by the individual in question. If, however, 
one is being clandestinely observed, not only can one not reasonably anticipate
Consider the position o f the prisoner condem ned to solitary confinement. S /he has been 
removed from a social context (not sim ply society in general but also the com m m unity o f the 
prison population) and has been placed in isolation. Such a person does not have privacy. But, a 
prisoner w ho retires to her/his cell to read does have privacy in that they are separate from the rest 
o f the prison com m unity.
Indeed, one could say precisely the same about bodily contact and spatial privacy interests in a 
public crowd.
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being the focus of someone else’s attention, but also one becomes a means to 
someone else’s end: a factor which in itself is de facto offensive and disrespectful of 
the individuab^^.
Fourth, to describe privacy as a state and therefore to seek to offer a neutral 
description of the concept of privacy does not preclude us from attributing value to 
such a state. Nor does it prevent us from seeking to accord (legal) protection to 
such a state for the good ends which it can further and for the interests which it can 
protect. It has already been argued in previous chapters that a state of separateness 
can protect ‘good’ ends - both private and public. In essence, such a state can be seen 
as one in which the interests of the individual are a fortiori paramount. If one 
chooses to accord respect and protection to such a state this is evidence of a degree 
of commitment to valuing individuals. But, the obvious question which arises from 
this is why should we seek to protect such a state of privacy when we already have 
mechanisms for respecting individuals and protecting their interests? The response 
which this thesis suggests is that such existing mechanisms cannot always provide 
adequate protection and furthermore, the concept of privacy advanced here allows 
us to recognise a broad range of interests which we might not otherwise have 
recognised. To view privacy either as solely concerned with personal information, 
or to argue that autonomy, confidentiality or liberty can adequately protect privacy 
interests is to fail to protect many important interests and to miss many interesting 
nuances. That said, one criticism which might be levelled at the view of privacy 
presented here is that it confuses privacy with concepts such as autonomy, liberty 
or even confidentiality. For example, a state of separateness implies a state of non­
interference which is arguably simply one definition of liberty or freedom. 
Similarly, it might be argued that the state in question is one which depends largely
O f course, this is not to  say that strong counter arguments cannot be made to justify such 
observation - for example, close circuit television in shopping malls for security purposes. H ow ever, 
if such tapes are sold to television shows for entertainment purposes arguably this becomes an 
offensive use o f the images obtained.
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on the notion of autonomy - the individual as self-ruler. This would be an 
important criticism and even if it were not raised in respect of the definition of 
privacy advanced here, the relationship between privacy and these other, related 
concepts must nevertheless be examined.
4.2. - Privacy and Related Concepts
Many writers associate the beginning of western legal interest in privacy with the 
seminal article by Warren and Brandeis The Right to Privacy^ published in the 1890- 
91 volume of the Harvard Law Review*^/ This article was written at the instigation 
of Mr Warren, a once-notable Boston lawyer, after he took umbrage at what he 
saw to be excessive press intrusion into the events of his daughter’s marriage. From 
such humble beginnings was born the US tort of invasion of privacy^^ 2. Warren and 
Brandeis looked at cases drawn from areas as diverse as defamation breach of 
confidence^ '^  ^ and c o p y r i g h t ^ ^ s  and concluded that the common law recognised a 
general right to privacy^^ .^ This they classified as a ‘right to be a l o n e ’ ^ ^ 7  Xhis work 
has been much praised^ ^® and much criticised^^ ,^ but undeniably its influence has 
been unimaginably far-reaching. For present purposes, it is neither intended to 
praise nor particularly criticise this work, but rather to use it as an illustration of a
Warren, S.D. and Brandeis, L.D. ‘The Right to Privacy’. 4, H arvard Law Review  y 193, 1890-91.
152 P q j . analysis see Prosser, supra cit.
153 "Warren and Brandeis, loc. cit. y at 205.
See, for example, Abernathy v  Hutchinson 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825) and Prince A lbert v  Strange 1 
M cN . & G. 25 (1849).
For example, Tuck v  Priester 19 Q B D  639 (1887).
It is often pointed out that ironically the authors relied heavily on  English com m on law cases to 
support their argument and yet to this day no com m on law right to privacy has been recognised in 
England.
The ‘right to be alone’ was first expounded by C ooley, T.M.; ‘C ooley : A  Treatise on the Law 
o f Torts'. Second Edition, 1888, at 29.
158 P q j -  example, see Gavison, R.; 'T oo Early For A Requiem : Warren and Brandeis Were Right on 
Privacy vs. Free Speech'. 43, South Carolina Law Review, 437, 1992.
159 P q j .  example, Zimmerman, D.L.; ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight : A  Farewell to  Warren and 
Brandeis’ Privacy T ort’. 68, Cornell Law Review, 291, 1984, Pratt, W.F.; ‘The Warren and Brandeis 
Argument for a Right to  Privacy’. Public Law. 161, 1975, Bloustein, E.J.; ‘Privacy. Tort Law and the 
C onstitution : Is Warren and Brandeis’ Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?*. 46, Texas Law  
Review, 611, 1968, Kalven, H .; ‘Privacy in Tort Law : Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’. 31, Law  
and Contemporary Problems, 326, 1966.
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common problem which arises in the field of privacy study - conflation of concepts 
and confusion of terminology. The association of privacy with the ‘right to be 
alone’ has been made by many writers since Warren and B r a n d e i s a n d  all have 
been subject to the same criticism : by conceiving privacy to be a ‘right’ to be free 
from intrusion or interference they have equated privacy with hberty^^ .^ This is not 
only confusing generally, but for those who seek to argue positively about privacy 
it can have adverse consequences. For example, Fried has recognised that,
...to present privacy only as an aspect of or an aid to general liberty is to
miss some of its most significant differentiating features
Similarly, Posner has observed,
...we already have perfectly good words - Liberty, Autonomy, Freedom 
- to describe the interest in being allowed to do what one wants (or 
chooses) without interference. We should not define privacy to mean 
the same thing and thereby obscure its other meanings^ '^ .^
4.2.1. - The United States" Constitutional Right o f Privacy
The conflation of privacy with liberty is a common problem in the United States. 
Indeed, this is the primary criticism levelled at the US Constitutional right of 
privacy which was interpreted out of the US Constitution by the Supreme Court in 
Griswold v  Connecticut^^^. This case concerned Estelle Griswold who was the 
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League in that state. In defiance of a 
statute criminalising contraception and acts aiding and abetting the use of
See, for example, Blom -Cooper, L.; ‘The Right to Be Let A lone*. It), Journal o f Media Law and  
Practice, 53, 1989.
The classification of privacy as a ‘right* in se might also be problematic for som e, see supra.
162 Parent warns against this very specifically, supra.
163 Fried, ‘Privacy’, loc. cit., at 490.
Posner, ‘A n Econom ic Theory o f Privacy* in Schoemnan, ‘Privacy: A n  A nthology’, op. cit., at 
274 - 275.
381 U S 479 (1965). For an account of the historical lead-up to Griswold see, Rubenfeld, loc. cit., 
at 740 - 744.
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contraception^*" ,^ Griswold provided information, instruction and medical advice to 
married couples as to the various means of preventing conception. She was 
successfully prosecuted under the law and fined $100, The constitutionality of the 
statute was immediately challenged and the case was ultimately heard by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. In a seminal decision, the Supreme Court 
‘interpreted out’ of the US Constitution a right to privacy which is not expressly 
included therein. It did so by reference to what it called ‘penumbras’: ‘...emanations 
from those guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] that help give them life and substance.’ 
Various guarantees create 'zones of privacy’. In other words, various rights 
expressly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, such as the right of association^^  ^ or the 
right against self-incrimination^^^ or the right not to have soldiers quartered in one’s 
home during peacetime^^ ,^ as applied to states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause^^°, create spheres of life which are protected and 
'"private". And, in order for that protection to be complete, the true extent of the 
zones of privacy which exist must be recognised, even i f  there is no express mention 
of their existence in the text of the Constitution. As the Court said in Griswold,
The present case...concerns a relationship lying within the zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it 
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather 
than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by 
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.
Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle [that] a 
“governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected 
freedoms”...Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The
166 provisions in question were paragraphs 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes o f  
C onnecticut (1958 rev.).
Part of the First Am endm ent.
168 (-jjg Fifth A m endm ent.
The Third A m endm ent.
see 482-85. In all the Court held that the penumbras emanated from the first, third, fourth, fifth 
and ninth amendments.
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very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationshipd^^
In this way the Court ruled the Connecticut statute unconstitutional and in doing 
so gave birth to the Constitutional Right to Privacy^^ .^ It is important to note that 
at this stage that the right was concerned with family life and its protection^^^. It 
was, however, soon extended to ‘individual rights’ and beyond in cases such as 
Eisenstadt v  Baird^'^^ (in which prohibitions on contraceptive use by single persons 
was held to be unconstitutionaP^^), Roe v  Wade^'^^ (in which the right of privacy 
was held to be broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate a 
p r e g n a n c y Planned Parenthood v  Danforth^'^^ (in which the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a statute requiring a woman to obtain her spouse’s consent to 
abortion) and Planned Parenthood o f Southeastern Pennsylvania v  Casey '^^  ^ (in which 
the Court re-affirmed the authority of Roe and Danforth^^^)^^^. These decisions
per Justice D ouglas, at 485.
H eavy reliance was also placed on  the N in th  A m endm ent (per Justice Goldberg, at 493) and the 
Fourteenth A m endm ent (per Justices W hite and Harlan, at 500 - 502, 502 - 508).
In particular. Justice W hite made it clear that the p olicy  behind the statute - namely, an attempt 
to ban ‘illicit sexual relationships’ (and by this was meant all forms o f “prom iscuity” and sexual 
relations between non-married couples) - was perfectly permissible as a legislative goal.
174 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
175 pej-Justice Brennan, ‘[iff under G risw old  the distribution of contraceptives to married persons 
cannnot be prohibited, a ban on  distribution to unmarried persons w ould  be equally impermissible. 
It is true that in G risw old  the right of privacy in question inhered in the martial relationship. Yet 
the marital couple is n ot an independent entity w ith  a m ind and heart o f its ow n, but an association  
of tw o individuals each w ith  a separate intellectual and em otional make-up. If the right of privacy  
means anything, it is the right o f the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted  
governmental intrusion into matters so fundam entally affecting a person as the decision w hether to 
bear or beget a child.’, ibid, at 453.
176 410 U .S. 113 (1973).
177 Roe V Wade is easily the m ost analysed U S C onstitutional right o f privacy case. As an exam ple of 
the range o f arguments w hich have been made surrounding it consider, Ely, J.FL; ‘The Wages o f  
C rying Wolf: A  C om m ent on Roe v  Wade\  Yale L aw  Journal, 920, 1973.
178 428 U .S. 52 (1976).
179 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992); 505 U .S. _.
180 iqote, however, the court also held certain restrictions on  a w om an’s abortion decision to be 
constitutional in this case. The case concerned several provisions o f the Pennsylvania Abortion  
Control A c t w hich provided that (except in an emergency) a physician could not perform an 
abortion w ithin  24 hours of a request, that such physicians had to furnish w om en seeking an 
abortion w ith  inform ation pertaining to  the nature o f  abortion, the risks involved and available 
alternatives to abortion, the risks o f continued pregnancy, and the age of the fetus. There were also 
provisions concerning parental consent, spousal notification and public recording o f  abortions 
performed. A lthough a majority o f  the Supreme C ourt held that ‘the essential holding o f Roe v  
Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed’ (at 2804), it struck dow n on ly  the provision of
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extend considerably the rights of persons (particularly women) in the area of 
reproduction. More generally, we see how the ‘right of privacy’ started as a ‘family 
right’ and has become an ‘individual right’ which guarantees many personal and 
sexual freedoms 1^ 2. It does, however, have its limits. This point was made quite 
categorically by the Supreme Court in Bowers v  Hardwick^^^.
4.2,1,1, - Bowers v  Hardwick
In this case the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which criminalised sodomy 
was challenged by Michael Hardwick who had been prosecuted under the law. He 
argued that his homosexual activity was ‘a private and intimate association’ beyond 
the legitimate reach of state intervention and protected by his Constitutional Right 
to Privacy. Justice White, who wrote for the 5-4 majority upholding the statute, 
framed Hardwick’s case rather differently. He asserted that the essence of the case 
was whether ‘...the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy’184. Thus put, it is hardly surprising that 
Hardwick’s case was unsuccessful.
the Pennsylvania Act w hich  concerned spousal notification. The remaining provisions were not 
‘unduly burdensom e’ on  the w om an and therefore acceptable in constitutional terms. This language 
is revealing. It represents a significant shift away from the language of Roe v  Wade w hich required 
the state to sh ow  a ‘com pelling interest’ to justify interference w ith  the abortion decision. This shift 
in term inology is not mere sophistry. The need sim ply to  avoid an ‘unduly burdensom e’ provision  
means that states can legitim ately give inform ation to w om en about abortion and its risks and 
consequences in an attempt to  persuade (but not coerce) them  into opting out o f abortion. Such an 
outcom e, arguably, was not possible w ith  the language o f Justice Blackmun in Roe v  Wade,
181 For critical com m ent on  these and other right o f privacy cases in the area o f reproduction, see 
Keynes, E.; ‘Liberty. Property and Privacy: Towards a Jurisprudence o f Substantive D ue Process’. 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State U niversity Press, 1996, chapter 8.
18^As Rubenfeld has noted, ‘[t]he great peculiarity o f the privacy cases is their predominant, though  
not exclusive, focus on  sexuality - not “sex” as such, o f course, but sexuality in the broad sense o f  
that term; the netw ork o f decisions and conduct relating to the conditions under w hich sex is 
permissible, the social institutions surrounding sexual relationships, and the procreative 
consequences o f sex. N oth in g  in the privacy cases says that the doctrine must gravitate around 
sexuality. Nevertheless, it has.’, loc. cit., at 744.
185 478 U .S. 186 (1986).
184 ibid, at 190.
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o f  the varied and disparate bases of the decision in Bowers v  Hardwick, that which 
is of most relevance to the present discussion is the following. Justice White noted 
that to date the Constitutional privacy cases ‘protected’ three categories of activity: 
marriage, procreation and family r e l a t i o n s h i p s Since the activities of 
homosexuals fall into none of these, he argued, their activities cannot be protected 
by the privacy right. This is bizarre reasoning by anyone’s standards. First, all that 
Justice White did in Bowers was to describe the nature of the Court’s prior decisions 
on privacy. What he did not do, and yet which is surely fundamental to his 
argument, was to provide an explanation of the underlying doctrinal philosophy 
which ties these three areas together. In the absence of such, these three categories 
can only be examples of the sphere of life protected by privacy, they cannot be 
determinative in any way. Second, Justice White also failed to explain why he 
thought (as he and the majority obviously did) that the Constitutional right of 
privacy should be restricted to areas of life which do not include homosexual 
conduct. This latter point should not be misinterpreted. It does not say that no 
justification for upholding the Georgia statute was advanced. Rather, it asks the 
question, why is privacy - which is clearly concerned with sexual conduct and 
sexuality - not concerned with the sexuality of all, including homosexuals? It is no 
longer possible to argue, for example^86  ^ that the right of privacy is concerned with 
families and marital activity, for the court’s decision in Eisenstadt v  Baird permitted 
single people to have access to contraceptives and this can only be seen to be about 
sex. Bowers then is surely inconsistent and unprincipled. It refuses to extend the 
authority which we do have from previous cases (which indicate that sexual 
freedom should be protected), yet offers no justifiable rationale for its departure 
from such cases which clarifies for us the true basis of the US Constitutional Right 
of Privacy.
185 ihid, at 190 -191 .
186 As one might have done after G risw old v  Connecticut, supra cit.
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N ot surprisingly the Bowers decision has been heavily criticisedi87. Those who 
analyse the aftermath primarily ask the question, ‘what does privacy mean now?’ 
Many see privacy as being concerned with choices and decisions, but this simply 
begs the question, which choices and decisions are protected by privacy? And, as 
Rubenfeld has pointed out, ‘[o]n this point the Court has offered little g u i d a n c e . ’ i 8 s
We are told that privacy encompasses only those “personal rights that 
can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’” \_Roe v  Wade at 152], that it insulates decisions “important” to a 
person’s destiny \Whalen v Roe 429 US 589, 1977, at 600], and that it 
applies to “matters...fundamentally affecting a person” {Eisenstadt v  
Baird at 438, 453]. Perhaps the best interpretation of these formulations 
is that privacy is like obscenity : the Justices might not be able to say 
what privacy is, but they know it when they see it.i89
Rubenfeld himself argues, however, that this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
leaving privacy open to allegations of conceptual confusion (see infra) and ill- 
considered development. For him the underlying principle which binds together 
privacy cases and which provides a consistent and justifiable rationale for them is 
that of ‘the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a 
progressively more normalizing state’190. This is an aspect of liberty, but not the
8^7 See, for example, Rubenfeld, loc. cit., Kohler, M .H.; ‘H isto iy . H om osexuality, and 
H om ophobia: The Judicial Intolerance o f Bowers v  H ardw ick*. 19, Connecticut L aw  R eview , 129, 
1986, and Thom as, K.; ‘Beyond the Privacy Principle’. 92, Columbia L aw  R eview , 14331, 1992, 
Thom as argues not on ly  that Bowers is inconsistent w ith  prior case-law, but also that the decision  
legitim ises hom ophobic violence in that it sanctions the existence o f anti-sodom y (and therefore 
anti-homosexual) laws. Furthermore, he argues that the language of ‘privacy’ is ill-equipped either to  
protect the interests o f homosexuals or to challenge adequately the C ourt’s reasoning in Bowers.
8^8 Rubenfeld, loc. cit., at 751.
8^9 ibid.
9^9 ibid, at 784ff. Rubenfeld rejects ‘personhood’ as the unifying principle w hich represents the 
interests w hich should be protected by privacy. H e does so in the context o f the Bowers v  H ardw ick  
case and primarily on the grounds that to argue that privacy protects a ‘hom osexual identity’ 
essential to on e’s self-conception and being is to  buy into the heterosexual classification o f  
hom osexuality as a deviance. As he says, ‘[t]o protect the rights o f the “hom osexual” w ould  of 
course be a victory; doing so, how ever, because hom osexuality is essential to  a peson’s identity is no 
liberation, but sim ply the flip side o f the same rigidification o f sexual identities by w hich our 
society sim ultaneously inculcates sexual roles, normalizes sexual conduct, and vilifies 
“faggots”...Thus personhood, at the instant that it proclaims a freedom of self-definition, reproduces 
the v e iy  constraints on  identity that it purports to resist.’, loc. cit., at 780 - 781. Such an argument is 
n ot dissimilar to arguments made by fem inists concerning the public/private distinction, supra.
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aspect commonly understood which prohibits laws which restrict specific conduct. 
Rather, Rubenfeld’s thesis is that privacy concerns laws which ‘take over’ the lives 
of individuals because they are concerned with aspects of life which are profoundly 
and extensively affected by such laws. One’s liberty or freedom is not merely 
restricted in certain aspects; one’s entire life is directed down a state-proscribed 
path. He puts it thus,
...laws against abortion, interracial marriage, non-nuclear family 
residences, and private education all involve a peculiar form of 
obedience that reaches far beyond mere abstention from the particular 
proscribed act. It is a form of obedience in which the life of the person 
forced to obey is thereafter substantially filled up and informed by the 
living, institutional consequences of obedience. The person finds himself 
in a new and sharply-defined, but also broadly encompassing 
institutional role because of their affirmative direction of individuals’ 
lives, these roles - whether as mother, spouse, student or family member 
- have profoundly formative effects on identity and c h a r a c t e r .
Moreover, this analysis explains and justifies the protection of rights in the Bowers v  
Hardwick scenario. The obedience of anti-sodomy laws has the product of forcing 
homosexuals into relations with the opposite sex and requires that they adopt 
‘normalised’ social roles as between themselves and the opposite sex. Undeniably, 
this has profound implications for the everyday lives of such p e r s o n s 9^2
The appeal in Rubenfeld’s analysis is strong. He not only provides us with a 
unifying concept of privacy which at the same time provides consistent explanation 
of past cases and allows clear prediction for future cases, but he also provides a valid 
theoretical basis on which to defend Hardwick’s claim and to criticise the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of that claim. The content of his right of privacy is a right ‘not to 
have the course of one’s life dictated by the s t a t e ’ ^ 9 3  an aspect of a liberty
argument, however, Rubenfeld’s thesis is open to the criticism which is made so
191 ibid, at 792-793.
192 ibid, at 799 - 802.
193 ibid, at 807.
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often of the Constitutional right of privacy and those who write about it; namely, 
that privacy is confused with and conflated with liberty. Before we examine this 
charge, there is a more obvious question which must be addressed. If, indeed, 
Rubenfeld and others are right and it is liberty which is the issue and not privacy, 
why then should the Supreme Court persist with privacy analyses?
Cavison notes that the use of the language of privacy rather than liberty was 
deliberate on the part of the US Supreme Courti94. This is primarily because a 
problem for the Court in Griswold was the need to distinguish ‘the substantive due 
process rationale’ established in Lochner v  New York^^^. This 1905 decision 
represents the extreme ‘liberal’ approach once adopted by the Court towards the 
legitimacy of state intervention in the lives of individuals. In that case the Court 
held as unconstitutional a N ew  York law which sought to restrict the hours that a 
bakery worker could work in any one d a y 1 9 6  or any one w e e k  1 9 2 .  The rationale 
behind the statute was that the state sought to develop consistent labour law 
policies and to protect the health and safety of workers. The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected these arguments and held by a majority that the principle of 
liberty of contract was unduly compromised by such an act. Taking as its authority 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenti9s^ the Court held that to 
uphold the constitutionality of such an Act would be effectively to deprive 
individuals of their liberty interests in contracting upon terms agreed privately 
between themselves and their e m p l o y e r s i 9 9 .  The Court saw the case as an attempt to 
impose external constraints on economic relations rather than one truly concerned
194 See Gavison, ‘Fem inism  and the Public/Private D istinction*, loc. cit., at 31 - 32, and 34 - 35.
195 198 U S 45 (1905).
196 10 hours per day.
197 60 hours per week.
198 The Fourteenth A m endm ent guarantees the protection o f  life, liberty and property, none of 
w hich can be taken away w ithout ‘due process of law ’. The clause is not, however, m erely  
concerned w ith  procedural requirements but has been interpreted to mean substantive due process; 
that is, it acts to restrict the substantive pow er of the state to  regulate the lives o f  individuals 
w ithout good reason.
199 ibid, at 53.
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with worker welfare - an end not acceptable as a legislative goal in its eyes. The 
immediate consequence of this decision was that economic regulation was treated as 
an issue requiring strict scrutiny if contained in any statute, the implication being 
that freedom in economic matters was a fundamental freedom under the 
Constitution. Vost-Lochner, the Supreme Court was, however, very heavily 
criticised. As an interpretation of ‘liberty’ in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
decision is not only very broad, but also it arguably ignores the very real problem 
of inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee. The protection 
of individuals was seen to be abandoned to the vagaries of the marketplace.
Although the specific ruling in Lochner was overturned only twelve years later^ Q^, 
the effects of the decision continued to be felt long afterwards^^k In particular, the 
protection of ‘liberty’ under the Constitution as a matter of substantive due 
process came to be seen in a bad light as a result of the Lochner economic rights 
analysis292. Thus, when the Court came to decide Griswold in 1965, it was keen (a) 
to extend the protected rights of individuals to include the use of contraceptives 
between married couples, but (b) to avoid using the rationale of Lochner (and 
therefore ‘liberty’ as it had been used previously) for fear of undermining the 
protection to be afforded^^k As Cavison has observed: ‘Privacy reasoning offered a 
way out of the Lochner dead end’294. Of course, it should not be forgotten or
9^9 Bunting v  Oregon 243 U .S . 426 (1917).
291 The decision in N e b b ia v N e w  York  291 U .S. 502 (1934) signaled the beginning o f the end-point 
of Lochner-type thinking towards the regulation o f econom ic matters. Here the Court held that 
strict scrutiny was no longer necessary and that the law need only not be ‘unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious’ and the means selected to  achieve the particular legislative end should have a real and 
substantial relation to that end. Eventually, in West Coast Hotel Co, v  Parrish 300 U .S . 379 (1937) the 
Court upheld a statute requiring a m inim um  wage for w om en even although it interfered w ith  
freedom of contract because the Court recognised in real terms that there was a very great inequality  
of bargaining power between the parties concerned.
292 For account o f the ‘demise o f  substantive due process’, see Keynes, op. cit., chapter six.
293 T o see h ow  this is done see Griswold, supra cit., at 482.
294 Gavison, ‘Fem inism  and the Public/Private D istinction*, loc. cit., at 34. She also notes, ‘[t]he 
privacy argument identified reasons for w hich non-interference was justified : the personal nature o f  
the choice; the intimate area o f life invovled; and the centrality o f the decision to o n e’s self-identity. 
A ll o f these reasons help to justify the choice o f privacy over liberty argum ents.’, id. For a 
discussion of the events of this tim e and the key decisions of the Court, see Keynes, op. cit., chapter 
seven.
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allowed to be obscured that the primary constitutional provision used remains the 
same - the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
brings us to the crucial question: are ‘liberty’ and ‘privacy’ under Lochner and 
Griswold et a i the same things under different guises?
Various arguments have been advanced on both sides^ s^. Some have argued that the 
Lochner cases were concerned solely with economic interests and that the flaw with 
those cases is that the Court cannot and should not act as a dictator of state 
economic policy. Given that the privacy cases do not involve the Court in acting as 
a ‘super legislature’, the cases can be distinguished. However, as Rubenfeld points 
out: ‘[i]n its own eyes, the Lochner Court was not regulating economics; it was 
protecting liberty - the liberty of c o n t r a c t . ’ 2 9 6  Furthermore, he points out quite 
rightly that that which is ‘private’ can easily extend to economic matters, even if 
the Supreme Court has thus far chosen to restrict privacy cases principally to 
matters of s e x u a l i t y 2 9 2 .  Rather, his defence of the two sets of cases focuses on the 
‘pre-political’ nature of the Lochner decisions. The concerns of those cases - that is, 
liberty of contract cases - were property rights which pre-existed the Constitution 
and so did not require the explicit protection of the Constitution. Privacy rights, 
however, have evolved because of ‘creeping totalitarianism’ and are thus political 
rights created in response to societal influences. Unfortunately, the utility of this 
analysis is limited for the purposes of the present discussion. Rubenfeld provides a 
means of distinguishing the privacy and liberty cases, but he does not address the 
criticism that his ‘privacy’ analysis is simply a ‘liberty’ analysis by another name. 
Similarly, Gavison provides us with an explanation of the Court’s use of ‘privacy’ 
and not ‘libeity’, but this still begs the question whether, at the end of the day, 
‘privacy’ is not simply confused with ‘liberty’ as a general metaphysical concept.
295 See, in particular Rubenfeld, loc. cit., at 802 - 805.
296 ibid, at 803.
297 id.
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4.3. - Conflation of Concepts
Commentators criticise the US Constitution's privacy right on many different 
levels298. As discussed, one major criticism which is frequently voiced is the alleged 
confusion of ‘privacy’ with ‘liberty’. Parent, for example, shows deep concern 
about the confusion that surrounds such notions^^ .^ He argues.
The defining idea of liberty is the absence of external restraints or 
coercion. A person who is behind bars or locked in a room or 
physically pinned to the ground is unfree to do many things. Similarly, 
a person who is prohibited by law from making certain choices should 
be described as having been denied the liberty or freedom to make 
them. The loss of liberty in these cases takes the form of a deprivation 
of autonomy. Hence we can meaningfully say that the right to liberty 
embraces in part the right of persons to make fundamentally important 
choices about their lives and therewith to exercise significant control of 
different aspects of their behaviour. It is clearly distinguishable from  
privacy, which condemns the unwarranted acquisition o f undocumented 
personal knowledge. [Emphasis added - Parent’s definition of the concept of privacy].2i9
He feels that all of the U.S. constitutional privacy cases however, '..conflate the 
right to privacy with the right to liberty. ' 211 Whereas one may not agree with his 
particular definition of privacy, his point on confusion of concepts is, nevertheless, 
a valid one2i2. Wagner DeCew offers the following explanation.
Given early association of a legal right to privacy as a right to be let 
alone and the well-known explanation of a concept of negative liberty in
208 H enkin, L. ‘Privacy and A u ton om y*. 74, Columbia L aw  Review , 1410, 1974 has argued that 
G risw old  and its progeny have given rise to  ‘an additional zone of autonom y  o f presumptive 
im m unity to governmental regulation’. This C onstitutional right o f privacy he considers, ‘...m ay  
not add m uch protection to  “traditional value privacy.’” , at 1424 - 1425. A  similar criticism has been 
advanced by Gross, H.; ‘Privacy and A u ton om y’, in Feiiiberg, J. and Gross, H . (eds.); ‘Philosophy  
of Law’, Second Edition, U SA , W adsworth Inc., 1980, at 246 - 251.
299 Parent, 'Privacy. M orality and the Law', loc. cit.
219 ibid, at 274 - 275.
2^ 1 ibid, at 284.
2^ 2 A lthough by no means altogether novel; see, for example. Gross, FL; 'Privacy and A u ton om y', 
N om os XIII, 180 - 181, and H enkin, 'Privacy and A u to n o m y ', loc. cit.
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terms of freedom from interference, it is hardly surprising that privacy 
and liberty should often be equated.213
There is, however, an additional problem which stems from the fact that although 
one may accept wholeheartedly that privacy and liberty, as defined by Parent, are 
completely separate, it does not necessarily follow that the two concepts, in se, raise 
issues wholly unconnected with each other. Furthermore, as Wagner DeCew  
points out in relation to the U.S. cases,
'...it is not at all clear that Parent has shown that the constitutional 
privacy cases involve no "genuine" privacy i n t e r e s t s . ' 2 i 4
Clearly, however, the two concepts are by no means synonymous. As Wagner 
DeCew herself states, it is simple to show how one's notion of privacy can be 
shown to be distinct from that of liberty. The example she gives is where one's 
privacy is being constantly invaded by surreptitious surveillance, of which one is 
unaware, thereby having no effect on one's liberty. To this one could add the 
example of genetic testing where information is gathered about oneself from family 
members when one is wholly ignorant of the fact. Both of these examples involve 
invasion of one's private sphere yet involve no impingement on one’s liberty. 
Indeed Wagner DeCew states.
While the word "privacy" could be used to mean freedom to live one's 
life without governmental interference, the [U.S.] Supreme Court 
cannot so use it since such a right is at stake in every case. Our lives are 
continuously limited, often seriously, by governmental r e g u l a t i o n . 2 i 5
In fact the Supreme Court has expressly rejected this idea^ ^^  However, we can 
once again accept that perhaps this particular conflation of privacy with liberty is
213 Wagner D eC ew , ’T he Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics', loc. cit., at 162.
214 ibid.  ^ at 161.
215 ibid  at 162.
216 Paris A du lt Theatre I  et at. v  Slaton, D istrict A  ttom ey, et al. 413 U .S . 49. D e C ew  makes this point 
at 163 - 164.
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wrong, yet this does not necessitate that we reject completely the possibility of a 
relationship between the two concepts. Just as Wagner DeCew gives examples of 
privacy issues which do not involve liberty, and vice versa, she equally talks of 
autonomy examples which exclude all mention of privacy^i^. She qualifies this 
immediately, however, by acknowledging,
'[that] a subset of autonomy cases, however, certain personal decisions 
regarding one's basic lifestyle, can plausibly be said to involve privacy 
interests as well. They should be viewed as liberty cases in virtue of 
their concern over decision-making power, whereas privacy is at stake 
due to the nature of the decision. More needs to be said about which 
decisions and activities are private ones, but it is no criticism or 
conflation of concepts to say that an act can be both a theft and a 
trespass. Similarly, acknowledging that in some cases there is both an 
invasion of privacy and a violation of liberty need not confuse those 
concepts.'218
She also comments that.
'..loss of privacy can diminish freedom. Nevertheless defending privacy 
cannot always protect l i b e r t y . ' 2 D
What a defence of privacy can do, however, is protect some forms of liberty; 
principally those relating to the personal sphere of individuals' lives. The same is 
true for autonomy. And, in the case of personal information, this can be said of 
confidentiality too. This point cannot be stressed too strongly. Many 
commentators who concern themselves with the concepts of liberty or autonomy 
face problems of conceptual confusion, difficulty of definition and ambiguities of 
scope. Beauchamp and Childress, for example, point out that autonomy is terribly 
conceptually confused and 'not a univocal concept in either ordinary English or
2*7 at 164 - 165. 
2*8 ibid, at 165.2*9 ibid.
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contemporary philosophy'220. Similarly, Dworkin considers a plethora of 
definitions of autonomy offered by writers in that field almost none of which is in 
conformity with one another^^*. Similarly, in the context of liberty, Berlin has 
noted that,
Almost every moralist in human history has praised 
freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and 
reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that 
there is little interpretation that it seems able to
resist.222
In light of this it is important to recognise the fact that concepts such as liberty, 
autonomy and privacy are interrelated. Indeed, one could go as far as to say that 
they are interdependent, each one relying on another in order to fulfil its true 
function in the best possible way223. Consider the impossibility of making 
autonomous choices without a degree of freedom from interference224. Consider the 
residual value of liberty if one’s life choices are never respected. And, consider 
whether it is feasible to be truly free or fully autonomous without some sphere of 
the private? It is submitted here that liberty and autonomy cannot properly fulfil 
their function or potential in protecting individuals and their interests without a 
concomitant commitment to a respect for privacy. Each of these concepts performs 
the same function, albeit in different ways: each represents an expression of the
229 Beauchamp, T. L, and Childress, J.F.; 'Principles of Biomedical Ethics', Fourth Edition, N ew  
Y ork, O xford U niversity Press, 1994, at 120 - 121.
22* D w orkin , ‘The T h eo iy  and Practice o f A u to n o m y ’, op. cit. „
222 Berlin, L; 'Four Essays on Liberty'. O xford, O xford U niversity Press, 1969, at 121.
223 This is supported inter alia  by H allborg, R.B. Jr.; ‘Principles o f Liberty and the Right to  
Privacy’, 5, L aw  and Philosophy, 175, 1986 w ho argues for a view  o f privacy w hich  is deduced from  
fundamental principles o f liberty. This he does ‘in order to  obtain a right to privacy w hich is not 
easily defeasible, and a right w hich ought to  be a permanent part o f our legal system .’ That is, he 
sees the essence and value o f privacy as being derivative.
224 Greenawalt has argued, for example, that ‘[gjiven a society in w hich m any life-styles and points 
of v iew  evoke negative reactions if publicly know n, a substantial degree o f freedom from  
observation is essential if there is to be any genuine autonom y; and real choice also depends on the 
ability o f  persons to enjoy states o f privacy w ithout intrusion, see Shattuck, J.H .F .; ‘Rights of 
Privacy’, N e w  Y ork and Skokie, 111., N ational T extbook  Com pany in association w ith  American  
C ivil Liberties U nion , 1977, at 199. T he original version of this material is to  be found at 
Greenawalt, K.; ‘Privacy and its Legal Protections’, 2, Hastings Center Studies, 45, 1974.
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fundamental respect which a liberal society has for its citizens. Yet, each is also 
open to criticism as ill-defined, anti-communitarian and conceptually obfuscated. 
That said, it may be that we see liberty and autonomy as ends in themselves rather 
than as means to an end, while we may view privacy purely as a device to reach a 
certain end. Even so, it is submitted that it is not necessary to show privacy to be a 
fundamental and ultimate value of itself in order to argue validly for its protection. 
Furthermore, as Gavison points out.
'Privacy has as much coherence and attractiveness as other values to 
which we have made a clear commitment, such as liberty. Arguments 
for liberty, when examined carefully, are vulnerable to objections 
similar to the arguments..[against] privacy, yet this vulnerability has 
never been considered a reason not to acknowledge the importance of 
liberty, or not to express this importance by an explicit commitment so 
that any loss will be more likely to be noticed and taken into
consideration.'225
She feels that the case for an explicit commitment to privacy is made by pointing 
out the distinctive functions of privacy in our lives. Are there then, specific 
functions for privacy to perform over and above a general support for other 
concepts such as liberty and autonomy?
It has been argued thus far in this work that this is indeed the case in the context of 
genetic information. Chapters three and four have shown how concepts such as 
autonomy and confidentiality do not and cannot address the concerns and interests 
which surround the availability of genetic information. The work of this chapter so 
far has been to examine current thinking on privacy and to outline common themes 
and criticisms relating to the views of privacy which have been advanced to date. In 
the course of this, the elements which support the view of privacy proposed in this 
work have been covered.
225 Gavison, 'Privacy and the Limits o f the Law ', loc. cit., at 468.
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Above, the definition proposed of privacy in this work has been defended in the 
abstract and can be summed up as follows. Privacy is a state of separateness from 
others which primarily protects two kinds of interest: informational privacy and 
spatial privacy. Privacy as so defined finds its roots in moral notions about 
individuality and presupposes social norms such as respect for individuals. In this it 
is allied to the related concepts of liberty and autonomy, and all three perform 
essentially the same function - they define how individuals are perceived and treated 
in western society and they operate to establish and maintain the boundaries 
between the individual and society. Moreover, they are all adjuncts to a view of 
human dignity and respect which is prevalent in our society. Privacy (and liberty 
and autonomy) is (are) not solely concerned with protection from harm but also 
with according respect to individuals, irrespective of the ability of such individuals 
to control, comprehend or command situations. To see privacy in such terms 
allows one to comprehend better why a state of separateness should be sought. It 
further allows us to put forward valid and legitimate reasons for arguing that such a 
state should be protected and that invasion should only be on legitimate grounds 
and for legitimate reasons. Below, in the final section of this chapter, a more 
specific defence of privacy is presented which applies the definition here advanced 
to the four genetic information scenarios outlined at the end of chapter two to 
show how privacy in se can best protect the interests involved.
5.1. - SCENARIOS
5.1.1. - A  Privacy A  nalysis
Many arguments concerning the case scenarios have already been made in this
thesis. It is pointless to recount them again here. Rather, it is proposed that the
responses of the laws of autonomy and confidentiality - discussed in chapters three
and four respectively - be briefly laid out in relation to each of the above scenarios
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and then an account given of how privacy as defined in this work could assist in 
addressing the problems in question.
5.2. - SCENARIO ONE: Employers and Insurers
In this, our first scenario two questions require to be addressed: that of access to 
existing genetic information and that of testing to reveal genetic information. As 
should now be perfectly clear, the first of these involves issues of informational 
privacy. The second concerns spatial privacy. What can a privacy analysis add to 
the way in which we might address these questions?
First, what is the role of informational privacy? We have seen how both
confidentiality and autonomy set up strong reasons and important legal
requirements to protect the interests an individual has in maintaining security of
personal information. A means of ensuring specific and strong informational
privacy protection would add to this and could require not only that consent to use
the information be obtained, or that confidential information remains confidential,
but also that respect for the information as relating to a specific individual and
having special significance because of that be forthcoming during the entire time
that the information is kept. Thus all uses and all disclosures would have to be done
with express consent or for the strongest and most justifiable of reasons. For
example, it could be argued that even where information is no longer confidential
(and therefore no longer protected by the law of confidence) it should continue to
receive respect and should not be used arbitrarily. This recognises the continuing
privacy interest which an individual has in information about him /her - for even if
information has been released into the public domain sufficiently to remove a duty
of confidence, in real terms that information is not public knowledge (in the sense
that the ‘public’ as a collective knows it). That is, disrespect for the information can
still be displayed and harm to the individual can still result. Continued protection
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of privacy interests would ensure that this is minimised where possible. Similarly, 
the mere obtaining of widely drawn consent from an individual should not be seen 
as carte blanche to use or disclose the personal information without further 
concern. Autonomy ensures that consent must, in the main, be given, but thereafter 
autonomy does little to protect information. Arguably once again a continued 
informational privacy interest could ensure that respect is always forthcoming to 
personal information as long as it remains linked to an identifiable individual.
A final point about informational privacy is unique to the context of genetic 
information. We should not forget that information obtained about one person also 
relates to the genetic relatives of that person. Thus, the information that insurers 
and employers keep private and secure is so kept not just for the prospective 
insured, employee or job applicant with whom they deal, but also for the relatives 
of such a person. Such persons might never have consented to the information 
being passed on (that is, exercised an autonomous choice), nor even be aware of the 
existence of such information. They are, nevertheless, entitled to security of that 
information. It is submitted that only by recognising this through a specific 
informational privacy right can adequate protection be accorded to all involved.
Second, how does the concept of spatial privacy help to resolve matters when
prospective insured, employees and job applicants are asked to take a genetic test?
Arguably, to recognise a specific spatial privacy right is the best means to prevent
the harm and affront which can arise from such testing practices. As we have seen,
the law of confidentiality is of no use in such a context, and the law of autonomy
which simply requires 'consent' can ill protect individuals who may feel that they
are in no position to refuse consent in the face of an insurer or (prospective)
employer. A legally protected spatial privacy right would suffer from none of these
weaknesses. This is so because, (a) there would be a prima facie presumption that all
individuals are in a state of separateness as regards unknown genetic information,
4 0 1
and (b) strong reasons would therefore be required to invade that sphere in certain 
circumstances. In the employer/insurer context a financial interest would never be 
sufficiently strong to justify interfering with spatial privacy interests. If harm could 
be avoided by testing then interference may becomes more acceptable, but as has 
been argued in previous chapters, in this context this arises only very rarely. 
Furthermore, neither employers nor insurers are best placed to deal with 
information of this kind because of the potential inherent conflict they have 
between acting in their own interests and acting in the interests of individuals. 
Given this, a strong case can be put that even i f  harm can be avoided by the 
discovery of genetic information through testing, that testing should not be done 
by employers or insurers.
5.2.1. - Scenario One: A Conclusion
The recognition and protection of informational and spatial privacy interests would 
strengthen considerably the rights of individuals who face requests for genetic 
information from employers and insurers. We saw in chapter two how various 
reforms have been advocated to protect individuals in this context, and it is 
submitted that everything that is said here not only accords with such proposals, 
but add considerable weight to the arguments in their favour. Indeed, to embody 
the privacy interests enunciated here into a legal right would be a very good way of 
instituting such reforms.
5.3. - SCENARIO TWO: State Interests
In the context of state interests in screening programmes, once again arguments
have already been made above that such programmes are open to question. The two
kinds of privacy interests articulated in this work help to strengthen arguments
against state programmes in two different ways.
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First, let us consider informational privacy. This interest requires that any use or 
disclosure of genetic information which is linked to an identifiable individual is 
kept secure and not made subject to unwarranted or unauthorised activities. This is 
so irrespective of the existence of a relationship between the person holding the 
information and the subject of the information, it is non-dependent on the 
confidential nature (or otherwise) of the information and it does not require any 
express provision from the subject requiring that the information be kept secured. 
In other words, although the laws of confidentiality and autonomy can help to keep 
personal information secure, their particular provisions which might otherwise 
hinder protection do not do so here. Thus, from the perspective of the state which 
might wish to gather together genetic information - for example, to compile 
genetic databases - a strong presumption exists against such practices which, if it 
cannot prevent them, at least requires minimal usage, strong security measures, 
patient consent to use and disclosure and/or the use of a n o n y m i s a t i o n ^ ^ ^ .
Second, what is the position regarding spatial privacy? This interest can be used to 
counter arguments that support the compulsory testing of individuals since these 
programmes require individuals to know information about themselves which they 
might not otherwise choose to know. As we have seen, this is potentially harmful 
and inherently disrespectful. That said, if a state can show a compelling interest^^  ^
in requiring testing then such testing might prove to be acceptable. The point, 
however, is that to recognise spatial privacy interests in this context is to place an 
ever-more-onerous burden on the state to justify its programmes.
226 For a discussion of possible uses and means of protection concerning databanks see Macklin, R.; 
‘Privacy and Control o f Genetic Inform ation*, in Annas, G.J. and Elias, S.; 'M apping the Human  
Genom e: U sing Ethics and Law as Guides', N e w  York, O xford U niversity Press, 1992, chapter 9, 
especially at 165 - 169.
227 The use o f US C onstitutional language here is not meant to  im ply any connection w ith the 
debate about the legitimacy o f U S state intervention. It is sim ply convenient use o f language.
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5.3.1. - Pre-marital Screening
Arguably, for pre-marital testing no state interest is sufficiently strong to override 
individual privacy interests. This is so because the interests of the state in such cases 
are clearly centred around reproductive choice rather than concern with individual 
health (if this were not the case then testing would be carried out on individuals 
irrespective of their intentions to m a r r y ) 228, And, as has been argued in previous 
chapters, such an interest is not strong because it is an interest in future persons 
(which is weak compared to the interests of existing persons) and also it is an 
interest which cannot be successfully furthered because the facilitation of choice 
does not and cannot ensure that the ‘correct’ choice (from the state perspective) will 
be made. The recognition of the individual spatial privacy interest fundamentally 
undermines the state’s case in such circumstances.
5.3.2. - Ante-natal and Neo-natal Screening
In the context of ante-natal and neo-natal screening the point has already been made 
that the motivation behind testing is different depending on when the testing 
occurs. For ante-natal screening the primary motive is to facilitate parental choice 
in continuing with the pregnancy. The only variable is where there is an available 
cure for the tested-for condition in which case, clearly, concern for the fetus is also 
a factor229. In contrast, neonatal screening is carried out primarily to protect the
228 That said, if the concern o f the state was individual health, and provided som ething could be 
done about the condlton, then m andatory testing becom es more acceptable. In such a case, 
however, the testing should be o f the population at large and not just those w h o  intend to marry. If 
the programmes is restricted to those w ho intend to marry its status once again becom es 
questionable not just on  autonom y and privacy grounds but also those o f justice - w h y  are single 
persons excluded?
229 N o te , in the case where a test detected a fetal abnormality, it is very clear that the law in the 
U nited  K ingdom  w ould still permit an abortion even i f  a cure for the condition was available, see 
supra chapter three. Thus, arguably even in the case o f cure, the paramount consideration w ith  ante­
natal screening remains parental (w om en’s) choice.
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interests of the child. These motivations are important for assessing the validity of 
such screening programmes from the privacy perspective.
5.3.2.1. - Ante-natal Screening
The question of whether or not parental choice can and should be facilitated has 
already been discussed. The acceptability of such an act depends on several factors 
such as (a) the right of the parents to have their choice facilitated , and (b) the 
interests of others which might be compromised in an attempt to facilitate parental 
choice. The first of these factors refers to the autonomy of the parents in question - 
are they, as individuals, given the right to ‘choose’ to receive further information 
about their reproductive practices? If so, then the aim of facilitating choice is an 
admirable one because it furthers individual autonomy. If, however, the parents do 
not themselves ‘choose’ to know but the information is thrust upon them in an 
effort to help them to choose, this is offensive to their spatial privacy interests in 
not knowing. It is submitted that it is better to protect the individuals in such a case 
by reference to a spatial privacy concept than by reference to autonomy because 
autonomy itself can be turned against the individuals in an attempt to justify the 
action: we do it to facilitate your choices - to 'enhance' your autonomy. A clearly 
recognised spatial privacy interest would provide an excellent means for defeating 
such an argument.
In such cases it is hard not to conclude that the primary motive of a state in forcing
people to make informed choices is a desire to reduce costs of expensive future
(defective) children. But, even if a state proclaims child welfare as a laudatory aim of
its screening programme, one cannot avoid the fact that the means offered to
achieve that aim is abortion. Thus, two birds are killed with the same stone - no
child will suffer but also it is still the case that no extra costs will be incurred. And,
the message which is attached to this stone reads that death is preferable to
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‘defective’ life and that the state in which we live is short on compassion and 
tolerance. A dangerous path to follow.
5.3,2.2. - Neo-natal Screening
The objective of neonatal screening is to secure the health and welfare of the child. 
It has already been suggested in previous chapters, however, that to further this 
concern some further end must come from testing beyond the mere acquisition of 
knowledge. The recognition of a child’s spatial privacy interests bolsters 
considerably this argument. Consider the cases of Huntington’s disease and 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy. While no cure is available for these conditions, the 
case for carrying out neonatal testing for their presence in children is considerably 
weakened by the spatial privacy interests of those children. This case was made in 
chapter three where we saw a powerful argument by Wertz et al outlining the 
actual harm which can result from such early testing^^o. Preparedness of carers 
cannot be ensured and it is far from clear that the child’s own best interests are 
served in such cases. We also saw, however, that the principle of autonomy could 
not help children in such cases. A recognition of spatial privacy interests can. Such 
interests dictate that it is for the child him or herself to decide, when sufficiently 
competent, whether or not to undergo such a test.
The question of testing for sickle cell anaemia (SCA) poses slightly different 
problems because, although not curable, the condition is treatable with regular 
blood transfusions. Testing will, however, also disclose those who are 
asymptomatic but carriers. The acceptability of such a screening programme must 
consider still the child’s spatial privacy interests. And, in light of the US experience
230 ’'^ertz, D .C . eta l.\ ‘Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents: W ho Decides?’, 272, Journal 
o f  the Am erican Medical Association, 875, 1994, at 878, cited in H offm an, D .E . and Wulfsberg, E.A.; 
‘Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions: Is it in Their Best Interests?*, 23, Journal o f  Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, 331, 1995, at 333.
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which led to racial discrimination and harassment, it might be better not to 
implement a screening programme for such a condition. Rather, individuals should 
be treated on an individual basis. If screening were not implemented racial groups at 
‘high risk’ from SCA would not be set apart in the community and therefore 
would be less likely to be set apart by the community. Also, not to test large groups 
of persons simply because of their race means that the privacy interests of such 
persons will be protected because they will not be required to know information. 
Yet, for individual children who experience symptoms or in whose family there is 
already an incidence of SCA, testing could be carried out. Although this potentially 
impinges on the child’s privacy interests, this is mitigated by the availability of 
treatment for the condition. Furthermore, if one waits until symptoms appear, this 
approach does not impinge on the interests of carriers because they will remain 
asymptomatic and therefore will never have to submit to testing. If these 
individuals choose at a later date to know their status that is entirely within their 
domain.
Finally, the condition known as ischaemic heart disease raises yet another set of
problems. Although such a condition is multifactorial - and therefore suggests that
an element of ‘control’ can be exercised over a child’s environment to affect the
onset or severity of the condition - it is imperative to stress that a test result in such
cases can at best only give a very unclear indication of a possible predisposition to
disease at some far distant date. Thus, a child who is subjected to screening is likely
to suffer the same fate as those undergoing screening for Huntington’s disease or
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy; namely; that they come to be seen as fragile
victims waiting to be consumed by some terrible fate. It then becomes important to
ascertain exactly what one can do to prevent or affect the onset of disease. If the
answer is: ‘we do not know’ or ‘not very much’ then arguably the child’s spatial
privacy interest would support an argument against screening. If, however, we
could be relatively certain that, given a predisposition, a strict dietary regime or a
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controlled home environment could affect to a significant degree the child’s chances 
of developing disease, then the balance is more likely to be tipped in favour of 
screening.
5.3.3. - Scenario Two: A  Conclusion
The conclusion which we can draw for this section is as follows. Spatial privacy 
interests help us not only to reflect on the interests at stake in screening 
programmes but also to argue against the acceptability of such programmes in the 
absence of clear and convincing evidence that strong interests o f benefit to the 
individuals concerned can be furthered by the testing. If such evidence is not 
available, these privacy interests undermine such screening programmes and call 
their validity seriously into question. Direct protection of privacy in such cases is 
preferable to any other option considered because (a) in the case of the law of 
confidentiality, no protection is afforded at all, (b) the law of autonomy does not 
protect to a satisfactory extent the interests which children have in not knowing 
because they are classed as incapax and decisions about the control of their 
information is given to others who might not appreciate the spatial privacy 
interests at stake or ignore them, and (c) in the case of ante-natal screening, the law 
of autonomy can actually be used to further the interest of parents rather than the 
child or future person. This last point leads us to an interesting question. Must we 
conclude that future persons have spatial privacy interests, and/or that these should 
be preferred to the autonomous choices of their parents? The first of these 
questions can be answered in the affirmative, because we can and do recognise the 
interests of future persons in a variety of ways^^h But, it is not necessary to go so 
far as to prefer these to the autonomy interests of living persons. Indeed, it is not
For example, in m any jurisdictions the interest o f the fetus in being born alive once it has 
reached a certain stage o f developm ent is recognised. Similarly, we recognise the interest o f  fetuses in 
not being harmed in the w om b by requiring pregnant w om en to refrain from engaging in certain 
activities w hile pregnant, such as w orking w ith  dangerous substances.
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argued, here that this should ever be the case. Nonetheless, awareness of such 
interests can help to inform living persons in the autonomous choices that they 
make, for example, whether or not to have an ante-natal test for Huntington's 
disease if one has no intention of aborting the fetus should the test prove to be 
positive.
5.4. - SCENARIO THREE: A Fam ily’s Right to Know
In this scenario the problem is one for a health care professional (Dr. Smith) to 
decide whether or not to disclose to his patients genetic information about a 
relative (Kenneth) who does not want the information to be disclosed. Kenneth is 
not a patient of Dr. Smith.
It will be recalled that the principle of respect for autonomy requires that individual 
choice be a determining factor in resolving our problem scenarios. To be 
autonomous an individual must be allowed to choose for him or herself the 
direction of his or her life, must be capable of making choices and must be free 
from interference by others in doing so. Autonomy therefore requires that we seek 
and respect where possible the choices of individuals. A problem with this model is 
that of conflicting autonomies. What does Dr. Smith do if Kenneth ‘chooses’ to 
keep his medical details private and yet in the opinion of Dr. Smith harm can be 
avoided and the autonomy of relatives can be enhanced by disclosure? As we saw in 
chapter three, Ngwena and Chadwick have made the powerful point that,
...what has to be taken into account is the fact that respecting the 
autonomy of one person may have implications for the autonomy of 
others. As the Royal College of Physicians argue, “Blood relatives have 
an interest in knowing the truth which has nothing to do with 
influencing their behaviour towards affected individuals in their 
families, but as a necessary means to finding out the truth about 
themselves”...How is the choice between the autonomy of different
409
people made?...What is clear is that the decision cannot be taken on 
autonomy grounds^'^'^.
We saw in chapter three how such a problem was irresolvable simply by an appeal 
to autonomy. Our other options then are confidentiality and, now, privacy.
The approach of confidentiality shows us that a duty of confidence is owed to 
Kenneth both by his own physician and our doctor. There is legal, ethical and 
professional authority for this. However, none of these sources imposes an absolute 
duty on a health care professional. We have seen in chapter four that confidentiality 
allows the doctor to breach confidences to inform the family if he can argue that to 
do so is in the public interest. In legal terms, and despite the restricted class of 
persons to be informed, it is probably the case that he can do so, invoking the 
public interest exception, given that a real risk of harm can be avoided by the 
availability of treatment for the recessive condition in question. Thus, we could say 
that for those individuals who are likely to be harmed by non-revelation of the 
genetic information of Kenneth, we disclose the information in question without 
breaching a duty of confidence to Kenneth^^ .^
From the perspective of privacy, this is an issue involving informational privacy - 
revelation of the information to others impinges on Kenneth’s interest in the 
security of his personal information. The question which arises is, is this a 
legitimate and justifiable infringement? We can approach this question from 
different perspectives. First, we can consider the acceptability of an absolute right of 
privacy. Second, if we reject this, we should consider the factors which might build
232 ]S[gwena, C. and Chadwick; R.; ‘G enetic Diagnostic Inform ation and the D u ty  o f  
Confidentiality: Ethics and Law*, 1, Medical Law  International, 73, 1993, at 77.
W hen it is said that w e do not breach the duty o f confidence owed to Kenneth, it is meant that 
the existence of a valid ‘public interest’ has the consequence that a duty is probably not ow ed to  
Kenneth as regards the inform ation in question, see T oulson  and Phipps, 'C onfidentiality', London, 
Sweet & M axwell, 1996, at para. 6-11.
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a strong case in favour of disclosure. In doing so we delimit the scope of the privacy 
interest.
Is the right to privacy advocated here an absolute one? This would not be in 
keeping with the general medico-legal ethos of most western states, and to argue for 
an absolute right would run counter to our views on the related concepts of 
autonomy, liberty and confidentiality, none of which receives absolute protection. 
This writer cannot see any sufficiently strong arguments which could be advanced 
to support such a claim. What, then, are the exceptions to privacy protection? It is 
difficult to reject the argument that ‘public interest’ is a valid exception to such a 
right, just as it is a determining factor in the law of confidentiality. However, what 
we need is a clearer idea of what we mean by ‘public interest’ - something which we 
certainly do not have in the law of confidentiality.
In the context of genetic information relevant factors have already been identified 
in chapter two which have a direct bearing on the strength of competing claims to 
information. These are:
• The availability o f  a cure
• The severity o f the condition and likelihood o f onset
• The nature o f the genetic disease
• The nature o f the genetic testing
• The nature o f the request
To this we should add the very relevant factor that invasion of privacy must have a 
reasonable likelihood of furthering the competing interest. Also, we should be 
clearer, if possible, about who constitute a public for the public interest exception 
to be used in the context of privacy.
411
5.4.1. - Promoting Public Interest
In the context of our present scenario it is submitted that the health care 
professional must consider the nature of the condition in question, the nature of the 
interests at stake and their respective ‘strengths’. On the one hand Kenneth has an 
interest in having his autonomy, confidentiality and informational privacy 
respected by not disclosing the information. Arguably, each of these is very ‘strong’ 
given the arguments which have already been put elsewhere. On the other hand, 
the doctor faces two different kinds of interests from relatives: (1) the autonomy 
interests of those who might want to know and who are likely to be physically 
harmed by non-disclosure, (2) the interests of the son and wife who are 
contemplating having a family.
It has already been argued in chapter three that the interest of the couple wishing to 
have a baby is simply an interest in a choice to reproduce and it has been stated, 
following Ngwena and Chadwick^ '^ ,^ that harm to such a choice by not revealing 
information is not sufficiently weighty to justify disrespecting Kenneth. That was 
on the grounds of autonomy. A privacy argument along the lines made out above 
adds more weight to this viewpoint. Thus, even if one were not convinced that 
Kenneth’s autonomy should be enough to defeat the claims of the couple, the 
additional factor of his privacy interest serves to weaken considerably any 
competing claim.
The issue is somewhat different concerning relatives who themselves may suffer 
physical harm if not informed of Kenneth's condition. There is an additional 
imperative if they expressly wish to know. Arguably, if disclosure can both avoid 
physical harm and respect the wishes of relatives then there is a strong argument to 
be made that the information should be disclosed. If we assess the factors to be 
loc. cit.
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considered in relation to the specific disease in question we see that there is force in 
the argument that exceptions to the duty of confidentiality and the right to 
informational privacy should be invoked. However, and as was argued in chapter 
four, if the information is to be disclosed this should happen in a limited fashion. 
First, to the parents of the family in question to establish if they are both carriers. If 
they are not, no one else need know because no one else is at risk.
5.4.2. - Who is the 'public' in the privacy 'public interest' exception f
The question of whether the family constitutes a ‘public’ is a difficult one to 
answer. A ‘public’ is a collective defined, like ‘society’, by reference to the 
i n d i v i d u a p 3 5 .  It is submitted that, relatively speaking, the other individuals in a 
family unit can constitute a ‘public’ by virtue of the fact that as a common 
collective with a common interest in familial information they have a claim to the 
information in question. What is not argued here, however, is either that (a) the 
‘familial public’ has necessarily the same common interest in the information^^^, or 
(b) that the ‘familial public’, by virtue of its strength of numbers alone, should have 
an automatic strong(er) claim to the information in question. In other words, it is 
not argued or even accepted that the family is a distinct group with rights or 
interests of its own. It is a collective of individuals, each of which can derive benefit 
from the claim of the collective to the information, but the collective itself does 
not, and cannot have a unitary claim.
Consider the nature of the claims which family members can have: either a claim to 
know the information or a claim not to know. These are diametrically opposed and
See supra., chapter one.
236 N o te , however, that Chadwick has pointed out that the concept o f  'solidarity' can be invoked to  
found a claim that families do have a collective claim concerning the use and control o f their genetic 
inform ation, see Chadwick, R.; 'The P hilosophy o f the Right to  K now  and the Right N o t  to  
K now ', in Chadwick, R ., Levitt, M. and Shickle, D ., (eds.); 'The R ight to K n ow  and the Right N o t  
to K now ', Aldershot, A vebury, 1997, chapter 1 at 20.
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a single group or family cannot logically put the same two claims at the same time. 
Only individual members of the group or family can do so. But, how then can one 
claim a ‘public interest’ if, in the final analysis, the claim is an individual one? An 
answer might be to consider the essential nature of the ‘public interest’ exception: it 
is a claim that on policy grounds competing interests should be put in the balance 
with those interests seeking protection; in this case, privacy interests. It is a 
recognition of the legitimate nature of the interests in question. Although we can 
see these interests as individual in nature (relative X wants to know and relative Y 
does not etc.), we can meaningfully see them as public in nature too. An analogy 
can be drawn from the law of confidentiality. In X  v  and W  v  EgdeW^^  ^ it was 
made clear that the interests which had to be weighed in the balance were the public 
interest in maintaining confidentiality and the public interest in disclosure, even 
although the courts recognised the essentially private nature of the claims. 
Similarly, one can argue that a family’s interests are public interests and that these 
should be weighed in the balance with the public interest in respecting the privacy 
of individuals generally. We have already seen in this and previous chapters how  
such a public interest in privacy exists. To so contend is not so much to make 
‘public’ the interests of individuals, but to engage in a debate about the legitimacy 
of the competing interests. That this is not simply done on an individual level 
(individual v. individual) is a reflection on the unfairness of such a balancing 
exercise: for, it would not be a balance at all at the end of the day - the greater 
number of ‘individual family’ interests would always outweigh the unitary privacy 
interest of the patient in question. A ‘public interest’ analysis allows for a fairer 
balance to be undertaken. And, the fairness of the exercise depends on the factors to 
be considered. These have been outlined above^^ .^ Thus, in our current problem, 
arguably the fact that something can be done to alleviate harm and suffering, and 
that the circle of individuals to be informed can be kept small until there is a real
X  V y  [1988] 2 A ll ER 648, chapter four supra.
238 W V  Egdell [1990] 1 A ll ER 835, chapter four, supra.
239 Section 5.4., supra
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likelihood of harm, means that Kenneth’s informational privacy could be 
compromised to allow our doctor to inform the parents of the family unit of the 
history of disease. O f course, the position might be very different if nothing could 
be done for the family. Arguably in such a case, disclosure simply to facilitate 
preparedness is not a sufficiently strong reason to invade someone else’s privacy. 
This has been argued above, and inter alia, this conclusion has been reached because 
it is not at all clear that disclosure in such cases can de facto avoid harm or accord 
respect to the individuals in question. Indeed, it might cause harm in that 
individuals might be unable to cope with the information.
This last point merits close attention before we leave this matter. Everything which
has been said so far about this scenario presupposes that the relatives either want to
know Kenneth's genetic diagnosis, or that it is in their interests to know. Of
course, as has often be repeated in this work, it is very difficult to assume either of
these in the context of genetic information. This is so because unwarranted
disclosures of information can interfere with spatial privacy interests, and in this
context those would be the spatial privacy interests of Kenneth's relatives. This
factor affects considerably the outcome of this scenario from a privacy perspective.
It means, for example, that everything that has been said above about a legitimate
disclosure of information and interference with Kenneth's information privacy is
valid only in cases where we know that relatives of a proband actually want to
know. If such a wish has been expressed then the argument stands that disclosure is
permissible in the particular circumstances of this scenario to avoid physical harm
on the basis of the privacy 'public interest' exception. And, whereas Kenneth's
informational privacy interests will be compromised, the spatial privacy interests of
his relatives will not be affected because they choose to know. If, however, we do
not know what the wishes of the relatives are (or if they have expressed a wish not
to know) then our privacy perspective must change. We cannot simply assume that
disclosure is in a public interest (because harm may result rather than be averted),
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and it may well be the case that in such circumstances the concern for the spatial 
privacy interests of relatives actually helps us to respect the informational privacy 
interests of Kenneth because it prevents us from carrying out an unsolicited 
disclosure to unsuspecting relatives.
5.4.3. - Scenario Three: A  Conclusion
Privacy arguments in this case assist greatly in resolving the dilemmas faced by our 
health care professional. For example, the claim of the couple trying to have a 
family is doubly defeated on both autonomy and  privacy grounds. Indeed, whether 
the claims of the couple would be grounds to breach confidentiality is similarly 
questionable.
For those relatives who wish to know information, arguably privacy strengthens 
the proband’s position but at the end of the day also yields the same result as the 
law of confidentiality: namely, that disclosure in the particular circumstances o f this 
scenario is acceptable. This is so because it is not argued here that privacy should be 
an absolute concept, and because it is accepted that a form of public interest defence 
should exist, as in the law of confidentiality. However, the difference between the 
privacy analysis of this problem compared to a confidentiality analysis is the nature 
of the ‘public interest’ exception which permits disclosure. In the case of privacy it 
is articulated in more detail. Relevant factors are identified such as severity of injury 
from disease, likelihood of onset and availability of harm-reducing measures etc. 
This allows for a more informed - and arguably more justified - invocation of the 
public interest. This, it is submitted, is a crucial element in the success of any 
privacy law. Arguments in favour of privacy protection are often challenged and 
defeated on the grounds that 'privacy' is too amorphous a concept. The same is true 
of 'public interest'. In the context of this work it has been shown that it is possible
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to articulate specific privacy interests which can be protected in tandem with 
clearly definable public interests.
Finally, the recognition of both forms of privacy interest - informational and spatial 
- brings a whole new dimension to the problem of information disclosure. For, we 
see that just as one individual can have informational privacy interests in keeping 
information secure, relatives of that person can have spatial privacy interests in not 
being subjected to unwarranted disclosure of that information. The source of each 
of these interests is the same - the common heritage in the genetic information. 
And, in cases where we do not know whether those with spatial privacy interests 
would wish to know the information in question, a strong case can be put that they 
should not be subjected to this information. This argument is all the more strong 
for the fact that not to disclose also protects the informational privacy of another. 
Neither autonomy nor confidentiality allow such an argument to be made. We 
shall explore this matter further in our last scenario.
5.5. - SCENARIO FOUR; A Right N ot to Know?
Finally, we come to consider the familial right not to know. In chapter four it was 
argued that the law of confidence cannot help in securing a right not to know  
information '^^o. The discussion in this section will, therefore, proceed on the basis 
of the law of autonomy and the definition of privacy proposed in this work.
In chapter three it was argued that autonomy makes an uneasy basis for a claim not 
to know informationnel. Such a possible claim can arise in two circumstances, either
(a) when the individual in question has absolutely no idea that information is 
available, or (b) when the individual has some information, e.g. - family history, but
neo supra. 
nei supra.
417
nothing more specific. An autonomy perspective of (a) would suggest that we 
should seek to establish the views of the individual about whether or not s/he  
would like to know the information in question, because autonomy requires choice 
and choice requires information. However, if we ask the individual to ‘choose’ not 
to know, we alert them to the fact that there might be something to know (indeed, 
this must be so or we would not approach them at all) and thereby deprive them of 
the opportunity to exercise meaningfully an interest in not knowing. That is, how  
can one respect the interest in not knowing if one seeks to help the individual 
choose by informing them that such a choice must be made? In the circumstances of
(b), a limited degree of information might solicit a blanket refusal from the 
individual and arguably this should be respected, even although it is based on scant 
data. However, as was argued in chapter three, every autonomy analysis leaves open 
the possibility of challenge if the individual’s choice can be questioned because of 
limited capacity or material interference by others. Thus, arguably, a blanket refusal 
to know might be open to challenge by those with more information if it is felt 
that the ‘choice’ in question was not legitimate because it was based on too little 
information. Thus, on an autonomy analysis the exercise of the choice not to know 
even in cases where there is some basis for that choice, might lay open the 
possibility of a paternalistic approach to the treatment of genetic data. In other 
words, in both cases an autonomy analysis alone does not offer a strong basis for an 
argument for a right not to know. H ow  then, if at all, can privacy assist in this 
problem?
The argument has already been put above in favour of the interest in not knowing 
in certain cases. In the context of genetic information those 'certain cases" can be 
determined, once again, by reference to the factors identified above and in chapter 
one as relevant for genetic privacy cases. These are:
418
• The availability o f a cure
• The severity o f the condition and likelihood o f onset
• The nature o f the genetic disease
• The nature o f the genetic testing
• 'The nature o f the request
• The question o f whether disclosure can further a valid public interest
• The question o f how the individual might be affected i f  subjected to unwarranted 
information
A spatial privacy analysis founds a right not to know information. Consider the 
following examples. First, if the individual has no knowledge at all that familial 
information exists, the spatial privacy interest stands as a prim a facie bar to the 
person being approached and told the information. Before such an approach is 
made spatial privacy requires that we consider how the individual might be harmed 
by disclosure and what ‘good’, if any, might come from disclosure. It requires that 
we reflect on the act of disclosure and places the onus on us not to disclose unless 
faced with compelling reasons to do so. Finally, it goes some way to ensuring that 
the decision-maker does ‘not rest content with assumptions that flow from 
preconceived value p r e f e r e n c e s ’ ^ '^ ^  Yhat is, a privacy analysis reveals the broader 
and more complex reality of scenarios involving genetic information. This does not 
happen if we analyse the issue from the perspective of autonomy or confidentiality. 
Autonomy arguments are open to the possibility that one can argue for 'autonomy 
enhancement' by disclosing information. Confidentiality is so replete with ill- 
defined exceptions that disclosure can easily be justified at the discretion of those in 
possession of the information. Indeed, in the context of disclosure to family 
members confidentiality is utterly useless in protecting a right not to know because
242 Mackiin, ‘Privacy and C ontrol o f  G enetic Inform ation*, in Annas, and Elias, ‘G ene Mapping: 
U sing Law and Ethics as Guides’, op. cit., chapter 9, at 164.
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one cannot breach a duty of confidence by giving someone information about 
themselves.
Second, all of the above is equally true in the case of a refusal based on limited 
knowledge. However, in addition we have an indication that an individual might 
not wish to know information. Autonomy requires that we respect such a wish and 
a spatial privacy analysis gives us a excellent reason to do so. It is accepted that a 
privacy analysis does not necessarily make it easier for us to respect a wish not to 
know if that wish seems irrational (e.g.- if there is a complete cure for the condition 
and yet refusal is still given) but, it does give us all the more cause to reflect that the 
‘refusal’ should be respected nonetheless. And, it is submitted that a privacy 
analysis leads us to do so, even i f  we would like to act more paternalistically 
towards the individual. In contrast, an autonomy model allows us to act 
paternalistically, because of the susceptibility of autonomy to 'enhancement' and 
'facilitation' arguments. Arguably a privacy model in conjunction with an 
autonomy model persuades us not to do so.
Thus, in the circumstances of scenario four Nicola must consider the privacy 
interests of her female relatives in not knowing of the history of breast cancer in 
the family. In chapter three it was argued from the perspective of autonomy that 
Nicola could approach her relatives with the news of her own condition and let 
them decide for themselves whether they should do something about discovering 
their own genetic composition. From the perspective of privacy, Nicola must 
seriously consider the spatial privacy interests of her relatives. This might lead her 
to conclude that the information should not be imparted, for example, in the case of 
the sister who is unlikely to be able to take advantage of the ‘cure’ available because 
she is phobic about operations, or the cousin who is likely to react badly to the 
information given that she is prone to bouts of depression.
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5.5.1. - Scenario Four: A  Conclusion
In light of the above, our spatial privacy analysis provides Nicola with a more 
sophisticated model than is currently available from either of the concepts of 
autonomy or confidentiality with which to determine how she should proceed 
with the news about her condition. In particular, given the circumstances of her 
sister and cousin who might react very badly to the news and who might refuse to 
undergo the available treatment (mastectomy) even with the knowledge of their 
greater risk, Nicola might decide that the privacy of these persons should not be 
invaded with the news that there is a history of breast cancer in the family or that 
she herself has the disease. That said, because there is a risk that these relatives 
might die if not informed, Nicola would arguably require strong and clear evidence 
that they would not wish to be informed^^ .^ This situation is different from that in 
scenario three, because there is no competition between the privacy interests of the 
proband and his/her relatives. If Nicola chooses to tell her relatives this clearly has 
no implications for her informational privacy. The same was not true in scenario 
three where a third party in possession of familial genetic information sought to 
disclose it in direct conflict with the proband's informational privacy interests. In 
the circumstances of individual cases this might be enough to tip the balance a 
different way.
It is not forgotten when discussing these scenarios that in a real-life context matters 
would not be so straight-forward. It is acknowledged that in a family context it is 
very difficult to keep matters ‘secret’ or ‘private’. Also, faced with the prospect of 
death, many would consider that everyone would wish to know of a predisposition 
to disease, no matter how upsetting the knowledge. This work cannot address such 
issues. But, the point to be made is that the privacy analysis advanced here can be
243Arguably, however, N ico la ’s decision not to disclose w ould be stronger in a case where no  
treatment were available at all.
421
seen as a reflection of a wider trend in medicine and the care of others. The 
principle of sanctity of life is no longer seen to be the absolute value in health care. 
Quality of life has taken over that position. And acceptance of this requires many 
paradigm shifts. If one thought that the ‘supreme value’ were to save life at all cost, 
then subtle privacy issues such as those advanced here would not arise. If, however, 
one values quality of life and accepts that v/e might prefer quality to mere 
continuation of life itself, then this requires us to accept that individuals might have 
an interest in preserving their current quality of life, even if that comes at the cost 
of life itself. The privacy model suggested here provides us with one way of seeking 
to respect such an interest.
6.1. - ASSESSING PRIVACY PROTECTIO N MEASURES
It can be seen from the study of the four case scenarios that the arguments for 
protecting privacy are strongest in the case of employers, insurers, the state and 
when a health care professional is in possession of genetic information. In such cases 
it would be entirely possible to institute legal protection for both informational and 
spatial privacy interests. In the case of informational privacy the burden on third 
parties would be to ensure that any genetic data held on individuals were kept as 
secure as possible and used/disclosed only in the most justified of circumstances. 
The basis for saying that the information should be kept secure stems from the fact 
that it relates to individuals who have a strong privacy interest in it. It should not 
matter how the information was gained (e.g. - because of a confidential relationship) 
nor how often it has been disclosed by others in different contexts (i.e. - if it 
becomes part of the public domain). However, we have seen that, to an extent, 
measures exist to protect the security of information generally, and these measures 
are likely to become even tighter after 1998 once the United Kingdom has 
introduced into domestic law the provisions of the Data Protection Directive^^ .^
244 See chapter one, supra.
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Nevertheless, specific privacy legislation designed to protect informational privacy 
interests in genetic information would be by no means superfluous, because it could 
take account of the unique fact that the security is maintained not just for the 
proband but also for his/her family.
Legal protection of spatial privacy interests does not currently exist in the United 
Kingdom. There is no 'right not to know'. It has been argued that a specific 
commitment to protecting such interests is legitimate and worthwhile. But would it 
be viable? This question deserve close attention and is the subject of the next 
section.
7.1. - A  RIGHT N O T  TO KNOW : A LEGAL FRAMEWORK?
7.1.1. - A  duty not to inform
One way to enshrine a right not to know in law would be to make an unauthorised 
disclosure a cause of action leading to the payment of damages either for harm 
caused or simply because the privacy of the information is not respected. In the 
former case, the harm is upset rather than physical injury. Some may argue that this 
is insufficient injury, but we can see in many areas that a precedent has already been 
set for recognising such injury. For example, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 
the Race Relations Act 1976 contain identical provisions that 'damages in respect of 
an unlawful act of discrimination may include compensation for injury to feelings 
whether or not they include compensation under any other h e a d . ' 2 4 5  Similarly, in 
the law of confidence damages are payable even in the absence of detriment246. 
Whereas it is by no means settled that the law of confidence does or does not 
require detriment to be shown247  ^ powerful arguments exist that detriment is not
245 1975 A ct, s.66(4); 1976 A ct s.57(4).
246 supra, chapter four.
247 W.
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necessary because the offence is to the confidential nature of the information 
and/or the relationship created by the confidential information either or both of 
which are injured a priori by the use or disclosure of the information. In like 
manner, one could argue that it is the disrespect for the individual’s privacy 
interests manifest in an unauthorised disclosure of genetic information which is 
offensive and not necessarily the resultant ‘harm’ in the guise of upset.
The legal recognition of such a right of action would give much weight to the
privacy claim under scrutiny, which is that of spatial privacy. It would help to
ensure that proper reflection is given to cases involving spatial privacy interests and
would have a deterrence effect on those who would seek to act in an overly
paternalistic way towards others. An obvious problem with this approach,
however, is that the existence of a ‘right’ not to know implies that a ‘duty’ should
exist in certain cases not to disclose information. Yet, an important factor in
determining whether such a ‘duty’ exists is the question of how the individual
might react. This is a very subjective matter which can be especially difficult for
any third party to assess. It leads to the possibility that individual A might
determine that individual B should not be informed of information, when in fact
individual B would actually want to know, had s/he been given the opportunity.
As we have seen, the privacy argument about not disclosing is based primarily on a
desire not to harm and a desire to respect the individual, but in such a case the very
fact of non-disclosure might cause harm and might be an act of disrespect in itself.
The problem is that the determining factor for deciding whether a duty not to
disclose exists is a subjective assessment of how the individual will react. N ot only
is this difficult to assess but arguably it is simply another form of paternalism. Is
then, an objective analysis preferable? In such a case, the person in possession of the
information would assess factors such as likelihood of onset, availability of cure etc.
together with an objective consideration of what a person in the subject’s position
would or would not want to know. Such a ‘reasonable subject’ could assume the
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particular characteristics of the actual subject. At the end of the day, provided that 
the assessment was a reasonable one, no legal action could lie against someone who 
had decided not to disclose information. O f course, the assessment of such factors 
is much easier when done by a health care professional, or a party with access to 
expertise such as the state, employers or insurers. It is far less clear whether family 
members are in a position to make meaningful assessments of such factors, let alone 
whether they should be the subject of a legal action if they disclose information in 
unjustified circumstances. It is more permissible to impose a duty on third parties 
who seek genetic information or who seek to disclose it, not to do so or to do so 
only in the most justified of circumstances.
Yet, even if such an objectively assessed privacy right were accepted, it might be 
objected that it is open to the same criticism as has been levelled at Wacks^ s^  ^ in that 
it does not take account of cases where actual harm occurs to an actual individual. 
That said, the criticism of Wacks was primarily one concerned with consistency. 
Wacks' model is about avoiding harm, and it does not do that across the board. The 
privacy model advanced here is concerned not solely with avoiding harm but also 
with according respect - it tries to offer a way of recognising the subtle and wide- 
ranging privacy interests which can exist in genetic information. It does not pretend 
to offer an ideal solution for all cases. Perhaps, then, an objective approach is the 
best way forward. For it provides a means of reflecting on the question of respect 
and the nature of harm and seeks to incorporate such reflections into the decision­
making process concerning the use to which information should be put. That in 
doing so it adopts an objective stance allows us at least to move away from an 
entirely subjective approach and allows us to reach decisions based on the actual 
facts about the circumstances in question including the nature of the disease, its 
spread, its chances of harm, prior views of the patient etc. Furthermore, an 
objective approach can be given direction by the law - we can prescribe, for
248 supra, section 3.3.
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example, that prior indications of a wish not to know should be respected, or that 
circumstances involving a disease for which there is no cure should primarily be 
treated as non-disclosure cases. The same is not true of a subjective approach.
Finally, even if all of the above is accepted, one question still remains: does this 
approach avoid a paternalistic assessment of spatial privacy interests? To an extent it 
does not, but perhaps this can never be avoided in any cases where one cannot 
approach the individual him or herself to determine how one should proceed. 
Rather, it might have to be conceded that the worth of this approach is more 
limited, but not necessarily any less valuable. For although one must come to an 
objective assessment of how one should proceed (based on an objective assessment 
of how the individual subject might react), one can nonetheless come to a decision 
in an ethically acceptable and respectful way. An example of an unacceptable 
approach would be to determine the individual’s best interests by reference to, for 
example, the standards of the medical profession^^^. A preferable approach would 
be to attempt to put the decision-maker in the position of the subject and to give 
the decision-maker the responsibility of determining what the individual would 
want by reference to all available evidence, for example, written advance directives, 
evidence of relatives, prior oral evidence from the subject him/herself. In addition, 
a well-defined spatial privacy right could bring to this a clear account of the kind of 
factors which would make disclosure in different circumstances acceptable or 
unacceptable.
7.1.2. - No duty to inform
An alternative means of enshrining in legal terms an interest in not knowing would 
be to avoid imposing a duty to disclose information, save in exceptional
249 YLis is the (unfortunate) position n ow  applicable in the U nited Kingdom. See Airedale NHS  
Trust V Bland [1993] 1 A C  789 and Law  H ospital NHS Trust v  Lord Advocate  1996 SLT 848; 1996 
SLT 869.
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circumstances. This becomes a policy matter which could affect the future direction 
of the existing law. For example, one could refuse to recognise an action in 
negligence for failure to disclose genetic information, except perhaps in 
circumstances where there is an incontrovertible means available for avoiding 
harm. This is particularly relevant for wrongful birth actions. Should, for example, 
a woman who is misled about the results of a prenatal genetic test and gives birth to 
a ‘genetically defective’ child as a result, be able to claim a wrongful birth action 
because she was denied the chance to avoid the ‘harm’ (namely the birth of the 
child) by having an abortion? In such a case it is argued that the harm is to her 
(primarily financially). Undeniably, the right to choose abortion is hers. But, 
should the spatial privacy interest of the future child - in not knowing that k might 
suffer from a genetic condition - be used to deny the woman an action of wrongful 
birth? This is surely very difficult to accept. For in such a case there is, arguably, no 
privacy interest sufficiently strong to challenge the woman’s right. This, however, 
is because the privacy interests of the future child are minimal given its (legal) status 
as a non-person.
Perhaps a better example comes from the law of confidence. We saw in chapter four 
that the law of confidence is sufficiently vague to allow for variable interpretations 
of its scope, especially through the public interest exception. And a popular 
interpretation of the public interest exception is that k recognises that a health care 
professional owes a duty not just to his patient but also to the public^^o. In the 
context of genetic information, it has been argued on this basis that a doctor has a 
duty to disclose information, either as part of the law of confidence, or as part of a 
duty of care in negligence as in Tarasoffl^^. Arguably to refuse to recognise such 
duties is a more viable way than the wrongful birth case of recognising and giving 
legal weight to privacy interests in not knowing. Thus, in cases where there is no
250 See W  V Egdell, s u p r a  c i t .
251 Discussed supra, chapter four.
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treatment or cure available and/or the condition is late-onset, or the degree to 
which others will be affected is minimal, the courts could not allow actions in 
negligence or could refuse to uphold breach of confidence actions as a way of 
sending a message that in determining whether or not a duty to disclose exists a 
very important feature is the interest of others in not knowing. The problem with 
such an approach is that it leaves the matter of the recognition of spatial privacy 
interests to the judiciary who can only recognise such interests as and when 
relevant disputes come to court. Also, and more importantly from the individual’s 
perspective, such an approach does not accord any right of compensation to those 
who have had their privacy interests invaded, it merely acts to pay abstract lip- 
service to such interests - perhaps an unsatisfactory and insufficient legal response.
7.1.3. - Protecting Spatial Privacy & Ante-Natal Screening
In the particular case of ante-natal screening a final, more subtle way of recognising 
an interest in not knowing is to ensure that genetic counselling is comprehensive 
and detailed prior to testing and that it is never presented as routine. At the 
moment counselling, screening and testing is unregulated in the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, as the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has 
observed.
Some witnesses were...concerned that in many places 
patients were not provided with the information they 
needed if they were to give informed consent to pre­
natal screening. For example. Professor Marteau found 
that "on about 50 per cent of occasions [screening] 
tests were presented as routine"; since such tests were 
presented as being for reassurance, rather than as a 
means of giving the choice of whether to continue 
with an affected pregnancy, women took them  
without consideration...[t]here is ample evidence that 
some, at least, of the screening currently offered in the
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course of antenatal care falls far short of best
practice. 252
In such cases and with proper counselling the consequences of testing can be 
evaluated in most cases by individuals in the abstract and an indication of their 
willingness to receive test results (either positive or negative) can be given in an 
informed manner. If at this stage the potential spatial privacy implications for the 
future person were also articulated this might help to protect such interests or at 
least ensure that decision about the future were taken in full knowledge of them. 
Legally, those with the responsibility for counselling might be given an express 
obligation to ensure that individuals are made aware of such interests.
8.1. - GENETIC INFORMATION A N D  PRIVACY: A CONCLUSION
This chapter has defended the definition of privacy presented in this work by 
setting out the existing thinking on privacy and offering the definition against the 
works of other writers, indicating areas of agreement and disparity. The US 
Constitutional position was also examined as a means to address the debate about 
conflation of terms in the privacy debate. Thereafter the definition of privacy 
proposed was used to show how it can assist in resolving the complex problems 
which arise from the four scenarios outlined earlier in this work concerning 
familial genetic information. It has been argued that a commitment to privacy in se 
is the best way forward for only this can adequately ensure that the interests which 
individuals have in their own genetic information - both spatial and informational - 
are protected. It has been accepted that the most problematic reform would be to 
enshrine in law a right not to know, and it has been conceded that this is most 
probably viable as against health care professionals, the state, employers and 
insurers. Nonetheless, such protection is exceptionally important and valuable. In
252 H ouse o f  C om m ons Science and T echnology C om m ittee, 'Human Genetics: T he Science and 
the C onsequences', Third Report, H M SO , July 1995, para. 87.
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the family context, even if one does not accept that a legal right not to know should 
be recognised and enforced, an appreciation of the privacy interests at stake can go a 
long way to ensuring that decisions involving the disclosure and use of genetic 
information are taken in the most sensitive manner possible.
In the conclusion to this work, an account will be given of how one could proceed 
to protect by legal means such privacy interests as are identified in this work.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
1.1 - INTRODUCTION
It now becomes clear that the nature of the privacy concept advanced in this work 
is specific to two kinds of interests which patients in a health care setting might 
have in genetic information about themselves. As was stated in chapter one of this 
work, this relatively narrow view of privacy has been chosen to allow a more in- 
depth analysis of the concept, and no warrant can be given of the necessary value of 
this conception of privacy in other contexts. That said, one could easily extend the 
definition of privacy advanced here to other scenarios, both within the health care 
context and beyond. For example, similar issues arise concerning knowledge about 
one's HIV antibody positive status. Also, knowledge about one's parentage could 
equally be analysed using the privacy rubric of this thesisb It is not, however, the 
function of this chapter to undertake such a task. Rather, this chapter will consider 
the ways in which legal effect could be given to informational and spatial privacy in 
the health care context concerning genetic information. The chapter is divided into 
three parts. Part one considers arguments for extending existing laws to address 
privacy issues. This is a common argument which is advanced in the wider privacy 
debate and also merits consideration here. Included here will be a discussion of the 
Roman law actio injuriarum  which some have submitted could assist in the 
protection of personal privacy in Scotland. Second, the role of legislation will be 
examined, focusing particularly on recent American attempts to protect genetic 
privacy by statute. Finally, part three will reflect on the aims of recognising and 
protecting informational and spatial privacy and will set the discussion of legal 
protection of these interests in the wider context of optimal health care solutions, 
that is, we shall examine the question of whether legal solutions are the best 
solutions in this field.
 ^ C f-  O 'D onovan, K.; 'A  Right to K now  O ne's Parentage?', 2^  Journal o f  Law  an d the Family, 27, 
1988.
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2.1. - NEW PROBLEMS, OLD LAW?
In the debate which has raged for many years about the value of privacy and the 
proper method of its protection both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, an 
option which has been frequently advanced is the extension of existing legal actions 
to protect 'privacy interests'^. In the health care context, the most likely candidate 
to protect privacy is the action of breach of confidence. Recent judicial 
developments have made this option all the more favourable, as they have removed 
some of the more obvious stumbling blocks to using this action to protect privacy. 
Thus, for example, the House of Lords in Spycatcher finally settled the point that a 
relationship need not exist between parties in order for a duty of confidence to 
arise .^ Similarly, in Hellewell, the decision of the court that a duty of confidence 
could arise merely from the circumstances of taking a photograph, has led some to 
argue that the duty can be imposed unilaterally'^. As Fenwick and Phillipson say.
It seems that there is only one ingredient which is 
essential : it must be shown that a reasonable person 
who acquired the information would have realised 
that it was confidential.
2 See, for example, Seipp, D.J.; ’English Judicial R ecognition o f a Right to Privacy*. 3, Oxford  
Journal o f  Legal Studies, 325, 1983, Prescott, P.; 'Kaye v  Robertson - a reply*. 54, M odem  Law  R eview , 
451, 1991, c/- W ilson, W .; 'Privacy, Confidence and Press Freedom  : A  Study in Judicial A ctivism ', 
53(1), M odem L aw  R eview , 43, 1990. H ogg considers a range o f cases w hich can and have protected  
privacy interests, although ultim ately he concludes that these are not adequate to  protect the full 
range o f interests subsumed under the privacy rubric, see H ogg, M.; 'The V ery Private Life o f the 
Right to Privacy', 2(3), 'Privacy and Property', Edinburgh, Edinburgh U niversity Press, 1994. See 
too,T hom son, J.J.; 'The Right to Privacy', 4, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 295, 1975, discussed in 
chapter five. The Calcutt C om m ittee considered this option  and examined, inter alia, the laws o f  
trespass, breach o f confidence and defamation, but concluded that '...m ost o f  the serious 
infringments o f privacy...involve no relationship or duty o f confidence', para.8.7., Calcutt; 'Report 
o f  the Com m ittee on Privacy an d  Related Matters', Cm  1102, H M SO , June 1990 (Calucutt I).
 ^A ttorney General v  Guardian Newspapers No,2 [1990] 1 A C  109, discussed in chapter four, supra. 
Arguably, however, this point was already settled in Stephens v  A very  [1988] Ch. 449, at 482.
See, for example, Fenw ick, H . and Phillipson, G.; 'Confidence and Privacy: A  Re-exam ination', 
55, Cambridge Law Journal, 447, 1996, at 451 - 452.
 ^ ibid, at 452.
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This they use as part of an argument that the law of confidence can now go a long 
way, in the context of personal privacy and invasions by the press, to protecting the 
interests with which one is concerned in such cases. In fact, they argue that the case 
of Kaye v Robertson^ could have been effectively dealt with as a breach of confidence 
case. Similar arguments have been made by Wee Loon who has submitted that 
■judicial activism is...the answer to the inability of the present law in England to 
give better protection to an individual's privacy.'^ Whereas this might be true, the 
present writer would respond that it is not true if that activism takes place in the 
context of the breach of confidence action. This is so for two reasons. First, as 
MacQueen has rightly pointed out, '[wjhatever the merits of the debate, it is clear 
that confidentiality is not a complete substitute for privacy, and that there may be 
various problems which the law of confidence cannot reach’®. Despite the 
developments outlined above, it is submitted that this is still true. As Wacks has 
said,
...in general terms, the action for breach of confidence 
is inadequate to deal with the archetypal 'privacy' 
complaint because the action is largely concerned 
with: (a) disclosure or use rather than publicity, (b) the 
source rather than the nature of the information, and
(c) the preservation of confidence rather than possible 
harm to the plaintiff caused by its breach .^
Also, as Hogg has noted, there must be use or disclosure of information before an 
action in confidence can lie, yet with privacy arguably the invasion occurs when the 
information is obtained. Similarly, it is the case that only the person to whom the 
duty is owed can sue for breach of confidence, and not necessarily the persons to
 ^ [1991] FSR 62, discussed in chapter one, supra,
 ^W ee Loon, N-L.; ’Emergence o f  a Right to  Privacy from  w ithin the Law of Confidence?'. 5, 
European Intellectual Property R eview , 307, 1996, at 312.
® Stair M emorial Encyclopaedia, volum e 18, paragraph 1456.
 ^W acks, R.; 'Privacy and Press Freedom '. London, Blackstone Press Ltd., 1995, at 56.
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whom the information relates^ .^ One additional point should also be noted. An 
action of breach of confidence is possible only so long as the confidential 
information remains confidential. Once it becomes part of the public domain it is 
no longer protected. In contrast, privacy is concerned with interests in personal 
information; those interests do not necessarily change, nor does the information 
become any less 'personal' simply because more people have access to it.
Secondly, and of more direct relevance to this thesis is the failing of the law of 
confidence to take account of the so-called 'spatial privacy' interests discussed in 
previous chapters. The argument for this has been made above, but is repeated here 
to refute the notion that the law of confidence in the health care setting can dispel 
effectively our privacy concerns: if privacy is conceived not simply as a desire to 
control personal information, but rather as a general sphere of separateness from 
others, and so also encompasses notions of spatial separateness, then it is no answer 
to say that an action which is concerned solely with information is an acceptable 
solution to privacy invasions. It may be that such an action can address many of the 
privacy concerns that arise in the health care context, but to settle for such 
protection is, arguably, to adopt an unsophisticated view of the true nature of the 
problems at hand. For this reason, the piecemeal development of confidence must 
be rejected
H ogg, loc. cit., at 14 - 15. N ote , however, that H ogg com m ents that the m ove towards a 
'reasonable person' approach to the establishm ent o f a duty might ease the w ay for recognition of 
the fact that the duty should be ow ed to  the person about w hom  the inform ation relates, and not 
the person from w hom  the inform ation has com e.
A n  attempt has been made to introduce statutory provisions governing personal inform ation in 
the health care setting. H ow ever, this has not been successful so far and does not encompass issues 
of spatial privacy. It is, therefore, not considered in any depth in this work: see, 'A  Bill G overning  
the U se and Disclosure o f Personal H ealth Inform ation'. A  Draft Bill by the M ulti-Disciplinary  
Professional W orking Group, July 1994.
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Other less likely candidates for protecting privacy have also been examined 
elsewhere such as trespass^ ,^ defamation^^ and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress '^ .^ It is not necessary to investigate these in any depth here, however, 
because to do so would do nothing to further the thesis of this work. For, it is 
submitted that to adopt a piecemeal approach to privacy protection is to miss the 
importance of privacy as a value in se\ a value which has been argued for 
throughout this work. Each of these areas has been found lacking in the context of 
the general privacy debate, and this would be all the more true in the setting of this 
work.
In similar vein, it is submitted that recourse to the European Court of Human 
Rights would be an ineffective means of protecting the kind of privacy interests 
which surround genetic information. Under Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights citizens are guaranteed ‘respect for [their] private 
and family life, [their] home and [their] correspondence.’ Under Article 8(2) 
exceptions are permissible only if they are ‘necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ Whereas, as we 
have seen, it might well be possible to argue that genetic information can and 
should be disclosed in circumstances which fall within some of these exceptions, it 
is not clear that the privacy right enjoyed by citizens would necessarily cover the 
protection of genetic information in the first place. The Court has tended to give a 
wide margin of appreciation to Signatory States. The attitude tends to be that unless 
there is a commonality of approach between the States to a certain issue, the Court
See Calcutt I, op. cit. 
ibid.
Wacks, 'Privacy and Press Freedom ', op. cit. at 80 - 89.
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is reluctant to extend Convention protection to that area^ .^ With a subject as new 
and uncertain as genetics, privacy protection is, therefore, unlikely to be extended 
to encompass genetic privacy. Furthermore, the standing of the Convention 
generally within the United Kingdom is not high, it not being a part of domestic 
law as such^ .^ Yet, even once the Convention is incorporated into UK law^ ,^ it will 
still be the case that interpretation of 8(1) will fall to courts, and thus the protection 
of genetic privacy will turn on the whim of the judges. In the opinion of this writer 
this would be an unsatisfatory state of affairs.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the proposition that in Scotland at least, the 
common law action of actio injuriarum  might provide a remedy for invasions of 
privacy. Several commentators have advanced this notion but none has examined 
the issue is any real depth^®. In the civilian tradition, the origin of the actio 
injuriarum  lies in the XII Tables^  ^and its scope concerned instances of affront to a 
person {injuria) which were not dependent on a particular form to result in 
liability. That is, interference with one's actual bodily integrity was not necessary.
See, m ost recently, X, Y  and  2  v  U K  (75 /1995/581/667), 22 April 1997.
See, R v K h a n  (Sultan) [1996] 3 A ll ER 289 (HE).
W hich is likely to occur in Parliamentary session 97-98.
A m ong those w ho have suggested this route are Blom -Cooper, L.; 'The Right to be Let A lon e" , 
10, Journal o j Media Law and Practice, 53, 1989, Carey M iller, D.L.; 'Privacy: Interception of  
Com m unications - Could Scots Law H ave a Rem edy?'. 1980, Scots Law  Times (News) 209, Carey 
Miller, D .L . and Lardy, H .; 'Calcutt II: C om m ents from a Scottish Perspective', 1993 Scots Law  
Times 199, Lord Kilbrandon, 'The Law o f  Privacy in Scotland', 2, Cam brian L aw  R eview , 35, 1971, 
and Shapiro, E.E.; 'A  Peek at Privacy', l>(>, Journal o f  the L aw  Society o f  Scotland, 103, 1991. The 
possibility was considered both  by the Y ounger C om m ittee [op. cit.. A ppendix I, para.72) and the 
Scottish Law C om m ission in its consultative m em orandum  on the protection o f confidential 
inform ation (SLC; 'Confidential Inform ation', memorandum N o.40 , 14 A pril 1977, paragraphs 48 - 
58.) H ow ever, the C om m ission did not include recom m endations on this area in its 1984 report on  
reforms o f the law  of confidence (SLC; 'Breach o f Confidence', SLC N o  90, 1984, para 1.7.). Others 
still have argued that the existing general com m on law o f Scotland could provide protection for 
general privacy interests, see H ogg, M.; 'Privacy : A  Valuable and Protected Interest in Scots Law ', 
1992 Scots Law  Times 349, H ogg, 'The V ery Private Life o f the Right to  Privacy', op. cit., and 
McLean, J.A.; 'Privacy, Scots Law. H um an Rights and Europe', 2%, Journal o f  the law  Society o f  
Scotland, 21, 1993.
F or the best account o f the action by far, see Zimmerman, R,; 'The Law o f Obligations: Roman  
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition'. O xford, Clarendon Press, 1996, chapter 31. XII Tables, 
tab.8,4 read in conjunction w ith  tab.8,2 and tab. 8,3, ibid., at 1050.
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and affront could take many forms such as raising a rabble against a specific person, 
approaching an unmarried woman with libidinous intentions, generally bringing a 
person into disrepute, beating or torturing another man's slave, or preventing a 
person using his own property^^. Common to all of these was an 'attack' on the 
personality of another^h As Zimmerman points out,
...the actio injuriarum afforded a strong and efficient 
protection against injury to immaterial interests, and 
in particular against insulting behaviour of any kind^ .^
More particularly, the action was thought to protect three kinds of interest : person 
{corpus), reputation ifama) and dignity {dignitas). The action was constituted by an 
intentional 'attack' on such aspects of the person {animus injuriandiy^ and damages 
were payable for sentimental damages. Modern reception of the action has been 
seen in many countries including Germany, Holland and South Africa. The 
relevance of all of this to privacy comes from the argument - which had been made 
principally in South Africa^  ^ - that dignitas encompasses much more than just 
honour or dignity and in fact encompasses all residual rights of personality not 
covered by fam a  or corpus^^. Given the nature of general privacy interests discussed 
in this work it is not difficult to see how such interests might be subsumed under 
the rubric of 'rights of the personality'^^. The South African courts have accepted 
such an argument^^ and, as has been stated, the common heritage of Scots law with
20 ibid, at 1053 - 1059.
21 ibid, at 1059.
22 ibid, at 1062.
20 ibid, at 1067.
2^1 See, for example, M cQuoid-M ason, D .; 'The Law o f Privacy in South A frica', Johannesburg, Juta 
and C o., 1978.
20Zimmerman, op. cit., at 1084.
26 Zweigert and K otz discuss this notion  o f  'rights o f  the personality' in a comparative context: see 
Zweigert, K. and K otz, LL; 'A n Introduction to Comparative Law', Second Edition, Oxford, 
C larendon Press, 1987, paperback 1992, chapter 50.
27 See, for example, O'Keefe v  Argus Prin ting an d  Publishing Co. L td  1954 (3) SA 244 (C), S v A  1971 
(2) SA 293 (T) and S v  1 1976 (1) SA 781 (RAD) - cited by Zimmerman, op. cit., at 1084, note 263. 
M ost recently see N ational Media Ltd. v  fooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) in w hich  the South African
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such a system, has led commentators to argue for common law recognition of such 
an action in Scotland to protect privacy2®. Such an argument is initially appealing 
for those keen to laud the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Scots law, but in the 
context of the present work it is not an option which merits serious consideration 
for several reasons. First, it is by no means clear that the action has indeed been 
received into Scots law. Second, even if reception has occurred no one has a clear 
idea of the form in which reception has taken place. Of course, to this one can 
respond 'we should find out', but the third objection to this route must also be 
considered; namely - we are entirely dependent on judicial intervention to establish 
the parameters of such an action. In most cases this would take a considerable 
amount of time, but in the context of genetics the time to act is now. Finally, the 
recognition of such a right of action at common law in Scotland might well be a 
triumph for that jurisdiction, but in real terms the right is restricted to a small 
number of persons and/or offensive acts occurring within the jurisdiction. A 
disparity of protection as between Scotland and the other jurisdictions in the 
United Kingdom is not, it is submitted, a desirable or adequate response to the 
problems under review in this thesis. For these reasons it is necessary to turn away 
from the option of common law developments to consider an analysis of ‘privacy- 
specific’ laws which have as their primary (or even sole) concern the kinds of 
interests which are important in this thesls29.
Appellate D ivision  held that privacy was a stii generis interest o f personality. It should also be noted  
that the South African courts have held that juristic persons have a right to privacy: Financial M ail 
(Pty) Ltd. V  Sage Holdings L td  1993 (2) SA 451 (A); M otor Industry Fund Adm inistrators (Pty) Ltd. v  
Janit 1994 (3) SA 56 (W).
2® In particular, see Carey Miller, loc. cit.
2  ^ For a discussion arguing in favour o f specific privacy legislation in the U K , see Lord Bingham o f  
Cornhill, ‘O pinion: Should There Be a Law to Protect Rights o f Personal Privacy?’. [1996] 
European H um an Rights Law  R eview , 450, and Eady, D .; ‘Opinion: A  Statutoiy Right to Privacy’, 
[1996] European H um an Rights L aw  R eview , 243.
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3.1. - LEGISLATIVE PRO TECTIO N OF GENETIC PRIVACY
It is proper to focus the discussion of this section on any available legislation which 
directly concerns issues of genetics and privacy. This leads us to the United States 
where the Genetic Privacy A ct has recently been drafted concerning the collection, 
analysis, storage and use of D N A  samples and the genetic information derived from 
them. This section will examine in some depth the provisions of this Act and the 
problems which have surrounded it^ o.
3.2. - The Genetic Privacy Act
This piece of law was produced for the US Ffuman Geonome Project's ELSP^ 
division by George Annas, Leonard Glantz and Patricia Roche of the Boston 
University School of Public Health^^, The draft is in the format of a federal statute 
and has already been introduced in several states^ .^
2° This A ct is not the on ly  piece of legislation to be created in the U S directed specifically at genetic 
information. For example, in N ovem ber 1995 Congress introduced the Genetic Privacy and Non- 
D iscrim ination A c t 199S w hich is concerned w ith  disclosure and use lim itations on genetic 
information. The provisions are, in the main, similar to m any o f those contained in the GPA, 
although this A ct also addresses the question o f access to inform ation by em ployers and insurers. 
The A ct prohibits em ployers from  gaining access to  genetic inform ation for the purposes of 
discriminating betweeen or restricting the rights o f current or prospective workers (s.5). Those 
providing health insurance cannot use genetic inform ation to affect health insurance and also 
prevents the use of genetic inform ation to  induce individuals to  buy insurance (s.6). Prior even to  
this, in September 1991, the California state legislature voted for a bill w hich concerned genetic 
privacy. The A ct, if passed, w ould  have prohibited discrimination on  genetic grounds and w ould  
have im posed an eight-year m oratorium  on  the use o f genetic test results by insurers. The bill was, 
however, vetoed by the state's G overnor on  14 O ctober 1991. For com m ent see, W ilkie, T.; 
'Perilous Knowledge: The H um an G enom e Project and Its Im plications', London, Faber and Faber, 
1993, at 11. It should also be noted that the International Bar A ssociation and the H um an G enom e 
Organisation have been w orking together for som e five years on  a treaty w hich  w ill guarantee 
m inim um  standards of respect for individuals and their genetic inform ation, see D yer, C.; 
‘Agreement Near on U se o f H um an Genetic Inform ation', 313, British Medical Journal, 1223, 1996.
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues concerning the H G P.
2^ For information on  this see. H um an Genome News, 6(6), March - A pril 1995, at 4.
2^  The text of the A ct can be found on  the internet at the folloiw ng site:
h ttp ://w w w .orn l.gov/T ech R esou rces/H um an _G en om e/resource/privacy/privacyl.htm l It w ould  
seem  that the m ost far-reaching legislation has been passed in N e w  Jersey (for com m ent, see 
Charatan, F.B.; 'N e w  Jersey Passes G enetic Privacy Bill'. 313, British Medical Journal, 71, 13 July
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As the introduction to the Act states :
The Act is based on the premise that genetic 
information is different from other types of personal 
information in ways that require special protection. 
The D N A  molecule holds an extensive amount of 
currently indecipherable information. The major goal 
of the Human Genome Project is to decipher this code 
so that information it contains is accessible. The 
privacy question is, accessible to whom?^^
It continues,
[T]he overarching premise of the Act is that no 
stranger should have or control identifiable D N A  
samples or genetic information about an individual 
unless that individual specifically authorizes the 
collection of D N A  samples for the purpose of genetic 
analysis, authorizes the creation of that private 
information, and has access to and control over the 
dissemination of that information^^.
Thus we can see that the Act envisages a highly individualistic approach to the
question of control of genetic samples and information. In particular, the person
from whom a sample has been taken (the 'sample source') has the following rights:
• The right to determine who may collect and analyse DNA^6;
• The right to determine the purposes for which a D N A  sample can be
a n a ly s e d ^ 7 .
1996), but in Maryland a bill based on the G PA  was defeated in the M aryland Senate (for com m ent, 
see H oltzm an, N .A .; 'Panel C om m ent : The A ttem pt to Pass the Genetic Privacy A ct in M aiyland', 
2'h, Journal o f  law. Medicine an d Ethics, 367, 1995). In M ay 1997 it was reported that as o f April 1997 
at least 15 states had enacted genetic privacy laws, and according to a survey conducted by the 
B iotechnology Industrial Organisation, m ore than 75 similar bills were pending in m ore than 30 
states: see, The Gene Letter, volum e 1, Issue 5, M ay 1997 on internet site - 
http://w w w .geneletter.org/G 597/hum angenom e.htm  
ibid. 
ibid.
26 ibid, s. 101.
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• The right to know what information can reasonably be expected to be derived 
from the genetic analysis^®;
• The right to order destruction of D N A  samples^^;
• The right to delegate authority to another individual to order the destruction of
D N A  samples after the death of the sample source'*®;
• The right to refuse to permit the use of the D N A  sample for research or 
commercial activities'**; and
• The right to inspect and obtain copies of records containing information 
derived from the genetic analysis of the D N A  sample'* .^
A person who collects a D N A  sample from an individual has the following
corresponding duties:
• To provide specific information verbally to the sample source prior to the 
collection of the D N A  sample'* ;^
• To provide notice of the rights and assurances which the sample source has, 
prior to the collection of the D N A  sample'*'*;
• To obtain written authorisation which contains required information'*^;
• To restrict access to D N A  samples to persons authorised by the sample source'* ;^
• To respect a sample source's instructions regarding the maintenance and 
destruction of D N A  samples'* ;^
27 ibid, s.102(a).
2® ibid, 3.101(b)(3).
2^  ibid, 3.104(b).
'*0 id.
'** ibid, 3.102.
'*2 ibid, 3.113.
'*2 ibid, 3.101(b)(1).
'*'* ibid.
'*5 ibid, 3.101(a).
'*6 ibid, 3.111(a) and (b). 
'*7 ibid, 3.104(b) and (c).
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• To keep genetic information derived from samples confidential, and to obtain 
written consent from the sample source prior to any disclosure of such 
information, except where disclosure is limited to access by specified researchers 
for compiling data'*®.
It should be noted, however, that the Act defines the term "private genetic 
information" to mean,
...any information about an identifiable individual that 
is derived from the presence, absence, alteration, or 
mutation of a gene or genes, or the presence or
absence of a specific D N A  marker or markers, and
which has been obtained; (1) from an analysis of the 
individual's DNA; or, (2) from  an analysis o f the D N A  
o f a person to whom the individual is related‘^'^ .
[emphasis added]
This clearly seeks to take account of the not inconsiderable interests which relatives 
of a 'sample source' can also have in genetic information. And yet, very
interestingly the Act gives a property right in the D N A  sample to the sample
source^®. The very pressing question which then presents itself is, how does the Act 
seek to reconcile the interests of sample source and family members to whom the 
information also relates?
The individualistic approach of the Act is very prevalent in its provisions. For 
example, section 111 provides that anyone in possession of private genetic
'*® ibid, s s . l l l  - 112.
'*^  ibid, s.3.
5® ibid, 5.104(a). This m ove clearly has very far-reaching im plications for a great number o f areas 
w ithin  the disciplines o f law, m edicine and science generally. These are, how ever, outside the scope 
o f the current w ork. For com m ent see, Lin, 'Conferring a Federal Property Right in
G enetic Material: Stepping into the Future w ith  the Genetic Privacy A ct'. 22, Am erican Journal o f  
L aw  an d Medicine, 109, 1996.
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information in a business or professional capacity must obtain written 
authorisation before disclosure to others is permissible, but section 112 provides 
that it is for the sample source or his/her representative^* to authorize such 
disclosure52. Similarly, in section 113 the right to inspect and request a copy of 
private genetic information records is only given to the sample source or his/her 
representative^^. The right to request amendments to such records is also restricted 
to such persons^ "*.
Section 115 deals with disclosures pursuant to compulsory process and lays down 
that compulsory disclosure is permissible only in certain clear cut circumstances^^, 
and even then the sample source or his/her representatives have the right to be 
given notice of any such demands and to lodge objections'^.
Part C of the Act deals with exceptions to the general rules of genetic privacy. 
These extend to, access to information for the identification of dead bodies^ ,^ the 
collection, storage and typing of D N A  samples for federal, state or local law 
enforcement purposes^®, and collection and analysis of samples pursuant to court
5* T he term 'sample source's representative' is defined in section 3 of the A ct as : '...any person w ho  
has the legal authority to make health care decisions concerning a m inor or an incom petent person, 
or the adm inistor or executor o f a deceased person's estate, if any, otherwise the next o f kin o f a 
deceased person.' Clearly, this definition does not necessarily mean that the represetattive w ill be a 
fam ily member, but even where s /h e  is, this role w ill not extend beyond one or tw o  familial 
intim ates such as mother, father or siblings.
52 ibid, s .ll2 (a )( l) .
52 ibid, 5.113(a).
54 ibid, 5.114(a).
55 ibid, s. 115(a): 'N o person w ho maintains private genetic information may be com pelled to 
disclose such inform ation pursuant to a request for com pulsory disclosure in any judicial, legislative, 
or administrative proceeding, unless - (1) The person maintaining the genetic inform ation has 
received the authorization o f  the sample source or the sample source's representative to release the 
inform ation in response to such a request for com pulsory disclosure; (2) The sample source or the 
sample source's representative is a party to the proceeding and the private genetic inform ation is at 
issue; or (3) The genetic inform ation is for use in a law enforcement proceeding or investigation in 
w hich  the person maintaining the inform ation is the subject or party;'.
56 ibid, s. 115(b).
57 ibid, s. 121.
5® ibid, S.122.
443
ordered analysis^  ^ (for example, paternity suits). Each of these is, however, 
restricted to actions ’necessary' for the furtherance of the specific goal. In addition, 
Part D provides for regulations and safeguards concerning research on genetic 
material and allows disclosure of private genetic material for research purposes, 
once again only with the specific consent of the sample source or his/her 
representative^®.
It is not clear how well the distinction is drawn in this Act between a D N A  sample 
and private genetic information derived from a sample^*. Axiomatically, the first is 
unique and personal to the person from whom the sample was taken. The same is 
not true of the information, yet as the above examples show the exclusive right 
over such information (as with samples) is nevertheless retained by the sample 
source. In fact, the issue of relatives' rights arises only rarely in the Act. One such 
place is in the provisions of section 131 which concerns research involving genetic 
analysis.
Subsection (e) of section 131 relates to pedigree analysis and family linkage studies. 
It provides that:
When a research project includes analysis of D N A  
from family members for pedigree analysis or linkage 
analysis—
(1) the Institutional Review Board...shall...require—(A) 
that education and counseling regarding how pedigree
5^  ibid, s. 123.
6® ibid, s. 132. N o te  too  that this section allows lim ited access to  private genetic inform ation w ithout 
subject autority if that access is on ly  for statistical or epidem iological reasons and no copies o f the 
inform ation are made and no further disclosure occurs. For com m ent on the general perceived effect 
of the A ct on the practice of medicine, see R eilly, P.R.; 'Panel Comm ent: The Impact o f the 
Genetic Privacy A ct on M edicine', 23, Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics, 378, 1995.
6* Part A  o f the Act deals w ith  collection and analysis o f D N A  samples. Part B concerns disclosure 
of private genetic information.
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analysis is conducted and the kind of information that 
results from such analysis is provided to research 
subjects; (B) that as far as practicable separate records 
are maintained on each subject.
(2) prior to the participation, and in addition to the 
disclosures required by section 101 of this Act, 
subjects shall be— (A) informed that one risk of their 
participation is that by the end of the project other 
family members may learn private genetic information 
about them; (B) informed of what will be done with 
records and data generated during the project; (C) 
informed that the project may determine that some 
members of their family are not genetic relatives.
This must be read in conjunction with subsection (f) which states that:
When complying with the provisions of section 113 of 
this Act, no person shall provide an individual in the 
pedigree with private genetic information about 
another person without that other person's 
authorization.
This serves to re-inforce the individualistic approach to the idea of rights and 
interests over private genetic information. Arguably, subsection (e) is merely a 
guarantee that informed consent to proceed with the research is obtained - 
individuals are given the choice to continue or not based on clear information about 
what might come from the work. Subsection (f) in contrast, makes it clear that 
participation in the pedigree or linkage analysis gives one no claim to familial 
genetic knowlege, if that knowledge identifies another family member specifically. 
Thus the notion of a familial interest in the general information derived from 
individual members of a family is either non-existent, or substantially weakened as 
compared to individual rights in individual genetic information. That is, any 
information one might be able to access on one's family will be of a general.
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anonymised nature. This is not to judge the appropriateness or otherwise of such an 
approach, it is simply to outline the general thrust of the legislation under scrutiny.
As further evidence of the general attitude underlying this legislation, consider the 
provisions of s. 101(b)(8). This section provides that prior to the collection of a 
D N A  sample from an individual the person should be informed, inter alia,
[T]hat the genetic analysis may result in information 
about the sample source's genetic relatives which may 
not be known to such relatives but could be 
important, and if so the sample source will have to 
decide whether or not to share that information with 
relatives62.
It is fortunate that the text of this Act is accompanied by a commentary prepared 
by its authors in which they seek to clarify their general aims and to expand up the 
specific terms of the Act. O f the above provision they say the following.
Creating either a contractual or statutory obligation 
for individuals to share [genetic] information with 
their family members would not only be
unprecedented, but inadvisable. The creation of new 
substantive rights or duties of family members is not 
our intention and is beyond the scope of this Act.
However, because the Act creates rules that govern the 
use and disclosure of information, it is imperative that 
individuals be informed of the fact that by seeking 
genetic information about themselves through genetic 
analysis, they may also become privy to information 
about other family members who would also want 
and/or need such information...[w]hile it will be an 
individual choice as to whether or not to share that 
information with others, this disclosure should
62 ibid, s.l01(b)(8).
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instigate discussion between the sample source and the 
collector of the s a m p le ^ ^ .
3.2.1. - Informational Privacy and the Genetic Privacy Act
Two initial questions arise for informational privacy interests - as defined in this 
thesis - from what has been said above. First, is it correct that no obligation is 
imposed on a sample source to reveal information given that genetic information 
alsb concerns relatives? Second, does the Act adequately protect the informational 
privacy interests of relatives when genetic information is in the hands of third 
parties, such as employers/insurers or the state?
3.2.1.1. - No D uty to Disclose
It should be clear from the thrust of argument in preceding chapters that the 
present writer would agree that no general obligation should be imposed on any 
individual to share genetic information with his/her family members. Thus, to this 
extent it is agreed that the approach of the provisions of the Genetic Privacy Act is 
correct in that they accord a high degree of protection to the individual sample 
source's informational privacy interests^^. Such interests allow the sample source to 
determine the use to which information is put and the disclosures which can occur.
62 See also, Annas, G.J., Glantz, L .H . and R oche, P.A.; 'Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science. 
Policy, and Practical Considerations', 23, Journal o f  Law, Medicine and Ethics, 360, 1995.
64 The authors o f  the Act also note that, 'O ne suggestion is that access to  genetic testing in som e 
circumstances be made conditional on a prior agreement to disclose inform ation to  other family 
members w ho becom e identified as at risk. This suggestion, however, has not been w idely  
supported for several reasons, including the fact that it w ould  deter individuals from  seeking  
inform ation about themselves'. As an example of a w ork w hich supports this v iew  the authors cite 
The President's C om m ission for the Study o f  Ethical Problems in M edicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research, Screening and Counseling fo r  Genetic Conditions, W ashington D .C ., U .S. 
G overnm ent Printing Office, 1983, at 43, For an opposing view  they refer to Chapman, M .; 'Invited 
Editorial: Predictive Testing for Adult O nset Genetic Disease : Ethical and Legal Im plications o f the 
U se o f  Linkage Analysis for H untington D isease'. A7, Am erican Journal o f H um an Genetics, 1, 2, 
1990.
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The case for agreeing that a duty to disclose to relatives should not be imposed on a 
sample source can be made on two different levels.
First, if a general duty to disclose were imposed irrespective of whether any attempt 
were made to establish if relatives would wish to know, this would lead to 
intrusion on the spatial privacy interests of such relatives. More is said of this 
presently, but the general argument has in essence been made in chapter five; 
namely - unsolicited approaches are rarely justified. What, however, if relatives do 
wish to know? Should a duty to disclose be imposed in such cases?
It is submitted that even if relatives wish to know, no general duty to disclose 
should be i m p o s e d ^ ^ .  As has been been suggested p r e v i o u s l y 6 6 ,  the primary right to 
information derived from an individual lies with that individual. Other 'familial 
rights' must be very stong and clear-cut before they can legitimately challenge those 
of the individual. Here we have the strong informational privacy interests of the 
sample source faced with a claim to know by relatives. What is the basis of this 
latter claim? Arguably, it should only be that there is a strong 'public interest’ in 
knowing the information. For example, because a cure exists for the condition 
potentially affecting relatives, or because effective treatment is available. In other 
words, following the argument in chapter five, the claim of relatives to know is 
valid only i f  some objectively identified 'public' (familial) interest could be served 
by interfering with the informational privacy interests of the sample source. If such 
a public interest cannot be found, it is submitted that no information need be 
disclosed against the wishes of the sample source. If one accepts the arguments of
65 The authors o f the A ct expressly disapprove the im position o f a 'duty to  warn' on  the grounds 
that it w ould  be 'im possible to  set logical boundaries on  such an exception' and also because 'the 
"no exception rule" maximises the privacy between individuals w ho receive services that result in 
private genetic inform ation and their health care providers': see, Annas, G lantz and Roche; 
'Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science. Policy, and Practical C onsiderations', loc, cit., at 364.
66 In chapter three and chapter five, supra.
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chapter five that a privacy 'public interest' could be developed which has a high 
degree of specificity about what is and is not in the interests of relatives to know, 
then a more accurate and fair balance could be struck between the interests of 
sample source and relatives concerning genetic information.
Importantly, it should be noted that the claim of relatives to know is not to be 
based on their own informational privacy interests. Any claim based on such 
interests can only be made regarding the use and security of genetic information vis- 
a-vis third parties outside the familial context. This is so because privacy is 
concerned with preventing unwarranted interference with one's own private sphere. 
It is, therefore, not appropriate to appeal to the concept to invade someone else's 
private sphere (in this case that would be the sphere relating to the informational 
privacy interests of the sample source).
3.2.1.2. - The Informational Privacy Interests o f Relatives
The focus which the Genetic Privacy Act puts on the (sole) right of the sample 
source67 to determine, inter alia, the purposes for which a sample may be 
collected^®, analysed^  ^ or used^ ®, demonstrates a failure of the Act to take due 
account of the important informational privacy interests which family members 
also have in shared genetic information. It is also a failure to respond to the realities 
of genetic information.
The informational privacy interests of relatives are potentially impinged upon 
when, for example, information is released by the sample source into a public or
67 O r his/her representative.
6® supra, s.lO l.
69 supra, 8.102(a).
7® supra, s.112(a)(1).
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quasi-public domain when such a disclosure could have implications for his/her 
relatives (e.g. - insurance matters). Similarly, if the state or other organisations wish 
to compile databases of genetic information, they could easily build up relatively 
accurate pictures of family inheritance simply by gaining access to the genetic data 
of a few individual family members. Thus questions of security and control of 
fam ily  information arise, but these are left by the Act to be decided by the sample 
source alone. It is submitted that it is particularly narrow-minded approach. It 
allows the entire determination of family informational privacy to rest with one 
individual. This is not to suggest, however, that the 'family' should somehow  
decide collectively. N ot only would this be practically impossible, but it is also 
highly probable that the 'family' would not be able to participate as a collective^*. 
But, the recognition of family informational privacy interests and a commitment to 
their protection could be achieved by ensuring that third parties who come into 
possession of genetic information must treat it with the utmost security, and 
further that they should not be permitted to use it in respect of family members 
who are not themselves sample sources. This could be the case even if a particular 
sample source gave his/her consent for such uses. Thus, for example, the Act might 
be amended to provide that employers, insurers or the state should not be allowed 
to compile 'familial' databases from genetic information provided by one or a few 
members of a family. In this way the informational privacy interests of families 
could be protected without any need to involve the individual family members at 
all, and it would ensure that one individual could not 'consent' to practices which 
unduly impinge on family privacy.
7* This w ould  be so either because not all fam ily members w ould k now  the inform ation, or because 
certain families members m ight be exercising a right not to know , or because the sample source 
m ight not want family members to k now  the inform ation.
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3.2.2. - Spatial Privacy and the Genetic Privacy Act
The Genetic Privacy Act allows sample sources to decide for themselves whether or 
not to disclose genetic information to relatives. Many would argue that this is not 
necessarily a 'bad thing' because often such a person will be better (or even best) 
placed to establish how the relative in question might feel about receiving such 
information. However, the Genetic Privacy Act does not give any guidance to a 
sample source on how to decide whether or not disclosure should happen. In 
particular, there is no recognition of the possible spatial privacy interests which 
relatives who are the potential recipients of such information might have in not 
knowing. The arguments for this have been rehearsed above and need not be 
repeated here. Yet, if it is accepted that individuals can have valid interests in such 
notions, then it is submitted that an Act which purports to deal with genetic 
privacy should include provisions aimed at recognising and protecting such 
interests.
The only part of the Genetic Privacy Act which comes close to recognising such 
interests is that concerned with minors. Section 141 of the Act provides that:
(a) INDIVIDUALS U N D ER  16 -  Except as provided 
in sections 131(c) and 151, the individually identifiable 
D N A  sample of a sample source who is under 16 years 
of age shall not be collected or analyzed to determine 
the existence of a gene that does not in reasonable 
medical judgment produce signs or symptoms of 
disease before the age of 16, unless :
(1) there is an effective intervention that will prevent 
or delay the onset or ameliorate the severity of the 
disease; and
(2) the intervention must be initiated before the age of 
16 to be effective; and
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(3) the sample source's representative has received the 
disclosures required by section 101 of this Act and has 
executed a written authorization which meets the 
requirements of section 103 of this Act and which also 
limits the uses of such analysis to those permitted by 
this section72.
The authors justify these provisions as follows:
There are two reasons for this prohibition on the 
exercise of parental discretion. First, if someone learns 
that the child is a carrier of a gene that disposes the 
child to some condition later in life, this finding may 
subject the child to discrimination and stigmatization 
by both the parents and others who may learn of this 
fact. Second, a child's genetic status is the child's 
private genetic information and should not be 
determined or disclosed unless there is some 
compelling reason to do so.
This corresponds precisely with arguments which have been made in previous 
chapters concerning the spatial privacy interests of individuals. Arguably, what the 
Genetic Privacy Act does here is to recognise the spatial privacy interests of 
children, and further, it recognises that these should not be invaded without due 
cause72. Where the Act is deficient, it is submitted, is in not recognising the spatial 
privacy interests of all persons about whom genetic information is known but who 
have not sought it out themselves. There is no valid reason why such interests 
should only protected for minors.
72 N o te  too  that although under section 131(c) research on samples taken from  identifiable m inors is 
perm itted provided that the parent or guardian agrees in light of all relevant facts, if that research 
reveals genetic disease w hich is incurable the parent or guardian w ill not be given access to  that 
inform ation. Access w ill on ly  be granted if the inform ation in question concerns a condition  which  
in reasonable medical judgment can be effectively ameliorated, prevented, or treated w hile the child  
is under 18. T he exception under s .151 provides that: 'Regardless o f her age, a pregnant w om an shall 
have all the rights and authority o f an adult sample source in regard to  her D N A  sample and the 
D N A  sample o f her fetus unless she is otherw ise incom petent under the provisions o f section 143.'
72 The A ct does not, however, go so far as to  recognise any spatial privacy interests for fetuses. 
Section 151 and 152 provide that a com petent pregnant w om an has the sole right to  determ ine both  
w hen D N A  samples shall be taken from  her fetus and h ow  genetic inform ation about the fetus shall 
be used.
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o f  course, the situation of the minor is not exactly the same as that of the adult 
relative of a proband. One clear point of difference concerns the actual existence of 
information. In the case of the minor the legal prohibition concerns the initial 
collection or analysis of genetic material. In the case of an adult relative of a 
proband, this is not the point at issue since no one can prevent anyone else from  
seeking to have their own genetic material analysed. This, however, is a superficial 
and ultimately unhelpful distinction. For, the true issue in both cases is essentially 
the same in that it concerns the unwarranted intrusion of private genetic 
information into the private sphere of the individual in question. Thus the interest 
of the adult relative is not in seeking to control the proband's access to the 
information, but rather simply in having his own spatial privacy interests of non- 
access respected. For the minor precisely the same interest is at stake.
Relatedly, the minor in such cases is him/herself the proband, and therefore s/he  
has the primary right to decide what happens to genetic information. Given this, 
one might argue that the above provisions simply ensure that the choice of 
accessing genetic information be left until the child is capable of making choices for 
him/herself. In contrast, no such specific provision is necessary in the case of an 
adult because it is axiomatic that the adult may choose to know or not to know  
his/her own information. This is true, but as we have seen in the previous 
paragraph, the question here is not simply one of access, but also one of non-access. 
Although one might classify the child's interest as one of autonomy and choice, 
under the Genetic Privacy A ct the child is only protected from attempts to gain 
specific access to the child's genetic information. It does not protect the child from 
unwarranted disclosure of genetic information coming from relatives. Adults are in 
an equally vulnerable position. In fact, one can draw a clear parallel between the
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child and the unknowing adult in that, in many senses, they are both incap ax as 
regards the genetic information. N ow , whereas the child is generally incapax, the 
adult can certainly make a choice to know (in that s/he has the capacity to choose). 
But, as has been pointed out previously, in spatial privacy cases, to offer the 
individual the opportunity to choose might be to offend against the very interests 
with which one is concerned. Thus, it is submitted that it is acceptable in the case of 
genetic information to adopt the position that both adult and child are incapax. The 
consequence of this is equally the same, namely, that both should only be 
approached in rare circumstances and with due cause. This in essence is what has 
been argued in chapter five about spatial privacy interests.
It is further submitted that in the case of genetic privacy legislation such as the 
Genetic Privacy A ct it would not be too difficult to extend this form of protection 
to adult relatives of a proband. The example of the above provision concerning 
children could be adapted to include adults. The prohibition would not only be on 
direct testing of the adult or child, but would extend to unwarranted approaches to 
family members with genetic information. What constitutes a 'warrantable' 
approach would have to be settled by more debate on the legitimate nature of 
competing interests and a proper assessment of genetic risks and consequences 
within the family and wider community setting. The question of remedies could be 
dealt with in a straight-forward manner, as the Genetic Privacy A ct already provides 
{infra).
3.2.2,1. - Incapable Adults
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Finally, we must consider the position of incapable adults. The provisions of the 
Act give rise to concerns for both the informational and spatial privacy interests of 
such persons.
Section 143 provides that genetic material shall not be collected from an 
incompetent person nor analysed unless the following provisions are satisfied:
(1) the analysis is necessary:
(A) to diagnose the cause of incompetence; or
(B) to diagnose a genetic condition which in 
reasonable medical judgment can only be effectively 
ameliorated, prevented or treated while the sample 
source is incompetent; or
(C) to diagnose a genetic disease of a parent, sibling, 
child or grandchild of the sample source provided that 
the disease in reasonable medical judgment can be 
effectively ameliorated, prevented, or treated;
(2) the analysis is limited to that which is necessary for 
such diagnosis; and
(3) the sample source's representative has executed 
authorisation which meets the requirements of section 
103 of this Act.
Section 144 continues:
Private genetic information about an incompetent 
person shall not be disclosed unless :
(a) the information -
(1) is necessary for the diagnosis of a genetic condition 
which in reasonable medical judgment is effectively 
ameliorated, prevented or treated while the person is 
incompetent; or
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(2) is necessary for the purposes of genetic counselling 
for a relative of the person;
(b) the information disclosed is limited to that which 
is necessary to conduct such treatment or counselling; 
and
(c) the sample source's representative executes an 
authorization that meets the requirements of section 
112 of this Act.
N ote how the interests of family members are considered to be legitimate reasons 
for collecting and using genetic information from an incapax under these 
provisions. Strict limits are applied - rightly so - but the absence of an ability to 
consent seems to be the overriding factor here. This sends out an interesting 
message. The interests of relatives in a sample source's genetic information do not 
change in the slightest depending on whether the sample source does or does not 
possess capacity to consent, but under the Act it is only in the latter case that such 
interests are recognised. Some may argue that this is prefectly legitimate given the 
primary rights of the competent adult, but to others such an individualistic view 
perhaps places too much emphasis on the value of consent and pays undue 
deference to the fact of having capacity to exercise autonomous choice. It cannot be 
denied that the privacy of the incapax is interfered with in such circumstances. The 
provisions concerning the collection of genetic material clearly raise concerns for 
spatial privacy. In like manner, the provisions relating to disclosure of genetic 
information invoke informational privacy issues. Can this be justified?
A good starting point is the premiss that an incapax is no less possessed of rights 
than is a capax. To justify touching the incapax or disclosing his/her genetic data 
one might argue that it is therefore reasonable to assume that the incapax might
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have voluntarily consent to either act had s/he been able to do so. This is certainly 
an argument, but for the present writer it is not a convincing one unless one has 
clear indications that the incapax would indeed have consented. For example, the 
presence of an advance directive. Absent this, it is difficult to see how the incapax 
could exercise his/her 'right to choose' except through the medium of a third party 
who, in such circumstances, would have to choose on the basis of no evidence of 
what the incapax would wish. O f course, it could be asked why should we imagine 
that the incapax would refuse rather than consent? But, this leads us into a 
minefield of legal sophistry which it is fruitless to pursue here. Rather, the present 
writer would prefer to argue that because of the interference with the incapax's 
privacy interests which these provisions entail, they are can only be justified in two 
rare circumstances: (a) the 'best interests' of the incapax, (b) the privacy 'public 
interest' outlined in chapter five. That is, we must ask, is there a strong and valid 
reason for infringing privacy which either helps the incapax or advances a 
legitimate interest of family members?
A 'best interests' argument applies in all cases of incapacity7“^. We see it here and we 
see it in the provisions relating to minors. The question of what is in the best 
interests of an incapax must, axiomatically, involve an assessment of all relevant 
factors, the most important of which are clear medical benefit and competent 
patient wishes if any are available. Added to this should be the spatial privacy 
interests of individuals. This places a heavier onus on those seeking to 'treat' the 
patient for all of the reasons enunciated previously in this work.
As to whether a legitimate public interest defence is incorporated in the provisions 
of the Genetic Privacy Act relating to incapax adults, it is submitted here that there
A t least, this is true in the U nited  Kingdom.
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is not. This is so because information can be sought and used for the diagnosis in 
others of any condition which 'in reasonable medical judgment' can be effectively 
ameliorated, prevented or treated. It is also permissible to use information for the 
genetic counselling of relatives. The former is objectionable because no distinction 
is made between the severity of affliction as between different diseases, nor is any 
distinction made between conditions for which relatively little can be done and 
those for which much can be done, or which can be cured. Also, the provisions 
make no attempt to require that all other means be exhausted before information is 
sought from the incapax. It is suggested that on the analysis offered in this work, all 
of these would have to be considered to establish a sound argument that would 
justify interfering with the privacy interests of the incapax.
The question of releasing genetic information about an incapax for counselling of 
relatives is objectionable because the information is used simply to facililate choices 
for others, and it has been argued strongly already that this is not a valid reason to 
interfere with genetic privacy. For these reasons, it is submitted that the provisions 
relating to incapax adults inadequately protect the privacy interests of such 
individuals.
3.3. - Informational and Spatial Privacy Interests and the Genetic Privacy Act
The Genetic Privacy Act is to be welcomed as a significant advance in the field of 
genetics and the law. It contains some very useful provisions and highlights well 
many of the problems which surround genetic privacy^ .^ However, as has been
For a brief discussion o f  the A ct and an argument that legislators w ou ld  do better to  concern 
themselves w ith  particular examples o f misuse o f genetic inform ation rather than genetic privacy in 
se, see M cGleenan,T.; 'Rights to  K n ow  and N o t to Know: Is There A  N eed  For A  Genetic Privacy 
Act?.', in Chadwick, R ., Levitt, M ., and Shickle, D ., (eds.); 'The R ight to K now  and the Right N o t  
to  K n ow ’, Aldershot, A vebury, 1997, chapter five.
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established, the Act does not adhere completely to the view of privacy interests 
which is advanced in the present work. The Act has been criticised for this 
primarily because the view which it does take is insufficiently sensitive to the true 
nature of the interests at stake, as well as to the positions of both sample sources 
and family members in relation to genetic information. That said, it has hopefully 
been well demonstrated that an Act such as the Genetic Privacy Act could be easily 
adapted to take account of the recommendations which have been made. The same 
is true of what is said in the next section, which deals with the question of 
remedies.
4.1. - REMEDIES
Part H  of the Genetic Privacy A ct outlines the various remedies available to those 
given rights under the Act^ .^ These are as follows:
• A private right of action in civil law for damages or equitable relief if one's 
rights are violated^^;
• A right to damages and costs for any negligent collection or use of a sample, or 
disclosure of private genetic information in violation of the Act^ .^
• Wilful violations of the Act also provide the sample source or his/her 
representative with an action for damages (including punitive damages) and 
costs^ .^
• The attorney general also has the powers to award injunctive relief for any 
potential violations of the Act and to issue civil penalties for violations (not 
exceeding $50,000^°.
ibid, s. 171. 
ibid, s.171(a).
ibid, s. 171(d). This right is given so lely  to the sample source or h is/h er representative. 
ibid, 8.171(e).
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Precisely the same, or substantially similar remedies could be extended to recognise 
the privacy interests of family members in genetic information which are not 
currently protected by the Act. This is true both of informational and spatial 
privacy interests. As the Act currently stands informational privacy interests of 
relatives are left to the whim of the sample source and spatial privacy interests are 
recognised only for minors. It has been argued, however, that the Act should be 
extended to protect familial informational privacy by ensuring that third parties 
outside the family who are in possession of genetic information are not only under 
an obligation to keep the information secure, but also are prohibited from using the 
information to the potential detriment of the family. This should be so even if 
individual family members' consent to such uses.
For the better protection of spatial privacy interests, it is submitted that 
unauthorised disclosures of information or attempts to obtain information be made 
actionable. This would be most viable once again against third parties outside the 
family unit. It is proposed that any person or organisation who comes into 
possession of genetic information without the knowledge of the individual(s) to 
whom it relates should be provided with detailed guidance on the law and the 
nature of interests at stake, the relative merits and demerits of disclosure and 
security, the limits of genetic information and the current state of medical 
developments concerning gene therapy and other treatments and cures. A right of 
action could be brought against anyone who made an improper disclosure to an 
individual, but it is likely that in the vast majority of cases health care professionals 
will be put in a position of receiving such information in the first instance. It is 
they who will decide whether or not testing should be carried out and it is they
ibid, s. 172.
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who will decide how genetic information should be used and/or disclosed. O f 
course, in many circumstacnes the HCP will be working for employers, insurers or 
the state, upon whom a duty is clearly also imposed, but it will be through HCPs 
that respect for individual privacy will first be tested^k It is fitting, therefore, that 
health care professionals assume the primary duty not to disclose. Should there be a 
conflict between an HCP's duties to his/her patient and his/her employers, the 
patient should be fully informed of this and the reasons why genetic information is 
being sought must be made clear. The uses to which the information will be put 
must be disclosed, and if these are surpassed a prima facie breach of duty to respect 
privacy will have occurred.
Where the HCP receives information directly from a sample source s/he should be 
charged with the task of counselling the sample source and establishing as clearly as 
possible the limits of their relationship, taking into account the wider familial 
interests where appropriate. Arguably, part of the counselling should cover the 
limits of the proband's own powers to decide unilaterally what should be done 
with genetic information. It is not envisaged that this would be a system of strict 
liability, for no health care professional could reasonably be held responsible for the 
conduct of relatives who inform others, but it would serve to develop a more 
sophisticated approach to the management of familial genetic information and 
would help to ensure the responsible handling of such information by those who 
first discover it or who subsequently use it in a professional capacity. One might of 
course argue that any counselling which is given should be non-directive, but it is 
the view of the present writer that the reality is that this is an impossible state of 
affairs to maintain^^. It is far better to accept the reality that counselling is driven by
It is trite law that the em ployer w ould  be vicariously liable for the failings o f the H C P.
For examples o f this argument, see Chadwick, R.; 'W hat Counts For Success in G enetic 
C ounselling?'. 19, Journal o f  Medical Ethics, 43, 1993 and Clarke, A.; 'Is N on -D irective Genetic 
C ounselling Possible?'. 338, Lancet, 998, 1991.
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various policy considerations and adopt as a policy the view that as much respect as 
possible should be given to privacy interests.
5.1. - GENETIC IN FO R M A TIO N  - A N  ETHIC OF CARE
This writer is not so naive as to imagine that a legal framework such as that 
proposed above would prove to be easily workable in practice. For one thing, it 
would prove to be very difficult in practice to control the free-flow of information 
within families. To some, the imposition of legal sanction for certain instances of 
information exchange within a family might prove to be too large a sledgehammer 
to crack too small a nut. And, it is hard to get away from the conclusion that in 
many circumstances families are best left alone to deal with familial issues in their 
own way. To attempt to police something as ethereal as 'information' within the 
family unit, might prove to be foolhardy. This is why it has been emphasised that it 
would be preferable to focus legislative action on third parties outside the family - 
such as employers, insurers, health care professionals and the state - in an attempt to 
protect genetic privacy. Certainly, in many cases the most serious of threats will 
come from such quarters.
This work has sought to highlight the unique problems posed by the free 
availability of human genetic information, and has sought to give a new and fresh 
perspective to the privacy debate. The interests which have been identified not only 
expose a highly complex structure of interconnecting issues which develops from 
the availability of genetic information, but they also indicate the need for due 
recognition of the true subtleties of this area. We have examined how we can better 
protect genetic privacy from the perspective of the law, and it has been forcefully 
argued that much can be done in legal terms to protect privacy interests. Flowever,
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in complement to any legal provisions that might be instituted, other things could 
be done which would go a long way to developing the optimal framework within 
which problems of genetic information can be tackled. For example, the idea of 
giving a high degree of responsibility to health care professionals who deal with 
genetic information and who provide genetic counselling to families can be 
formalised to an extent by ensuring that proper guidelines are issued to such 
persons, that they be professionally trained, that they have a clear idea of the 
interests at stake, that they can properly communicate the intricacies of these 
interests to all concerned. Arguably such persons should, in certain cases, advise on 
appropriate courses of action. All of this can be informed by ethics, and crucially, it 
would revolve around the recognition and protection of the privacy interests 
argued for in this work. In turn, appropriate bodies could be established with 
statutory authority to issues guidelines, train professionals, provide advice and 
regulate counselling practices. At the present time in the United Kingdom we have 
no such scheme which operates at a national level. The House of Common Science 
and Technology Committee recommended the establishment of a Hum an Genetics 
Commissions^ which would have, inter alia, the reponsibility to:
• monitor the availability of genetic servies in different regions;
• advise local research ethics committees on genetic research protocols;
• approve screening programmes before they are introduced;
• disseminate best practice and keep it under constant review;
• prescribe the circumstances in which particular types of genetic diagnosis and 
screening should be provided or proscribed.
N o  action has, as yet, been taken to introduce such a body. In the United States, the 
Joint National Institutes of Health and Department of Energy Report on the
H ou se o f  C om m ons Science and T echnology Com m ittee; 'H um an Genetics: T he Science and Its 
C onsequences', Third Report, 1994-95:HC41~I, July 1995, paragraphs 140 -147 .
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Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project®'^  has 
recommended the establishment of a federally-chartered Advisory Committee on 
Genetics and Public Policy. Inter alia, powers would be given to the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services®  ^ and other government 
departments to regulate and monitor matters concerning genetic policies and 
practice, legislative and regulatory policy, professional education, public education, 
access to and security of personal health files containing genetic information and 
issues of genetic privacy and confidentiality. These models are ideal to further the 
aims outlined in the current work. Such bodies would be established by statute and 
would thereby have considerable authority in the field. They would bring a degree 
of homogeneity to professional dealings with genetic information and with 
appropriately drafted guidelines*^ would ensure a high degree of protection for the 
individuals who are the subjects of that information.
6.1. - C O N C LU SIO N
To conclude this work, we should consider the path that we have followed and the 
end point which we have reached. Within a framework of disputed value, namely 
privacy, we have considered the delicate problems of access and non-access to 
genetic information. We have examined the unique problems which arise from the 
fact that genetic information relates not only to the individual from whom the
The C om m ittee was established on 30 April 1996. T o see its interim  report see Internet site: 
h ttp ://w w w .o rn l.g o v /h g m is /archive/elsirept.htm l
It is envisaged that the A dvisory C om m ittee be established w ithin  this Department.
The N IH -D O E  W orking Group on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications o f H um an G enom e  
Research has, for example, already produced 'Interim  Principles o f  the Task Force on Genetic Testing  
w hich include reference to  protection o f indivdiual privacy. Principle III-15 states that test results 
should not be released w ithout the prior w ritten consent o f the tested individual. N either  
em ployers, insurers, governm ent agencies nor relatives can receive genetic inform ation w ithout such  
consent. Principle III-16 provides that relatives w ill o n ly  be Informed in very rare circusmtances 
such as w hen  failure to inform  w ill result in irreversible or fatal harm and the person tested refuses 
to  com m unicate the inform ation . The text o f these principles can be found at:
W ysiwyg://77/http://infonet.welch.jhu.edu/policy/genetics/index.html
464
information is initally derived, but also to relatives of that individual. We have 
distilled the concepts of informational and spatial privacy from an examination of 
the nature of the interests which such parties have in the information in question, 
and it has been argued that current laws and practices do not provide us with 
appropriate means to recognise the existence of such interests, nor do they protect 
them adequately. As an alternative approach, we have considered the matter from 
the perspective of the legal and philosophical debates surrounding the value and 
utility of privacy, and a strong case has been made that a useful and valuable 
construct of genetic privacy can be established which is amenable to legal 
protection. The case for legal protection of genetic privacy has been put, 
supplemented by recommendations concerning the establishment of appropriate 
bodies with legal powers to ensure that genetic information is handled in the most 
sensitive manner possible. The law has a crucial role to play in ensuring 
professional responsibility towards the use and treatment of familial genetic 
information. What is urgently required is a uniform and formalistic framework to  
determine the optimal approach to dealings in genetic information - one which 
takes due account of the wide range of interests at stake and one which shows due 
deference to the special role within that framework for privacy.
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